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Abstract 
 
Renneboog et al (2008) argue that it remains to be seen whether corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) can be priced. In light of this, this thesis tests the performance and 
market valuation of CSR indicators by using a comprehensive set of KLD indicators.  
 
Chapter Three of this thesis examines the effect of CSR on financial performance by 
incorporating CSR into the investment process. As no clear break point is found for the 
normalised KLD score, the net KLD score is used as an alternative portfolio metric. In 
addition, most KLD indicators are found to have insignificant alphas for the high-scoring, 
low-scoring, and long-short portfolios—meaning that investors do not earn abnormal 
returns through a long-short strategy. Moreover, insignificant alphas are recorded for 
most of the indicators under the best-in-class approach—meaning that the application of 
industry classification does not affect results. Finally, both the conditional Ferson and 
Schadt (1996) model and conditional three-factor model are used as robustness checks, 
with most indicators having insignificant alphas for these conditional models. As such, 
the results imply that there is neither outperformance nor underperformance when using 
portfolios formed with CSR scores; however, there are significant differences in factor 
loadings between high-scoring and low-scoring CSR portfolios.  
 
Chapter Four uses a framework consistent with the Peasnell (1982) and Ohlson (1995) 
model to examine whether CSR is reflected in share prices. The CSR indicator is treated 
as the “other information” variable, and the association between CSR and market price is 
estimated by controlling for book value of equity, net income and dividends. Although 
the market is found to value different KLD indicators differently, most of the indicators 
are found to have positive impact on market value (except for corporate governance and 
human rights). R&D and advertising expenditure are both added to the valuation model 
for robustness checking purposes. Some of the CSR indicators—and especially for the 
case of environment—are not valued during the earlier stages, but become increasingly 
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valued over time. The ten industries are also found to have varying effects on market 
valuation. In summary, high-scoring CSR firms display higher valuations than low-
scoring CSR firms, and thus it can be concluded that a socially responsible agenda does 
not conflict with maximising shareholder value. 
 
Since most of the CSR indicators in Chapter Four lead to positive market price valuations, 
Chapter Five aims to disaggregate the value effect into the separate components of ROE 
ratio, the implied cost of capital (ICC) and growth rate. Three different methodologies are 
used to test the relationship between CSR, ICC and the long-run growth rate. The 
relationship between CSR and growth rate is positive with all of the methodologies. 
However, the different methodologies return differing results for the relationship between 
CSR and ICC, which may be due to the different assumptions made by each approach. 
Furthermore, it suggests that long-run growth rate differences in general may be more 
important than ICC differences. Finally, most KLD indicators are found to have 
significantly higher P/V and ROE1 ratios for the high-scoring CSR portfolios than for the 
low-scoring CSR portfolios.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Context and motivation 
Although much research has been conducted into corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
there is no clear consensus as to how socially responsible investment strategies affect 
financial performance, and thus investors, managers and other interested parties receive 
very mixed signals on this subject. Unsurprisingly, Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang 
(2008) fail to come to a conclusion as to whether or not CSR can be priced. Moreover, 
CSR is constantly increasing in importance (Bassen et al, 2006), with more than 50 
percent of Fortune 1000 firms in the US publishing CSR reports, while 10 percent of 
investments made in the US take CSR into consideration (Galema et al, 2008). 
Furthermore, an increasing number of firms now incorporate CSR into different areas of 
their business (Harjoto and Jo, 2007).  
 
Interest in the relationship between CSR and corporate financial performance (CFP) 
begins with the controversial paper by Friedman (1970), who appears to argue that 
companies should not engage in CSR, and that the primary social responsibility of a 
business is to maximise shareholder profit. A number of empirical studies follow, each 
attempting to establish whether CSR strategies can be consistent with maximising 
shareholder value. In order to review evidence on the relationship between CSR and CFP, 
Margolis and Walsh (2003) analyse 127 empirical studies published between 1972 and 
2000. Nearly half of these studies are found to show a positive relationship between CSR 
and CFP; while a further seven show a negative relationship; 28 show an insignificant 
relationship; and the remainder show mixed results. The authors duly conclude that most 
studies suggest a positive relationship between CSR and CFP, while only a few support a 
negative relationship. Orlitzky et al (2003) back this conclusion by analysing 52 studies 
with the meta-analysis method. Moreover, a higher correlation is found between CSR and 
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accounting-based CFP measurements than in the case of market-based measurements. 
Margolis et al (2007) use the meta-analysis method to test the relationship between CSR 
and CFP in 167 studies. The authors identify 27 percent of the studies as reporting a 
positive relationship; 58 percent as reporting no significant relationship; and 2 percent 
showing a negative relationship. Renneboog et al (2008) provide a critical literature 
review for studies into socially responsible investments (SRI). The authors highlight 
several future directions for SRI-related research, such as the emergence of SRI, which 
combine the behavioural differences between SRI and conventional investors. The 
potential research questions could concern corporate finance, asset pricing and financial 
intermediation, while the authors also suggest testing how CSR affects the cost of capital 
at the firm level.  
 
Many studies have been conducted into the relationship between CSR and CFP, with 
these studies considering the various measurements for financial performance (such as 
return and Tobin’s q) and also CSR variation measurements (such as environment, 
governance and overall measurement). Some of the studies look at specific industries, 
while others are broader; some are conducted by researchers in the field of management 
studies, while others are conducted by researchers of finance.  
 
Initially, empirical finance studies focused on SRI fund performance. SRI funds provide 
positive and negative screening for groups of stocks, and therefore act as a type of 
investment tool for principled investors. Portfolio theory notes that if the investment 
universe for funds is constrained, the investment opportunity set will have less favourable 
efficient frontiers. Thus, many empirical studies test for the underperformance of SRI 
funds. However, many of these studies are unable to identify any underperformance by 
SRI funds. For example, when Hamilton et al (1993) compare SRI funds and 
conventional funds in the US market, they do not find any significant difference in 
performance between the two fund groups. Likewise, when Geczy et al (2003) compare 
US portfolio funds with and without SRI constraints, they find that SRI constraints are 
costly when fund managers are skilled. Gregory et al (1997) compare the performance of 
ethical and non-ethical funds in the UK market and conclude that there is no significant 
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difference in the performance between the two. When Kreander et al (2005) apply size-
adjusted benchmarks to SRI and non-SRI funds for four European countries, they find 
that both SRI and non-SRI funds have similar Jensen’s alphas.  
 
However, Brammer, Brooks and Pavelin (2006) argue that fund performance is 
inseparable from the ability of fund managers and that, therefore, research into SRI fund 
performance is unable to explain whether social responsibility results in a net cost or 
profit for firms. As the number of CSR investors increases, better understanding is 
needed of the direct relationship between CSR and a firm’s financial performance (i.e., 
one that is not affected by considerations of fund manager performance). Furthermore, 
several governments have already introduced CSR disclosure regulations for institutional 
funds (Sparkes, 2006), while the United Nations’ “Principles for Responsible 
Investment” (PRI, 2010) advises investors to consider environmental, social and 
governance-related CSR factors when making investment decisions, as well as providing 
six principles for responsible investment.  
 
Consequently, it is these factors that motivate this thesis to analyse the relationship 
between CSR and CFP from the level of the firm (rather than analysing SRI funds). 
Furthermore, existing studies in this area provide inconsistent results. For example, 
several studies create portfolios based on CSR performance in order to analyse how CSR 
affects stock market performance. Of these, Derwall et al (2005) and Kempf and Osthoff 
(2007) find that a strategy of longing high-scoring CSR firms and shorting low-scoring 
firms returns very high alphas for the US market. Guenster et al (2011) report a higher 
Tobin’s q ratio for high eco-efficient US firms than for low eco-efficient firms. However, 
Brammer et al (2006) find that high-scoring CSR firms provide negative financial 
performance in the UK market. Although Galema et al (2008) do not find a significant 
alpha, they report a positive effect for the book-to-market ratios. Meanwhile, Fernando et 
al (2010) find that, for the environment indicator, both “green” and “toxic” firms have 
lower Tobin’s q ratios than neutral firms.  
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Three more recent studies test the relationship between the cost of equity capital and CSR, 
with Sharfman and Fernando (2008) identifying a link between improved environmental 
risk management and a lower cost of equity capital. El Ghoul et al (2011) find that high-
scoring CSR firms have lower costs of equity capital than low-scoring CSR firms, while 
Dhaliwal et al (2010) find that firms that initiate CSR disclosures have higher costs of 
equity capital during the year before a CSR disclosure, and lower costs of equity capital 
during the year following a CSR disclosure. Although several studies investigate Tobin’s 
q, few of these consider the impact of CSR on valuation by using other methods. One 
exception to this is Hassel et al (2005), who identify a negative relationship between 
environmental performance and market valuation for Swedish firms.  
 
Another motivation for this thesis is related to the assumption that CSR strategies are 
unlikely to reduce a company’s vulnerability to systematic risk (McGuire et al, 1988). 
Systematic risk is normally macroeconomic in nature, and includes interest rate shocks, 
economic growth rate shocks and inflation shocks. McGuire et al (1988) report that social 
responsibility has less impact on a firm’s systematic risk “since most events affecting a 
firm’s level of social responsibility do not systematically affect all other firms in the 
marketplace” (a view consistent with that of Cornell and Shapiro (1987)). For example, if 
a firm adopts responsible practices in order to reduce pollution-related incidents, this will 
lead to a lower risk of cash flow shock and an increase in the firm’s expected future cash 
flows. Such a reduction in firm-specific risk would be captured in stock returns at the 
point where the change is made, and in a permanently higher valuation thereafter.  
 
In summary, it is these factors that motivate this thesis to use these tests to ascertain if 
and how CSR affects financial performance.  
 
In terms of the link between these motivations and the empirical chapters in this thesis, 
Chapter Three begins by testing the abnormal returns of CSR. However, in the case that 
CSR policies and CSP do not change frequently and that markets are efficient, an analysis 
of returns is incomplete. If markets are efficient, abnormal returns will occur only when 
there are unexpected CSR-related changes; if no such changes occur, factor loadings will 
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capture any cost of capital differences. However, if CSR affects the expected cash flow or 
cost of capital, then CSR will be associated with a permanent change in valuation. 
Moreover, if a CSR-related change occurs before the start of a returns measurement 
period, it will not be possible for the returns study to observe this change. In addition, the 
returns study will only capture the effects of the CSR-related change, whereas valuation 
will capture the level of the CSR-related change. Thus, CSR market valuations are run in 
Chapter Four. Based on the results of Chapter Four—and in order to identify the source 
of CSR impact on market valuation—Chapter Five attempts to disaggregate the effect on 
value into the three separate components of the return on equity (ROE) ratio, implied cost 
of capital and growth rate. Cash flow effect1 is reflected in higher profitability or higher 
long-run growth, while the numerator and denominator in the cash flow function are used 
to show the net effect of the cost of capital and the firm’s cash flow, respectively. As such, 
Chapter Five is able to resolve differences in the long-run implied growth rate by holding 
the cost of capital constant, and to resolve differences in the implied cost of capital by 
holding long-run growth constant.  
 
1.2 Research questions 
The inconsistency in results from existing studies investigating the links between CSR 
and financial performance at the firm level highlights a need for further research using 
new models and a more comprehensive approach.  
 
The CSR performance data used in this thesis is obtained from KLD Research & 
Analytics Inc. KLD has a long history of conducting CSR measurements, and KLD data 
has been used in many studies (such as Kempf and Osthoff (2007)). KLD data uses 
binary presentation for a number of strengths and concerns across different categories of 
CSR indicators (namely Community, Governance, Diversity, Employee Relations, 
Environment, Human Rights and Product). It is important to note that, in this data, the 
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V , where tc is the expected cash flow in year t.  
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numbers of strengths and concerns2 are not consistent for every KLD indicator, and also 
that different indicators have different numbers of strengths and concerns. Therefore, this 
thesis uses both the normalised and net KLD scores in order to provide a comprehensive 
analysis.  
 
Chapter Three tests whether CSR leads to abnormal returns. Only a small number of 
existing studies focus on abnormal CSR returns by using portfolio methodology (such as 
Derwall et al (2005), Kempf and Osthoff (2007) and Fernando et al (2010)). These 
studies use different datasets for testing CSR performance, while also using different 
standards to create portfolios for different CSR indicators. Ullmann (1985) notes that the 
different methodologies, CSR indicators and financial performance indicators used in the 
studies may skew subsequent results. In Chapter Three of this thesis, both the normalised 
and net KLD scores3 are used to create portfolios (due to problems with the normalised 
KLD score). Factor models are also used to test whether the individual indicators (or the 
overall score of KLD indicators) can provide abnormal returns. Finally, the effect of these 
KLD indicators on the loading factors is also tested. 
 
Chapter Four examines the market valuation of CSR, with the aim of exploring whether 
CSR is reflected in share prices, and how CSR is reflected in stock prices/company value. 
In the Ohlson (1995) model, the CSR indicator is treated as an “other information” 
variable, with the association between CSR and market price being estimated by 
controlling for book value of equity, net income and dividends. Intangible assets are then 
used in the Ohlson model to test how CSR is valued by markets for robustness checking 
purposes. Finally, the market valuation of CSR is tested for the Ken French ten industries 
in order to show the importance of industry effect.  
                                                 
2 “Strengths” refer to the positive ratings for each KLD indicator, while “concerns” refer to the negative 
ratings for each KLD indicator. For example, a “strength” is given if a company has good employee-related 
policies, with the extent of benefits available to employees being used to determine whether this is a 
“strength” or a “major strength”. 
3 A normalised KLD score means that the rating score is computed to a range from zero to one. The 
advantage of this process is that it provides a comparison between different metrics and years. For more 
detailed examples of this, see Section 3.3.6. A net KLD score means that the rating score is computed by 
using the score of strengths minus the score of concerns to obtain the overall score for each qualitative 
criterion. For more detailed examples of this, see Section 3.3.7.2. 
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Chapter Five looks into the factors determining the market value of CSR. Following on 
from the results in Chapter Four (that conclude that CSR indicators are indeed valued by 
the market), Chapter Five attempts to disaggregate the valuation effect into the cost of 
capital, forecasted ROE and growth rate components. Although both El Ghoul et al (2011) 
and Dhaliwal et al (2010) identify a relationship between the cost of capital and CSR, 
they only test for the effect of CSR on the cost of capital, and do not consider other 
components that may also affect market valuations. Neither do the authors consider 
which components might have particularly strong effects on market valuation. As such, 
Chapter Five contributes to previous research by taking this area of study one step further. 
As well as testing the relationship between the implied cost of equity capital and CSR 
using the Ashton and Wang (2012) model, a modified version of the Easton and Sommers 
(2007) model and the residual income valuation model, Chapter Five also tests the 
relationship between the long-run growth rate and CSR in order to provide a detailed 
analysis of how CSR is valued by the market. In summary, Chapter Five disaggregates 
valuation effects in order to measure the effect of CSR on each of these individual 
components.  
 
1.3 Contributions and features of this research 
Chapter Three contributes to existing research by using a longer time period to 
investigate the financial performance of CSR. Since KLD data is available from 1991, the 
data period used in this thesis stretches from 1991 to 2008—and is thus longer than the 
time periods used in other studies (such as Kempf and Osthoff (2007)). Due to difficulties 
met when creating portfolios with the normalised score (i.e., with no clean break point 
being found), the net score is instead used to create portfolios and test performance. 
Moreover, comprehensive factor models and a comprehensive set of KLD indicators are 
also used to test performance. In particular, it should be noted that few CSR studies use 
the conditional Ferson and Schadt (1996) model or the conditional three-factor model 
(which are both used to measure changes in risk and market premiums over time 
according to the “economic state”). Seeing that issues relating to the KLD portfolios can 
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affect the composition of the time series portfolios (for example, prior to 2001, KLD data 
contains only firms from the S&P 500 and Domini 400 indices, whereas the number of 
firms rises sharply in 2001 and 2003 to include Russell 1000 and Russell 3000 firms, 
respectively) and also that changes in the KLD CSR indicators can significantly alter the 
high- and low-scoring portfolios, Chapter Three uses both of these conditional methods to 
provide robustness checking. The results of the chapter duly infer that using portfolios 
formed by CSR scores results in neither outperformance nor underperformance. This 
holds important implications for investors in the sense that, if choosing to invest in high-
scoring CSR firms affects neither gains nor losses, investing with a conscience is 
essentially costless.  
 
Chapter Four makes a significant contribution to existing research by applying a 
framework consistent with the Peasnell (1982) and Ohlson (1995) model to value CSR 
indicators. The share price is used as the dependent variable, while book value of equity, 
net income and dividends are used as the independent variables, and the CSR indicator is 
treated as the “other information” variable. Chapter Four also looks at the potential 
importance of intangible assets (such as advertising and R&D expenditure) and the 
importance of industry effect on this valuation model. This estimation is based on the 
market value of firms, which is a more accurate indicator than abnormal returns (as a low 
CSR rating may affect abnormal returns due to expected cash flow shocks or higher 
expected cost of capital). One problem involved when testing CSR returns is that it is not 
always obvious whether CSR exposure is a priced systematic risk factor. If CSR affects 
both systematic and unsystematic risk, the combined effect on both the cost of capital and 
the firm’s cash flow may provide a more accurate valuation level4. The results in Chapter 
Four show that CSR engagement is positively priced, that the implications for corporate 
managers are interesting, and that a well-planned CSR strategy can increase firm value.  
 
Chapter Five uses three different methodologies to compute the implied cost of equity 
capital and growth rate in order to disaggregate the valuation effect of these components. 
The first methodology uses the residual income valuation model to estimate the implied 
                                                 
4 See Section 1.1 for a more detailed explanation.  
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cost of equity capital and long-run growth rate individually, thus allowing for the full use 
of analyst forecasts. The next two methodologies use a new approach from Ashton and 
Wang (2012) and a modified version of the Easton and Sommers (2007) model, 
respectively, which simultaneously estimate the implied cost of equity capital and long-
run growth rate. The advantage of these approaches is that there is no need to assume 
terminal values or future growth rates. As is explained by Ashton and Wang (2012), “the 
infinite series of expected future flows from an asset is invariably truncated using a 
terminal valuation. Hence the precision of this implied cost of capital estimate is 
potentially very dependent on the assumed rate of growth in perpetuity of the future flows 
inherent in the construction of this terminal valuation”. Ashton and Wang (2012) also 
state that “growth rates are an endogenous variable which is estimated simultaneously 
with the implied cost of equity capital”. As such, Chapter Five contributes to existing 
research by applying these new approaches to test for the implied cost of capital and 
long-run growth rate, which are then used to test the relationship between CSR, implied 
cost of capital and growth rate. Moreover, although two studies have already been 
conducted into the relationship between the cost of equity capital and CSR (namely El 
Ghoul et al (2011) and Dhaliwal et al (2010)), these studies do not use the portfolio 
methodology to test this relationship, nor do they test the relationship between growth 
rate and CSR. Since Chapter Four of this thesis finds that CSR is valued by the market, 
Chapter Five goes on to test whether the market valuation of CSR has its source in the 
implied cost of capital or growth rate—or both. If high-scoring CSR firms display higher 
growth rates than low-scoring CSR firms, this implies that high-scoring CSR firms have 
more persistent abnormal earnings than low-scoring CSR firms, and thus they would be 
expected to have a long-term competitive advantage on low-scoring CSR firms. Portfolio 
study allows for the comparison of the implied costs of capital and growth rates from 
several mutually exclusive portfolios, with portfolios being grouped according to specific 
company characteristics (such as CSR).  
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis now proceeds as follows:  
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Chapter Two provides a review of existing CSR-related literature. Section 2.1 provides a 
definition of CSR; Section 2.2 analyses the different types of relationship between CSR 
and financial performance from a theoretical point of view; and Section 2.3 reviews the 
differences between accounting-data performance and market-data performance relating 
to CSR. Section 2.4 comprises two parts, with the first part reviewing the difference in 
the financial performance between SRI and non-SRI funds from different markets; and 
the second part reviewing the financial performance of CSR from different testing 
methodologies.  
 
Chapter Three examines portfolio formation and portfolio returns. The normalised KLD 
rating score is computed according to the number of strengths and concerns for each 
KLD indicator, which highlights problems with using the normalised rating score to 
create portfolios. The net KLD rating score is therefore also used to create portfolios. The 
positive method is used to create portfolios without industry neutral; while the best-in-
class method is used to create portfolios with industry neutral. Moreover, both the Fama-
French three-factor model and Carhart four-factor model are used to measure financial 
performance, and both the conditional Ferson and Schadt (1996) model and the 
conditional three-factor model are used as robustness checks. Finally, the empirical 
results are separated according to portfolio formation (namely those based on the net 
KLD score portfolio and those based on the normalised KLD score portfolio). 
 
Chapter Four examines CSR market valuation. A framework consistent with the Peasnell 
(1982) and Ohlson (1995) model is applied to value the CSR indicators and two financial 
performance measurements are run. The first of these measurements is the valuation 
model without intangible assets, while the second is the valuation model with intangible 
assets. Chapter Four uses both the normalised and net KLD rating scores to measure CSR 
performance, with the empirical results then being presented in two sections according to 
the two different rating approaches.  
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Chapter Five examines the disaggregation of the valuation effect for CSR. The residual 
income valuation model is used to estimate the implied cost of equity capital and long-
run growth rate; while a new approach from Ashton and Wang (2012) and a modified 
version of Easton and Sommers (2007) model are also used to simultaneously estimate 
the implied cost of equity capital and long-run growth rate. Chapter Five uses the net 
KLD score to form CSR portfolios (as, as is detailed in Chapter Three, constructing the 
portfolios with the normalised KLD score proves problematic). The net KLD score is 
much cleaner, thus enabling the portfolios to be more adequately constructed. Chapter 
Five also discusses the empirical results using different methodologies.  
 
Finally, Chapter Six provides a summary of the main findings of this thesis, while also 
suggesting directions for future research. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Defining CSR 
There is still much controversy around the scope of corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
and, as such, various definitions for the term exist. One of the earliest of these is from 
Friedman (1970), who asserts that a business’ “social responsibility” is simply to increase 
its profits. Friedman states that: “There is one and only one social responsibility of 
business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so 
long as it stays within the rules of the game” (Friedman, 1970: 126).  
 
Likewise, Hill et al (2007) define CSR as the economic, moral, legal, and philanthropic 
actions of firms, which manifest themselves in the quality of life of stakeholders. The 
World Bank Council for Sustainable Development defines CSR as “the continuing 
commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development 
while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the 
local community and society at large”. Another variant on the definition comes from 
McWilliams and Siegel (2001), who define CSR as “actions that appear to further some 
social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law”. 
 
Carroll (1999) explores the long and varied history of the concept of CSR by analysing 
the development of CSR from the beginning of the 1950s through to the 1990s. The 
author designates the 1950s as CSR’s “modern era”, noting that definitions of the term 
then widen and proliferate through the 1960s and 1970s. The 1980s give rise to new CSR 
definitions, as well as more empirical research and alternative themes (such as corporate 
social performance and stakeholder theory). CSR then continues to develop through the 
1990s. In his analysis of CSR, Dahlsurd (2008) notes that, although numerous clear and 
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unbiased definitions exist for CSR5, still no “standard” definition is reached. The author 
uses contemporary definitions of CSR to identify five different CSR dimensions, namely 
environmental, social, economic, stakeholder and voluntariness. He then uses frequency 
counts to analyse the frequency in which each of these five dimensions is used and finally 
concludes that: “The analysis shows that the existing definitions are to a large degree 
congruent. Thus it is concluded that the confusion is not so much about how CSR is 
defined, as about how CSR is socially constructed in a specific context”.  
 
In terms of understanding CSR, it is also important to consider the concept of corporate 
social performance (CSP). Carroll (1979) defines CSP as a “multidimensional construct” 
comprising the four components of economic responsibility for investors and consumers; 
legal responsibility for government; legal and ethical responsibility for society; and 
discretionary responsibility for the community. Wartick and Cochran (1985) describe 
CSP as the interaction of the principles and processes of social responsibility with the 
policies of a corporation. Wood (1991a:693) notes that CSP can be defined as “a business 
organization’s configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social 
responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the 
firm’s societal relationships”. Further to this, Wood and Jones (1995) use stakeholder 
theory to analyse the structure of a firm’s social relationships, classifying a firm’s 
“policies, programs, and outcomes” as “internal stakeholder effects, external stakeholder 
effects, and external institutional effects”, respectively. Wood and Jones (1995) also 
argue that stakeholders set the standards for corporate behaviour, are affected by 
corporate behaviour, and evaluate corporate behaviour. Thus, many authors agree that the 
content of CSP is a comprehensive indicator in terms of evaluating a firm’s performance 
for each stakeholder (Carroll, 2000). Margolis et al (2007) state that: “Although theorists 
attempt to distinguish corporate social performance from corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), sometimes subsuming CSP under the umbrella of CSR and sometimes the reverse 
(Barnett, 2007; Carroll, 1979, 1999; Wood, 1991), the terms corporate social 
performance and corporate social responsibility (CSR)—or ‘socially responsible 
behaviour’—are often used interchangeably in empirical studies”.  
                                                 
5 Dahlsurd’s (2008) summary of the numerous definitions of CSR is presented in the Appendix.  
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2.2 CSR-related theoretical analysis  
Although the relationship between CSR and CFP has been a topic of study for more than 
thirty years, conclusions from existing studies remain mixed (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; 
Orlitzky et al, 2003). Some studies use instrumental stakeholder theory to explain the 
positive relationship between CSR and CFP (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997), while others use agency problems to explain negative associations 
(Graves and Waddock, 1994). This section will therefore consider the reasons for 
continuing inconsistencies around the relationship between CSR and CFP.  
 
Brammer and Millington (2008) offer a comprehensive explanation for the relationship 
between CSR and CFP. However, they also provide three assumptions to limit the 
variation of the relationship, namely: “(1) whether there are positive financial payoffs to 
good social performance; (2) whether any such payoffs derive from the absolute level of 
a firm’s social performance or from its performance relative to peers; [and] (3) whether 
any such payoffs are subject to diminishing returns”.  
 
2.2.1 The positive relationship between CSR and CFP 
Brammer and Millington (2008) explain the positive relationship between CSR and CFP 
as meaning that firms with better social performance are able to enjoy financial benefits. 
The authors analyse this relationship under the assumption that social performance can 
provide financial benefits and does not reduce returns.  
 
In neoclassical economic theory, several reasons can be used to explain why good social 
performance might contribute to enhanced financial performance. Firstly, enhanced 
financial performance can be a result of increased profits or reduced costs from good 
social performance. McWilliams and Siegel (2000) use two different models, with one 
following Waddock and Graves (1997) in not including the R&D variable in their 
formula, and a second that does include the R&D variable in their formula. The authors 
duly report that there is a high correlation between CSR and R&D, when using the 
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formula without the R&D variable, CSR results in an upwardly bias 6  in financial 
performance. However, when the formula with the R&D variable is used, the relationship 
between CSR and financial performance is found to be neutral. Secondly, good social 
performance is found to act as a form of advertising for firms, thereby increasing the 
demand for products and reducing price sensitivity. A study by Sen and Bhattacharya 
(2001) looks into why and when CSR affects consumer behaviour. Their conclusion 
comprises two main points, namely that: a) CSR has a positive effect on consumers’ 
evaluation of a company and that, b) CSR has a complex effect on consumers’ purchasing 
decisions. Thirdly, good social performance can reduce wages, attract good employees 
and also reduce costs through improved working efficiency. As such, Turban and 
Greening (1996) report a positive relationship between CSR and a company being able to 
attract good employees, while also arguing that CSR provides firms with a competitive 
advantage. Porter and van der Linde (1995) note that improved environmental regulations 
also reduce production waste. Moreover, in an analysis of the impact of CSR on financial 
markets from an economic and financial perspective, Heal (2005) finds that CSR in a 
resource-allocation role reduces potential conflicts between corporations and society. The 
same study concludes that CSR is a profitable strategy and is able to reduce risk 
management and maintain stakeholder relationships, which are considered important for 
long-term profitability. 
 
Instrumental stakeholder theory is also important in terms of explaining higher financial 
performance where an effective manager-stakeholder relationship exists. Jones (1995) 
highlights that an effective manager-stakeholder relationship is an important resource for 
a company. Specifically, an effective manager-stakeholder relationship is found to: (1) 
decrease costs as negative regulations and fiscal activities are discarded (Hillman and 
Keim, 2001); (2) improve profits and productivity as the company is able to attract better 
                                                 
6 McWilliams and Siegel (2000) report that: “The most striking results are that R&D, CSP, and financial 
performance all appear to be strongly positively correlated. This supports our hypothesis that estimation of 
Equation 1 constitutes a specification error that may result in an overestimation of the impact of CSP on 
financial performance. This overestimation arises because CSP is positively correlated with R&D, which 
has been found to be a strong determinant of improvements in economic performance.” Here, Equation 1 
means that both the R&D and advertising variables have been excluded. 
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employees (Moskowitz, 1972); and (3) increase profits by providing different types of 
products or services (Hillman and Keim, 2001).  
 
2.2.2 The negative relationship between CSR and CFP 
Brammer and Millington (2008) explain the negative relationship between CSR and CFP 
as referring to the situation where firms with better social performance experience fewer 
financial benefits than other firms. The authors analyse this relationship under the 
assumption that social performance cannot provide financial benefits. In neoclassical 
economic theory, a company with poor social performance has less direct costs than a 
company with good social performance—meaning that the company with good social 
performance does not enjoy any competitive advantage over the latter. Aupperle et al 
(1985) follow Carroll’s definition of CSR to test the relationship between CSR and 
profitability. The authors conclude that CSR is unable to provide firms with higher profits, 
and also that different “levels” of CSR are not found to affect performance. The 
principal-agent paradigm is then used as the emphasis theory to explain this relationship. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as “a contract under which one 
or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent”. In this relationship, principals are owners or shareholders, while agents are 
managers. The “agency problem” is identified in the context that shareholders are unable 
to fully control company managers, meaning that managers are often in a position to 
make decisions that increase their own benefits rather than company returns. As such, 
CSR is provided as an example of the agency problem due to the fact that it provides 
benefits for managers (e.g., working environment, employee policy, etc.), rather than 
leading to shareholder returns.   
 
2.2.3 The non-linear relationship between CSR and CFP 
Brammer and Millington (2008) go on to explain a third relationship in which “middle 
levels” of CSR result in the highest levels of financial performance, while “extreme 
levels” of CSR result in the lowest levels of financial performance. This relationship 
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shows that strong CSR provides higher financial performance from the extreme low CSR 
level stage to the middle CSR level stage, but then leads to decreased financial 
performance from the middle CSR level stage to the extreme high CSR level stage. 
Before the middle CSR level stage, higher financial performance is recorded in cases 
where CSR has improved the relationship between a company’s managers and 
stakeholders. However, CSR conducted over and above this relationship is found to result 
in decreased financial performance. As is detailed in Section 2.2.2, the principal-agent 
theory can also be used to explain the stage above the middle CSR level. 
 
Finally, Brammer and Millington (2008) explore another non-linear relationship, in 
which extremes of CSR (whether the highest or lowest) are found to result in the highest 
levels of financial performance, while “middle levels” of CSR result in the lowest levels 
of financial performance. Porter (1980)7 notes that firms require either lower costs or 
differentiation strategies in order to hold a competitive advantage, and that both of these 
factors provide companies with better financial performance than those positioned in the 
“middle” of these two factors. Porter’s (1980) study shows that, during the early stages of 
this non-linear relationship, improved CSR leads to increased direct costs—thus leading 
to higher-priced products and a potential fall in consumers (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004). 
However, in the later stages, improved CSR leads to improved product quality and a 
differentiation strategy that helps attract consumers to the products (Bhattacharya and Sen, 
2004). Thus, the lowest financial performance is recorded for the “middle” stages of CSR, 
when neither low costs nor differentiation strategy are able to improve financial 
performance.  
 
Most studies into the relationship between CSR and CFP can be classified into two 
categories—namely studies that analyse the relationship from a management perspective, 
and those that analyse the relationship from an empirical financial perspective. As this 
section has already analysed how CSR affects CFP from a management point of view, the 
remainder of the Chapter examines this relationship from a financial point of view.  
                                                 
7 Porter (1980) does not discuss the relationship between financial performance and CSR. Brammer and 
Millington (2008) only use this paper to explain the non-linear relationship between CSR and CFP. For a 
more detailed explanation, please see page 1329 in Brammer and Millington (2008).  
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2.3 Comparison of accounting-data and market-data performance 
Another way of analysing the relationship between CSR and CFP is to divide related 
empirical literature into market-based and accounting-based testing. Market-based 
measurements consider the shareholder to be the main group to be satisfied (rather than 
other stakeholder groups) and therefore focus on share price or stock returns (Cochran 
and Wood, 1984). Accounting-based measurements reflect the internal efficiency of firms 
(Cochran and Wood, 1984) by showing how management decisions on fund allocation 
reflect the ability of internal decision-making. Accounting-based measurements include 
return on assets (ROA), return on earnings (ROE) and earnings per share (EPS). Ullmann 
(1985) and Orlitzky et al (2003) suggest that the conflicting results on the relationship 
between CSR and CFP may be derived from the use of different research methodologies 
and different financial performance measurements.  
 
Although some studies have been conducted using stock market-based measurement, still 
these studies provide mixed results. Earlier studies fail to adjust for risk, such as is the 
case of Moskowitz (1972), who reports that firms with high social responsibility rankings 
have higher-than-average stock returns. However, when using a sub-sample of firms from 
Moskowitz, Vance (1975) finds that such firms yield lower stock market performance 
than a separate group of sample firms taken from the New York Stock Exchange 
Composite Index, Dow Jones Industrials and Standard and Poor’s Industrials. Subsequent 
studies improve financial performance measurement by introducing risk-adjusted stock 
return measures (e.g., Klassen and McLaughlin (1996), Derwall et al (2005) and 
Brammer et al (2006)). Meanwhile, Alexander and Bucholtz (1987) apply the same data 
as Moskowitz, and duly find limited associations between social responsibility and risk-
adjusted stock returns. 
 
In terms of accounting-based performance, earlier studies fail to control for variables 
when testing for associations between CSR and accounting-based performance (Bragdon 
and Marlin, 1972; Bowman and Haire, 1975; Parket and Eibert, 1975). In light of this, 
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subsequent studies move to introduce control factors. For example, Cochran and Wood 
(1984) record a positive relationship between CSR and accounting performance after 
controlling the age of assets; Hart and Ahuja (1996) identify a positive relationship 
between pollution reduction and several performances for a two-year horizon; and Russo 
and Fouts (1997) find that environmental performance is positively related to ROA, 
especially in the case of high-growth industries. Waddock and Graves (1997) also test the 
relationship between environmental performance indicators and several financial 
performance measurements (such as ROA). However, the authors of the study are unable 
to identify the direction of causality. Guenster et al (2011) find high eco-efficient firms to 
have slightly greater ROAs than low eco-efficient firms, while a positive relationship is 
found to exist between eco-efficiency and Tobin’s q.  
 
The conflicting results provided by existing studies may be due to the fact that both 
accounting-based and stock market-based performance measures focus on different 
aspects of performance, and also that each has its particular biases (McGuire, Schneeweis 
and Hill, 1986). Several disadvantages can be found for accounting-based measurements. 
For example, as accounting-based measurements measure the historical performance of 
firms (McGuire, Schneeweis and Hill 1986), they are easily affected by managerial 
manipulation and differing accounting standards (Branch, 1983). Also, accounting 
performance measurements need to be adjusted by risk, industry characteristics and other 
variables (Ullmann, 1985). Moreover, accounting-based performance measurements, 
such as ROA and ROE, are difficult for a firm to measure for a long-term period, just as 
it is also difficult to value intangible relationships (Barney, 1991) (such as the value of 
service and reputation, which are not shown in financial statements (Bentson, 1982)).  
 
As such, some papers suggest that stock market performance should be used in order to 
avoid the weaknesses of accounting-based measurements. Market-based measurements 
have several advantages over accounting-based measurements, including the fact that 
they are less affected by different accounting standards and managerial manipulation, and 
that they test future economic performance rather than past. Lubatkin and Shrieves (1986) 
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and Rappaport (1992) argue that market-based measurements are better than accounting-
based measurements as they are better positioned to value future income.  
 
2.4 CSR-related empirical analysis  
2.4.1 The financial performance of SRI funds 
This sub-section focuses on empirical studies relating to the performance of socially 
responsible investment (SRI) funds, with most studies attempting to identify whether SRI 
funds result in underperformance or outperformance.  
                   
Numerous studies have been conducted into the financial performance of SRI funds. 
However, the results of these studies often tend to be inconclusive and contradictory. 
While some studies show no difference between SRI and non-SRI (Mittal, Sinha and 
Singh, 2008; Cortez, Silva and Areal, 2009), others find SRI to significantly outperform 
non-SRI—while others still report SRI to considerably underperform non-SRI (Luther 
and Matatko, 1994; Bauer, Koedijk and Otten, 2005). The earliest empirical analysis of 
SRI funds is taken from Moskowitz (1972). Most early studies on the performance of SRI 
use the factor-model to test time-series regressions without considering other factors. A 
brief summary of these results is provided below according to different markets.  
 
2.4.1.1 Evidence from the US 
Several empirical studies have been conducted into the performance of SRI funds in the 
US, including a study by Hamilton et al (1993) of 32 SRI funds and 320 randomly 
selected non-SRI funds in the US over the period 1981-1990. Since the number of funds 
increases sharply between 1982 and 1990, two sub-periods are used to test the mutual 
fund performance with the CAPM model (with the monthly market return for the CAPM 
being equal to the value-weighted NYSE index). For the first sub-period, 17 SRI funds 
are compared with 170 non-SRI funds (all established before 1985). The average monthly 
alpha for the SRI funds is recorded at -0.06%, which is higher than the average monthly 
alpha of -0.14% for the non-SRI funds. For the second sub-period, 15 SRI funds are 
compared with 150 non-SRI funds (all established after 1985). The average monthly 
alpha of these SRI funds is recorded at -0.28%, which is lower than the average monthly 
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alpha of -0.04% for the corresponding non-SRI funds. Hamilton et al (1993) also 
conclude that there is no statistically significant difference in the average of the alphas for 
SRI and non-SRI. Diltz (1995) and Sauer (1997) also fail to find any significant 
difference in the performance of SRIs and traditional investments. 
 
Statman (2000) tests the performance of 31 SRI funds in the US against 62 non-ethical 
funds for the period 1990-1998, with both the SRI and non-ethical funds used being of 
similar sizes. The study records the average expense ratio for the SRI funds as 1.50%, 
compared with 1.56% for similar non-ethical funds. The S&P 500 Index and Domini 400 
Social Index (DSI 400) are used as market indices for the CAPM model, with both 
indices returning the same results. The average monthly alpha is recorded at -0.42% for 
the SRI funds and -0.62% for the non-SRI funds. As such, the study concludes that the 
performance of SRI funds is not significantly different to that of non-SRI funds. Thus, the 
authors argue that socially responsible mutual funds do not earn statistically significant 
excess returns, and that the performance of such mutual funds is not statistically different 
from the performance of conventional mutual funds using a simple regression against a 
market index. 
 
Due to the inconsistency in results from existing studies into SRI and non-SRI funds, 
comparing the average performance of these two types of fund provides investors with 
information of limited use.  
 
Geczy et al (2003) examine diversification costs for investors by comparing optimal 
portfolios with and without SRI constraints for the period 1963-2001. The optimal 
portfolios are constructed for mean-variance investors according to short sale constraints. 
The optimal portfolios are selected from 35 SRI funds and 894 non-SRI funds, with the 
predictive distribution of fund returns being used for each optimisation. The study 
proposes that the difference in certainty-equivalent returns between portfolios with and 
without SRI constraints is an indication of the diversification costs of imposing SRI 
constraints. The study duly concludes that there are significant financial costs involved 
when mean-variance investors impose SRI constraints on their portfolios. However, these 
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costs also depend on whether investors choose to follow asset pricing models or managed 
funds. For example, for investors that follow the CAPM model rather than investing in a 
fund, the monthly cost of the SRI constraint is recorded at five basis points. For investors 
that follow multifactor asset pricing models (such as the three- or four-factor models), the 
monthly cost of the SRI constraint is found to be at least 30 basis points. For investors 
that put their faith in the skills of a fund manager, the SRI constraint imposes large costs 
on investors. Furthermore, for SRI funds void of “sin” stocks, the cost of the SRI 
constraint is also found to increase by an additional 10 basis points per month.  
 
Geczy et al (2003) identify differences in both the basic characteristics and risk exposures 
of SRI and non-SRI funds. For example, the authors calculate the average expense ratio 
for the SRI funds to be 1.33%, which is higher than the 1.10% for non-SRI funds. The 
average annual turnover for SRI funds is found to be 81.5%, which is lower than the 
175.4% for non-SRI funds. Moreover, the monthly abnormal return for the equally-
weighted SRI portfolios is recorded at 0.21%, which is higher than the monthly abnormal 
return of 0.08% for the equally-weighted non-SRI portfolios. However, the difference 
between these two portfolios is not found to be significant. Since the study uses the four-
factor model to test fund performance, the size factor of the SRI portfolio is 0.20, which 
is higher than the size factor of 0.16 for the non-SRI portfolios. Similar results are 
recorded for both the book-to-market and momentum factors for the two portfolios.  
 
Each of the studies mentioned above examine the relationship between SRI funds and 
non-SRI funds. However, these studies do not consider investment screens for SRI funds 
in detail, which may also affect fund performance. 
 
In contrast, Goldreyer et al (1999) use 29 equity funds, 9 bond funds and 11 balanced 
funds to test SRI funds performance for the period 1981-1997. A CAPM model is used to 
test the performance of each fund, with the model duly finding the average annual 
abnormal return of the 29 SRI equity funds to be -0.49%, while the average alpha of the 
20 non-SRI equity funds is 2.78%. The authors also look at whether investment positive 
screens affect fund performance. They duly find SRI equity funds with positive screens to 
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have a monthly average abnormal return of -0.11%, which is significantly higher than the 
return of -0.81% for funds without positive screens. Thus, the authors conclude that SRI 
fund performance is indeed affected by investment screens. Barnett and Salomon (2006) 
find that the return of SRI funds decreases when the total number of social screens 
increases—until a maximum number has been reached (after the maximum number has 
been reached, the SRI fund returns start to increase again).  
 
Several other studies have also been conducted into the performance of SRI portfolios 
using firm-level information to design the portfolios. Of these, when Grossman and 
Sharpe (1986) compare a South African free portfolio with unscreened portfolios, they 
find no significant difference in the returns of the two portfolios. Likewise, Guerard 
(1997) and Stone et al (2001) do not find any significant difference in the returns from 
SRI and non-SRI portfolios when using KLD data.  
 
2.4.1.2 Evidence from the UK 
One of the earliest studies into the performance of social investments in the UK is by 
Luther et al (1992), who analyse the performance of 15 ethical funds (identified by the 
Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS)) in the UK for the period 1984-1990. Two 
benchmarks are used, namely the FT All-Share (FTA) Index and the Morgan Stanley 
Capital International Perspective World Index (MSCIP). The authors calculate the 
average monthly alpha of these ethical funds to be 0.03%, which they consider to be 
insignificantly different from zero. Luther et al (1992) find the return from ethical funds 
to be similar to that from the benchmarks. In their study, there is a higher weighting of 
small market capitalisation in the ethical fund portfolios, while the returns from the 
ethical funds is also found to correlate closely with those from low dividend yield 
companies.  
 
A subsequent study by Luther and Matatko (1994) considers whether returns from ethical 
funds are affected by benchmarks. The study uses nine ethical funds and three 
benchmarks for the period 1985-1992 to evaluate ethical fund performance (the 
benchmarks used are the FTA Index, the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index (HGSC) 
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and a combination of these two indices). The study concludes that ethical funds 
underperform the FTA index. However, the authors also note that the return from the 
ethical funds’ is higher than that from the HGSC benchmark for smaller firms, while the 
ethical funds also appear to outperform the combination index.  
 
In order to avoid the benchmark issue, Mallin et al (1995) carry out a direct comparison 
of ethical and non-ethical funds. Their study uses 29 ethical funds and 29 non-ethical 
funds, with both groups of funds being of a similar size and age. For the ethical funds, the 
highest and lowest monthly alphas are 1.21% and -0.28%, respectively, while 22 of the 
29 ethical funds are found to have positive alphas. For the non-ethical funds, the highest 
and lowest monthly alphas are recorded at 1.56% and -0.41%, respectively, while 23 of 
the 29 non-ethical funds have positive alphas. The study duly concludes that ethical funds 
outperform non-ethical funds.  
 
Gregory et al (1997) compare the performance of 18 ethical funds and 18 non-ethical 
funds for the period 1986-1994, using both time-series and cross-sectional regressions. 
Both groups of funds are similar in terms of fund size, age and investment area, and the 
study uses both the FT All Shares Index and the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index 
to compute benchmark portfolio returns. Ranging from -0.71% to 0.24%, the monthly 
alphas of the ethical funds are found to be mostly insignificant. In addition, most of the 
ethical funds have significant exposure to “small firms”. The authors of the study 
conclude that there is no statistically significant difference between the performance of 
SRI and non-SRI funds.  
 
After comparing SRI and non-SRI fund performance in the UK using both time-varying 
and persistence performance, Gregory and Whittaker (2007) note that static and time-
varying models provide different performance levels for SRI funds. Moreover, a home 
bias is also identified for the portfolio allocation for the UK SRI funds. After controlling 
for this home bias, the authors conclude that ethical investors are no worse off than 
ordinary investors, as well as identifying a difference in risk exposure between SRI and 
conventional funds.   
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In conclusion, Luther et al’s (1992) study into UK ethical funds supports the findings of 
Statman (2000) (who compares the returns of ethical and non-ethical US funds, as is 
described in Section 2.4.1.1). After improving the market index by using a small 
capitalisation benchmark, Luther and Matatko (1994) are unable to identify any clear 
relationship with SRI funds. Then, a matching approach is introduced in order to solve 
the benchmark problem, after comparing SRI and non-SRI funds using both time-series 
and cross-sectional regressions, Gregory et al (1997) contend that SRI funds do not 
perform as well as other funds. However, they also note that this may be down to small 
firm exposure risk rather than the SRI criteria. Finally, when using a longer time period 
and a larger number of funds, Gregory and Whittaker (2007) do not identify (on a risk-
adjusted basis) any differences in the performance of SRI and non-SRI funds.  
 
2.4.1.3 Evidence from other markets 
Several studies also test the performance of SRI funds in markets outside the UK and US. 
For example, Schroder (2004) uses funds from the US (30), Germany and Switzerland 
(16) to test SRI fund performance. Using a two-factor model and both blue-chip and 
small-cap indices benchmarks, the author reports the alphas as ranging from -2.06% to 
0.87%. There are 38 negative alphas, with only four of these being significant. Moreover, 
the author identifies a small-size stocks bias for European SRI funds and a large-size 
stocks bias for US funds. In addition, the author also tests the ability of market time for 
the fund managers, the author reports five funds as having positive significant timing 
coefficients and seven as having negative significant timing coefficients.  
 
Kreander et al (2005) compare the performance of 40 SRI and 40 non-SRI funds across 
Europe. Both groups of funds are of a similar size, age and investment area, with equal 
fund distribution between countries (namely, Belgium (1), the Netherlands (2), Germany 
(4), Sweden (11), Norway (2), Switzerland (2) and the UK (18)). The Jensen’s alpha for 
both SRI and non-SRI funds is found to be similar, at 0.20% and 0.12% per month, 
respectively. Moreover, the study also tests the ability of market timing for both fund 
managers, with this method showing both funds as having significant timing coefficients.  
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Bauer et al (2005) use large survivorship-free samples to test the performance of SRI 
funds. The SRI funds used include those from Germany (16), the UK (32) and the US 
(55), while 4,384 non-SRI funds are also used. The testing period is 1990-2001, and the 
Carhart four-factor model is used to test fund performance. The study reports German, 
domestic UK and domestic US funds as having monthly alphas of 0.29%, 0.09% and -
0.05%, respectively, with domestic US SRI funds having significantly lower alphas than 
conventional funds. However, no significant difference is found between the alphas for 
the US international SRI funds and US international conventional funds. For the UK, the 
SRI funds are found to have significantly higher alphas than conventional funds in both 
the case of domestic and international funds. However, in Germany, both SRI and non-
SRI funds are found to have insignificant alphas. Furthermore, a “learning stage” is 
identified for both German and US SRI funds, with the SRI funds significantly 
underperforming during the 1990s, before then reaching a similar level of performance as 
SRI funds and reference conventional funds for the period 1998-2001. In addition, the 
SRI and non-SRI funds are shown to have different levels of risk exposure, with UK and 
German SRI funds investing in a higher proportion of small firms than SRI funds from 
the US. This same study also finds that the funds use size, market risk and book-to-
market ratio as factors to separate SRI and conventional funds (this method of separation 
is less commonly used with current SRI funds).  
 
Bauer et al (2006) use the conditional Carhart four-factor model to test Australian SRI 
funds for the period 1992-2003. The authors report domestic SRI funds as having 
insignificantly lower alphas than domestic conventional funds, and international SRI 
funds as having insignificantly higher alphas than international conventional funds. 
Employing the same methods as in Bauer et al (2006), Bauer et al (2007) find no 
significant difference between the alphas for SRI and non-SRI funds in Canada (the 
authors compare 8 SRI funds with 267 non-SRI funds). This evidence leads to the 
conclusion that there is no difference between SRI and non-SRI fund performance in 
either Australia or Canada.  
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2.4.2 The financial performance of CSR at the firm level 
As discussed in Chapter One, it is difficult to separate fund performance from the skills 
of fund managers. Thus, there is increasing interest in conducting research that tests the 
direct relationship between CSR indicators and a firm’s financial performance. Many 
studies have been conducted into the relationship between CSR and CFP, with the 
findings from most of these studies being either inconclusive or contradictory. Also, 
although the studies are well documented, they are generally not particularly well 
structured, which makes them difficult to categorise. Griffin and Mahon (1997) argue that 
methodological inconsistency is one of the reasons behind conflicting results for the 
relationship between CSR and CFP. Ullmann (1985) highlights the different 
methodologies and indicators used during previous studies, and also the fact that this may 
lead to skewed results. Here this thesis follows Guenster et al (2011) in considering these 
studies within three categories: event studies, portfolio studies, and regression analyses.  
 
2.4.2.1 Event studies 
Event studies investigate how positive and negative events affect financial markets. This 
phenomenon is predicated by Efficient Market Theory, which assumes that the stock 
market provides an efficient reflection of current market information and expectations. A 
growing number of studies use event study to test whether publicly available information 
affects the value of a firm, with related events including occurrences such as public 
disclosures or product recalls. If a company’s stock price is found to increase or decrease 
according to new information the market has received for that company, the 
corresponding price change is considered to be explained by the release of this new 
information.   
 
Shane and Spicer (1983) note how stock prices change when information on a firm’s 
social performance is published by external organisations (the study also notes that 
information provided by external organisations is more consistent and of more 
comparable value than voluntary disclosures by companies themselves). The authors 
 41 
select eight studies from the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) 8  that look at 
environmental performance in four industries. They then test the performance of 
corporations in these industries for six trading days around the release dates for the CEP’s 
findings. The study concludes that corporations generally experience largely negative 
abnormal returns two days prior to the release of the CEP’s findings. The same study also 
notes that, on report release dates, companies with high pollution-control performance 
rankings experience significantly more positive returns than lower-ranking companies.  
 
Similarly, Hamilton (1995) takes pollution data reporting from the Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI) as the “event”, and then investigates the subsequent reaction of investors 
and journalists. In terms of investor reaction, the author notes that firms experience 
statistically significant negative abnormal returns during the day on which the TRI 
pollution data is released (with firms losing an average $4.1 million in stock value, or 0.3 
percent of the market value of publicly traded firms). More specifically, when a 
company’s pollution rating is seen to rise from previous TRI data, the stock value for that 
company drops significantly. However, the author also finds these effects to be lessened 
when investors know about a company’s pollution information in advance (such as from 
disclosure information in a company’s annual report).  
 
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) identify two theoretical pathways (namely revenue gains 
and cost savings) that link environmental management with better financial performance. 
The authors argue that, according to Efficient Market Theory, stock price movements 
help explain how environmental performance affects actual financial benefits. The 
authors consider “positive” environmental events to include the announcement of 
environmental awards by an independent third party, and “negative” environmental 
events to include environmental crises and poor external ratings for environmental 
performance or pollution leaks. They use a NEXIS database keyword search to identify 
140 positive events for the period 1985-1991, resulting in a total of 96 publicly traded 
firms from 14 manufacturing sectors. Using the same method, 22 negative events 
                                                 
8 The Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) was founded in 1969 and publishes reports on the corporate 
social performance of various firms and industries with the aim of raising awareness of this performance 
among the US public (White, 1996). 
 42 
involving 16 firms are identified for the period 1989-1990. In terms of financial 
performance measurement, a company’s market value is assessed using stock return. The 
authors use a market valuation model to estimate the performance of each firm using a 
200-trading-day estimation period, with the period ending with the ten trading days 
before the day of event announcement. The event periods in the study comprise three 
days—namely the day of, and the days before and after, the event announcement. The 
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) study reports high-polluting industries as having higher 
market values than low-polluting industries, with strong environmental management 
yielding a 0.63% average cumulative abnormal return (or $80.5 million in market value). 
In contrast, weak environmental management is shown to yield a -0.82% average 
cumulative abnormal return (or -$390 million in market value). This shows a significant 
positive abnormal return for strong environmental management and a significant negative 
abnormal return for weak environmental management. The authors also highlight the fact 
that “other researchers have noted the difficulty of inferring causality in longitudinal 
studies because of the potential for confounding variables. To avoid this problem, 
financial event methodology has been used”.  
 
Lorraine et al (2004) examine the effect of environmental performance information (such 
as negative information relating to fines for environmental pollution, and positive 
information including commendations for environmental performance) on share prices in 
the UK. Fines are reported to have a strong effect on share price, with negative 
information providing negative stock returns, especially during the week following the 
relevant announcement news (the share returns analysed are those from the 10 days 
before and after the official announcement date). However, no abnormal returns are 
recorded for positive information. Moreover, with regards to the cross-sectional analysis, 
the authors argue that fines could explain the majority share price response, while other 
explanatory variables are unable to successfully explain the share price response. Karpoff 
et al (2005) note that companies experience significant losses in share value whenever 
news of an environmental violation relating to those companies is announced, as well as 
discussing the reasons that cause investors to be so sensitively affected by negative news.  
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Curran and Moran (2007) also use event study to examine how CFP is affected by 
environmental and social performance. The authors use the FTSE4Good UK Index as the 
CSR proxy, with firms included in the index being classed as having “good CSR”, and 
firms excluded from the index being classed as having “bad CSR”. The authors find 
positive announcements to have a positive effect on share price and daily returns, and 
negative announcements to have a negative effect on share price and daily returns. 
However, these effects are not found to be significant, meaning that there are no 
abnormal returns, even for the firms included in the index.  
 
Godfrey et al (2009) use 178 negative legal actions as the event to test the relationship 
between CSR and shareholder value for the period 1993-2003. Some CSR activities are 
found to result in goodwill and “insurance-like” protection, while other CSR activities 
fail to have the same effect. The authors classify CSR activities into the two categories of: 
“institutional CSR activities” (“CSR activities that target the firm’s secondary 
stakeholders”) and “technical CSR activities” (“CSR activities that target the firm’s 
primary stakeholders”). An “insurance-like” benefit is found for institutional CSR 
activities, while technical CSR activities are not found to provide this benefit. Thus, the 
authors conclude that investment in CSR (especially investment relating to stakeholders) 
could protect shareholder value in a negative event situation.  
 
Meanwhile, Boyle et al (1997) use event study to test stock market reaction to ethical 
initiatives, taking defence contractors and the Defense Industries Initiative as an example. 
Hall and Rieck (1998) examine whether positive corporate social activity affects 
shareholder value, with their study finding that corporate donations have a significant 
positive effect on shareholder value on announcement day. 
 
In summary, event study tests stock market performance relating to CSR-based events in 
the short term (Bennett et al, 1999) (for long-term periods, stock prices are affected by 
various other events that are difficult to control adequately). On the whole, the event 
studies mentioned above mostly record positive abnormal returns after positive events, 
and negative abnormal returns after negative events. However, Cormier et al (1993) 
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emphasises that, when explaining event study results, the circular relationship should also 
be taken into account. For example, where event study identifies a causal relationship 
between CSR and CFP (indicating that CSR activities affect CFP), the circular 
relationship between CSR and CFP should also be considered.  
 
2.4.2.2 Portfolio studies 
Portfolio study is a separate area of research that compares the average risk-adjusted 
returns from several mutually exclusive portfolios. Portfolios can be grouped according 
to specific company characteristics, such as size, book-to-market ratio or, as is relevant 
here, according to CSR characteristics. Normally, the performance attribution model is 
used to test these portfolios in order to control common intervening factors.  
 
During the earlier stages of portfolio study, Cohen et al (1995) report that investing in 
leading environmental firms makes no difference in terms of returns. Recently, Gompers 
et al (2003) focus solely on the corporate governance indicator, using 24 governance 
rules to build a governance index, and then creating portfolios for “well-governed” and 
“badly-governed” firms. Their study reports abnormal returns for when stocks are bought 
in well-governed firms and sold in badly-governed firms. Bauer et al (2004) use the 
Deminor Corporate Governance ratings to create portfolios to compare well-governed 
portfolios with badly-governed portfolios. As in the previous study, a positive 
relationship is found to exist between corporate governance and stock returns.  
 
Derwall et al (2005) use the factor models to assess the performance of two stock 
portfolios. Eco-efficiency9 scores taken from the Innovest Strategic Value Advisors rating 
database are used to construct two mutually exclusive portfolios. The authors select stock 
returns from the CRSP database according to all firms in the Innovest universe, while 
also stating that they “…ranked the companies annually on their most recent eco-
efficiency ratings. The high-ranked (low-ranked) portfolio consists of companies making 
up the 30 percent of total capitalisation rated highest (lowest) by Innovest”. The authors 
                                                 
9 Derwall et al (2005) state that: “The Innovest scores build on the concept of “eco-efficiency”, which can 
be interpreted as the economic value a company adds (e.g., by producing products and delivering services) 
relative to the waste it generates when creating that value”.  
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apply both the CAPM and Carhart four-factor frameworks to the study, thereby 
controlling for several non-environmental factors when evaluating stock performance. 
They conclude that, after controlling risk, investment style and sector exposure, high-
ranked portfolios significantly outperform low-ranked portfolios by nearly 6 percent per 
year (for the period 1995-2003). They also note that neither market sensitivity, 
investment style nor industry bias are able to explain performance differences. 
Furthermore, even with the inclusion of transaction costs, the authors show that best-in-
class portfolio earns risk-adjusted and style-adjusted returns that are 6 pps higher than 
that of the worst-in-class portfolio. 
 
Brammer et al (2006) test the relationship between CSR and stock performance in the UK, 
using social performance data sourced from the Ethical Investment Research Service 
(EIRIS). Three main indicators are used in their study. The first of these is employee 
responsibility, which comprises measurements for health and safety systems, employee 
training and development, equal opportunities, good employee relations and job creation 
and security. The second indicator is environment, which comprises the quality of 
environmental policies, environmental management and environmental reporting. The 
third indicator is community (taken as a single variable). Since all of these CSR rankings 
are text-based, the authors translate the rankings into quantitative variables in order to 
create disaggregate or aggregate portfolios. They then focus the portfolio returns over 
one-, two- and three-year holding periods. The authors find firms with higher social 
performance scores to have lower returns then firms with lower social performance 
scores. The firms with the lowest social performance scores (i.e., zero) are shown to 
outperform the market, while firms with high social performance provide low returns. 
The environmental and community indicators are found to have a negative relationship 
with stock returns, while employment indicators have a weakly positive relationship with 
stock returns. Consequently, the authors suggest that different CSR indicators should be 
considered individually.  
 
Kempf and Osthoff (2007) compute normalised KLD scores to rate CSR performance, 
before then using both a positive and best-in-class screening policy to create portfolios 
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for the qualitative KLD data. Next, they use a negative screening policy to create 
portfolios for the exclusionary KLD data, while using a Carhart four-factor model to 
measure financial performance. For portfolio formation, under the positive policy, high-
scoring portfolios include the top 10 percent of all firms, while low-scoring portfolios 
include the bottom 10 percent of all firms. In order to avoid industry bias, the authors 
apply the best-in-class screening policy to create high-scoring portfolios with the top 10 
percent of all firms within each industry class, and low-scoring portfolios with the bottom 
10 percent of all firms within each industry class. Under the negative screening policy, 
low-scoring portfolios include all firms with at least one controversial indicator, while 
high-scoring portfolios include all other firms. Moreover, the authors apply the long-short 
trading strategy to the portfolios (which involves buying stocks with high CSR ratings 
and selling those with low CSR ratings). The authors then test whether the long-short 
trading strategy leads to increased financial performance. The authors report significant 
positive abnormal returns for long-short portfolios (for the period 1992-2004) for both the 
positive screening policy and best-in-class screening policy, but do not find any 
significant abnormal returns for the negative screening policy. Moreover, the best-in-
class screening policy provides the highest abnormal returns, at 8.7 percent per year. 
However, Hong and Kacperczyk (2007) find that negative ethical firms (i.e., businesses 
involving alcohol, tobacco, and gaming) have higher expected returns.   
 
Galema et al (2008) also use KLD social performance data to create portfolios. However, 
in contrast to Statman and Glushkov (2009) and Kempf and Osthoff (2007), Galema et al 
(2008) create portfolios according to the strength and concern for each indicator. For 
measuring financial performance, the authors use the Fama-MacBeth and book-to-market 
regressions. The authors conclude that, when using equally-weighted portfolios, leaders 
in community-related CSR outperform laggard companies for the period 1992-2006. 
However, companies leading in the area of employee relations are found to outperform 
laggards by using value-weighted portfolios. Overall, CSR affects stock returns by 
lowering book-to-market ratios and not by positive alphas.   
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Statman and Glushkov (2009) also create portfolios using corporate social data taken 
from KLD. The KLD data used includes strengths and concerns for each qualitative 
indicator, while including only concerns for each exclusionary indicator. (The KLD 
database is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, as it is also used in this thesis to 
measure CSP.) In contrast to Kempf and Osthoff (2007), Statman and Glushkov (2009) 
exclude firms that do not have both strengths and concerns, due to concerns that some of 
these firms have not been evaluated by KLD. Three groups of portfolios are finally 
selected for the study. The first of these groups is the top-overall vs. bottom-overall 
portfolios (top-overall portfolios are those in which all firms sit in the top third for two or 
more CSR characteristics, and not in the bottom third for any other characteristic; while 
bottom-overall portfolios are those in which all firms sit in the bottom third for two or 
more CSR characteristics, and not in the top third for any other characteristic). The 
second group of portfolios comprises accepted firms vs. shunned firms (with “shunned 
firms” including firms associated with alcohol, tobacco, gambling, firearms, military or 
nuclear power, while “accepted” firms covers all other types of firm). The third group of 
portfolios comprises the DS400 Index vs. the S&P 500 Index. The authors use the CAPM, 
three-factor and four-factor models to measure financial performance. The study duly 
concludes that stock return from the top-overall portfolios is higher than for the bottom-
overall portfolios (for the period 1992-2007). Meanwhile, the risk-adjusted return of 
shunned firms is shown to outperform that of accepted firms. However, the difference in 
returns between the shunned and accepted firms is found to lack statistical significance 
when using the four-factor model.  
 
Guenster et al (2011) analyse the economic value of corporate eco-efficiency. As with 
Derwall et al (2005), Guenster et al (2011) also obtain their eco-efficiency scores from 
the Innovest Strategic Value Advisors rating database. Their data set comprises 154 
companies at the end of December 1996, increasing to 519 companies by the end of 
September 2004. The study tests both operating and financial performance. For operating 
performance, the authors follow the multivariate model of Waddock and Graves (1997) to 
analyse the relationship between ROA and eco-efficiency. For financial performance, 
both firm and portfolio levels are used to analyse the relationship between Tobin’s q and 
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eco-efficiency. During this regression, the control variables include two-year sales 
growth, firm age, firm size, ROA, R&D spending, an interaction term between sales 
growth and R&D spending, and a dummy variable for Nasdaq companies. The authors 
conclude the relationship between eco-efficiency and operating performance to be 
positive and slightly asymmetric. The ROA for high eco-efficient firms is found to be 
slightly greater than that for low eco-efficient firms, while a positive and time-varying 
relationship is also found to exist between eco-efficiency and Tobin’s q. The study shows 
that, during the beginning of the sample period, high eco-efficient firms are not trading at 
a premium relative to low eco-efficient firms. However, a premium is found to emerge 
and increase substantially over time, with the stock market overvaluing environmental 
information from 2001-2004.  
 
Edmans (2011) examines the relationship between long-run stock returns and a CSR 
factor—employee satisfaction. The author groups portfolios made up of the “100 Best 
Companies to Work For in America”. The author records the annual alpha for this value-
weighted portfolio as 3.5% (for the period 1984-2009 and when using the four-factor 
model at), which is 2.1% higher than industry benchmarks and thus outperforms 
characteristic-matched firm benchmarks. The author also notes that the “100 Best 
Companies to Work For in America” have significantly more positive earnings surprises 
and announcement returns. Overall, the Edmans (2011) study identifies a positive 
relationship between employee satisfaction and long-horizon stock returns, even when 
controlling for industry, factor risk or firm characteristics. The author also argues that the 
value of intangible assets is not be fully incorporated by the market.  
 
In summary, in the studies mentioned above, portfolios are constructed according to CSR 
performance or by matching industry, firm size or other additional criteria. One limitation 
with the portfolio method is that it is difficult to ascertain the exact relationship between 
CSR and financial performance under different elements of CSR performance. However, 
the portfolio method is able to compare the average returns for high- and low-scoring 
CSR performance portfolios.  
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2.4.2.3 Regression and Correlation Analyses  
Regression and correlation analysis is the third approach used to test the relationship 
between CSR and CFP. However, results from such studies are mixed, and thus findings 
on the relationship between CSR and CFP remain inconsistent and inconclusive. As noted 
by Oppenheim (1970), the multiple regression study can provide total variance from 
multivariate procedures, as well as identifying how individual variables can explain this 
variance. However, two limitations also highlighted are that the model requires a large 
number of observations, and also that a theory is needed to link the variables together in 
order to prevent the disaggregation of the explained variance.  
 
Spicer (1978) selects 24 companies in the pulp and paper industry for the period 1968-
1973. However, the author omits six of these companies for the fact that four of the firms 
miss the 25-percent sales requirement (meaning that 25 percent of sales must originate 
from the paper industry for each company) and that no Compustat financial data is 
available for another two. The author reports companies with better pollution control as 
having higher profitability, larger asset bases, lower overall risk, lower systematic risk 
and higher price/earning ratios than companies with poorer pollution control. However, 
these significant associations are found to reduce over a period of time, and can therefore 
only explain the phenomenon in the short term.  
 
Chen and Metcalf (1980) dispute Spicer’s (1978) empirical results based on the same 
group of data, indicating that the significant correlation between pollution control records 
and financial indicators is spurious. They analyse the possible causal relationship among 
the dependent variable, the independent variable, and the control variable. The 
relationship between dependent and independent variables is not direct, as the control 
variable will have either a direct or indirect affect on this relationship. The study 
concludes that the significant correlation between pollution control records and financial 
indicators cannot be justified due to the use of size as a control variable.    
 
Mahapatra (1984) also points to the lack of evidence showing that pollution control 
initiatives can lead to improved stock performance. The author classifies investors into 
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the two groups of “ethical” and “rational economic” investors based on how the investors 
respond to long-term pollution control expenditure, and the study formulates its 
hypotheses according to ethical investor theory. In the study, a sample of 67 firms is 
taken from six industries, which account for nearly 75 percent of the pollution control 
expenditure for all industries for the period 1967-1978 (Rutledge, 1979). Pollution 
control expenditure in the six industries is then compared with average market return, and 
a negative relationship is found to exist between environmental and market performance. 
These results go against ethical investor theory and are thus consistent with the rational 
economic investor.  
 
In summary, the results from these earlier studies into the relationship between CSR and 
CFP are largely inconclusive, as both significantly positive and negative relationships are 
found to exist. This highlights the need to consider more recent studies, for which 
improved data and methodology help mitigate the weaknesses of earlier research.  
 
Hart and Ahuja (1996) analyse the relationship between emissions reductions and CFP 
for a sample of S&P 500 firms. Two criteria are used for the selection process, namely: a) 
that the firms should belong to manufacturing, mining or other production industries and, 
b) that each industry is represented by at least four firms. For the multiple regression 
analysis, the change in the ratio of TRI-reported emissions in GBP to the company’s 
revenues in thousands of USD for the period 1988-1989 is used as the emissions 
reduction, while control variables are used as independent variables. The return on assets 
(ROA), return on sales (ROS) and return on equity (ROE) are used as dependent 
variables, while the control variables used are advertising intensity, R&D intensity, 
capital intensity and leverage. These financial performances are shown to improve two 
years after the firms’ reductions in emissions. Moreover, the financial performance for 
firms having had higher emission levels prior to reducing emissions is seen to improve 
more than for other companies. Overall, the relationship between emission reduction and 
firm performance is found to be positive with a time lag of 1-2 years, with ROS and ROA 
being affected by emission reductions sooner than ROE. The study uses averages of 
emission reductions per unit of revenue for each industry to identify “high” and “low” 
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polluting firms. No significant effect on financial performance is found for low-polluting 
firms, whereas positive significant effects are found for high-polluting firms.  
 
Cordeiro and Sarkis (1997) test the relationship between environmental proactivism and 
firm performance by using 523 firms that report their toxic releases in line with the 1990 
US Pollution Prevention Act. In contrast to other papers, the authors use one-year 
earnings-per-share and five-year earnings-per-share growth forecasts as measures of CFP. 
Both the firms’ sales and debt-to-equity ratios are used in order to control for the effects 
of firm size and leverage on performance forecasts, while industry-adjusted values are 
used in order to reduce industry effect. (However, the authors subsequently find that it 
makes little difference as to whether industry-adjusted values or non-industry-adjusted 
values are used.) For the multiple regression analysis, analysts’ performance forecasts for 
1993 are used as the dependent variable; while the performance of the firms’ 
environmental proactivism in 1992 or the change in environmental proactivism from 
1991-1992 are used as the independent variables. Both firm size and leverage are also 
used as independent variables in both regressions. The study identifies significantly 
negative relationships between the performance of proactivism in 1992, the change in 
proactivism from 1991-1992, and also the one-year earnings-per-share forecast and five-
year earnings-per-share growth forecast at the significant levels of 0.1 and 0.05. When 
applying non-industry-adjusted values, the change in proactivism is not found to be 
significant, as other studies reach the same results when applying industry-adjusted 
values. The study ends by concluding that environmentally proactive firms have lower 
earnings-per-share in the short term (since the study only covers a short time period).  
 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) use regression analysis to test the relationship between 
CSR and CFP. The authors note that regression functions lacking the R&D and 
advertising expenditure variables will necessarily be misspecified10. Due to the fact that 
CFP can be affected by both of these variables, the authors find CSR as having an 
insignificant effect on CFP when the regression model is used with the R&D and 
                                                 
10 Please see Footnote 5 for a more detailed explanation.  
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advertising expenditure variables. Therefore, the model without both variables is 
misspecified.  
 
Hillman and Keim (2001) follow Baron (2001) by disaggregating CSR into stakeholder 
management (strategic CSR) and social issue participation (altruistic CSR), before then 
testing the relationship between CFP and these two CSR elements. The relationship 
between CFP and strategic CSR is found to be positive, while the relationship between 
CFP and altruistic CSR is found to be negative.  
 
Thomas (2001) tests the relationship between excess stock market returns and corporate 
environmental policy. The data used in this study comes from a Croydon Borough 
Council (UK) survey of 297 pension schemes (that garnered 131 responses). The survey 
asks three main questions, namely: whether the firms have an environmental policy; 
whether the firms have ever been prosecuted by a UK environmental agency; and 
whether the firms provide environmental policy training to their staff. Thomas (2001) 
uses a multiple regression framework to test the relationship between the monthly excess 
stock return and monthly excess return for the market index, with size factor given as an 
additional explanatory variable. Dummy variables based on survey questions are used in 
this regression, with the value of the dummy variable equalling “one” if the company has 
an environmental policy, has been prosecuted by an environmental agency or provides 
environmental policy training to its staff. The results show that, for firms with an 
environmental policy, the excess return for firms in high-polluting industries increases 
over the period 1995-1997 and moves from negative to positive over the three sub-
periods. For companies that have been prosecuted by an environmental agency, there is a 
significant positive effect for the excess return in the first sub-period (1985-1991), which 
is then reversed for the third sub-period (starting 1995). Meanwhile, the author fails to 
identify any significant explanatory power for the excess return when environmental 
policy staff training is used as a dummy variable.  
 
Surroca et al (2010) reject claims of a direct relationship between social and financial 
performance (suggesting that the evidence of a direct relationship presented in previous 
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studies is flawed due to the fact that researchers do not consider intangible resources). In 
this context, the authors apply intangible resources to their regression and find an indirect 
relationship between social and financial performance, which is dependent on the effect 
of the intangible resources.  
 
Several firm-based studies estimate the relationship between CSR and the cost of equity 
capital. Sharfman and Fernando (2008) use 267 US firms to test the relationship between 
environmental risk management and the cost of capital. The authors note that good 
environmental risk management appears to result in a lower weighted average cost of 
capital—and more specifically that good environmental risk management leads to a 
higher cost of debt capital—while higher levels of environmental risk management 
reduces the cost of equity capital for firms. Using the CAPM theory, the authors find that 
higher levels of environmental risk management lead to lower systemic risk betas, as well 
as less volatile performance. Thus, the authors conclude that improved environmental risk 
management leads to improved economic performance (such as the decreased cost of 
equity capital or transfers from equity to debt financing).  
 
Having selected firms with individual CSR reports and CSR ratings from the KLD 
database, Dhaliwal et al (2010) consider how a firm’s initiative in disclosing CSR 
activities voluntarily affect the cost of a firm’s equity capital. The authors record higher 
costs of equity capital in the year prior to the CSR disclosure, and then a lower cost of 
equity capital after the firms have disclosed their CSR activities. As well, after disclosure, 
institutional investors and analyst coverage are found to prefer firms that display good 
social performance (there are some minor errors in the analyst forecasts).  
 
El Ghoul et al (2011) use 12,915 US firms from the period 1992-2007 to consider the 
effect of CSR on the cost of capital. The authors apply four different valuation models to 
compute the implied cost of equity capital—namely the Claus and Thomas (2001) model, 
Gebhardt et al (2001) model, Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model and Easton 
(2004) model 11 . All of these models are based on current share prices and analyst 
                                                 
11 El Ghoul et al (2011) provide a detailed explanation of these models, which is given in Appendix A.  
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forecasts. The CSR data used in the study is taken from the KLD database, and 
regressions are run between CSR and the implied cost of equity capital by controlling 
firm-specific control variables, industry and year-fixed. The authors report higher levels 
of CSR as resulting in significantly lower implied costs of equity capital. However, not 
all KLD indicators are found to affect the implied cost of equity capital. For example, 
firms displaying good performance for employee relations, environment and product 
indicators are found to have lower implied costs of equity capital; while good 
performance for community, diversity and human rights does not appear to affect the 
implied cost of equity capital. Firms in both the tobacco and nuclear power industries 
have higher implied costs of capital. However, the authors conclude that, in general, 
stronger CSR performance contributes to higher valuations and lower risk.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
Over the past decade, a significant amount of research has been conducted into the links 
between CSR strategies and CFP. Some firms spend billions of dollars on CSR every 
year, while others do not. Despite the high volume of studies in this area, still no clear 
conclusion has been reached as to the financial value of CSR for companies (Renneboog 
et al 2008). 
 
This Chapter has analysed existing literature, concentrating on three main areas, namely: 
a) CSR-related theory; b) a comparison of the performance of SRI and non-SRI funds; 
and c) an analysis of different methodologies used to measure the performance of CSR. 
In terms of CSR-related theory, this Chapter explores a number of theories used in 
existing literature to explain the effects of CSR on financial performance. SRI 
performance is analysed from the perspective of the US, UK and other markets; while 
event study, portfolio study and regression and correlation analysis are the methodologies 
used to examine CSR performance. However, in both of these cases, the findings from 
existing literature are found to be contradictory and therefore inconclusive. Ullmann 
(1985) and Griffin and Mahon (1997) both suggest that differing methodologies are to 
blame for the conflicting results on the relationship between CSR and CFP. Thus, using 
appropriate measures has become more important. Moreover, as studies into the 
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performance of SRI funds are unable to explain whether or not CSR provides firms with 
net costs or profits; several governments have introduced CSR disclosure regulations for 
institutional funds; and also the number of CSR investors continues to rise (Galema et al, 
2008), a better understanding of the relationship between CSR and financial performance 
is required. It is a combination of the above factors that motivates this thesis to make use 
of more comprehensive methodologies to analyse if and how CSR affects financial 
performance and market valuation at the firm level.  
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Chapter Three: Portfolio Formation and Portfolio 
Return 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this Chapter is to test the portfolio returns for CSR, and to establish whether 
or not CSR leads to improved CFP. Renneboog et al (2008) argue that it is still an open 
question as to whether CSR can be “priced”, a problem that sends inconsistent signals to 
investors, managers and stakeholders with regards to CSR-related returns.  
 
In this Chapter, CSR portfolios are created to examine how CSR affects CFP, while also 
looking at whether CSR leads to abnormal returns. CSR rating data from KLD Research 
& Analytics Inc is used to create “high” and “low” CSR rated portfolios. The normalised 
KLD score is first computed in order to create the portfolios. However, when attempting 
this, no clear break points are found for the scores, while some of the portfolios only 
contain a small number of firms—or even no firms at all. Therefore, the net KLD score is 
instead used to create the portfolios (although the net score is less complex than the 
normalised score, it has clearer points for classifying the portfolios). In the case of the 
normalised KLD score, the negative, positive and best-in-class approaches are used to 
create portfolios. (The negative approach is only used for controversial indicators to 
classify the high and low portfolios, while the positive approach rates all firms based on 
qualitative indicators, and the best-in-class approach applies the ten-industry 
classification and positive approach together in order to create portfolios.) For the net 
KLD score, a score is deemed to belong to the high-scoring portfolio when it is greater 
than zero, and to the low-scoring portfolio when it is less than zero.  
 
When using the Fama-French three-factor model, Carhart four-factor model, conditional 
CAPM and conditional three-factor model, no difference is apparent in the performance 
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of the high- and low-scoring portfolios for either the normalised or net score. The long-
short strategy provides an insignificant alpha for most indicators, while the performance 
of the best-in-class approach is similar to that of the positive approach, however, there is 
some evidence of lower factor-loading exposures in high-scoring CSR firms, which 
consistent with El Ghoul et al (2011). In summary, this Chapter uses longest-period KLD 
data and attempts to create portfolios by using normalised scores. However, as using the 
normalised scores proves problematic, net scores are instead used to create portfolios and 
test performance. Moreover, comprehensive factor models are used to test performance 
(it should be noted that CSR studies do not commonly use the conditional CAPM or 
conditional three-factor models).  
 
3.2 Methodology overview 
This thesis is interested in the relationship between CSR and returns for two reasons. First, 
it aims to ascertain whether investors can earn abnormal returns from such strategies 
(which in an efficient market should not be possible). Second, it aims to prove the 
assumption that if, as some ICC studies have suggested, CSR leads to lower costs of 
capital, then CSR engagement should lead to lower factor exposures. The factor models 
used in this Chapter are the Fama-French three-factor model, Carhart four-factor model, 
conditional CAPM and conditional three-factor model. A brief overview of each of these 
models is given below. 
 
3.2.1 Fama-French three-factor model and Carhart four-factor model 
The earliest of these models is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964) 
and Lintner (1965), which is developed according to the mean-variance analysis of 
Markowitz (1952), who examines the relationship between risk and return for a portfolio 
framework. The authors assume that investors are risk averse, and also that investors only 
look at the mean and variance of a portfolio.  
 
As the CAPM model comes to be better understood, some researchers argue that the 
model fails its purpose due to several reasons, with the first argument concerning the 
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conditional CAPM. The CAPM of Sharpe and Lintner assumes that market beta and 
market premium are both constant, while the conditional CAPM includes time variations 
for market beta and market premium. The second argument comes in the form of the 
multi-factor model. For the CAPM model, there is only one factor to explain expected 
return, whereas models such as the Fama-French three-factor model and Carhart four-
factor model explain expected return using several more factors.  
 
Fama and French (1992) evaluate the joint roles of market beta, firm size and market 
equity (ME). Their study shows that the beta has minimal explanatory power for average 
return. The authors conduct individual tests for size, E/P, leverage and book-to-market 
equity, as well as conducting joint testing. For the individual tests, size, E/P, leverage and 
book-to-market equity are found to have significant explanatory power for the cross-
section of average return. However, for the joint testing, both size and the book-to-market 
ratio are able to significantly explain the cross-section of average stock return. As such, 
the authors conclude that risk is multidimensional under rational stock prices. In 
summary, the authors test the relationship between stock returns, market beta and some 
firm-level variables to find that the stock return is significantly affected by size and book-
to-market ratio variables. The authors conclude that, on the whole, the CAPM fails under 
empirical study, as stock returns can be explained by size, P/E, D/E, book-to-market and 
long-term returns (especially in the case of size and book-to-market ratio). Fama and 
French (1998) find that, in addition to the US market, price ratios also affect another 
twelve markets.  
 
Fama and French (1993) is an extension of the research conducted in Fama and French 
(1992). The main points are as follows: (1) For stocks, mimicking portfolios are 
constructed according to size and book-to-market ratio, which are able to explain—and 
are sensitive to—the risk of stock return. By regressing the stock portfolio with excess 
market return and mimicking return for size and book-to-market portfolios, the authors 
find that the intercepts for this regression are close to zero, meaning that it is possible to 
explain the stock return by a combination of market factors, size and book-to-market risk 
factors; (2) For bonds, the authors construct mimicking portfolios according to the term 
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and default premiums, and find that the average returns for bonds can be explained by 
term-structure factors; and (3) The authors build a three-factor asset pricing model for 
stocks, using the excess return on market portfolio, size and book-to-market equity as risk 
factors.  
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) identify a positive relationship between past and future 
returns. Once “winner” and “loser” portfolios have been formed using past returns, the 
difference in the returns for these portfolios is observed for the months following the 
portfolio formation date. The authors conclude that there is a positive relationship 
between the returns of the previous twelve months and future returns. Neither the CAPM 
nor the Fama-French three-factor model are able to explain this difference in returns 
between winner and loser portfolios.  
 
Carhart (1997) constructs the four-factor model using market excess return, SMB, HML 
and momentum factors. The author uses the equally-weighted return of past winner 
portfolios—minus the equally-weighted return of past loser portfolios—as the momentum 
factor. A similar process is also employed to create the momentum factor for both SMB 
and HML factors.  
 
Ang and Zhang (2004) report that, when using simulation, the calendar-time portfolio 
regression method (CTPR) has a strong ability to detect abnormal performance. The 
three-factor model is found to be better at evaluating performance than the four-factor 
model, due to the fact that the four-factor model has a higher chance of rejecting the null 
hypothesis, and the testing power is then found to be significantly reduced for the long-
term period.  
 
3.2.2 Conditional asset pricing model 
The CAPM of Sharpe and Lintner is an unconditional model, which assumes that the 
market beta is constant. Their model uses average return and beta risk over the testing 
period, which neglects to consider variations in the financial market during the testing 
period. Ferson and Warther (1996) use a simple example to support their argument that 
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the conditional model is better than the unconditional. The authors assume that the 
market has a bull and bear state, with each having an equal chance of occurring. They 
also assume a 20 percent expected return for the S&P 500 in a bull market, and a 10 
percent return in a bear market. The risk free return to cash is 5 percent if a mutual fund 
holds the S&P 500 in a bull and cash in a bear market. For the conditional on a bull 
market, the beta is 1, while the expected return is 20 percent (the same as with the S&P 
500 expected return) and the alpha is zero. Similarly, the alpha of the conditional on a 
bear market is found to be zero. However, incorrect performance is recorded for the 
unconditional model, for which the beta is 0.612 and alpha is 0.015. As such, and unlike 
with the conditional model, the unconditional model reports positive abnormal 
performance.  
 
There is much literature concerning conditional performance evaluation (CPE). Both risk 
and market premiums change over time according to the “economic state”, which is 
measured using public information variables. The earliest CPE studies are from Chen and 
Knez (1996), Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Ferson and Warther (1996), who all record 
significant statistic and economic performance under the conditional approach. Hansen 
and Singleton (1982) find that the conditional CAPM works well when compared with 
the unconditional CAPM (the market beta is used as the time variance for the conditional 
CAPM). Merton (1980) notes that, over time, economic conditions affect both expected 
market excess return and related volatility. 
 
Campbell (1987) finds that time variations in expected stock and bond returns can be 
explained by using term-structure variables. Likewise, Fama and French (1989) find that 
expected stock returns and long-term bond returns can be affected by business-cycle 
patterns and business conditions. Strong economic conditions result in lower expected 
returns, while a weak economic environment has higher expected returns to induce 
investment from consumption.  
 
                                                 
12 The detail calculation is showed in notes 3 in this paper.  
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Ferson and Schadt (1996) find that the unconditional expected returns used in traditional 
performance methods are unable to observe changes in expected returns and risk over 
time, and therefore argue that traditional methods are unreliable. The authors duly 
provide a conditional method, which incorporates instrument variables for controlling 
time variations that can capture more accurate performance. Time-varying conditional 
betas are recorded under the conditional model, and the authors report that risk exposure 
changes according to the availability of public information. In the traditional model, more 
negative Jensen’s alphas are found than positive, thus indicating poor average 
performance (Jensen, 1968; and Elton et al, 1992). In contrast, the conditional model 
provides neutral performance, with the mean of the alphas being almost zero. The 
evaluation of conditional performance is consistent with the assumption of a semi-strong 
form of market efficiency. This solves the problem of the dynamic behaviour of returns, 
something which traditional performance cannot control. Furthermore, the authors also 
find short term interest rates to be the most important conditional variables (compared 
with other conditional variables used in the same study).  
 
Several studies argue that the conditional versions of simple asset pricing models are 
better than traditional models when explaining the cross-section return (including those 
by Chan and Chen (1988) and Jagannathan and Wang (1996)). Zheng (1999) and Becker 
et al (1999) both find that mutual funds perform better with conditional alphas than with 
unconditional alphas. However, Ghysels (1998) and Harvey (2001) find that different 
instrument variables affect the performance of loading factors.  
 
Furthermore, Fama and French (1997) find estimations of industry cost of equity to be 
imprecise, with both the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor models returning standard 
errors of more than 3 percent each year. The same study also finds industry risk loading 
to vary significantly over time under the CAPM and three-factor models. In order to 
reduce the volatility of risk loadings, the study employs two different methods. The first 
method employs rolling regressions by using monthly returns from the previous five 
years to run the rolling CAPM and three-factor models. As the authors explain: “The idea 
is that, if the true CAPM and three-factor slopes for industries vary through time, the 
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time-series variation of the rolling-regression slopes should exceed that implied by 
estimation error”. The second method is that of conditional regression, which uses 
instruments to tract risk in order to avoid the weaknesses of unconditional regressions 
(such as with the CAPM and three-factor models). Both size and book-to-market ratio are 
used as proxies for the sensitivity of SMB and HML. In the case that one industry is 
smaller, the SMB loading of that industry is found to increase, while both the book-to-
market ratio and HML loading increase if the industry is suffering. With reference to the 
conditional regression, the authors state that: “Thus, we try to track time-varying 
sensitivities to SMB and HML with conditional regressions in which an industry’s SMB 
and HML slopes vary with the average size and book-to-market-equity of firms in the 
industry”. Finally, they find that the average R square increases when the Ln(ME)SMB 
and Ln(BE/ME)HML variables are added to the three-factor model. After comparing the 
performance of the full-period constant-slope regression, conditional regressions and 
rolling regressions, the authors find that, for a one-month forecast, both the full-period 
constant-slope regression and rolling regression provide similarly precise forecasts 
(however, these are still slightly less precise than with the conditional regression). For the 
long-term forecasts, both the full-period constant-slope regression and conditional 
regression provide similar forecasts (which are slightly better than the rolling regression 
for forecasts of more than two years).  
 
3.2.3 Comparison of equally-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) returns 
Since usually more than one firm is used during testing, it is necessary to compute the 
average of these firms’ returns by using either equally-weighted or value-weighted 
returns.  
 
Fama (1998) examines equally-weighted and value-weighted returns, arguing that there is 
more weighted allocation for small firms in the equally-weighted portfolios, and that this 
could have a potentially negative effect on the effectiveness of the model. In contrast, the 
value-weighted returns (which are allocated according to total market capitalisation) are 
found to be more accurate, and thus it is concluded that the value-weighted method can 
reduce related problems with the model.  
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Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) report that the choice between the equally-weighted 
and value-weighted methods depends on the perspective of the researcher. They argue 
that the value-weighted method is more suited to evaluating aggregated wealth effect, 
while the equally-weighted method is more suited to evaluating a typical firm’s abnormal 
return in specific tests.  
 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) note that, in the case that small firms have a greater 
misevaluation than large firms, the abnormal returns from the equally-weighted portfolio 
are greater than those from the value-weighted portfolio. For the value-weighted method, 
a single firm occupying a large proportion of the portfolio leads to a high variation in 
returns, larger standard error and low t-statistics. If the misevaluation is created by a 
common bias, the large firms can trade away the misevaluation more easily than the small 
firms due to the fact that the large firms have higher trading costs than small firms—and 
also because the price of the small firms tends to be more affected by trading volume.  
 
3.3 KLD data 
3.3.1 KLD-related studies
13
 
Waddock and Graves (1994) use KLD data to test the relationship between CSP and 
institutional owners, duly summarising that “Analysis indicated a significant, positive 
relationship between social performance and the number of institutions holding the shares 
of a company and a positive but insignificant relationship between social performance 
and the percentage of shares held by institutions”. The authors also state that KLD is 
much needed as a multidimensional CSP measurement index as it includes different 
industries and a large number of companies.  
 
Waddock and Graves (1997) use KLD data to test the relationship between CSP and CFP, 
and also note that KLD uses several sources to gather companies’ social performance 
data. The first involves sending an annual questionnaire to the investor relations office of 
                                                 
13 A number of these papers have already been discussed in the literature review. Please see sections 2.4.2.2 
and 2.4.2.3 for more details.  
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every rated company (KLD maintains an on-going relationship with companies’ investor 
relations offices in order to ensure the accuracy of data). The second source of data is 
internal company documents, including annual reports, 10K forms, quarterly reports, 
proxy statements and also reports specific to CSP. The third data source is external 
documents relating to the companies, including related news articles and trade magazines. 
The fourth data source is company-related information, such as articles in periodicals, 
newsletters from the regional environmental protection agency, academic journals, and 
also legal and regulatory reports. The final source of data is external survey and rating 
agencies that provide information to KLD.  
 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) use KLD data as CSR performance to test the relationship 
between CSR and CFP. The authors note that regression functions lacking the R&D and 
advertising expenditure variables will necessarily be misspecified. Hillman and Keim 
(2001) also use KLD data as CSR performance to disaggregate CSR into stakeholder 
management (strategic CSR) and social issue participation (altruistic CSR), before then 
testing the relationship between CFP and these two CSR elements.  
 
Kempf and Osthoff (2007) compute normalised KLD scores to rate CSR performance. 
They find significant positive abnormal returns for long-short portfolios (for the period 
1992-2004) for both the positive screening policy and best-in-class screening policy, but 
no significant abnormal returns for the negative screening policy. Moreover, the best-in-
class screening policy provides the highest abnormal returns at 8.7 percent per year.  
 
Sharfman and Fernando (2008) use KLD’s environment score to test the relationship 
between environmental risk management and the cost of capital. The authors note that 
good environmental risk management appears to result in a lower weighted average cost 
of capital.  
 
Galema et al (2008) also use KLD social performance data to create portfolios. However, 
in contrast to Statman and Glushkov (2009) and Kempf and Osthoff (2007), Galema et al 
(2008) create portfolios according to the strengths and concerns for each indicator. They 
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find that CSR affects stock returns by lowering book-to-market ratios, and not through 
positive alphas.   
 
Statman and Glushkov (2009) also create portfolios using corporate social data taken 
from KLD. In contrast to Kempf and Osthoff (2007), Statman and Glushkov (2009) 
exclude firms that do not have both strengths and concerns, due to concerns that some of 
these firms have not been evaluated by KLD. Three groups of portfolios are finally 
selected for the study. The first of these groups is the top-overall vs. bottom-overall 
portfolios; the second group of portfolios comprises accepted firms vs. shunned firms; 
and the third group of portfolios comprises the DS400 Index vs. the S&P 500 Index.  
 
Fernando et al (2010) use KLD’s environment indicator to test how ownership, analyst 
coverage and stock market valuation vary based on environmental performance. Surroca 
et al (2010) use KLD data to test the direct relationship between social and financial 
performance (suggesting that the evidence of a direct relationship presented in previous 
studies is flawed due to the fact that researchers do not consider intangible resources). 
Dhaliwal et al (2010) use KLD data as CSR performance to test how a firm’s initiative in 
disclosing CSR activities voluntarily affects the cost of a firm’s equity capital. The 
authors record higher costs of equity capital in the year prior to the CSR disclosure, and 
then a lower cost of equity capital after the firms have disclosed their CSR activities.  
 
El Ghoul et al (2011) test the effect of CSR on the cost of capital. The CSR data used in 
the study is obtained from the KLD database, and year-fixed effect regressions are run 
between CSR and the implied cost of equity capital by controlling firm-specific control 
variables and industry. The authors report that higher levels of CSR result in significantly 
lower implied costs of equity capital. However, not all KLD indicators are found to affect 
the implied cost of equity capital.  
 
3.3.2 Alternative approaches to CSP measurement 
With studies returning varied and inconsistent findings, the relationship between CSP and 
CFP remains unclear. Waddock and Graves (1997) claim that one of the reasons for this 
uncertainty lies in the different methods with which CSP is measured. The authors 
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summarise various methods used to measure CSP in previous studies, with each of the 
methods being shown to have different limitations. The first of these methods uses 
forced-choice survey instruments (Aupperle, 1991), which find it difficult to match the 
rate of returns. The second uses the Fortune Reputational and Social Responsibility Index 
(as used by O’Bannon and Preston (1993)), which measures a firm’s management from a 
broader perspective, rather than just by providing measurements of specific areas of CSP. 
The third method uses document content analysis (such as that in Wolfe (1991)). 
Although this measurement provides valuable information relating to a firm’s behaviour, 
the analysis can be conducted using various types of document, thus resulting in certain 
omissions or inclusions that might affect the analysis. The fourth method noted is the case 
study method (such as used by Clarkson (1991)). However, as only a small group of firms 
are used (and also as different case study methods are applied to the various studies), the 
subsequent results are inconsistent and difficult to compare. The final methods of note are 
those using social disclosure (Preston, 1978) and pollution control investments (Spicer, 
1978), which are only able to provide information on a specific CSP area of a company, 
rather than the overall CSR performance. As each industry and company has different 
approaches that explain these one-dimensional measurements, this thesis will utilise the 
CSP measurement index in order to avoid limitations, and thereby overcome related 
problems.  
 
Sharfman (1996) also analyses a number of methods used to measure CSP in previous 
studies, namely: (1) Fortune magazine data—with the author reporting that “studies using 
Fortune magazine data have the advantage of the data being provided by presumably well 
informed managers outside of the focal firms. However as Aupperle, (1991) and others 
have suggested there have been no attempts to validate these data and there is no 
discernible theory underlying the choice of variables”; (2) Survey based approaches—
with the author reporting that “Survey based approaches such as Aupperle (1984) also 
have their own strengths and weaknesses. In Aupperle (1984), the survey instrument 
relied heavily on Carroll (1979) for its theory providing it with a sound basis upon which 
to build. The instrument also appears to employ many of Kerlinger’s (1986) and others’ 
methodological suggestions to improve the validity of the gathered data. In his own 
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critique of his work Aupperle (1991) suggests that his data are limited by the use of 
single respondents in the firms and by some of the biases to which self-reported data are 
susceptible, e.g., a social desirability bias”; and (3) Content analysis approaches—with 
the author reporting that “content analysis approaches (e.g., Wolfe, 1991) bring a 
different dimension to the investigation of CSP. By analyzing the written statements of 
corporations, a researcher is less susceptible to self-report bias. While corporate 
statements are, by definition, self-serving, proper content analysis methods can take this 
bias into consideration. Further, there is a large body of literature available (e.g., Weber, 
1985) to help the researcher improve the rigor by which content analyses are done. 
However, the validity of content analyses rests on the coding schema adopted by the 
researcher. The more questionable the schema, the more the research is open to criticism”. 
The author suggests that KLD data should be used in order to avoid problems associated 
with the methods mentioned above.  
 
Another database relating to the US market is Innovest14. Guenster et al (2010) report that 
“One of the main strengths of this database is its comprehensiveness. Using over 20 
information sources, both quantitative and qualitative in nature, Innovest’s analysts 
evaluate a company relative to its industry peers via an analytical matrix. Companies are 
evaluated by more than 60 criteria, which jointly constitute the final rating”.  
 
Two research papers use Innovest data. First, Derwall et al (2005) use factor models to 
assess the performance of two stock portfolios. Eco-efficiency scores taken from the 
Innovest Strategic Value Advisors rating database are used to construct two mutually 
exclusive portfolios. The authors conclude that, after controlling risk, investment style 
and sector exposure, high-scoring portfolios significantly outperform low-scoring 
portfolios by nearly 6 percent per year (for the period 1995-2003). Second, Guenster et al 
(2011) use eco-efficiency scores obtained from the Innovest Strategic Value Advisors 
rating database to analyse the economic value of corporate eco-efficiency. The authors 
conclude the relationship between eco-efficiency and operating performance to be 
positive and slightly asymmetric. The ROA for high eco-efficient firms is found to be 
                                                 
14 This was despite us offering to pay the commercial rate for the data.  
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slightly greater than that for low eco-efficient firms, while a positive and time-varying 
relationship is also found to exist between eco-efficiency and Tobin’s q. Thus, these 
alternative avenues also provide contradictory results.  
 
In terms of the UK market, social performance data is taken from the Ethical Investment 
Research Service (EIRIS)15. Brammer et al (2006) test the relationship between CSR and 
stock performance in the UK using social performance data sourced from EIRIS. Three 
main indicators are used in their study, namely: employee responsibility, environment 
and community (taken as a single variable). The authors find firms with higher social 
performance scores to have lower returns then firms with lower social performance 
scores. The firms with the lowest social performance scores (i.e., zero) are shown to 
outperform the market, while firms with high social performance provide low returns.  
 
In addition, Hassel et al (2005) appear to be the only researchers to test the market 
valuation of CSP (they test the market valuation of environmental performance for 
Swedish firms). Having obtained environmental performance data from 
CaringCompany16  (CC) Research, the authors mention that “CC is a member of an 
international network that provides information on the ethical and environmental 
responsibility of firms. Their clients are leading investment companies, banks, and 
insurance companies in Sweden. Their proprietary performance-rating model is built on 
23 criteria and aggregated into five categories. The categories on which firms are 
evaluated are as follows: (I) environmental objectives and strategy, includes environment 
reporting (five criteria); (II) implementation of environmental processes (five criteria); 
(III) production-related environmental issues (five criteria); (IV) product-related 
environment issues (five criteria); and (V) service company-related issues (three criteria)”.  
 
3.3.3 Advantages and disadvantages of KLD indicators 
Although many empirical studies on CSP exist, most of these consider only one or two 
specific areas of social performance. This provides a very limited perspective on CSP 
                                                 
15 See page 1028 in Brammer et al (2006) for more details on EIRIS.  
16 See Appendix 1 for more information on the CSR databases used in different countries. A copy of the 
detailed references for the database is available on request from the author.  
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performance, and is therefore unable to reflect the overall CSP performance of a 
company (Wolfe and Aupperle, 1991). Thus, the relationship between CSP and CFP in 
these studies remains unclear. As is noted in Chapter Two of this thesis, some research 
studies record a slight positive relationship between CSP and CFP (e.g., McGuire et al, 
1988), while others find a strong positive relationship (e.g., Cochran and Wood, 1984), 
and others still report a negative relationship (e.g., Shane and Spicer, 1983).  
 
Waddock and Graves (1997) also note that CSP should be considered as a 
multidimensional construct, which can be affected by inputs to outputs. Different inputs 
can vary wildly (with differing environmental strategies, for example), just as can 
different internal processes (such as differing employee welfare or gender equality 
strategies) and different outputs (such as differing relationships with the local community) 
(Aupperle et al, 1985; Wolfe and Aupperle, 1991; and Aupperle, 1991). Waddock and 
Graves (1994) note that different CSP characteristics (and also different CSP domains 
and performance) hold differing levels of importance in different industries. In addition, 
CSP can also include a company’s managerial decisions and behaviour. As such, the 
authors argue that the definition and measurement of CSP are both inconsistent— 
especially due to the fact that some studies use only one or two dimensions of CSP and 
do not, therefore, reflect overall CSP performance. In summary, a multidimensional CSP 
measurement index is needed that includes different industries and a large number of 
companies.  
 
In order to overcome the problems mentioned above, it is necessary to use CSP data that 
has been measured by using standard criteria and consistent valuations of important 
social attributes. As such, this thesis opts to use CSP data from Kinder, Lydenberg & 
Domini (KLD), which claims to provide an independent CSP service and also assesses 
CSP from a number of different dimensions. Waddock and Graves (1997) list several 
advantages derived by using KLD data. First, KLD sells CSP ratings to a large 
investment community and rates all S&P 500 companies. Second, KLD rates multiple 
CSP attributes for each company. Third, KLD is an independent company that provides 
unique CSP ratings by using its own standard processes and criteria to rate companies, 
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while working independently and without any relationship to rated companies. Fourth, all 
companies are rated using the same criteria, resulting in a high level of consistency.  
 
Moreover, companies’ KLD ratings change annually according to changing information. 
For example, on 18 July, 2006, TIAA-CREF (the largest retirement fund in the US) sold 
1.2 million Coca-Cola shares, worth a total $52.4 million. KLD Research & Analytic Inc 
duly recorded concerns relating to workers’ rights and environmental practices, and thus 
dropped the Coca-Cola Company from its Broad Market Social Index from July 2006. 
Sharfman (1996) compares the construct validity of KLD data with other CSP 
measurements, concluding that “…researchers interested in studying corporate social 
performance now can have confidence in the KLD measures and can feel secure in the 
idea that this new data does tap into the core of the social performance construct”. Wood 
and Jones (1995) rate the KLD database as the “best-researched and most 
comprehensive” social performance database. 
 
However, as is the case with other databases, the KLD database has a number of 
disadvantages, which can be summarised in three parts: (1) First, it is assumed that the 
strengths and concerns for each KLD indicator indicate perfectly opposing directions; 
otherwise, the net score would be misleading when the variables do not converge (Carver, 
1989); (2) Second, it is assumed that all criteria and sub-criteria carry equal importance. 
However, in reality, some CSP areas may be deemed to be more important than others, or 
different industries may rate different areas of CSP as holding different importance. In 
order to overcome this problem, Ruf et al (1993) survey managers and use analytical 
hierarchy modelling to compute a weighted average CSP for each company across eight 
attributes. They duly allocate a single CSP number to each firm, with the highest value of 
a single CSP index being 1.66 and the lowest being -2.0. Both Waddock and Graves 
(1994, 1997) use academic opinion to rate KLD criteria in order of importance, thereby 
allocating a different weighting to each of the various KLD criteria. (3) The number of 
criteria and sub-criteria change over time, and so this thesis includes the new criteria and 
sub-criteria as soon as they are added by KLD, while deleting criteria and sub-criteria as 
soon as they are removed. Although the basis sub-criteria are not consistent over time, 
 71 
this thesis uses the latest available rating information to compute the annual rating score 
for each firm.  
 
There are also additional limitations for two of the KLD indicators—namely corporate 
governance and human rights. Kempf and Osthoff (2007) do not include corporate 
governance in their research, as they report that the criteria definitions for corporate 
governance used by KLD are different to the corporate governance indices used in 
various studies. The human rights indicator is not available for several years and contains 
sub-criteria that are less consistent than for the other indicators. Therefore, when using 
the net KLD score approach to create portfolios, the high-scoring portfolio only includes 
a very small number of firms.  
 
For the case of exclusionary criteria, six controversial criteria are used—namely alcohol, 
gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power and tobacco. Portfolios are created by 
combining all six controversial criteria, and thus it is not possible to evaluate the 
individual impact that each of the controversial indicators has on financial performance. 
Moreover, most firms are found to belong to the zero net score group, meaning that only 
a very small number of firms belong to the low-scoring portfolio for each controversial 
indicator.  
 
3.3.4 Introduction to KLD data 
KLD provides annual data “snapshots” relating to environmental, social and governance-
related performance for rated companies. The earliest year of data available from KLD is 
1991, from which year KLD starts rating all companies in the S&P 500 and Domini 400 
Social indices (comprising almost 650 companies in total). In 2001, KLD extends its 
database to include all companies in the Russell 1000—while also including all 
companies in the Russell 3000 from 2003. For the purpose of this thesis, all rated 
companies are included, meaning that 650 firms form the data from 1991, increasing to 
3000 firms in 2003 (it should be noted that Kempf and Osthoff (2007) only use 
companies belonging to the S&P 500 and DS 400).  
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In this thesis, KLD rating data involves two key assumptions. The first is that strengths 
must prefer and covary in opposing directions with concerns for each indicator in order to 
avoid the KLD rankings becoming distorted and, therefore, misleading (Mattingly and 
Berman, 2006). Researchers usually use the overall score for each indicator, which is the 
sum of the strengths minus the concerns. Carver (1989) argues that, when grouping the 
independent variables or non-convergent variables into a composite score, the basic 
relationship for these variables becomes distorted, thus affecting and confusing further 
testing and the subsequent relationship. Thus, if the strengths and concerns do not covary 
in opposing directions, and if there is no convergent validity between them, the strengths 
minus the concerns does not return an opposing score for each indicator. Thus, the 
combined score is misleading when the variables do not converge. As a result, this thesis 
assumes that the strengths and concerns indicate perfect opposing directions for each 
KLD indicator. The second assumption is that all criteria and sub-criteria are treated as 
being of equal importance. Although some researchers consider certain criteria to be 
more important than others, no standard rules are given to allocate the weighting for each 
of the criteria and sub-criteria. As such, in this thesis (and as in most studies), equal 
weight is given to all criteria and sub-criteria.  
 
Having understanding the KLD data, there are two different methods to present the CSR 
ratings from the KLD database. The first method is binary presentation, which means that 
each sub-criterion has a score of either one or zero (which is discussed in detail later in 
this section). The second method is that, for each qualitative criterion, KLD uses a five-
step scale to rate a company from having “major strengths” to “major weaknesses”. For 
the exclusionary criteria, KLD only evaluates the weaknesses of companies. Waddock 
and Graves (1994) convert all of these ratings into numerical values (meaning that, for 
qualitative criterion, +2 is used to represent a major strength and -2 a major weakness). 
The KLD rating for qualitative criterion ranges from major strength (+2), strength (+1), 
neutral (0), concern (-1), and major concern (-2). For exclusionary criteria, the rating 
score can only be -2, -1, or 0. Hillman and Keim (2001) also use this method of rating to 
test the relationship between shareholder value, stakeholder management and social 
issues. They report that shareholder value can be improved by stakeholder management, 
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and also that a negative relationship exists between social issues and shareholder value. 
Waddock and Graves (1997) also use the latter KLD rating method to test the link 
between CSP and CFP. They note that strategic managers have to allocate scarce 
corporate resources for social issues, and they find a positive relationship between CSP 
and prior financial performance under the slack resource availability theory. They also 
find a positive relationship between CSP and future financial performance under the good 
management theory.  
 
KLD uses several different sources to determine companies’ ratings for each criterion. 
For example, a “concern” is given if a company has fines or penalties relating to a 
specific criterion, and the amount of fines or penalties is used to determine whether it is a 
“concern” or “major concern”. It is considered a “strength” if a company has good 
employee-related policies, and the extent of benefits available to employees is used to 
determine whether this is a “strength” or a “major strength”. Judgement also forms an 
important part of KLD data, as it is necessary to determine various qualitative criteria, 
such as how “good” a company’s community relationship program is. As such, KLD 
discusses such aspects internally and makes a rating decision for each company. (The 
detailed factors that determine the ratings for each criterion are discussed in Section 
3.3.5.)  
 
KLD uses multiple criteria to rate companies, with the two broad categories of rating data 
being “qualitative” and “exclusionary” criteria. Seven qualitative criteria are 
considered—namely community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, human rights and product. The exclusionary criteria means that, where a 
company is involved in controversial business areas. Six controversial criteria are used—
namely alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power and tobacco. The qualitative 
indicators have both positive and negative ratings (i.e., “strengths” or “concerns”), while 
controversial indicators have only negative ratings.  
 
Multiple sub-criteria exist for each KLD criteria. For example, at the end of 2003, there 
are 10 sub-criteria listed under the community criterion, 7 for corporate governance, 11 
 74 
for diversity, 11 for employee relations, 13 for environment, 7 for human rights and 8 for 
product. Additionally, these sub-criteria can be divided into “strengths” and “concerns”. 
Each sub-criterion is presented by a binary summary, which means that each sub-criterion 
has a score of either one or zero. Where a company has a strength or concern on a 
particular issue, this is indicated by one. Where the company has neither a strength nor a 
concern, this is indicated by zero. However, the number of criteria and sub-criteria 
changes over the years, and, as such, this thesis includes the new criteria and sub-criteria 
as soon as they are added by KLD. Likewise, this thesis also deletes criteria or sub-
criteria as soon as they are removed by KLD. As such, this thesis uses the latest rating 
information available to investors to compute the annual rating score for each company. 
(It should also be noted that the number of controversial indicators varies over the years; 
for example, there is no “firearm” indicator before1998.)  
 
Table 3.1 introduces the number of strengths and concerns for each qualitative indicator, 
as well as the number of concerns for each controversial indicator. In the case that the 
sub-criteria are not rated by KLD, these sub-criteria are not included in the table. As has 
been previously noted, the number of strengths and concerns varies over the years. For 
example, for “community”, the number of strengths increases to seven in 2008, whereas 
the number of concerns stays almost stable (except for in 1993, when one concern is 
removed). For “corporate governance”, the number of strengths and concerns increases 
up until 2008; whereas for “diversity”, a new strength is added in 1995, while the number 
of concerns does not change from 1993. For “employee relations”, the number of 
strengths decreases to five in 1995, and then increases to six in 2003, with the number of 
concerns remaining stable throughout. For “environment”, the number of strengths 
fluctuates over the period, while the number of concerns increases to seven in 1999. For 
“human rights”, no strengths are given for the first three years, while three are recorded 
from 2002 and the number of concerns fluctuates throughout the period. For “product”, 
the number of strengths and concerns remains stable over the period (at four each). For 
controversial indicators, the number of concerns for all indicators remains the same until 
1997, while there is only one concern for each of the controversial indicators from 2002 
to 2008.  
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Table 3.1 Summary of number of strengths and concerns for each KLD indicator 
There are two broad categories of KLD rating data, which being “qualitative” and “exclusionary” criteria. 
Seven qualitative criteria are considered—namely community, corporate governance, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, human rights and product. Six controversial criteria are used—namely alcohol, 
gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power and tobacco. The qualitative indicators have both positive and 
negative ratings (i.e., “strengths” or “concerns”), while controversial indicators have only negative ratings. 
NR means not available.  
 
 
CSR 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Qualitative Indicators
Community
Strengths 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 6
Concerns 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
Corporate Governance
Strengths 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
Concerns 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3
Diversity
Strengths 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8
Concerns 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Employee Relations
Strengths 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5
Concerns 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Environment
Strengths 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5
Concerns 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7
Human Rights
Strengths NR NR NR 2 2 1 1 1 1
Concerns 2 2 2 5 3 3 3 4 4
Product
Strengths 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Concerns 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Controversial Indicators
Alcohol
Concerns 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
Gambling
Concerns 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
Tobacco
Concerns 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Firearms
Concerns NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 1 1
Military
Concerns 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Nuclear Power
Concerns 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  
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CSR 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Qualitative Indicators
Community
Strengths 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7
Concerns 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Corporate Governance
Strengths 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 6 6
Concerns 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 7 6
Diversity
Strengths 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Concerns 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Employee Relations
Strengths 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6
Concerns 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Environment
Strengths 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6
Concerns 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Human Rights
Strengths 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Concerns 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Product
Strengths 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Concerns 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Controversial Indicators
Alcohol
Concerns 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Gambling
Concerns 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tobacco
Concerns 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Firearms
Concerns 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Military
Concerns 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nuclear Power
Concerns 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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3.3.5 Description of the individual strengths and concerns for each indicator 
Since the KLD scores are calculated according to the individual strengths and concerns 
for each indicator, a detailed description of these individual strengths and concerns is 
provided below.  
 
The KLD data can be divided into the two broad categories of “qualitative” and 
“exclusionary” criteria. The “qualitative” criteria are considered first, starting with the 
community indicator, which has eight strengths and five concerns. In terms of the 
strengths, if a firm continuously gives to charity more than 1.5 percent of its three-year 
net earnings before taxes, or if it uses any other ways to give, the firm is rated as having a 
“charitable giving” strength (this strength is renamed from “generous giving” in 2002). 
The “innovation giving” strength applies when a firm implements innovation-giving 
projects for non-profit organisations (especially those that improve self-sufficiency for 
the economically disadvantaged), and also a firm allows non-traditional federated 
charitable giving drives in the workplace. The “non-US charitable giving” applies when 
the firm has notable charitable contributions outside the United States (meaning that at 
least 20 percent of the giving or innovative initiatives for giving programs are outside the 
United States). The “support for housing” strength applies when a firm supports housing 
initiatives for the economically disadvantaged (whether public or private, and such as the 
National Equity Fund or the Enterprise Foundation). The “support for education” strength 
applies when the firm supports primary or secondary school education, or if it runs youth 
job training programs (this strength is added in 1994). The “indigenous peoples relations” 
strength considers whether the proposed or current operations of a firm respects the land, 
human rights, culture, intellectual property and sovereignty of indigenous peoples (it 
should be noted that this strength is added in 2000, and then moved to become part of the 
human rights indicator from 2002). The “volunteer programs” strength considers whether 
the firm has strong volunteer programs (this strength is added in 2005). Finally, the 
“other” strength considers whether firms have a strong in-kind giving program or carry 
out any other significant community activities. Turning to the community concerns, for 
the “investment controversies” concern, KLD evaluates whether, as financial institutions, 
the firms invest in or lend to any controversial activities (especially those investments 
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associated with the Community Reinvestment Act). The “negative economic impact” 
concern considers whether a firm’s activities lead to any form of economic impact (KLD 
states that: “These controversies can include issues related to environmental 
contamination, water rights disputes, plant closings, “put-or-pay” contracts with trash 
incinerators, or other company actions that adversely affect the quality of life, tax base, or 
property values in the community”). For the “indigenous peoples relations” concern, the 
standards for the “concern” are opposite to those applying to the indigenous peoples 
relations strength (it should also be noted that, as is the case with the indigenous peoples 
relations strength, this concern is added in 2000 and then moved to become part of the 
human rights indicator in 2002). The “tax disputes” concern considers whether the firm 
has been involved in any tax disputes relating to the federal, state, local or non-US 
government authorities (it should be noted that KLD moves this concern from the 
governance to community indicator in 2005). Finally, for the “other” concern, KLD 
considers whether the firm is involved in any other notable community-related 
controversies.  
 
The corporate governance indicator has five strengths and six concerns. In terms of the 
strengths, the “limited compensation” strength applies to firms that pay relatively lower 
levels of compensation to top managers or board members (specifically, lower than 
$500,000 overall compensation per CEO per year, or $30,000 per year for external 
directors). The “ownership” strength is given if a firm owns more than 20 percent but less 
than 50 percent of another company with KLD strengths, or if another company with 
KLD strengths owns more than 20 percent of the firm (if the firm owns more than 50 
percent of another firm, it is treated as a division of the first firm). The “transparency” 
strength considers whether the firm reports effectively the measurement of social and 
environmental performance or one specific measurement (this strength is added in 2005). 
The “political accountability” strength considers whether the firm is able to affect public 
policy issues, or if its political involvement is recorded explicitly (this strength is added 
in 2005). Finally, for the “other” strength, KLD evaluates whether the firm has an 
especially good company culture, or any other good corporate governance-related 
activities not otherwise rated by KLD. Turning to the corporate governance concerns, the 
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standards for the “high compensation” concern are opposite to those for the corporate 
governance strength (i.e., that top managers or board members receive higher levels of 
compensation, meaning that the firm pays more than $10 million per year per CEO or 
more than $100,000 per year for external directors). The “ownership” concern applies if 
the firm owns more than 20 percent but less than 50 percent of another company with 
KLD concerns, or if another company with KLD concerns owns more than 20 percent of 
this firm. The “accounting” concern considers whether the firm has been involved in any 
accounting-related controversies deemed to be of a serious nature (this concern is added 
in 2005). The “transparency” concern is applied when the firm lacks effective reporting 
to show the measurement of social and environmental performance (this concern is added 
in 2005). The “political accountability” concern applies when the firm has been involved 
in controversies that affect public policy issues, or if it has a particularly bad record in 
terms of its political involvement and does not show this clearly (this concern is added in 
2005). Finally, for the “other” concern, KLD considers whether the company has been 
involved in any other controversial activities relating to corporate governance and not 
rated by KLD.  
 
The diversity indicator has eight strengths and three concerns. In terms of the strengths, 
for the “CEO” strength, KLD evaluates whether the CEO is a woman or a member of a 
minority group in that particular firm. The “promotion” strength applies when the firm 
displays positive treatment of women and minorities (particularly in terms of whether 
such individuals hold positions able to affect the firm’s profits). The “board of directors” 
strength applies when the firm provides four or more boardroom positions for women, 
members of ethnic minorities, and/or the disabled (or alternatively a minimum of one-
third of positions when the number of directors is no more than 12). The “work/life 
benefits” strength applies when the firm provides good benefits for its employees, or if it 
implements any other projects to support employees’ work/life balance, such as childcare 
or elder care (it should be noted that this strength is renamed from “family benefits” in 
2005). The “women and minority contracting” strength applies when a minimum of 5 
percent of a firm’s subcontracting involves women and/or minority-owned firms, or when 
some other strong form of evidence exists to show that businesses with such attributes are 
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used. The “employment of the disabled” strength applies when the firm provides good 
hiring programs for the disabled, good human resource programs, or a good reputation for 
hiring disabled employees. The “gay and lesbian policies” strength applies when the firm 
has (or has improved) policies relating to gay and lesbian employees, and also when it 
provides benefits for employees’ domestic partners (this strength is added in 1995). 
Finally, the “other” strength applies when the firm supports other important positive 
diversity activities not rated by KLD. Turning to the diversity concerns, the 
“controversies” concern applies if the firm has paid significant amounts of fines or civil 
penalties due to non-affirmative action, or has otherwise been involved in any major 
controversies relating to affirmative action issues. The “non-representation” concern 
applies when there are no women on a firm’s board of directors or among its senior line 
managers. Finally, the “other” concern applies if the firm has been involved in any other 
controversial diversity-related activities not rated by KLD.  
 
The employee relations indicator has seven strengths and five concerns. In terms of the 
strengths, the “union relations” strength applies if the firm displays fair treatment of the 
unionised workforce. The “no-layoff policy” strength applies when firms have a 
consistent no-layoff policy (this strength is only used prior to 1995). The “cash profit 
sharing” strength applies when the firm has a cash profit sharing program for its 
workforce. The “employee involvement” strength applies when the firm provides 
employee stock options (this can be in the form of “gain sharing, stock ownership, 
sharing of financial information, or participation in management decision-making”). The 
“retirement benefits” strength applies when the firm has good retirement benefits 
programs. The “health and safety” strength applies when the firm has good health and 
safety programs. Finally, for the “other” strength, KLD evaluates whether the firm is 
engaged in any other good employee relations-related activities that are deemed to be of 
significance and are not rated by KLD. Turning to its concerns, the “union relations” 
concern applies when the firm has a bad relationship with unions. The “health and safety” 
concern applies if significant amounts of fines or civil penalties have been charged due to 
a firm breaking health and safety standards for employees, or if there have been any other 
serious controversies with regard to health and safety. The “workforce reductions” 
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applies if there have been dramatic decreases in the firm’s workforce during the years. 
The “retirement benefits” concern applies when firms do not provide well-defined benefit 
pension plans or retirement benefit programs. Finally, for the “other” concern, KLD 
evaluates whether the firm has been involved in any other negative employee relations-
related activities not rated by KLD.  
 
The environment indicator has seven strengths and seven concerns. In terms of the 
strengths, the “beneficial products and services” strength applies when the firm is able to 
earn significant profits from innovative remediation products, by using energy efficiently, 
or by improving products so that they benefit the environment. The “pollution 
prevention” strength applies when the firm has decreased emissions and toxic waste by 
using pollution-preventing programs. The “recycling” strength applies when a firm uses a 
high proportion of recycled materials in its products or if the firm is a recycling company. 
The “clean energy” strength applies when the firm uses renewable energy and clean fuels 
to combat climate change and air pollution, and also if the firm adopts positive climate-
related policies and activities beyond its actual operations. The “communications” 
strength applies when the firm adopts CERES principles, has positive key environmental 
reports, or has good internal communications systems that help improve environmental 
performance (this strength is added in 1996, but is then moved to become part of the 
corporate governance transparency rating in 2005). The “property, plant and equipment” 
strength applies when the firm’s property, plant and equipment standards are higher than 
average (this strength is added in 1995). Finally, for the “other” strength, KLD evaluates 
whether the firm has good management systems, voluntary projects, or any other positive 
environmental operations. Turning to environment concerns, the “hazardous waste” 
concern applies when the firm has more than $50 million in liabilities for locations with 
hazardous waste, or if it has been charged with fines or civil penalties for breaking waste 
management rules. The “regulatory problems” concern applies if the firm has been 
charged with fines or civil penalties for breaking air, water or other types of 
environmental regulation, or if it is found to have acted against the Clean Air Act, Clean 
Water Act or any other important environmental regulation. The “ozone depleting 
chemicals” concern applies when the firm is a key manufacturer of ozone-depleting 
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chemicals (with these chemicals including HCFCs, methyl chloroform, methylene 
chloride and bromines). The “substantial emissions” concern applies when the firm emits 
higher-than-legal levels of toxic chemicals for an individual operation. The “agricultural 
chemicals” concern applies if the firm produces large amounts of agricultural chemicals 
(such as chemical fertilisers or pesticides). The “climate change” concern applies when 
the firm earns a large proportion of its profit directly or indirectly from coal, oil or other 
fuels (such as for electric utilities or transportation companies; this concern is added in 
1999). Finally, for the “other” concern, KLD evaluates whether the firm has been 
involved in any other controversial environment-related activities.  
 
The “human rights” indicator has four strengths and seven concerns. In terms of the 
strengths, for the “positive record in South Africa” strength, the firm must have a 
strongly positive social record relating to South Africa (this strength is only included in 
1994 and 1995). The “indigenous peoples relations” strength applies when the proposed 
or current operations of the firm respect the land, human rights, culture, intellectual 
property and sovereignty of indigenous peoples (this strength is added in 2000, and then 
moved from the community to human rights indicator in 2004). The “labor rights” 
strength applies when the firm clearly details and traces overseas sourcing, when it has a 
good relationship with labour unions outside the United States, or when it has been seen 
to improve its activities relating to labour rights (this strength is added in 2002). Finally, 
the “other” strength applies when the firm has clearly disclosed human rights initiatives 
and issues, or when it has one of the best human rights-related performances in the 
industry on issues not rated by KLD. Turning to the human rights concerns, the “South 
Africa” concern applies when firms face controversy over their operations in South 
Africa (this concern is used from 1991 to 1994 only). The “Northern Ireland” concern 
applies when the firm operates in Northern Ireland (this concern is used from 1991 to 
1994 only). The “Burma” concern applies when the firm operates or invests directly in, or 
makes purchases from, Burma (this concern is added in 1995). The “Mexico” concern 
applies if a company has controversial operations in Mexico, particularly in terms of 
employee treatment or environmental damage (this concern is included from 1995 to 
2002 only). The “labor rights” concern applies when the firm has controversial labour 
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rules within its supply chain (this concern is added in 1998). The “indigenous peoples 
relations” concern has standards that are opposite to the indigenous peoples relations 
strength, meaning that the firm does not respect indigenous peoples (this concern is added 
in 2000). Finally, the “other” concern applies if the firm has been involved in any other 
important human rights-related controversies not rated by KLD.  
 
The product indicator has four strengths and four concerns. In terms of the strengths, the 
“quality” strength applies when the firm has displayed very high quality-related programs 
for a prolonged period, or if the firm is famous for its quality-related programs within its 
industry in the United States. The “R&D/innovation” strength applies when the firm is an 
industry leader in terms of R&D (and especially if it produces innovative products). The 
“benefits to economically disadvantage” strength applies when the firm provides products 
or services for the economically disadvantaged. Finally, the “other” strength applies when 
a firm’s products display very high social benefits. Turning to the product concerns, the 
“product safety” concern applies when the firm has been charged fines or civil penalties, 
or if it has been involved in any other controversies or controlled activities relating to 
product or service safety. The “marketing/contracting” concern applies when the firm has 
been involved in major controversies in terms of its marketing or contracting, or if it has 
been charged fines or civil penalties due to advertising methods, consumer fraud or 
government contracting. The “antitrust” concern applies when the firm has been charged 
fines or civil penalties for acting against antitrust regulations, or if it has been involved in 
any major controversies concerning antitrust activities (such as “price fixing, collusion or 
predatory pricing”). Finally, the “other” concern applies when the firm has been involved 
in any controversial franchise practices (such as nuclear safety problems for electric 
utility companies or product problems), or if the firm is involved in any other 
controversial product-related issues not rated by KLD.  
 
Next, the “exclusionary” criteria are considered, starting with the alcohol indicator, which 
has two concerns. The first concern includes the six points of: “licensing” (meaning that 
the firm’s licenses or brand name relate to alcoholic products); “manufacturers” (meaning 
that the firm produces alcoholic beverages); “manufacturers of products necessary for 
 84 
production of alcoholic beverages” (meaning that the firm generates 15 percent or more 
of its total revenue from providing raw or other materials for the production of alcoholic 
beverages); “retailers” (meaning that the firm earns at least 15 percent of its total revenue 
from selling alcoholic beverages); “ownership by an alcohol company” (meaning that 
more than 50 percent of the firm is owned by an alcohol-related firm); and “ownership of 
an alcohol company” (meaning that the firm owns more than 20 percent of another 
alcohol-related firm). The second concern is the “alcohol other” concern, which applies 
when the firm is involved in, and earns significant revenue from, activities relating to 
alcoholic beverages.  
 
The gambling indicator has two concerns. The first concern includes the six points of: 
“licensing” (meaning that the firm’s licenses or brand name relate to gambling products); 
“manufacturers” (meaning that the firm produces gambling products, such as slot 
machines); “owners and operators” (meaning that the firm owns and/or operates wagering 
casinos); “supporting products or services” (meaning that the firm supports or provides 
gambling-related services); “ownership by a gambling company” (meaning that more 
than 50 percent of the firm is owned by a gambling-related firm); and “ownership of a 
gambling company” (meaning that the firm owns more than 20 percent of a gambling-
related firm). The second concern is the “gambling other” concern, which applies when 
the firm is engaged in, and earns significant revenue from, activities relating to gambling 
or lottery. 
 
The tobacco indicator also has two concerns. The first concern includes the six points of: 
“licensing” (meaning that the firm’s licenses or brand name relate to tobacco products); 
“manufacturers” (meaning that the firm produces tobacco products); “manufacturers of 
products necessary for production of tobacco products” (meaning that the firm generates 
15 percent or more of its total revenue from providing raw or other materials for the 
production of tobacco products); “retailers” (meaning that the firm earns at least 15 
percent of its total revenue from selling tobacco products); “ownership by a tobacco 
company” (meaning that more than 50 percent of the firm is owned by a tobacco-related 
firm); and “ownership of a tobacco company” (meaning that the firm owns more than 20 
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percent of a tobacco-related firm). The second concern is the “tobacco other” concern, 
which applies when the firm earns a significant amount of revenue from the production of 
tobacco products.  
 
The firearms indicator has only one concern (added in 1999), which includes the four 
points of: “manufacturers” (meaning that the firm produces small arms ammunition or 
firearms);  “retailers” (meaning that the firm earns at least 15 percent of its total revenue 
from selling small arms ammunition or firearms); “ownership by a firearms company” 
(meaning that more than 50 percent of the firm is owned by a firearms-related firm); and 
“ownership of a firearms company” (meaning that the firm owns more than 20 percent of 
another firearms-related firm).  
 
The military indicator has four concerns. The first concern includes the four points of: 
“manufacturers of weapons or weapons systems” (meaning that the firm earns more than 
2 percent of its revenues or more than $50 million from the selling of weapons or 
weapons systems, or more than $10 million from the selling of nuclear weapons or 
nuclear weapons systems); “manufacturers of components for weapons or weapons 
systems” (meaning that the firm earns more than 2 percent of its revenues or more than 
$50 million from the selling of customised components for weapons or weapons systems, 
or more than $10 million from the selling of customised components for nuclear weapons 
or nuclear weapons systems); “ownership by a military company” (meaning that more 
than 50 percent of the firm is owned by a military-related firm); and “ownership of a 
military company” (meaning that the firm owns more than 20 percent of another military-
related firm). The second concern is the “minor weapons contracting involvement” 
concern, meaning that the firm is involved in minor weapons contracting, that it earns 
$10 to $50 million from weapons contracts mainly involving conventional weapons, or 
that it earns $1 to $10 million from weapons contracts mainly involving nuclear weapons 
(this concern is included from 1991 to 2002 only). The third concern is the “major 
weapons-related supplier” concern, meaning that, in the previous year, the firm obtained 
more than $50 million worth of contracts for weapon-related fuel or other products from 
the US Department of Defense (this concern is included from 1991 to 2002 only). Finally, 
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the “military other” concern applies when the firm receives a significant amount of 
weapons-related contracts, meaning that it earns over 2 percent or $50 million from these 
contracts, or over $10 million from nuclear weapons-related contracts (this concern is 
added in 2002).  
 
Finally, the nuclear power indicator has four concerns. The first concern includes the six 
points of: “construction and design of nuclear power plants” (meaning that the firm 
designs, engineers and/or constructs nuclear reactors and nuclear power plants); “nuclear 
power fuel and key parts” (meaning that the firm provides nuclear fuel and important 
components for nuclear plants and reactors); “nuclear power service provider” (meaning 
that the firm delivers materials for nuclear power and also maintains nuclear plants); 
“ownership of nuclear power plants” (meaning that the firm owns or operates reputable 
nuclear power plants); “ownership by a nuclear power company” (meaning that more 
than 50 percent of the firm is owned by a nuclear power-related firm); and “ownership of 
a nuclear power company (meaning that the firm owns more than 20 percent of another 
nuclear power-related firm). The second concern is the “design” concern, meaning that 
the firm earns a significant amount of revenue from the design of nuclear power plants. 
The third concern is the “fuel cycle/key parts” concern, meaning that the firm has a 
nuclear fuel cycle, or earns a significant amount of revenue from, selling important 
components or equipment for nuclear fuels. Finally, the “nuclear power other” concern 
means that the firm is involved in nuclear power operations (this concern is added in 
2002).  
 
In conclusion, KLD adds and removes individual strengths and concerns at various points 
during its rating period in order to reflect changes in the general operating environment, 
and therefore to make the rating more comprehensive and accurate. (Please see Table 3.1 
for the number of strengths and concerns for each indicator; and Appendix 2 for an 
detailed overview of the individual strengths and concerns for each indicator.)  
 
Now that the individual strengths and concerns for each of the indicators have been 
detailed, Table 3.2 provides a summary of the number of firms with a “positive”, “zero” 
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or “negative” net score for each of the qualitative indicators, and of those with a “zero” or 
“negative” score for each of the controversial indicators (the controversial indicators do 
not include a “positive” score as they do not include any strength ratings). The score of 
strengths minus the score of concerns is used to obtain the overall net score for each of 
the qualitative criterion, with the resulting value being named as the “positive net score” 
if the overall net score is greater than zero; named as the “zero net score” if the overall 
net score is equal to zero; and named as the “negative net score” if the overall net score is 
less than zero. It should, however, be noted that it is not possible to calculate the overall 
net score for the controversial indicators. As such, for these indicators, “zero score” 
means that the score of concerns is equal to zero; while the “negative score” means that 
the score of concerns is greater than zero.  
 
Table 3.2 details the number of firms for each of the KLD indicator groups. In terms of 
the qualitative indicators, the “zero net score” group comprises a higher number of firms 
than either the “positive net score” or “negative net score” group for all of the indicators 
(meaning that KLD considers most firms to have a score which is neither high nor low). 
Several of the groups comprise only a small number of firms—a point that is especially 
noticeable with the negative community net score, the positive and negative human rights 
net score, and the positive product net score. Although KLD extends its database to 
include more firms in both 2001 and 2003, this does not lead to any significant change in 
the number of firms for several of the groups. Another point that should be noted is that 
there is no ranking for human rights between 1991 and 1993. Turning to the controversial 
indicators, similarly, there are many firms in the “zero score” group for all of the 
indicators. However, the alcohol, gambling, tobacco and firearms indicators each only 
contain a very small number of firms for the “negative score” group. There is also no 
ranking for firearms until 1998.  
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Table 3.2 Summary of number of firms for each KLD indicator group 
The table shows a summary of the number of firms with a “positive”, “zero” or “negative” net score for 
each of the qualitative indicators, and of those with a “zero” or “negative” score for each of the 
controversial indicators. The score of strengths minus the score of concerns is used to obtain the overall net 
score for each of the qualitative criterion, with the resulting value being named as the “positive net score” if 
the overall net score is greater than zero; named as the “zero net score” if the overall net score is equal to 
zero; and named as the “negative net score” if the overall net score is less than zero. NR means not 
available.  
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CSR 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Qualitative Indicators
Community
Positive net score 176 184 183 204 207 205 184 169 158
Zero net score 445 433 442 411 414 423 446 447 450
Negative net score 18 18 17 20 16 15 19 39 52
Corporate Governance
Positive net score 12 28 36 37 34 57 60 59 63
Zero net score 600 517 477 453 405 554 345 311 335
Negative net score 27 90 129 145 198 32 244 285 262
Diversity
Positive net score 121 139 162 188 215 225 262 284 303
Zero net score 503 483 339 270 289 302 277 274 257
Negative net score 15 13 141 177 133 116 110 97 100
Employee Relations
Positive net score 123 141 155 181 191 174 200 229 240
Zero net score 457 391 384 333 325 354 342 332 317
Negative net score 59 103 103 121 121 115 107 94 103
Environment
Positive net score 80 84 90 81 90 95 105 104 86
Zero net score 446 405 403 393 402 438 434 443 441
Negative net score 113 146 149 161 145 110 110 108 133
Human Rights
Positive net score NR NR NR 0 6 12 6 1 1
Zero net score NR NR NR 0 605 606 610 618 617
Negative net score NR NR NR 643 26 25 33 36 42
Product
Positive net score 69 92 96 96 94 85 87 84 86
Zero net score 469 432 434 424 420 429 428 431 416
Negative net score 101 111 112 115 123 129 134 140 158
Controversial Indicators
Alcohol
Zero score 633 629 636 629 631 635 639 645 650
Negative score 6 6 6 6 6 8 10 10 10
Gambling
Zero score 634 631 638 629 631 635 639 646 652
Negative score 5 4 4 6 6 8 10 9 8
Tobacco
Zero score 636 632 638 631 632 636 644 651 655
Negative score 3 3 4 4 5 7 5 4 5
Firearms
Zero score NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 655 660
Negative score NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 0 0
Military
Zero score 526 530 543 546 563 571 579 594 602
Negative score 113 105 99 89 74 72 70 61 58
Nuclear Power
Zero score 604 601 605 597 603 610 616 620 624
Negative score 35 34 37 38 34 33 33 35 36
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CSR 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Qualitative Indicators
Community
Positive net score 149 160 178 219 231 222 219 210 186
Zero net score 460 864 824 2591 2637 2580 2540 2459 2489
Negative net score 52 86 99 141 146 183 184 252 240
Corporate Governance
Positive net score 61 57 64 525 569 363 540 432 398
Zero net score 314 753 687 1921 1595 1846 1289 1463 1538
Negative net score 286 300 350 505 850 776 1114 1026 979
Diversity
Positive net score 317 427 422 798 905 979 960 921 923
Zero net score 241 573 518 1509 1169 988 939 948 933
Negative net score 103 110 161 644 940 1018 1044 1052 1059
Employee Relations
Positive net score 263 264 265 225 289 290 299 392 411
Zero net score 294 673 650 1997 1758 1682 1624 1542 1539
Negative net score 104 173 186 729 967 1013 1020 987 965
Environment
Positive net score 79 84 92 108 79 120 147 158 205
Zero net score 459 856 859 2625 2673 2577 2486 2459 2397
Negative net score 123 170 150 218 262 288 310 304 313
Human Rights
Positive net score 2 4 4 3 4 4 5 5 7
Zero net score 596 1014 1014 2769 2740 2861 2824 2799 2790
Negative net score 63 92 83 179 270 120 114 117 118
Product
Positive net score 82 72 64 69 93 78 76 81 87
Zero net score 420 810 769 2497 2518 2470 2418 2364 2348
Negative net score 159 228 268 385 403 437 449 476 480
Controversial Indicators
Alcohol
Zero score 652 1099 1091 2936 2995 2965 2919 2901 2899
Negative score 9 11 10 15 19 20 24 20 16
Gambling
Zero score 653 1096 1086 2916 2973 2944 2901 2881 2876
Negative score 8 14 15 35 41 41 42 40 39
Tobacco
Zero score 656 1103 1092 2931 2994 2967 2925 2905 2903
Negative score 5 7 9 20 20 18 18 16 12
Firearms
Zero score 661 1108 1099 2946 3009 2980 2939 2915 2910
Negative score 0 2 2 5 5 5 4 6 5
Military
Zero score 603 1050 1062 2860 2925 2903 2864 2842 2821
Negative score 58 60 39 91 89 82 79 79 94
Nuclear Power
Zero score 627 1071 1073 2916 2984 2946 2907 2880 2871
Negative score 34 39 28 35 30 39 36 41 44
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3.3.6 Rating KLD data 
In order to test the relationship between financial performance and each KLD indicator, it 
is necessary to compute the overall score for each KLD indicator. There are three ways in 
which the overall KLD score is obtained in recent literature. Firstly, in Kempf and 
Osthoff (2007), instead of using the sum of the sub-criteria score to represent the overall 
score for each indicator, a normalised KLD score is computed. In order to compute the 
normalised score, the authors first use the score of strengths minus the score of concerns 
to get the sum score for each indicator, then summing the number of strengths and 
concerns for an overall range for each indicator. They then re-centre the sum score for the 
overall range for each indicator, and normalise the re-centred sum score to a range from 
zero to one. An example is given below to aid understanding of this method:  
 
The community indicator for firm A has three strengths, with each of these 
having a rating score equalling one. Firm A also has five concerns—one of 
which has a rating score of one, while the other four concerns are zero. The sum 
score for community is three minus one, equalling two. The overall range for 
community is three strengths plus five concerns, thus equalling eight. The 
authors re-centre the sum score for community, which is equal to seven from 
zero to eight. In order to render the rating score comparable, the authors 
normalise the sum score for community (seven) between zero and one—which is 
seven divided by eight, thus equalling 0.875. The normalised score of 0.875 is 
therefore used to create the portfolios.  
 
Moreover, this thesis also computes the correlations between different criteria, with the 
highest correlation being 0.35 (between “tobacco” and “alcohol”), and the lowest being -
0.14 (between “diversity” and “governance”).  
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Table 3.3 Correlation matrix of the indicators 
This table summarises the time average of cross-sectional correlations from 1991 to 2008 between all 
qualitative and controversial indicators. The abbreviations in this table: Com, the KLD measure for 
community relations indicators; Cgov, the KLD measure for governance indicators; Div, the KLD measure 
for diversity indicators; Emp, the KLD measure for employee relations indicators; Env, the KLD measure 
for environmental indicators; Hum, the KLD measure for human rights indicators; Pro, the KLD measure 
for product indicators; Alc, the KLD measure for alcohol indicators; Gam, the KLD measure for gambling 
indicators; Tob, the KLD measure for tobacco indicators; Mil, the KLD measure for military indicators; 
Nuc, the KLD measure for nuclear power indicators.  
 
Com Cgov Div Emp Env Hum Pro Alc Gam Tob Mil Nuc
Com 1
Cgov -0.04 1
Div 0.32 -0.14 1
Emp 0.11 0.01 0.13 1
Env 0.12 0.09 0.02 0.08 1
Hum -0.04 0.08 -0.12 0.02 0.19 1
Pro -0.05 0.16 -0.1 0.12 0.24 0.16 1
Alc -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0 0.05 0.09 1
Gam 0.02 0.03 0 0.03 0 0 0.04 0 1
Tob -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.35 0.04 1
Mil 0 0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.13 0.11 0.06 -0.02 0 -0.01 1
Nuc 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.17 0.02 0.1 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 1  
 
A second method for obtaining the overall KLD score is introduced by El Ghoul et al 
(2011), who simply use the score of strengths minus the score of concerns to obtain the 
overall score for each qualitative criterion. For example, the overall community score 
equals the score of strengths minus the score of concerns for the “community” indicator. 
However, for controversial criteria, a dummy variable value of one is used if a firm’s 
rating includes that particular controversial criterion, while a dummy variable value of 
zero is used if a firm is not given that particular controversial criterion. For example, the 
dummy variable of one is used if the firm’s rating includes the “alcohol” indicator, while 
a dummy variable of zero is used in all other cases. Furthermore, the authors also 
compute the overall CSR score, which sums all qualitative criteria except for corporate 
governance. Also, a variable is calculated to explain that the dummy variable is equal to 
one if the firm’s rating includes any one of the controversial criteria. The rating method 
used by El Ghoul et al (2011) is broadly similar to that used by Kemp and Osthoff (2007). 
However, the advantage of the normalisation process is that the normalised score 
provides a comparison between different metrics and years.  
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Thirdly, Fernando et al (2010) use the score of strengths and concerns for the 
“environmental” indicator to create portfolios. Four groups17 are used, with “green firms” 
meaning those with at least one strength but no concerns under the environment criteria; 
“toxic firms” meaning those with at least one concern but no strengths; “gary firms” 
meaning those with both strengths and concerns; and “neutral firms” meaning those with 
neither strengths nor concerns. Although this approach is only used for the environment 
in this paper, it can also be applied to other indicators.  
 
Problems have been identified with two KLD indicators. The first of these is human 
rights, as this criterion is not available for several years and its sub-criteria are also less 
consistent than other indicators. Most firms belong to the zero net human rights score, 
with only 61 firms having human rights “strengths”, but 1,210 having human rights 
“concerns”. Moreover, the human rights sub-criteria are less stable than other indicators’ 
sub-criteria18, since the number of sub-criteria changes over time (see Table 3.1). When 
this thesis tries to create portfolios for this indicator, the portfolios consist of only a very 
small number of firms, which will necessarily affect portfolio return. The second problem 
relates to the corporate governance indicator. Kempf and Osthoff (2007) do not include 
corporate governance in their research, as they report different definitions for corporate 
governance being used by KLD and several other studies (such as Gompers et al, 2003; 
Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; and Bebchuk et al, 2009). For example, according to KLD, 
high executive compensation is a corporate governance “concern”, while low executive 
compensation is a “strength” (see Appendix 2). The problem is that executive pay is 
likely to be affected by a company’s past performance. Despite of this, the corporate 
governance indicator is still used in this thesis.  
 
                                                 
17 A copy of the Green/Toxic results is available from the author on request.  
18Such as, positive record in South Africa as a strength in 1994 and 1995; Burma emerged as a concern in 
1995; Mexico as a concern from 1995 to 2002; and Northern Ireland as a concern from 1991 to 1994, etc.  
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3.3.7 Portfolio formation  
3.3.7.1 Normalised KLD score portfolio formation and related problems 
The KLD rating data used in this thesis ranges from the end of 1991 to the end of 2008 
(the earliest year for KLD rating data is 1991). Both the positive and best-in-class 
methods for qualitative indicators and the negative method for controversial indicators 
are used to create portfolios. In the case of the positive method, the rating of stock for 
each qualitative indicator is used, with all stocks being ranked at the end of year t-1. Then, 
the CSR portfolios are formed at the beginning of year t according to this ranking. All of 
the portfolios are held until the end of year t. Also, because KLD rating data is updated 
annually, new portfolios are created as the new rating scores are issued at the end of each 
year. In order to test the overall effect of the qualitative indicators, this thesis computes 
the average of the scores from all qualitative indicators to obtain a rating score known as 
“combination1”. DiBartolomeo and Kurtz (1999) note that SRI portfolio returns are 
greatly affected by sector exposure. Therefore, this thesis also tests for industry sensitive 
bias in its results. The Kempf and Osthoff (2007) approach (i.e., the best-in-class 
approach) is followed in order to overcome industry bias. This is because some industries 
may tend to have greater exposure to some types of KLD indicator concerns. Such as, 
energy companies are more sensitive for environmental concerns than financial 
companies. First, a search is conducted for the ten industry classification 19  for all 
companies in the Kenneth R. French data library according to their SIC code. Second, for 
each industry class, the companies are ranked for each indicator according to KLD 
ratings. Next, portfolios are created for each indicator in every industry (meaning that, for 
each industry, the method of portfolio creation is the same as with the positive method). 
Finally, the CRSP industry weighting is used to give a weighting to different industries, 
after which the various industry portfolios are combined into one portfolio. This method 
of constructing the portfolio avoids industry bias, and thereby forms a portfolio that is 
industry neutral.  
 
This thesis also creates a portfolio for controversial indicators by (in a similar method to 
that used above) ranking all companies according to their ratings at the end of year t-1. 
                                                 
19 The financial performances of 17-industry neutral portfolios are recorded in Appendix 4.   
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Next, the portfolio is formed at the beginning of year t, which then remains stable until 
the end of year t. New portfolios are then structured for each year. Following the Kempf 
and Osthoff (2007) method, this thesis creates a low-scoring portfolio that includes all 
companies with at least one controversial indicator. All other companies are considered to 
belong to the high-scoring portfolio. In addition, a combination 2 portfolio is also created 
by combining the “average qualitative indicators normalised score” with the “six 
controversial indicators normalised score”.  
 
Kempf and Osthoff (2007) use the top ten percentile of all stocks to create their high-
scoring portfolio, and the bottom ten percentile of all stocks to create a low-scoring 
portfolio (for both the positive and best-in-class method). They also use different cut-off 
points to test for sensitive analysis. This thesis follows Kempf and Osthoff (2007) by 
creating portfolios with and without the ten-industry classification. However, no clean 
break point is found for the normalised scores (while, in extreme cases, some of the KLD 
indicators/industries/year groups do not even display variations between firms for the 
normalised score). Because of this problem, when decile portfolios are created (such as 
when the top and bottom ten percentiles are used as cut-off points), if the firm in the next 
centile group has the same KLD normalised score as the current decile firm, the cut-off 
point continues beyond the decile until the clean break point is met. However, with this 
method, some portfolios contain no firms at all, while others only contain a very small 
number of firms.  
 
Knowing that such portfolios are unlikely to work, this thesis then changes the cut-off 
point to the upper quartile to create high-scoring portfolios (this point is also used as the 
cut-off point for both portfolios with and without industry neutral). For the high-scoring 
portfolios, all firms in the portfolio must have the same KLD normalised score. However, 
the same KLD normalised score is not set as a requirement for the low-scoring portfolios, 
so as to avoid an unreasonably low number of low-scoring firms in the portfolios.  
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Below, an example of the “community” criteria for 1991 is used to explain the scoring 
method used in this thesis to create portfolios without industry neutral. The scores for 
other indicators and also for different years are provided in Appendix 3.  
 
Figure 3.1 Example of community indicator normalised score for 1991  
Year 1991
Community Freq. Percent Cum.
0.375 18 2.82 2.82
0.5 445 69.64 72.46
0.625 135 21.13 93.58
0.75 38 5.95 99.53
0.875 3 0.47 100  
 
When the top and bottom ten percentiles are used as the break point, and the same KLD 
normalised score is kept for the high-scoring portfolio, the high-scoring portfolio includes 
the final two rows (consisting of 41 firms); whereas the low-scoring portfolio includes the 
top two rows (consisting of 463 firms, rather than 18 firms). The central group of firms 
forms the “rest-scoring” portfolio, which comprises only 135 firms. Most of the firms 
belong to the low-scoring portfolio, and no clean break point is found for the normalised 
score to create the portfolios. Moreover, when using the upper quartile break point, the 
high-scoring CSR portfolio still includes the final two rows (because this thesis aims to 
keep the same normalised score in this portfolio), whereas the low-scoring CSR portfolio 
still includes the top two rows. The rest-scoring portfolio has the same number of firms 
between the ten and quartile percentile break point. It is therefore concluded that there is 
no change in the portfolios when the break point is taken between the ten and quartile 
percentiles.  
 
Figure 3.1 provides an example of the allocation of the no-industry classification scores 
where there is no clean break point—a problem that becomes even more obvious when 
using the 10-industry classification to create the portfolios.  
 
Figure 3.2 gives an example of the score allocation for the ten industries. For industry 1, 
when the ten percentile is used as the break point, the high-scoring CSR portfolio 
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includes the final row (comprising 6 firms), while the low-scoring CSR portfolio includes 
the top two rows (36 firms). The rest-scoring CSR portfolio comprises 18 firms. Next, 
when the quartile percentile is used as the break point, the high-scoring CSR portfolio 
still includes the final row (6 firms), while there is no change for either the low-scoring or 
rest-scoring CSR portfolios. For industry 2, since only a few firms belong to this industry, 
no firms are generated for the high-scoring CSR portfolio when the ten percentile is used 
as the break point (because there is no clean break point for this group), while the low-
scoring CSR portfolio includes the top row (21 firms), and the rest-scoring CSR portfolio 
includes 4 firms. When the quartile percentile is used as the break point, the high-scoring 
CSR portfolio includes the final row (4 firms), while the low-scoring CSR portfolio 
includes the top row (21 firms). However, the rest-scoring CSR portfolio ceases to exist. 
As such, this thesis rules that portfolios should only be created when the normalised KLD 
score can be classified into at least two groups. For the case of industry 3, when the ten 
percentile is used as the break point, the high-scoring CSR portfolio includes the final 
two rows (6 firms), while the low-scoring CSR portfolio includes the top two rows (115 
firms), and the rest-scoring CSR portfolio includes 20 firms. When using the quartile 
percentile as the break point, the high-scoring portfolio includes the final three rows (26 
firms), the low-scoring portfolio stays the same, and there is no rest-scoring portfolio. 
Likewise, for industry 4, there is no high-scoring portfolio when the ten percentile is used 
as the break point, while the low-scoring portfolio includes the top two rows (22 firms), 
and the rest-scoring portfolio includes 6 firms. When the quartile percentile is used as the 
break point, the high-scoring portfolio includes the final row (6 firms), the low-scoring 
portfolio stays the same, and there is no rest-scoring portfolio. For industry 5, when using 
the ten percentile as the break point, the high-scoring portfolio includes the final row (4 
firms), the low-scoring portfolio includes the top row (47 firms), and the rest-scoring 
portfolio includes 7 firms. When using the quartile percentile as the break point, the high-
scoring portfolio includes the final two rows (11 firms), the low-scoring portfolio stays 
the same, and there is no rest-scoring portfolio. For industry 6, when using the ten 
percentile as the break point, there is no high-scoring portfolio, the low-scoring portfolio 
includes the top two rows (10 firms), and the rest-scoring portfolio includes 11 firms. 
When using the quartile percentile as the break point, none of the portfolios change (i.e., 
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they are the same as with the ten percentile break point). For industry 7, when using the 
ten percentile as the break point, the high-scoring portfolio includes the final row (4 
firms), the low-scoring portfolio includes the top two rows (56 firms), and the rest-
scoring portfolio includes 17 firms. When using the quartile percentile as the break point, 
the portfolios stay the same. For industry 8, when using the ten percentile as the break 
point, the high-scoring portfolio includes the final row (2 firms), the low-scoring 
portfolio includes the top two rows (26 firms), and the rest-scoring portfolio includes 6 
firms. When using the quartile percentile as the break point, the high-scoring portfolio 
includes the final two rows (8 firms), the low-scoring portfolio includes the top two rows 
(26 firms), and there is no rest-scoring portfolio. For industry 9, when using the ten 
percentile as the break point, the high-scoring portfolio includes the final row (1 firm), 
the low-scoring portfolio includes the top two rows (35 firms), and the rest-scoring 
portfolio includes 13 firms. There is no change in these portfolios when using the quartile 
percentile as the break point. Finally, for industry 10, when using the ten percentile as the 
break point, the high-scoring portfolio includes the final row (2 firms), the low-scoring 
portfolio includes the top two rows (95 firms), and the rest-scoring portfolio includes 49 
firms. When using the quartile percentile as the break point, the high-scoring portfolio 
includes the final two rows (18 firms), the low-scoring portfolio stays the same, and the 
rest-scoring portfolio includes 33 firms.  
 
Thus, it is clear that no clean break point can be found for the normalised scores in order 
to create the portfolios—especially in the case of the best-in-class method (industry 
neutral). While some portfolios contain no firms at all, others contain a very low number 
of firms, regardless of whether the ten or quartile percentile is used as the break point. 
This thesis believes that portfolios containing only a low number of firms will necessarily 
lead to misleading results. However, although problems have been identified with using 
normalised scores to create the portfolios, the results from the normalised scores are still 
presented in this thesis in order to show how portfolio formation methods affect results. 
Generally, the top quartile of the normalised KLD score is used to create high-rating 
portfolios, while the bottom quartile is used to create low-scoring portfolios, and 
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therefore an adjustment for the cut-off point for the low-scoring portfolio is required. The 
10 and 33 percentiles are used for the Sensitivity analysis.  
 
Figure 3.2 Example of community indicator normalised score for industries 1-10 for 
1991 
 
Year 1991 Industry 1 Year 1991 Industry 6
Community Freq. Percent Cum. Community Freq. Percent Cum.
0.375 1 1.67 1.67 0.375 1 4.76 4.76
0.5 35 58.33 60 0.5 9 42.86 47.62
0.625 18 30 90 0.625 11 52.38 100
0.75 6 10 100
Year 1991 Industry 2 Year 1991 Industry 7
Community Freq. Percent Cum. Community Freq. Percent Cum.
0.5 21 84 84 0.375 1 1.3 1.3
0.625 4 16 100 0.5 55 71.43 72.73
0.625 17 22.08 94.81
0.75 4 5.19 100
Year 1991 Industry 3 Year 1991 Industry 8
Community Freq. Percent Cum. Community Freq. Percent Cum.
0.375 5 3.55 3.55 0.375 1 2.94 2.94
0.5 110 78.01 81.56 0.5 25 73.53 76.47
0.625 20 14.18 95.74 0.625 6 17.65 94.12
0.75 5 3.55 99.29 0.75 2 5.88 100
0.875 1 0.71 100
Year 1991 Industry 4 Year 1991 Industry 9
Community Freq. Percent Cum. Community Freq. Percent Cum.
0.375 2 7.14 7.14 0.375 3 6.12 6.12
0.5 20 71.43 78.57 0.5 32 65.31 71.43
0.625 6 21.43 100 0.625 13 26.53 97.96
0.75 1 2.04 100
Year 1991 Industry 5 Year 1991 Industry 10
Community Freq. Percent Cum. Community Freq. Percent Cum.
0.5 47 81.03 81.03 0.375 4 2.74 2.74
0.625 7 12.07 93.1 0.5 91 62.33 65.07
0.75 4 6.9 100 0.625 33 22.6 87.67
0.75 16 10.96 98.63
0.875 2 1.37 100
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3.3.7.2 Net KLD score portfolio formation 
As has been previously mentioned, a number of problems have been identified with the 
normalised score—the key point being that (despite what some literature on the topic may 
claim) it is simply not possible to assemble “clean” quartile portfolios. This is illustrated 
in figures 3.1 and 3.2. Although a program could be written to cut such data into deciles, 
the effect of this would be to allocate firms to portfolios based on prior rankings. Thus, a 
more “rigorous” portfolio formation methodology is required. As such, this thesis uses 
the El Ghoul et al (2011) method as the net score approach to allocate the new group of 
portfolios to test their return and so as to avoid the normalised score problem affecting 
results. This thesis considers this categorisation to be rigorous, and also finds that it gives 
clean and unambiguous break points.  
 
By following El Ghoul et al (2011), this thesis uses the score of strengths minus the score 
of concerns to obtain the overall score for each qualitative criterion (which we call the 
“net score”), and duly sums the qualitative indicators score to obtain the overall CSR 
score. A net score greater than zero takes a place in the high-scoring portfolio; a net score 
less than zero takes a place in the low-scoring portfolio; and a net score of zero takes a 
place in the zero-scoring portfolio. The same rule is used for the overall CSR score. 
However, as no strengths are given for controversial indicators, these can only take place 
in the low-scoring and zero-scoring portfolios. Although the zero net score portfolio 
comprises many firms, the positive and negative net score portfolios for some of the 
indicators comprise only a very small number of firms (especially in the case of human 
rights—see Table 3.2). The net score portfolio formation methodology is more rigorous 
and also has clean break points. 
 
3.4 Performance measurement   
3.4.1 Financial data 
As has already been described above, the CSR data used in this thesis is obtained from 
KLD Research & Analytics Inc. In terms of financial data, the stock return, share price 
and number of outstanding shares are obtained from CRSP monthly return files. After 
merging KLD data with the stock return data, all firms appearing in both data files are 
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retained. All data on market risk premium, size factor, book-to-market factor and 
momentum factor is obtained from the Ken French data library. In order to compute the 
conditional CAPM model, instruments variables have been selected from DataStream, 
such as the one-month Treasury Bill rate, 10-year Treasury Bond yield and the yield on 
Moody’s corporate bonds. For the conditional three-factor model, the share price and the 
number of outstanding shares are obtained from CRSP, while book value is obtained 
from Compustat North America. After merging the KLD data, CRSP data and Compustat 
data, firms with data in all of these three databases are retained.  
 
3.4.2 Fama-French three-factor model 
This thesis first computes the excess monthly return for each portfolio, before running a 
regression with the excess market returns, monthly return for the common size factor, and 
monthly returns for the common book-to-market equity factor.  
 
The Fama-French three-factor model is expressed as follows: 
 
( )pt ft p p mt ft p t p t ptR R R R s SMB h HMLα β ε− = + − + + + ,                                                (3.1) 
where 
p tR  is the portfolio return in month t, ftR is the risk free rate, mtR is the market 
monthly return, SMB is the difference in return between small capitalisation firms 
portfolio and large capitalisation firms portfolio, and the HML factor is the difference in 
return between the high book-to-market ratio firms portfolio and low book-to-market 
ratio firms portfolio. Alpha is the abnormal return for portfolio p.   
 
3.4.3 Carhart four-factor model 
Carhart (1997) then adds the momentum factor to construct the four-factor model:  
 
( )pt ft p p mt ft p t p t p t ptR R R R s SMB h HML m MOMα β ε− = + − + + + + ,                              (3.2) 
where 
p tR  is the portfolio return in month t, ftR is the risk free rate, mtR is the market 
monthly return, SMB is the difference in return between small capitalisation firms 
 102 
portfolio and large capitalisation firms portfolio, the HML factor is the difference in 
return between the high book-to-market ratio firms portfolio and low book-to-market 
ratio firms portfolio, and MOM is the difference in return between portfolios of stocks 
with high and low returns over the past twelve months. Alpha is the abnormal return for 
portfolio p.   
 
3.4.4 Robustness check 
3.4.4.1 Conditional Ferson and Schadt (1996) model 
According to Ferson and Schadt (1996), it is estimated that: 
 
( ) ( )'0 1 1pt ft p p mt ft p t mt ft ptR R R R z R Rα β β ε−  − = + − + − +  ,                                          (3.3) 
where 1tz −  is a vector of instruments for the information available at the beginning of 
month t or at the end of month t-1, and ( )1 1t tz Z E Z− −= − is a vector of deviations of 
instruments from their unconditional means. The conditional variables are the one-month 
lagged Treasury Bill rate; the term structure is the 10-year Treasury Bond yield minus the 
3 month Treasury Bill rate; the default premium is the yield on Moody’s BAA minus the 
yield on Moody’s AAA corporate bonds; the lagged dividend yield is the yield on the 
S&P 500 index; and the dummy variable is equal to unity for the month of January. 
 
3.4.4.2 Conditional three-factor model 
In Fama and French (1997), a conditional model tracks time variation sensitivities for 
both the SMB and HML factors. This thesis uses CSR portfolio instead of industry 
portfolio, thus giving: 
 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2ln ln /pt ft p p mt ft p p t p p t ptR R b R R s s ME SMB h h BE ME HMLα ε     − = + − + + + + +     
                                                                                                                                        (3.4) 
where 
p tR  is the portfolio return in month t, ftR is the risk free rate, mtR is the market 
monthly return, SMB is the difference in return between small capitalisation firms 
portfolio and large capitalisation firms portfolio, and the HML factor is the difference in 
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return between the high book-to-market ratio firms portfolio and low book-to-market 
ratio firms portfolio. Ln(ME) is the value-weighted average of the natural log of market 
equity for all firms in each portfolio. Ln(BE/ME) is the value-weighted average of the 
natural log of BE/ME for each portfolio. BE/ME is measured once each calendar year and 
is used to explain 12 monthly returns starting in July of the following year. Ln(ME) and 
Ln(BE/ME) are measured net of their average values (across portfolios) each month in 
order to control for market-wide variation. 
 
The background of these performance measurements is discussed in Section 3.2.  
 
3.5 Empirical results  
3.5.1 The net KLD score portfolio 
3.5.1.1 Results for the Fama-French three-factor model 
The analysis of portfolio formation in the previous section finds net KLD score portfolios 
to be better than normalised KLD score portfolios. Thus, this section on empirical results 
is divided into two main parts. First, we report the net KLD score portfolio performance. 
Second, we report the normalised KLD score portfolio performance.  
 
Four different factor models are used to test the “no-industry” and “10-industry neutral” 
portfolios. For the “no-industry” portfolios, no industry classifications are used for the 
portfolio creation, nor do the regression tests use industry weightings. For the “10-
industry neutral” portfolios, the Fama-French ten-industry classification is used to create 
the portfolios and ten industry weightings are used in the performance (which is the same 
as for the “best-in-class” analysis). This method also explains the industry affect for 
different factor loadings. Where CSR can explain the risk for some industries but not 
others, different results are returned between no-industry portfolios and 10-industry 
portfolios. Tables 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 show the portfolio results without industry neutral, 
while tables 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 show the 10-industry-portfolio results for the three-factor 
model. Four different portfolios are regressed, which are the positive net CSR score, zero 
net CSR score, negative net CSR score and the long positive-short negative CSR 
portfolios (the long-short portfolio) for the Fama-French three-factor model, the Carhart 
 104 
four-factor model, the conditional Ferson and Schadt (1996) model, and the conditional 
three-factor model, respectively (with both conditional models used as robustness checks). 
The equally-weighted and value-weighted returns for all of these portfolios are also tested.  
 
First, Table 3.4.1 shows the equally-weighted Fama-French three-factor model regression 
results for the no-industry portfolios. In terms of alpha, the high-scoring governance 
portfolio has a significant negative alpha, which underperforms by 0.296% per month. 
The long-short governance portfolio has a significant negative alpha, while the long-short 
human rights portfolio also has a marginally significant negative alpha. The alphas for all 
other portfolios are no different from zero. In terms of beta20, most of the portfolios have 
significant betas, except for the long-short community portfolio. For governance, 
diversity, employee relations and environment, the high-scoring portfolios have 
significantly lower betas than the low-scoring portfolios. Negative, human rights and 
product have significantly higher betas for the high-scoring portfolios. The long-short 
overall portfolio has a significant negative beta. Turing to the long-short portfolio, the 
SMB factor captures size exposures, and for which there is no consistency between 
different indicators. For negative, governance and product, the high-scoring portfolios 
have significantly higher size exposures than the low-scoring portfolios; while diversity 
and employee relations show significantly lower size exposures for the high-scoring 
portfolio. Moreover, there is no significant difference in the size exposure for community, 
human rights and overall. HML explains the book-to-market exposure. Governance and 
human rights return significantly higher book-to-market exposures for the high-scoring 
portfolios than for the low-scoring portfolios. Community, employee relations, 
environment, product and overall return significantly lower HML for the high-scoring 
portfolios, while there is no significant difference for the other indicators. All of the F-
tests are statistically significant, thus confirming that the models are statistically 
significant.  
 
                                                 
20 A stock’s beta captures the degree of exposure to systematic risk, which measures the stock’s volatility in 
relation to the market and determines the required rate of return for the stock. According to CAPM, the 
required return of a stock is a function of the risk-free rate, the expected return on the market and the 
stock’s beta. Moreover, different firms have different exposures to systematic risk (a financial firm is more 
exposed to an adverse macroeconomic situation than a supermarket).  
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It could therefore be claimed that it is best to avoid investing in the high-scoring and 
long-short portfolios for governance criteria, as both of these have negative alphas. 
However (and as has already been mentioned), the criteria used by KLD to rate corporate 
governance is different to that used in many studies, and, as such, these results may lack 
significance. For the beta (which represents systematic risk), it can be concluded that 
there is lower beta when investing in high-scoring portfolios for governance, diversity, 
employee relations and environment. El Ghoul et al (2011) report a lower implied cost of 
capital for high-scoring CSR firms than for low-scoring CSR firms, which implies that 
some of the loading factors should have negative values for the long-short portfolios. The 
results in this thesis are consistent with this point—especially in the case of the HML 
factor, for which most indicators have negative HML loadings (except for governance 
and human rights). Both environment and product have significant negative loadings at 
the 1% level. The environment criteria results are consistent with Sharfman and Fernando 
(2008), while the overall regression results are consistent with El Ghoul et al (2011). 
 
Table 3.4.2 shows the value-weighted Fama-French three-factor model regression results 
for the no-industry portfolios, which are only slightly different to the equally-weighted 
results. In terms of alpha, the low-scoring governance portfolio has a significant positive 
alpha, while significant positive alphas are also recorded for the high-scoring and long-
short employee relations portfolios. The alphas for all other portfolios are no different 
from zero. In terms of beta, all of the high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring 
portfolios have significant positive betas. For the long-short portfolios, environment and 
product have significantly higher betas for the high-scoring portfolios. Governance and 
diversity have significantly lower betas for the high-scoring portfolios. No significant 
difference in betas is found for the other indicators or the overall portfolio. Turning to the 
long-short portfolio, for size exposure, the value-weighted results are similar to the 
equally-weighted results (except for in the case of employee relations, where there is no 
significant loading for the value-weighted results; and also except for in the case of 
negative, its high-scoring portfolio has significant lower size effect for the value-
weighted results). For HML, most indicators still have significantly lower book-to-market 
exposures for the high-scoring portfolios, except for governance and human rights. 
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Diversity has a significant negative HML loading for the value-weighted basis, but no 
significant HML loading for the equally-weighted basis. The HML coefficient for the 
overall portfolio is -0.178% per month for the value-weighted basis, and -0.068% per 
month for the equally-weighted basis. All F-tests are statistically significant, thus 
confirming that the models are statistically significant.  
 
Thus, it can be concluded that there are positive abnormal returns if investing in the low-
scoring governance portfolio or the high-scoring or long-short employee relations 
portfolios. There is also a significantly lower systematic risk if investing in the high-
scoring portfolios for governance and diversity. Moreover, most indicators have lower 
HML loadings for the high-scoring portfolio, except for governance and human rights (as 
problems with these indicators may have affected results, as discussed in the previous 
section).  
 
Next, Table 3.4.3 shows the equally-weighted Fama-French three-factor model regression 
results for the 10-industry portfolios. In terms of alpha, the alphas for these regression 
tests are similar to those for the no-industry portfolio Fama-French three-factor regression. 
The alphas of most portfolios are no different from zero, except for the long-short human 
rights portfolio, which has a significant negative alpha. In terms of beta, all of the high-
scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios have significant positive betas, while for 
the long-short portfolios, only governance, employee relations and overall have 
significant negative betas (while others have no significant betas). Turning to the long-
short portfolio, for size exposure, negative, governance, environment and product have 
significantly higher size exposures for the high-scoring portfolios than for the low-
scoring portfolios. Diversity and employee relations have significantly lower size 
exposures for the high-scoring portfolios, while the difference in size exposure for the 
other indicators is not significant. For the book-to-market exposure, governance, diversity 
and human rights have significantly higher HML loading factors for the high-scoring 
portfolios than for the low-scoring portfolios. Community, employee relations, 
environment and product have significantly lower HML loading factors for the high-
scoring portfolios, while the difference for the other indicators is not significant. When 
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comparing the equally-weighted results for the no-industry and 10-industry portfolios, 
there is little difference in the SMB exposure. However, some of the HML exposures 
change when the industry weighting is applied (for example, the HML loading factor 
changes from insignificant to significant positive for the diversity long-short portfolio, 
while the overall score changes to an insignificant HML loading factor for the 10-
industry portfolio).  
 
Table 3.4.4 shows the value-weighted three-factor regression for the 10-industry 
portfolios. In terms of alpha, again, most of the alphas are not significant, except for the 
low-scoring employee relations portfolio, which has a significant negative alpha (while 
its long-short portfolio has a significant positive alpha). In terms of beta, all of the high-
scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios have significant positive betas; while for 
the long-short portfolios, only the environment high-scoring portfolio has a significantly 
higher beta. Negative, diversity and employee relations have significantly lower betas for 
the high-scoring portfolios, while there is no significant difference for the other indicators. 
Turning to the long-short portfolio, for size exposure, governance, environment and 
product have significantly higher size exposure for the high-scoring portfolios, while only 
diversity has significantly lower size exposure for the high-scoring portfolios (there is no 
significant difference for the other indicators). For book-to-market exposure, only 
employee relations and human rights have a significant HML loading factor for the high-
scoring portfolios. There are a number of differences when comparing the no-industry 
results with the 10-industry results. First, there is a marked reduction for some of the 
adjusted R-squared statistics. The F-statistic shows that both community and overall 
long-short portfolios regressions are insignificant. Second, for HML exposure, most of 
the long-short portfolios change to insignificant from negative significant when the 10-
industry and no-industry value-weighted results are compared. Thus, it can be concluded 
that the high-scoring portfolios have lower risk exposures, which is a result of inter-
industry effects rather than intra-industry effects. Only the long-short employee relations 
portfolio has an abnormal return, while all indicators have lower systematic risk for the 
high-scoring portfolios (except for in the case of environment).   
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3.5.1.2 Results for the Carhart four-factor model 
While the analysis in the previous section relates to the Fama-French three-factor model, 
this section presents the results for the Carhart four-factor model.  
 
Table 3.4.5 reports the equally-weighted Carhart four-factor model regression results for 
the no-industry portfolios. In terms of alpha, both the diversity and product high-scoring 
portfolios have marginally significant positive alphas. The low-scoring negative, 
governance and product portfolios, the high-scoring employee relations portfolio, and the 
zero-scoring environment portfolio all have significant positive alphas. The long-short 
governance portfolio has a significant negative alpha. In terms of beta, all of the high-
scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios have significant positive betas. For the 
long-short portfolio, there is a similar beta effect as for the Fama-French equally-
weighted no-industry portfolio regression (except for in the case of diversity, which has 
an insignificant beta for the four-factor model). Governance, employee relations, 
environment and overall all have significant negative betas, while negative, human rights 
and product all have significant positive betas. Turning to the long-short portfolio, for 
size exposure, there are similar SMB effects for the three-factor and four-factor models 
for the equally-weighted no-industry portfolio regression. Negative, governance, 
environment and product have significantly higher SMB effects for the high-scoring 
portfolios than for the low-scoring portfolios, while diversity and employee relations 
have significantly lower SMB effects for the high-scoring portfolios. Moreover, there are 
similar HML effects between models. Community, employee relations, environment, 
product and overall have significantly lower HML effects for the high-scoring portfolios, 
while governance and human rights have significantly higher HML effects for the high-
scoring portfolios. Finally, for the momentum factor, governance, employee relations and 
overall have significantly higher momentum effects for the high-scoring portfolios than 
the low-scoring portfolios, while others are not significant. All F-tests are statistically 
significant, thus confirming that the models are statistically significant.  
 
Thus, it can be concluded that abnormal returns are obtained if investing in the low-
scoring portfolios for negative, governance and product; in the high-scoring portfolios for 
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diversity and employee relations; and in the zero-scoring portfolio for environment. 
Moreover, for systematic risk, the high-scoring governance, employee relations, 
environment and overall portfolios have lower systematic risk than the low-scoring 
portfolios. Negative, human rights and product have higher systematic risk for the high-
scoring portfolios.  
 
Table 3.4.6 shows the value-weighted four-factor model regression for the no-industry 
portfolios. Only the low-scoring governance portfolio and high-scoring employee 
relations portfolio have significant positive alphas, while all other portfolios have 
insignificant alphas. All of the high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios have 
significant positive betas, while the long-short portfolios have a similar beta effect as for 
the three-factor value-weighted regression for no-industry. Both governance and diversity 
have significantly lower betas for the high-scoring portfolios, while both environment 
and product have significantly higher betas for the high-scoring portfolios. Turning to the 
long-short portfolio, for both SMB and HML exposure, there is a similar effect as for the 
three-factor value-weighted no-industry portfolio regression. Both negative and diversity 
have significantly lower SMB effects for the high-scoring portfolios, while governance, 
environment and product have significantly higher SMB effects for the high-scoring 
portfolios. For HML exposure, most indicators have significantly lower HML effects for 
the high-scoring portfolios (except for in the case of governance and human rights, which 
have significantly higher HML effects for the high-scoring portfolios, while there is 
insignificant effect for negative). Problems already identified with the governance and 
human rights indicators may affect results. Finally, for the momentum factor, both 
diversity and employee relations have significantly higher momentum effects for the 
high-scoring portfolios than for the low-scoring portfolios. Environment has a 
significantly lower momentum effect for the high-scoring portfolio. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the momentum loading factor is less important than the HML loading 
factor.  
 
Next, Table 3.4.7 shows the equally-weighted four-factor model regression for the 10-
industry portfolios. The low-scoring negative, governance, diversity, human rights and 
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product portfolios, the high-scoring community and diversity portfolios, and the zero-
scoring employee and environment portfolios all have significant positive alphas. The 
long-short governance and human rights portfolios have significant negative alphas, 
while all others have insignificant alphas. All of the high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-
scoring portfolios have significant positive betas. For the long-short portfolios, the beta 
effect is the same as for the three-factor equally-weighted 10-industry portfolio regression 
(except for in the case of product, which has a significantly higher beta for the high-
scoring portfolio). Governance, employee relations and overall have significantly lower 
betas for the high-scoring portfolios. Turning to the long-short portfolio, both SMB and 
HML loading factors have a similar effect for these two regressions. Diversity and 
employee relations have significantly lower SMB effects for the high-scoring portfolios, 
while negative, governance, environment and product have significantly higher SMB 
effects for the high-scoring portfolios. For HML exposure, community, employee 
relations, environment and product have significantly lower HML effects for the high-
scoring portfolios, while governance, diversity and human rights have significantly 
higher HML effects for the high-scoring portfolios. Finally, for the momentum factor, 
governance, diversity, employee, product and overall have significantly higher 
momentum effects for the high-scoring portfolios.  
 
Table 3.4.8 shows the value-weighted four-factor model regression for the 10-industry 
portfolios. All of these portfolios have insignificant alphas. Meanwhile, all of the high-
scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios have significant positive betas. For the 
long-short portfolios, diversity has a significantly lower beta for the high-scoring 
portfolio, while environment has a significantly higher beta for the high-scoring portfolio. 
Turning to the long-short portfolio, for size exposure, governance, environment and 
product have significantly higher SMB effects for the high-scoring portfolios, while 
negative, diversity and employee have significantly lower SMB effects for the high-
scoring portfolios. For HML exposure, only employee has a significantly lower HML 
effect for the high-scoring portfolio, while only human rights has a significantly higher 
HML effect for the high-scoring portfolio. Finally, for the momentum factor, only 
negative, diversity and employee have significantly higher momentum effects for the 
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high-scoring portfolios than for the low-scoring portfolios. Furthermore, the F-test is 
insignificant for both the community and overall long-short portfolios.  
 
3.5.1.3 Robustness check 
3.5.1.3.1 Results for the Ferson and Schadt (1996) model 
As is noted earlier in this Chapter, KLD data starts in 1991 by rating firms on the S&P 
500 and the Domini 400 Social indices, before the database is then extended from 2001 to 
include the entire Russell 1000, and again to include the entire Russell 3000 from 2003. 
This necessarily affects the “high” and “low” portfolios over time. Thus, this thesis uses 
the Ferson and Schadt (1996) model for robustness checking by using the time variations 
of conditional variables. Table 3.4.9 shows the results for the equally-weighted no-
industry portfolio regression. There are no significant alphas for any of the portfolios. 
Again, all of the high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios have significant 
positive betas. Most of the long-short portfolios have significant negative betas, except 
for negative, environment and human rights (which have insignificant betas) and product 
(which has a significant positive beta). Turning to the long-short portfolio, both employee 
and overall have significantly higher Treasury Bill rates effect for the high-scoring 
portfolios. Both environment and product have significantly lower dividend yields effect 
for the high-scoring portfolios. However, human rights has a significantly higher 
dividend yield effect. For the Moody effect, negative, community and overall have 
significantly higher effects for the high-scoring portfolios. Next, both diversity and 
overall have significantly higher TERM (which represents that the term structure is the 
10-year Treasury Bond yield minus the 3-month Treasury Bill rate) effects for the high-
scoring portfolios. Finally, there are significantly lower JDUM (which represents the 
dummy variable for the month of January) effects for the high-scoring portfolios for both 
governance and human rights. Furthermore, there is an insignificant F-test for the long-
short community portfolio. In summary, there are no abnormal returns for any of the 
indicator portfolios, although some of the portfolios have lower systematic risk.  
 
Table 3.4.10 shows the results from the value-weighted no-industry portfolio Ferson and 
Schadt (1996) model regression. As with the equally-weighted no-industry portfolio 
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results, there are no significant alphas for any of the portfolios. The betas represent 
systematic risk. All of the high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios have 
significant positive betas. For the long-short portfolios, diversity has a significantly lower 
beta effect for the high-scoring portfolio, while environment and product have 
significantly higher beta effects for the high-scoring portfolios. Turning to the long-short 
portfolio, for the Treasury Bill rate effect, governance has a significantly lower effect for 
the high-scoring portfolio, while both employee and overall have significantly higher 
effects for the high-scoring portfolio. Next, governance and human rights have 
significantly higher dividend yield effects, while environment and product have 
significantly lower dividend yield effects for the high-scoring portfolio. For the Moody 
effect, community, employee relations, human rights and overall have significantly 
higher effects for the high-scoring portfolios, while governance has a significantly lower 
effect for the low-scoring portfolio. All of these indicators have insignificant TERM 
effects. Finally, only governance has a significantly lower JDUM effect for the high-
scoring portfolio. There is an insignificant F-test for the negative long-short portfolio. In 
summary, there are no abnormal returns for any of the indicator portfolios for either the 
equally-weighted or value-weighted no-industry portfolio regression, although some of 
the portfolios have lower systematic risk. 
 
Table 3.4.11 shows the results from the equally-weighted Ferson and Schadt (1996) 
regression for the 10-industry portfolios. Only the zero-scoring employee portfolio has a 
significant positive alpha, while all other portfolios have insignificant alphas. For the 
systematic risk beta, again, all of the high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring 
portfolios have significant positive betas; while, for the long-short portfolio, community, 
governance, diversity, employee and overall have significantly lower betas for the high-
scoring portfolios. Turning to the long-short portfolio, for the Treasury Bill rate effect, 
only overall has a significantly higher effect for the high-scoring portfolio. Next, negative, 
community and environment have significantly lower dividend yields effect for the high-
scoring portfolios, while human rights has a significantly higher dividend yield effect for 
the high-scoring portfolio. For the Moody effect, negative, community and product have 
significantly higher effects for the high-scoring portfolios. Both negative and diversity 
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have significantly higher TERM effects for the high-scoring portfolios. Both governance 
and human rights have significantly lower JDUM effects for the high-scoring portfolios. 
There is an insignificant F-test for the community long-short portfolio.  
 
Table 3.4.12 shows the results from the value-weighted Ferson and Schadt (1996) 
regression for the 10-industry portfolios. As is the case with the no-industry portfolio 
results, there are no significant alphas for any of the portfolios. Turning to the long-short 
portfolio, for the systematic risk beta, negative, community, diversity and overall have 
significantly lower betas for the high-scoring portfolios, while environment has a 
significantly higher beta for the high-scoring portfolio. For the Treasury Bill rate effect, 
both diversity and overall have significantly higher effects for the high-scoring portfolios. 
Next, negative has a significantly lower dividend yield effect for the high-scoring 
portfolio, while human rights has a significantly higher dividend yield effect for the high-
scoring portfolio. For the Moody effect, negative, community and overall have 
significantly higher effects for the high-scoring portfolios. Human rights has a 
significantly lower JDUM effect for the high-scoring portfolio, while product has a 
significantly higher JDUM effect for the high-scoring portfolio. Moreover, there are 
insignificant F-tests for the governance, employee and product long-short portfolios for 
the value-weighted regression.  
 
The conditional variables show different effects for the 10-industry and no-industry 
portfolios, meaning that the difference in conditional variables can be explained by 
industry effect. Very few of the portfolios have abnormal returns, and it can therefore be 
concluded that the Ferson and Schadt (1996) regressions do not change the inferences 
made from either the three-factor or four-factor regressions. There are no abnormal 
returns for any of the indicators using the long-short strategy.  
 
3.5.1.3.2 Results for the conditional Fama-French three-factor model 
This thesis also uses the conditional Fama-French three-factor model for the purpose of 
robustness testing. Table 3.4.13 shows the results for the equally-weighted no-industry 
portfolios. Only the long-short governance portfolio and high-scoring and long-short 
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human rights portfolios have significant negative alphas, while all others have 
insignificant alphas. Turning to the long-short portfolio, for the systematic risk beta, all of 
the long-short portfolios have significant beta effects. Negative, human rights and product 
have significantly higher betas for the high-scoring portfolios, while all other indicators 
have significantly lower betas. For SMB exposure, governance, employee relations, 
environment and product have significantly higher size exposures for the high-scoring 
portfolios. Only human rights has a significantly lower size exposure for the high-scoring 
portfolio. For the natural log of market equity exposure (S2), employee relations, human 
rights, and overall have significantly lower S2 effects21 for the high-scoring portfolios. 
For HML exposure, community and diversity have significantly higher HML exposures 
for the high-scoring portfolios. Environment and product have significantly lower HML 
exposures for the high-scoring portfolios. Next, for the natural log of the BE/ME 
exposure (H2), negative, community, governance and diversity have significantly higher 
H2 effects22 for the high-scoring portfolios. Although most of the portfolios do not have 
abnormal returns, both systematic risk and Ln(BE/ME) variables show significant effect 
for these indicators.  
 
Table 3.4.14 shows the value-weighted regression for the no-industry portfolios. Both the 
zero-scoring community and low-scoring governance portfolios have significant positive 
alphas, while both the high-scoring and long-short human rights portfolios have 
significant negative alphas. Turning to the long-short portfolio, for systematic risk, 
community and diversity have significantly lower betas for the high-scoring portfolios. 
Environment, human rights and product have significantly higher betas for the high-
scoring portfolios. For SMB exposure, community, environment and product have 
significantly higher size exposures for the high-scoring portfolios, while human rights has 
significantly lower size exposure for the high-scoring portfolio. For the natural log of 
market equity exposure, community and human rights have significantly lower S2 effects 
for the high-scoring portfolios. Next, for HML exposure, community, diversity, and 
                                                 
21 The “S2 effect” means that time-varying sensitivities to SMB are tracked with conditional regressions in 
which a portfolio’s SMB slope varies with the average size of firms in the portfolio.  
22 The “H2 effect” means that time-varying sensitivities to HML are tracked with conditional regressions in 
which a portfolio’s HML slope varies with the average book-to-market equity of firms in the industry.  
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human rights have significantly higher HML exposures for the high-scoring portfolios. 
Governance, environment and product have significantly lower HML exposures for the 
high-scoring portfolios. Finally, for the natural log of BE/ME exposure, most of the long-
short portfolios have significant positive H2 effects, except for negative and environment 
(which have insignificant effects) and also product (which has a significant negative 
effect). Furthermore, an insignificant F-test is found for the long-short negative portfolio. 
 
Table 3.4.15 and 3.4.16 show the results for the equally-weighted and value-weighted 
conditional three-factor model regressions for the 10-industry portfolios. Most of the 
portfolios still have insignificant alphas. The low-scoring employee portfolio and the 
high-scoring and long-short human rights portfolios have significant negative alphas for 
the equally-weighted regression. For the value-weighted regression, the zero-scoring 
community, employee and environment portfolios and the low-scoring governance 
portfolio have significant positive alphas. The low-scoring community portfolio and high-
scoring and long-short human rights portfolios have significant negative alphas.  
 
For the equally-weighted results, turning to the long-short portfolio, community, 
governance, employee and overall have significantly lower systematic risk betas for the 
high-scoring portfolios, while human rights has a significantly higher beta for the high-
scoring portfolio. For size exposure, governance, environment and product have 
significantly higher size effects for the high-scoring portfolios, while human rights has a 
significantly lower size effect for the high-scoring portfolio. For the natural log of market 
equity exposure, only negative and overall have significantly lower S2 effects for the 
high-scoring portfolios. Next, for HML exposure, both community and diversity have 
significantly higher HML effects for the high-scoring portfolios, while both environment 
and product have significantly lower HML effects for the high-scoring portfolios. Finally, 
for the natural log of BE/ME exposure, community, governance and diversity have 
significantly higher H2 effects for the high-scoring portfolios, while environment has a 
significantly lower H2 effect for the high-scoring portfolio. There is an insignificant F-
test for the negative long-short portfolio. 
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For the value-weighted results, turning to the long-short portfolio, negative, diversity and 
employee relations have significantly lower systematic risk betas for the high-scoring 
portfolios, while human rights has a significantly higher beta for the high-scoring 
portfolio. For size exposure, governance, environment and product have significantly 
higher size effects for the high-scoring portfolios. For the natural log of market equity 
exposure, diversity and overall have significantly lower S2 effects for the high-scoring 
portfolios. Next, for HML exposure, community, diversity and overall all have 
significantly higher HML effects for the high-scoring portfolios. Finally, for the natural 
log of BE/ME exposure, community, governance, diversity, employee and overall have 
significantly higher H2 effects for the high-scoring portfolios.  
 
The conditional variables have different effects for the 10-industry and no-industry 
portfolios, meaning that the difference in conditional variables can be explained by 
industry effect. According to previous analysis, we can also conclude that the conditional 
three-factor model regressions do not change the inferences made from the three-factor or 
four-factor regressions. 
 
3.5.2 The normalised KLD score portfolio 
3.5.2.1 Results for the Fama-French three-factor model 
This section provides an analysis of the normalised KLD score portfolio regression 
results, which are organised in the same way as the net KLD score results. Three different 
portfolios are regressed, namely the high-scoring, low-scoring and long high-short low-
scoring CSR portfolios (the long-short portfolio) for the Fama-French three-factor model, 
Carhart four-factor model, conditional Ferson and Schadt (1996) model and the 
conditional three-factor model (both of the conditional models are used for robustness 
testing). Both the equally-weighted and value-weighted returns are tested for all of these 
portfolios.  
 
Firstly, Table 3.5.1 shows the results for the equally-weighted three-factor model 
regression for the no-industry portfolios. For the alpha (which represents abnormal 
return), the long-short negative portfolio and the high-scoring and long-short governance 
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portfolios have significant negative alphas. The long-short community portfolio has a 
significant positive alpha, while all others have insignificant alphas. For the systematic 
risk beta, all of the high-scoring and low-scoring portfolios have significant positive betas. 
For the long-short portfolio, both negative and human rights have significantly higher 
beta effects for the high-scoring portfolios, while community, governance, environment, 
combination1 and combination223  have significantly lower beta effects for the high-
scoring portfolios. Turning to the long-short portfolio, for size exposure, negative and 
governance have significantly higher SMB effects for the high-scoring portfolios, while 
community, diversity and human rights have significantly lower SMB effects for the 
high-scoring portfolios. Finally, for book-to-market exposure, community, governance 
and human rights have significantly higher HML effects for the high-scoring portfolios, 
while diversity, employee, product and combination1 have significantly lower HML 
effects for the high-scoring portfolios.  
 
Table 3.5.2 shows the results for the value-weighted no-industry portfolio regression. For 
the abnormal return alpha, most of the portfolios have insignificant alphas (except for the 
high-scoring employee portfolio, which has a significant positive alpha). For the 
systematic risk beta, again, all of the high-scoring and low-scoring portfolios have 
significant positive betas. Moreover, for the long-short portfolios, community, 
governance and diversity have significantly lower beta effects for the high-scoring 
portfolios. Employee and combination1 have significantly higher beta effects for the 
high-scoring portfolios. Turning to the long-short portfolio, for size exposure, negative, 
community and diversity have significantly lower size exposures for the high-scoring 
portfolios, while governance, product, combination1 and combination2 have significantly 
higher size exposures for the high-scoring portfolios. Finally, for HML exposure, most of 
the long-short portfolios have significant HML effects—except for negative (which has 
insignificantly HML effect). Community, governance and human rights (which have 
significantly higher HML effects for the high-scoring portfolios), and diversity, employee, 
                                                 
23 In order to test the overall effect of the qualitative indicators, this thesis computes the average of the 
scores of all qualitative indicators (except human rights) to obtain a rating score known as “combination1”. 
Meanwhile, “combination2” is computed by combining the normalised score of the average qualitative 
indicators with the normalised score of the six controversial indicators.  
 118 
environment, product, combination1 and combination2 (which have significantly lower 
HML effects for the high-scoring portfolios).  
 
Tables 3.5.3 and 3.5.4 show the results from the 10-industry portfolios for both the 
equally-weighted and value-weighted three-factor models. For the equally-weighted 
results, only the long-short negative portfolio has a significant negative alpha, while all 
others have insignificant alphas. Turning to the long-short portfolio, for systematic risk, 
almost all of the indicators have significantly lower betas for the high-scoring 
portfolios—except for negative and product (which have insignificant effects) and also 
human rights (which has a significantly higher beta effect for the high-scoring portfolio). 
For size exposure, negative and governance have significantly higher size effects for the 
high-scoring portfolios, while community, diversity, employee relations and human rights 
have significantly lower effects for the high-scoring portfolios. Next, for HML exposure, 
governance, human rights and combination2 all have significantly higher HML effects 
for the high-scoring portfolios, while employee and product have significant negative 
effects for the long-short portfolios. There is no significant F-test for the long-short 
product portfolio.   
 
For the value-weighted results, only the low-scoring human rights portfolio has a 
significant negative alpha. Turning to the long-short portfolio, the loading factors have 
different effects to the no-industry portfolio, meaning that the difference in loading 
factors can be explained by industry effect. Negative, diversity, combination1 and 
combination2 have significantly lower betas for the high-scoring portfolios, while 
environment and human rights have significantly higher betas for the high-scoring 
portfolios. For size exposure, negative and diversity have significant negative effects, 
while governance and product have significant positive effects. Next, for HML exposure, 
community, environment, human rights, combination1 and combination2 have significant 
positive effects, while only negative has a significant negative effect. There is no 
significant F-test for the long-short employee relations portfolio.  
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3.5.2.2 Results for the Carhart four-factor model 
Tables 3.5.5—3.5.8 show the results for the four-factor model regression, while Table 
3.5.5 shows the equally-weighted no-industry portfolio results. For the abnormal return 
alpha, the low-scoring negative and governance portfolios and the high-scoring 
community, diversity, employee relations and combination2 portfolios all have 
significant positive alphas. The long-short negative and governance portfolios have 
significant negative alphas. Turning to the long-short portfolio, there is a similar loading 
factor effect for both the three-factor and four-factor models for the no-industry portfolios. 
For systematic risk, negative and human rights have significant positive betas, while 
community, governance, environment, combination1 and combination2 have significant 
negative betas. For size exposure, negative and governance have significant positive 
effects, while community, diversity and human rights have significant negative effects. 
For HML exposure, community, governance and human rights have significant positive 
effects, while diversity, employee relations, product and combination1 have significant 
negative effects. For the momentum factor, most of the portfolios have significant 
positive effects—except for negative, diversity, employee and human rights, which have 
insignificant effects.  
 
Table 3.5.6 shows the results from the value-weighted no-industry portfolio regression. 
Only the high-scoring employee and the low-scoring combination2 portfolios have 
significant positive alphas. Turning to the long-short portfolio, the models again have 
similar loading factor effects. For systematic risk, community, governance and diversity 
have significant negative betas. For size exposure, negative, community and diversity 
have significant negative size effects, while governance, product and combination1&2 
have significant positive size effects. For HML effect, community, governance and 
human rights have significant positive HML effects, while diversity, employee relations, 
environment, product, and combination 1&2 all have significant negative HML effects. 
For the momentum factor, only negative has a significantly higher effect for the high-
scoring portfolio. Community and combination 1&2 have significantly lower effects for 
the high-scoring portfolios. 
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Table 3.5.7 shows the results from the equally-weighted 10-industry portfolio regression. 
For the abnormal return alpha, the low-scoring negative, governance and 
combination1&2 portfolios and the high-scoring community and diversity portfolios all 
have significant positive abnormal returns. The long-short negative and governance 
portfolios have significant negative alphas. Turning to the long-short portfolio, for 
systematic risk, negative and human rights have significant positive betas, while 
community, governance, employee, environment and combination1&2 all have 
significant negative betas. For size exposure, negative and governance have significant 
positive size effects, while community, diversity, employee and human rights have 
significant negative size effects. For the HML effect, governance, human rights and 
combination2 have significant positive HML effects, while employee has a significant 
negative HML effect. For the momentum factor, negative, community, governance, 
product and combination1&2 have significant positive effects.  
 
Table 3.5.8 shows the results from the value-weighted 10-industry portfolio regression. 
All of the portfolios have insignificant abnormal returns. Turning to the long-short 
portfolio, for systematic risk, diversity, employee and combination1&2 all have 
significant negative betas, while environment has a significant positive beta. For size 
exposure, governance and product have significant positive size effects, while negative 
and diversity have significant negative size effects. For the HML effect, community, 
environment, human rights and combination1&2 have significant positive effects. For the 
momentum factor, negative has a significant positive effect, while both community and 
employee have significant negative effects.  
 
3.5.2.3 Robustness check 
3.5.2.3.1 Results for the Ferson and Schadt (1996) model 
This section focuses on the performance of the long-short strategy for the robustness 
check. Tables 3.5.9—3.5.12 show the results from the Ferson and Schadt (1996) model 
regression. Table 3.5.9 shows the results from the equally-weighted no-industry portfolio 
regression. There are no significant abnormal returns for the long-short portfolio. For 
systematic risk, only negative has a significant positive beta, while community, 
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governance, environment and combination1&2 all have significant negative betas. For 
the Treasury Bill rate effect, negative, community and employee relations all have 
significant positive effects. Next, negative and employee relations have significant 
negative dividend yield effects, while community, governance, human rights and 
combination2 all have significant positive dividend yield effects. For the Moody effect, 
negative, employee relations and combination1 all have significant positive effects. For 
the TERM effect, negative has a significant positive effect, while environment and 
combination2 have significant negative effects. Both governance and human rights have 
significant negative JDUM effects. There is no significant F-test for the long-short 
diversity portfolio.  
 
Table 3.5.10 shows the value-weighted no-industry portfolio results. There are 
insignificant alphas for all of the portfolios. For the systematic risk beta, community, 
diversity and human rights all have significant negative betas, while employee, product 
and combination1 all have significant positive betas. Both diversity and employee 
relations have significant positive Treasury Bill rates effect. For the dividend yield effect, 
community and governance both have significant positive effects, while employee and 
product both have significant negative effects. For the Moody effect, governance has a 
significant negative effect, while employee, human rights and combination1&2 all have 
significant positive effects. None of the indicators have significant TERM effects. Both 
governance and human rights have significant negative JDUM effects. There is no 
significant F-test for the long-short negative portfolio.  
 
Table 3.5.11 shows the equally-weighted 10-industry portfolio results. There is no 
significant abnormal return for any of the indicators for the long-short portfolios. 
Meanwhile, most of the indicators have significant negative betas, except for negative, 
human rights and product. For the Treasury Bill rate effect, negative has a significant 
positive effect, while environment has a significant negative effect. For dividend yield 
effect, negative has a significant negative effect, while community, governance, 
environment, human rights and combination1&2 have significant positive effects. For the 
Moody effect, negative has a significant positive effect, while environment has a 
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significant negative effect. For the TERM effect, negative has a significant positive effect, 
while both environment and combination2 have significant negative effects. Next, 
governance has a significant negative JDUM effect, while diversity has a significant 
positive JDUM effect. There is no significant F-test for the long-short human rights or 
product portfolios.  
 
Table 3.5.12 shows the value-weighted 10-industry portfolio results. There is still no 
significant abnormal return for any of the indicators. Turning to the long-short portfolio, 
diversity, employee relations and combination1&2 all have significant negative betas. All 
of the indicators have insignificant Treasury Bill rate effects. Next, community, 
environment and combination1&2 all have significant positive dividend yield effects. 
Only human rights has a significant positive Moody effect, while only combination2 has 
a significant negative TERM effect and all of the indicators have insignificant JDUM 
effects. The long-short governance, employee relations, environment and product 
portfolios all have insignificant F-tests.  
 
3.5.2.3.2 Results for the conditional Fama-French three-factor model 
This thesis also runs the conditional three-factor model for the normalised KLD score 
portfolio for robustness testing. Table 3.5.13 shows the equally-weighted no-industry 
portfolio results. The long-short governance, and the high-scoring and long-short human 
rights portfolios all have significant negative alphas, while all others have insignificant 
alphas. Turning to the long-short portfolio, negative and human rights both have 
significant positive betas, while community, governance, diversity, environment and 
combination1&2 all have significant negative betas. For size exposure, governance has a 
significant positive effect, while human rights has a significant negative effect. For the 
natural log of market equity exposure, community, diversity, employee relations and 
human rights all have significant negative effects. For HML exposure, employee relations 
and product have significant negative effects. Finally, for the natural log of BE/ME 
exposure, negative, governance, diversity and human rights all have significant positive 
effects.  
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Table 3.5.14 shows the value-weighted no-industry portfolio results (please note that only 
the long-short strategy is analysed). Only human rights has a significant negative alpha. 
Community and diversity have significant negative betas, while human rights has a 
significant positive beta. For size exposure, only human rights has a significant negative 
effect, while product and combination1&2 both have significant positive effects. For the 
natural log of market equity exposure, community, diversity, human rights and 
combination2 all have significant negative effects. For the HML effect, community, 
diversity and human rights all have significant positive effects, while governance, 
environment and product all have significant negative effects. Finally, for the natural log 
of BE/ME exposure, governance, diversity, employee, human rights and combination2 all 
have significant positive effects. There is no significant F-test for the long-short negative 
portfolio.  
 
Table 3.5.15 shows the equally-weighted 10-industry portfolio results (please note that 
only the long-short portfolio is analysed). Only governance and human rights have 
significant negative alphas. Community, governance, employee relations, environment 
and combination1&2 all have significant negative betas, while human rights has a 
significant positive beta. For size exposure, community and governance both have 
significant positive effects, while human rights has a significant negative effect. For the 
natural log of market equity exposure, negative, community, diversity and human rights 
all have significant negative effects. For the HML effect, diversity and environment have 
significant positive effects, while employee and product have significant negative effects. 
Finally, for the natural log of BE/ME exposure, governance, diversity and environment 
all have significant positive effects, while employee relations has a significant negative 
effect. There is no significant F-test for the long-short product or combination1 portfolio.  
 
Table 3.5.16 shows the value-weighted 10-industry portfolio results. For the long-short 
portfolio, only human rights has a significant negative alpha. Negative, diversity and 
combination1&2 all have significant negative betas, while human rights has a significant 
positive beta. For size exposure, negative and human rights both have significant negative 
effects, while community, governance and product have significant positive effects. For 
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the natural log of market equity exposure, community, diversity and human rights have 
significant negative effects. For HML exposure, community, diversity, environment and 
combination1&2 all have significant positive effects. Finally, for the natural log of 
BE/ME exposure, community has a significant negative effect, while governance, 
diversity, human rights and combination1 have significant positive effects. There is no 
significant F-test for the long-short product portfolio. The conditional variables have 
different effects for the 10-industry and no-industry portfolios, meaning that the 
difference in conditional variables can be explained by industry effect. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
An increasing number of firms include CSR as a factor into their investment decisions. 
This Chapter uses the portfolio approach to examine how CSR affects CFP. All KLD-
rated firms are tested for the period 1991-2008 and using four different factor models, 
with the main findings being that: (1) the normalised KLD scores do not have clear break 
points that can be used for portfolio classification, while some portfolios contain only a 
small number of firms or even no firms at all; (2) portfolios for most indicators have 
insignificant alphas, while the long-short portfolio also has an insignificant alpha, 
meaning that the long-short strategy does not earn abnormal returns; (3) most CSR 
indicator portfolios have insignificant alphas for the negative, positive and best-in-class 
approaches, while the application of industry classification is not found to affect results; 
(4) the alphas remain insignificant for most of the portfolios, regardless of which factor 
model or portfolio formation method is used; and (5) although most of the alphas are 
insignificant, there is a significant difference in the risk exposures of the high- and low-
scoring CSR portfolios, such as, there is lower beta and book-to-market exposures for the 
high-scoring CSR firms.  
 
Both the three-factor and four-factor models are used to test for CSR portfolio 
performance, with most of the portfolios having insignificant alphas. Even when the 
overall period is split into two sub-periods, no time-varying effect is recorded for the 
alphas. The conditional Ferson and Schadt (1996) model and conditional three-factor 
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model are used for robustness checking, since the conditional variables are controlled by 
time variation. However, most of the portfolios are found to have insignificant alphas as 
well. For the normalised KLD score portfolio, the 10 and 33 percentiles are used for 
Sensitivity analysis. However, these cut-off points do not appear to affect portfolio 
performance. In summary, these results imply that using portfolios formed by CSR scores 
results in neither outperformance nor underperformance. However, the high-scoring CSR 
firms have lower systematic risk and book-to-market exposure than the low-scoring firms, 
which is consistent with the findings of both Sharfman and Fernando (2008) and El 
Ghoul et al (2011). Moreover, the results also have important implications for investors in 
that, since using portfolios formed by CSR scores results in neither outperformance nor 
underperformance, choosing to invest in high-scoring CSR firms should not affect one’s 
gains or losses (and therefore investing with a conscience is essentially costless).  
 
Furthermore, the reason for the limited findings in this Chapter may be due to certain 
limitations with the KLD database, which can be summarised in three parts: (1) First, it is 
assumed that the strengths and concerns for each KLD indicator indicate perfectly 
opposing directions; otherwise, the net score would be misleading when the variables do 
not converge (Carver, 1989); (2) Second, it is assumed that all criteria and sub-criteria 
carry equal importance (although some studies consider certain criteria as being more 
important than others for the different industries, there are no standard rules to weight the 
criteria and sub-criteria for the different industries) and, as such, this thesis assumes an 
equal weighting for all of the criteria and sub-criteria; and (3) The number of criteria and 
sub-criteria change over time, and so this thesis includes the new criteria and sub-criteria 
as soon as they are added by KLD, while deleting criteria and sub-criteria as soon as they 
are removed. Although the basis sub-criteria are not consistent over time, this thesis uses 
the latest available rating information to compute the annual rating score for each firm.  
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Chapter Four: CSR Market Valuation 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Although numerous studies have been conducted into the financial performance of CSR, 
the results of these studies are generally either inconclusive or contradictory. However, as 
CSR practice increases in importance for companies, there is a need for a better 
understanding of how financial performance is affected by different CSR factors. Several 
studies consider the effect of CSR on stock market performance. Of these, in Derwall et 
al (2005) and Kempf and Osthoff (2007), a strategy of long in high-scoring CSR firms 
and shorting low-scoring firms results in very high alphas in the US. However, Brammer 
et al (2006) note that high-scoring CSR firms return negative performance in the UK, 
while Galema et al (2008) do not find any significant alphas. Likewise, Chapter Three of 
this thesis does not find any significant alphas for long-short portfolios using either the 
positive method (without industry neutral) or the best-in-class method.  
 
The results from Chapter Three of this thesis provide a better understanding of the effects 
of CSR on portfolio return. By using a framework consistent with Peasnell (1982) and 
Ohlson (1995), Chapter Four considers whether CSR is reflected in relevant valuation 
information, and also whether it is reflected/explained in share prices. In the Ohlson 
(1995) model, the CSR indicator is treated as the “other information” variable. In this 
Chapter, the association between CSR and market price is estimated by controlling book 
value of equity, net income and dividends. Moreover, intangible assets are also added to 
the formula (namely R&D and advertising expenditure), since both intangible assets and 
CSR can affect each other, and that CSR can represent intangible assets in the valuation 
models (Surocca et al, 2010); moreover, firm value rises when expenditure on intangible 
assets increases (Chauvin and Hirschey, 1994).   
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This Chapter makes a significant contribution to existing research by applying a 
framework consistent with the Peasnell (1982) and Ohlson (1995) model used to value 
CSR indicators in the US market by using a comprehensive set of CSR indicators. It also 
uses both the normalised and net KLD scores to quantify CSR (these methods are 
described in Chapter Three). The tests in this Chapter find that, although different CSR 
indicators are valued very differently by the market, most indicators have a significant 
positive impact on market value, which means that high-scoring CSR firms have higher 
valuations than low-scoring CSR firms. 
 
This estimation is based on the market value of firms, which is a more accurate indicator 
than abnormal returns. Chapter Three tests the abnormal returns of CSR. However, in the 
case that CSR policies and CSP do not change frequently and that markets are efficient, 
an analysis of returns is incomplete. If markets are efficient, abnormal returns will occur 
only when there are unexpected CSR-related changes; if no such changes occur, factor 
loadings will capture any cost of capital differences. However, if CSR affects the 
expected cash flow or cost of capital, then CSR will be associated with a permanent 
change in valuation. Moreover, if a CSR-related change occurs before the start of a 
returns measurement period, it will not be possible for the returns study to observe this 
change. In addition, the returns study will only capture the effects of the CSR-related 
change, whereas valuation will capture the level of the CSR-related change. Thus, CSR 
market valuations are run in Chapter Four. 
 
The motivation for this Chapter stems from the assumption that CSR strategy is unlikely 
to reduce a company’s vulnerability to systematic risk (McGuire et al, 1988). One 
problem involved when testing CSR returns is that it is not always obvious whether CSR 
exposure is a priced systematic risk25  factor. For example, changes in oil prices are 
systematic, and there is lower systematic risk when firms use renewable energy or low 
carbon projects. However, some CSR exposure still belongs to specific (rather than 
systematic) risk. For example, a firm may improve its technologies or use more advanced 
                                                 
25 Systematic risk as market risk is likely to affect most firms to some degree. Systematic risk is normally 
macroeconomic in nature, and includes interest rate shocks, economic growth rate shocks and inflation 
shocks.  
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machinery in order to avoid pollution spills, which is a specific risk and would affect 
further cash flow, thus lowering the risk of cash flow shocks and increasing the firm’s 
expected future cash flow. Such a reduction in firm-specific risk would be captured in 
stock returns at the point where the change is made, and in a permanently higher 
valuation thereafter.  
 
4.2 Methodology overview 
4.2.1 Background of the Ohlson valuation model development 
Since the valuation model used in this Chapter is based on the Peasnell (1982) and 
Ohlson (1995) model, some of the most important literature related with this model will 
first be discussed. During the past two decades, a considerable amount of attention has 
been paid to the relationship between accounting numbers and firm value. Accounting 
data is not initially used by the financial community for equity valuations, for the reason 
that accounting is considered to be historical information. For example, Appleyard (1980) 
states that: “It is well known that (conventionally measured) accounting income can’t be 
related to a firm’s capital stock in a simple way”. Preinreich (1936) separates accounting 
earnings to interest on investment and excess income, which can help value a firm’s 
goodwill. Edwards and Bell (1961) note that restructuration is needed for accounting in 
order to provide information for use in the present value analysis. They divide standard 
accounting income into “normal profits” and “monopoly profits” in economic terms. 
Normal profits are obtained from a diversified portfolio at the same systematic risk, while 
monopoly profits are the profits exceeding normal profits.  
 
Peasnell (1982) provides the earliest established principle that a firm’s theoretical value is 
equal to the present value of its residual income plus the opening book value of the firm. 
The author provides the mathematical connections between economic value and 
economic yield and accounting profit. Thus, the author concludes that the accounting data 
could then be used in the equity valuation. Since this contribution by Peasnell, the 
relationship between theoretical firm value and residual income stream has been the 
subject of increased attention.  
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Ohlson (1995) develops the accounting-based residual income valuation model to test 
equity, while then also adding the “linear information dynamic” model. Thus, there is a 
simple linear equation for stock price which is related to book value and profit. Although 
this model uses the same theory as the discounted cash flow (DCF) model, it proves 
better than the DCF for the fact the DCF method includes a terminal value, which 
represents the majority of a firm’s value under a finite horizon. In contrast, the Ohlson 
model uses accounting data to compute residual income, which accounts for future 
investment profit, looks for future forwards and does not have any terminal value effect.  
 
The Ohlson model comprises two parts, namely residual income valuation (RIV) and 
Ohlson’s information dynamics.  
 
Firstly, the present value of expected dividends (PVED) hypothesis is that asset prices are 
equal to the present value of all future dividends:  
[ ]
1
t t
t
E d
p
R
τ
τ
τ
∞
+
=
=∑ ,                                                                                                            (4.1) 
where tp  is the market price of equity at time t,  td  is net dividends paid at time t, R is 
unity plus the discount rate r, and tE  is the expectation operator at time t.  
 
Second, the clean surplus accounting relation: 
1t t t tb b x d−= + −                                                                                                              (4.2) 
Where tb  is the book value of equity at time t, tx  is the earnings at the end of period time 
t. 
This assumption allows future dividends to be expressed in terms of future earnings and 
book values. Combining the clean surplus relation in Equation (4.2) with the dividend 
discounting model in Equation (4.1) yields:  
[ ]1
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t t t t
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τ τ τ
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+ − + +
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+ −
=∑ ,                                                                                       (4.3) 
Simple algebraic manipulation allows Equation (4.3) to be rewritten as: 
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The final term in Equation (4.4) is assumed to be zero, and residual income or abnormal 
earnings is defined as 
1*
a
t t tx x r b −= − ,                                                                                                             (4.5) 
So that price can be expressed as the sum of book value and the present value of future 
abnormal earnings:  
1
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τ
τ
τ
∞
+
=
= +∑ ,                                                                                                     (4.6) 
which is the residual income version of the dividend-discounting model. It is important to 
note that this equation is just a restatement of the dividend-discounting model which in 
no way depends on the properties of accounting numbers other than through the clean 
surplus relation (Dechow et al, 1999).  
 
Ohlson uses a persistence parameter ω  to explain the relationship between abnormal 
earnings in successive years as: 1
a a
t tx xω+ = . Ohlson (1995) then contributes to this further 
by including an “other information” parameter in the RIV model, which is assumed to 
revert to zero. Ohlson uses the “linear information dynamic” model (LLD) to explain the 
zero-mean reverting character: 
 
1 1, 1
a a
t t t tx x eω ν+ += + +                                                                                                        (4.7) 
 
1 2, 1t t teν γν+ += + ,                                                                                                             (4.8) 
where abnormal earnings or residual income is 1*
a
t t tx x r b −= − , 1tb −  is the lagged or 
opening book value of equity, r is the cost of equity capital, and ω  and γ  are the 
persistence parameters. The value of these parameters is assumed to be between zero and 
one. tν  is the value relevant information that is not explained by accounting. 1e  and 2e  
assumes normal distribution and has a zero mean. Walker (1997) notes that the model 
assumes that there is no relationship between tν  and current earnings and dividends.  
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Finally, combining the residual income valuation model in Equation (4.6) with the 
information dynamics in Equations (4.7) and (4.8) yields the following valuation function, 
which is the Ohlson (1995) model.  
 
1 2
a
t t t tP b a x aν= + + ,                                                                                                         (4.9) 
where 1*
a
t t tx x r b −= − . 
 
The definition of these variables is the same as above, with tx  as the net income for year t, 
1tb −  as the lagged or opening book value, r as the cost of equity, 
a
tx  as the abnormal 
earnings or residual income, and tν  as the “other information” parameter. 
 
Ohlson uses an autoregressive process for both abnormal earnings and “other 
information”: 
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,                                                             (4.10) 
where ω  is the autoregressive parameter for abnormal earnings and γ  is the 
autoregressive parameter for “other information”. The value of ω  and γ  is assumed to 
be between zero and one. A value of one implies abnormal earnings or other information 
persists in perpetuity; a value of zero implies they have no impact on value after the 
current period. The Ohlson model assumes that abnormal earnings are most likely to be 
temporary in a competitive market. There are abnormal earnings if the rate of return is 
higher than the cost of capital. However, these abnormal earnings cannot hold for a long-
term period. 
 
Alternatively, the Ohlson (1995) model can be restructured in terms of earnings and book 
value: 
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                                                                  (4.11) 
There is a linear relationship between the theoretical stock price and book value, earnings 
and “other information” if we assume that the dividends are equal to zero.  
 
Bernard (1995, 733) states that: “The Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) 
studies stand among the most important developments in capital markets research in the 
last several years. The studies provide a foundation for redefining the appropriate 
objective of valuation research”.  
 
More specifically, Rees (1997) refines the Ohlson (1995) model by separating the 
earnings variable into “dividend” and “retained” earnings, while also including capital 
investment and total book value of debt in the refined model. The author considers UK 
firms over the period 1987-1995 and finds that there is value relevance for both dividends 
and capital investment. According to literature on information asymmetry, a positive 
relationship between dividends and price may explain the privilege of managers or 
private information. This implies that, if there is severe information asymmetry, the 
relationship between price and dividends will be highly positive.  
 
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999) test the predictive ability of the Ohlson (1995) model 
and also argue that information dynamics are not included in previous empirical tests. 
Following Ohlson (1998), they use analyst earnings forecasts to explain non-accounting 
information, and subsequently find that this provides more accurate explanation than 
historical models. In addition, they use several different measurements for both 
persistence parameters. For example, for the abnormal earnings persistence parameter ω , 
they use the value of zero, one, the unconditional estimate uω  and the conditional 
estimate cω ; while for the “other information” persistence parameter γ ,  they use the 
value of zero, one and the unconditional estimate ωγ . If ω  is equal to one, this shows a 
purely earnings model. However, if ω  is equal to zero, this shows a purely book value 
model. The authors find that the historical average of ω  is approximately 0.62, while the 
1 1 2
(1 )
(1 ) tt t t t
x r
P b a r a r d a
r
ν
+ 
= − + − + 
 
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historical average of γ  is approximately 0.32. The authors also find the range of return to 
be between 5.4% and 9.9% for the 12-month holding period when using different models 
that follow Ohlson (1995)’s linear information dynamics. Overall, the authors conclude 
that the empirical tests reasonably explain information dynamics.  
 
4.2.2 Background of the value relevance literature  
Based on its theoretical background, this type of method can be classified as “value 
relevance” literature. As such, in order to make this literature review more complete, 
some other studies related with value relevance must also be mentioned.  
 
Beaver (1998) defines value relevance as the association between accounting amounts 
and security market values. Barth et al (2000) highlight the relevance of value relevance 
research by providing an overview of value relevance studies. The authors note that there 
are several different valuation models for value relevance studies—in particular, models 
testing the relationship between equity market value and accounting variables are used to 
explain the information provided by accounting variables. The advantage of this kind of 
valuation model is that there is no need to assume market efficiency, seeing that investor 
decisions are already reflected in the share price. Moreover, the authors argue that the 
objective of value relevance studies is the testing of valuation characteristics for 
accounting variables, and is thus different to fundamental analysis studies (as 
fundamental analysis studies use accounting variables to value firms). The authors also 
note that the choice of valuation model is a key point in value relevance studies. The 
Ohlson (1995) model and its refined models are the most popular (the refined Ohlson 
(1995) models include the Fletham and Ohlson (1995) model and Ohlson (1999) model). 
Details of the Ohlson (1995) model have already been given above.  
 
Barth et al (2000) also note that the Ohlson model is a special valuation equation, which 
assumes that the capital market is perfect and complete and that, because of this, provides 
a linear relation result. However, if the capital market is not perfect and complete, the 
result will be of a nonlinear relation. This explains why most studies use the Ohlson 
model as their basis model, while other studies make adjustments for the Ohlson model 
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by including some potential nonlinear factors for particular tests. For example, Barth, 
Beaver and Landsman (1998) test the sensitivity coefficients for earnings and equity book 
value by using both financial health and industry indicators. Their study shows that the 
linear assumption does not hold between these indicators, but that the linear assumption 
holds within each indicator.  
 
In addition to this, Barth et al (2000) highlight two main approaches for value relevance 
studies. The first approach uses firm value as the benchmark for the valuation model, and 
thus reflects firm value (such as with Ohlson (1995)). The second approach uses changes 
in stock prices and returns as the benchmark, and thus reflects changing value over a 
period of time. Landsman and Magliolo (1988) state that, when selecting a valuation 
approach, the researcher should consider both research questions and econometric 
considerations.  
 
Beaver (2002) analyses several different aspects of value relevance and also defines value 
relevance as being the association between accounting amounts and security market 
values (Beaver, 1998). When the relationship between them is significant, the accounting 
number is termed as being “value relevant”. The author highlights two major 
characteristics in value relevance studies. First, a full understanding of related elements—
such as accounting standards and the specific criteria of the accounting variables—is 
required. Second, the author notes that “timeliness of information is not an overriding 
issue. Although value relevance research encompasses event studies, it also includes 
studies that examine the relation between the levels of stock prices and the accounting 
data”.  
 
Now that an overview of the theoretical background of value relevance has been given, 
some practical examples are given below. These examples provide some context as to 
how the hypothesis and research methodology in this thesis was developed—especially 
with regards to Barth et al (1998b), which follows the Ohlson model in testing whether 
brand value is a reliable variable for estimating share price. In the Ohlson model, brand 
value is treated as the “other information” variable. This test provides the basis for the 
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test used in this thesis, since CSR can represent brand/innovation (Surroca et al, 2010). 
As such, a test of how CSR is reflected in share price can be conducted by replacing the 
brand variable in the model with the CSR variable. Moreover, some researchers argue 
that a “circle effect”26 exists in the relationship between CSR and CFP (Waddock and 
Graves, 1997), and so the simultaneous equations used in Barth et al (1998b) can be used 
to test for this circle effect. Please see the following paragraph for a detailed analysis of 
Barth et al (1998b).  
 
First, Barth et al (1992) test the market value implications for pension costs. Taking into 
account that each pension component provides different information about a firm’s 
earnings, the market equity value is expressed as a linear relationship with different 
pension and non-pension net income variables. Next, Barth et al (1998b) test the 
relationship between brand value and share price. Brand value is a reliable variable for 
estimating share price and return. The authors develop a model in which the share market 
price is expressed as a linear function of book value of equity, net income and brand 
value. All of these variables are on a per share basis. The authors also test this equation 
for each year in order to ascertain whether the coefficients vary across years. Their model 
can be explained by the Ohlson (1995) model. Brand value is the “other information” 
variable in the Ohlson model, and can interpret information not related to book value and 
net income if the coefficient of brand value is greater than zero. In addition, the authors 
also test the relationship between changing brand value and stock return on a yearly basis, 
as brand value may change over time. Stock return is used as a dependent variable and is 
expressed as having a linear relation with net income, the changing of net income and the 
changing of brand value from time t-1 to time t. The coefficient of the changing of brand 
value is greater than zero when there is time-related information for the brand value. 
Furthermore, the authors use a simultaneous estimated equation to ensure that results are 
not affected by a possible simultaneity bias. Based on discussions with FinancialWorld, 
the brand value is expressed as having a linear relation with several factors that affect 
brand value. In summary, the authors identify a significant relationship between stock 
price, stock return and brand value; while the results are not attributable to the 
                                                 
26 See Section 6.3 on “Suggestions for future research” for a more detailed explanation.  
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simultaneity bias and there is still a significantly positive relationship between stock price, 
stock return and brand value after controlling for this bias.  
 
4.3 Data and performance measurement 
4.3.1 Financial data 
As already described in Chapter Three, the CSR data used in this thesis is obtained from 
KLD Research & Analytics Inc, while the normalised and net scores are computed to rate 
different firms. The financial data used comprises the book value per share, earnings per 
share and dividend per share from Compustat North America, while the share price is 
obtained from CRSP. After merging the KLD data, Compustat data and CRSP data, firms 
with data values in all three databases are retained, while firms missing values for any 
one of the three databases are dropped. Industry classifications are obtained from the Ken 
French data library. Intangible assets comprise advertising and R&D expenditure, also 
obtained from the Compustat database. As well, in order to deal with outliers in 
Compustat, firms are dropped if their BE/ME is less than 0.01 or greater than 100 (as is 
also the case in Cohen et al (2003)).  
 
4.3.2 Value relevance Barth model  
Now that the background of the model used in this thesis has been discussed in detail, the 
model can be used to estimate whether or not CSR indicators directly affect market value. 
In the Ohlson (1995) model, the CSR indicator is treated as the “other information” 
variable. Barth and Clinch (2009)27 compare four different deflators, namely: the number 
of shares outstanding, the book value of equity, the share price and the market value of 
equity. Their study reports share-deflated and undeflated specifications as delivering the 
best performance. When the number of shares is used as the deflator, there is no transient 
                                                 
27 Barth and Clinch (2009) report that “Based on data simulated using a modified Ohlson (1995) valuation 
model, we investigate effects on inferences of five potential scale-related effects: multiplicative and 
additive omitted scale factors, scale-varying coefficients, survivorship, and heteroscedasticity. We find that 
diagnostics identified in prior research are not successful in detecting or distinguishing these scale effects.” 
The same authors also report that “For each specification, we compare frequency of correct rejection that 
the coefficients equal zero, coefficient bias and absolute error, and regression explanatory power. We find 
that share-deflated and undeflated specifications generally perform the best, regardless of the type of scale 
effect.”  
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size variation effect, while there are no econometric difficulties with the number of shares. 
In addition, the number of shares show only minimal changes between different years and 
is unable to reflect economic factors (that are less related to scale effects). Thus, the 
number of shares is used as the deflator for valuation models in this thesis.  
  
The model used to measure the significance of the coefficient of the CSR indicator is: 
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= + + + + +∑ ,                                      (4.12) 
where itV  is the market value per share for firm i at the end of June for the following year, 
in order to ensure all financial information of the financial year ended in year t has been 
embedded in share prices, and also to ensure that KLD information for year t has been 
fully reflected in prices. itB  is the book value per share, itEPS  is the earnings per share, 
itDPS  is the dividend per share, itCSR  is the CSR indicator from the KLD database, 
jIND  is an industry dummy variable that is equal to one if firm i belongs to industry J, or 
is otherwise equal to zero.  
 
In accounting and finance, panel data is frequently used to estimate regression equations. 
When using multiple observations for the same firm and persistent dependent variables 
(such as earnings, forecast errors or balance sheet ratios), there can be strong residual 
autocorrelation within firms over time. Likewise, since variables such as earnings and 
stock returns pick up systematic changes in value, there can also be strong residual 
correlation across firms for a given time period. The “within” and “between” firm 
residual correlation therefore creates a bias in traditional OLS standard errors. In this 
thesis, if CSR scores are likely to be sticky for a firm across years, both the firm and time 
effects are controlled. 
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Gow et al (2010)28 compare the possible solutions for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence, including OLS and white standard errors, Newey-West, Fama-MacBeth, Z2 
statistics, one-way cluster-robust standard errors and two-way cluster-robust standard 
errors. Please see Table 4.1 for a summary of these solutions, which shows that only two-
way cluster-robust standard errors can solve both cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence at the same time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 See Gow et al (2010) pages 487-490 for a more detailed explanation of these solutions.  
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Table 4.1 Robustness of Methods to Cross-Sectional and Time-Series Dependence 
This table summarizes the robustness to cross-sectional and/or time-series dependence of methods 
commonly used in accounting research to calculate standard errors. A Y indicates the method is robust to 
the indicated form of dependence.  
Key to Methods: OLS: OLS standard error; White: White (1980) standard errors; N-W: Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors; FM-i: Fama-MacBech t-statistic based on mean and standard error of cross-section of 
coefficients from time-series regressions; FM-t: Fama-MacBeth t-statistic based on mean and standard error 
of time-series of coefficients from cross-sectional regressions; FM-NW: FM-t statistic with Newey-West 
(1987) correction; Z2-i: Z2 statistic based on mean and standard error of cross-section of t-statistics from 
time-series regression; Z2-t: Z2 statistic based on mean and standard error of time-series of t-statistics from 
cross-sectional regression; CL-i: robust standard errors clustered by firm (or industry); CL-t: robust 
standard errors clustered by time; two-way cluster-robust standard errors: robust standard errors clustered 
by firm and time.  
 
Method None Cross-Sectional Time-Series Cross-Sectional and Time-Series
OLS Y
White Y
N-W Y Y
FM-i Y Y
FM-t Y Y
FM-NW Y Y
Z2-i Y Y
Z2-t Y Y
CL-i Y Y
CL-t Y Y
CL-2 Y Y Y Y
Robustness of Methods to Cross-Sectional and Time-Series Dependence
Form of Dependence
 
 
Thus, the Petersen 2-way clustered standard error regressions with industry dummies are 
run, with the industry classifications coming from the Fama-French 48-industry 
classification. Petersen (2009) notes that the choice of a suitable method to deal with the 
cross-sectional and time-series dependence depends on the structure of the data. In the 
data set in this thesis, the two-way cluster robust standard error (Petersen, 2009) is used 
in order to ensure the robustness of both time and firm effects, since if CSR scores are 
likely to sticky for a firm across year, both firm and time effects need to be control. 
Petersen 2-way clustered standard error regressions are also run for each of the Fama-
French ten industries as a robustness test. In order to run the Petersen 2-way clustered 
standard error regressions with industry dummies, clustering by firm-year is used, which 
assumes that each firm-year cluster is independent. Gow et al (2010) compare several 
 208 
methods used to correct cross-sectional and time-series dependence, including the Z2 
statistic, one-way cluster-robust standard errors and two-way cluster-robust standard 
errors. They find that most of the methods are only able to solve one of the dependences, 
rather than both. However, two-way cluster-robust standard errors can solve both 
dependences together. Moreover, Z2 has a 24-percent chance of rejecting a true null 
hypothesis at the one percent level, while two-way cluster-robust standard errors has 
well-specified test statistics to test the hypothesis. Furthermore, Petersen (2009) and Gow 
et al (2010) highlight that the two-way cluster-robust standard errors approach returns 
biased standard errors when the number of clusters (firms or times) decreases. The data 
used in this thesis has an adequate number of clusters to use the two-way cluster-robust 
standard errors approach.  
  
4.3.3 Barth model with intangible assets 
Surocca et al (2010) argue that the relationship between CSP and CFP is a virtuous circle, 
stating that “investing in CSP improves intangibles that lead to superior levels of CFP, 
which in turn must be reinvested in intangibles in order to improve CSP”. This reflects 
the fact that both intangible assets and CSR can affect each other, and that CSR can 
represent intangible assets in the valuation model. Some studies report that firm value 
increases when the expenditure of intangible assets (such as R&D and advertising 
expenditure) increases (Chauvin and Hirschey, 1994; and Green et al, 1996). Thus, for 
the purpose of this thesis, both R&D and advertising expenditures are controlled in the 
valuation approach, with the valuation regression being:  
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where itADV  is the advertising expenditure for firm i in year t, and & itR D  is the R&D 
expenditure for firm i in year t.  
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Table 4.2 Correlations between CSR indicators 
Variables are: Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations indicator; Diversity, the net 
KLD CSR measure for diversity indicator; Employee, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicator; Environment, the net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicator; Human Rights, the net 
KLD CSR measure for human rights indicator; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicator; 
Advertising, the advertising expenditure per share, and R&D, the expenditure on research and development 
expenditure per share.  
 
Panel A: Correlations for observations where CSR indicators are available 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Human Rights Product
Community 1.000 0.190 0.242 0.126 0.423 0.024
Diversity 0.231 1.000 0.168 0.050 0.044 -0.108
Employee 0.175 0.174 1.000 0.087 0.308 0.075
Environment -0.019 0.040 0.054 1.000 -0.109 0.107
Human Rights 0.406 -0.025 0.184 -0.134 1.000 0.105
Product -0.017 -0.161 0.079 0.159 0.105 1.000  
 
Panel B: Correlations for observations where both CSR indicators and intangible 
expenditures are available 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Human Rights Product Advertising R&D
Community 1.000 0.225 0.291 0.137 0.337 0.014 0.261 0.163
Diversity 0.294 1.000 0.242 0.095 -0.009 -0.075 0.238 0.115
Employee 0.243 0.273 1.000 0.073 0.271 0.046 0.120 0.285
Environment -0.031 0.081 0.049 1.000 -0.113 0.115 -0.121 -0.068
Human Rights 0.368 -0.064 0.180 -0.169 1.000 0.136 0.129 0.143
Product -0.038 -0.155 0.055 0.163 0.125 1.000 -0.139 0.030
Advertising 0.256 0.143 0.023 -0.116 0.113 -0.116 1.000 -0.080
R&D 0.237 0.173 0.247 -0.206 0.097 0.001 0.083 1.000  
 
Panel A of Table 4.2 shows the correlation coefficients between net CSR scores, with 
Pearson correlations being those below the diagonal and Spearman rank correlations 
being those above the diagonal. Generally, CSR measures tend to be positively correlated, 
and there are significant correlations between CSR scores (with the 0.406 correlation 
between human rights and community being the highest, and the 0.231 correlation 
between community and diversity being the second highest). The lowest correlation is 
between environment and human rights, where there is a significant negative correlation 
of -0.134.  
 
Panel B shows the same correlations for those observations where both advertising and 
R&D are available. As is consistent with Surocca et al (2010), there is some evidence 
here that intangible asset expenditures and CSR are correlated. Both advertising and 
R&D show significant positive correlations with community, while R&D is also 
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correlated with employee [relations]. Interestingly, environment has a negative 
correlation with both advertising and R&D, while advertising is also negatively 
correlated with product. This may indicate that one of the functions of advertising activity 
is to overcome negative images of a firm’s product shortcomings or environmental 
concerns. The very low correlation between product and R&D is perhaps surprising given 
that “R&D/Innovation” is one of the KLD product strength indicators.  
 
However, this thesis does not attempt to test any feedback loop between CSR and 
intangibles, only simply attempt to investigate whether CSR explains anything to share 
price after controlling the impact of proxies for expenditure on intangibles.  
 
The valuation model used in this thesis has several advantages. First, it does not use 
analyst forecast earnings, for the reason that Hou, van Dijk and Zhang (2010) note that 
there is a bias in analyst forecasts. Second, the Peasnell/Ohlson model treats the CSR 
indicator as “other information”, meaning that the CSR coefficients reflect both the cost 
of capital and cash flow effects. If a variation is found in the cost of capital over industry, 
the Petersen 2-way clustered standard error regressions with industry dummies are able to 
reflect this variation. Third, Surroca et al (2010) note that CSR can represent 
brand/innovation, and Barth model regression is therefore able to reflect the CSR effect. 
Moreover, the Peasnell/Ohlson approach allows us to control some possible effects, such 
as, controlling for both R&D and advertising expenditures in the valuation model for 
further testing.  
 
4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 Net KLD score valuation 
The empirical results from this Chapter are summarised in two groups. The first group of 
results is based on the net KLD score rating, while the second group of results is based on 
the normalised KLD score rating. Both the book value (BV) and net income (NI) for all 
regressions have positive and highly significant coefficients, which is consistent with 
other Ohlson framework studies, such as Barth et al (1998).  
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Full sample CSR valuation  
Table 4.3.1 shows the regressions for price on CSR indicators when controlling for the 
Fama-French 48-industry classification and following Petersen (2009) in using two-way 
(year and firm) clustered standard error. First, each CSR indicator is tested independently. 
Next, the overall score is created by summing the CSR indicator scores, excluding that 
for human rights. Finally, the coefficients for all of the CSR indicators are tested 
simultaneously (this is referred to as “Combined” in the tables). For all of the regressions, 
the BV coefficients are around 0.9, thus being highly positive significant; the NI 
coefficients are all around 4.4, which is also highly positive significant; while the 
dividends coefficients are all greater than 2.0 and less than 3.0, which is also significant 
positive at the 5% level. Community, diversity and employee relations have highly 
significant positive coefficients, which are 2.174, 1.534 and 1.913, respectively. However, 
governance has a negative significant coefficient and human rights has an insignificant 
negative coefficient. Neither environment nor product have a significant positive impact 
on value. Furthermore, the overall measurement has a highly significant positive impact 
on value, which shows that the price increases by $0.789 with each unit increase in the 
overall net score. Seeing that Chapter Three reports high correlation between some of the 
CSR indicators, the combined regression is also tested in this Chapter and is shown in the 
final column. For the combined testing, most of the variables retain the same explanatory 
power as in their independent tests—except for product, which takes on a significant 
impact. All of the R-squared in Table 4.3.1 are around 69%.  
 
As is discussed in Chapter Three, there are problems with the KLD indicators for both 
corporate governance and human rights. The human rights criterion is not available for 
several years, and its sub-criteria are also less consistent than other indicators. And also, 
most firms have a zero net score for human rights. Kempf and Osthoff (2007) do not 
include the corporate governance indicator in their research, as they report different 
definitions being used by KLD and a number of studies. This problem may explain why 
both indicators return a negative valuation.  
 
S&P sample CSR valuation 
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As is highlighted in Chapter Three, early KLD data only rates companies in the S&P 500 
and the Domini 400 Social indices. Companies in the Russell 1000 are then included 
from 2001, while those in the Russell 3000 are included from 2003. This provides a 
motivation to run regressions for S&P 500 firms for the period 1991-2008. Table 4.3.2 
shows the Petersen 2-way clustered standard error regressions with industry dummies for 
price on CSR indicators for S&P firms only. As with Table 4.3.1, Table 4.3.2 shows the 
regressions for each individual CSR indicator, as well as those for the overall and 
combined testing. For all of the regressions in this table, the BV coefficients are around 
0.7, thus being highly significant positive; the NI coefficients are all around 4.6, which is 
also highly significant positive; and the dividends coefficients are all around 1.0 but less 
than 2.0, with most of the regressions having significant positive dividends coefficients at 
the 10% level when using a two-tailed test (except for human rights and combined, for 
which the coefficients of both indicators are insignificant). For the KLD indicators, 
community and diversity have a significant positive impact on price at the 10% level 
when using a two-tailed test. Employee relations, environment and product have a 
significant positive impact on value at the 5% level. Governance has a positive but not 
significant impact. This is different to Table 4.3.1. The human rights indicator has a 
significant negative impact at the 10% level when using a two-tailed test. There is a 
highly significant positive impact for the overall score regression, which shows that the 
price increases by $0.717 with each unit increase in the overall net score. Community, 
diversity and employee relations lose their explanatory power in the combined column, 
while both environment and product have significant positive impacts, and human rights 
has a significant negative impact for the combined regression. All of the R-squared in 
Table 4.3.2 are around 46%.  
 
The potential importance of intangible assets 
The importance of intangible assets is described in Section 4.3 on performance 
measurement. Both advertising and R&D expenditure are well-known types of intangible 
asset expenditure, as these are associated with increasing firm value (Chauvin and 
Hirschey, 1994; and Gu and Li, 2010). As such, both advertising and R&D expenditure 
are used in the valuation model in this Chapter. Table 4.3.3 shows the regressions for 
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price on CSR indicators with intangible asset proxies. Similarly, Table 4.3.3 also includes 
each of the individual indicator regressions, the overall score and the combined testing. 
BV and NI return significant positive coefficients for all of the regressions. For all of the 
regressions in this table, the BV coefficients are between 0.55 and 0.62, thus being highly 
significant positive; the NI coefficients are all around 6.6, which is also highly significant 
positive; the dividends coefficients are all around 1.6, having a positive impact on value 
but one that is not significant for most of the indicators, except for human rights and 
combined, both of which have significant positive impacts at the 10% level when using a 
two-tailed test. As expected, R&D expenditure has a significant positive impact for all of 
the regressions at the 5% level. However, advertising expenditure has a positive impact 
on value, which is not significant, thus showing that all advertising benefits are realised 
in the current period in the Peasnell/Ohlson framework or that current earnings include 
adequate advertising expenditure information (Franzen and Radhakrishnan, 2009). Lev 
and Sougiannis (1996) and Green et al (1996) provide consistent evidence to show that 
market value increases nearly four times that of current R&D expenditure. Green et al 
(1996) also note that current R&D capital can explain current market value. When both 
expenditures are included in the valuation equation, community and environment have a 
significant positive impact at the 10% level when using a two-tailed test; while diversity 
and employee relations have significant positive impact at the 1% level. Both governance 
and human rights have a negative impact on value—although this is not significant for 
governance, but is significant for human rights. There is no significant positive impact for 
product. The overall score has a highly significant positive coefficient, which shows that 
the price increases by $0.854 with each unit increase in the overall net score. Furthermore, 
for the combined regression, the results change after the inclusion of intangible assets 
expenditure. Community and governance lose their explanatory power; diversity, 
employee relations and product still have significant positive impacts; and environment 
and human rights retain insignificant impact, which is the same as for the regression 
without the intangible asset proxy.  
 
 214 
When including both R&D and advertising in the regressions, the sample size is reduced 
by more than 75% to ensure that both types of intangible asset are available for each firm. 
The adjusted R-squared is less than for the full sample regressions.  
 
The effect of deflation 
The tables above are based on the per share deflation basis. Table 4.3.4 shows the 
undeflated regressions for market capitalisation on CSR indicators. The table shows that, 
if firm size affects CSR, the per share deflation basis will mislead results. Thus, Table 
4.3.4 provides undeflated regressions to ensure the robustness of size effect. Barth and 
Clinch (2009) report that the undeflation and per share deflation basis provide the most 
robust checking during their simulation testing. In Table 4.3.4, for the undeflated 
regressions, both BV and NI have a highly positive significant impact on value, which is 
the same case as with the per share deflation regressions. The BV coefficients are around 
1.1, thus having a highly significant impact; the NI coefficients are around 7.2, thus also 
having a highly significant impact; and the dividends coefficients are around 1.8, 
however, none of the regressions have a significant dividends impact. In terms of the 
individual CSR indicators, community, diversity and employee relations each have a 
significant positive impact on value (especially in the case of diversity and employee 
relations, for which the impact is significant at the 1% level when using a two-tailed test). 
The governance indicator has a significant negative impact on value at the 1% level. 
Environment has a positive coefficient, while human rights and product have negative 
coefficients. However, none of these three coefficients are significant. Next, the overall 
score has a significant positive impact, which shows that the market capitalisation 
increases by $4.6E+08 with each unit increase in the overall net score. In the combined 
column, community, diversity and employee relations retain significant positive 
explanatory power; governance still has a significant negative impact; and environment 
and human rights each retain an insignificant explanatory power. However, for the 
undeflated combined regression, the product indicator does not have any significant 
negative impact on value. All of the R-squared in the table are around 71%. 
 
Time-varying effects 
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Tables 4.3.5 and 4.3.6 show the sub-period regressions29 used to test the valuation effect 
for the different sub-periods, as CSR ratings change over time. Guenster et al (2011) 
report that the market valuation for environment increases over time in the US market, 
and also that there is a premium for high-scoring eco-efficient firms during the later 
period. Although we could follow the Barth et al (1998) method to test individual year 
regressions, Gow et al (2010) provide a better approach by using two-way (year and firm) 
clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2009) to test the sub-period regressions. For tables 
4.3.5 and 4.3.6, the whole period is split into two sub-periods, namely 1991-1999 and 
2000-2008. Table 4.3.5 shows the regressions from 1991 to 1999. As with previous 
regressions, both BV and NI have a highly significant positive impact on value, while 
dividends also has a significant positive impact. Community, environment and product 
have a positive impact with no significance. Both diversity and employee relations have 
highly significant positive impacts on value. Governance and human rights both have 
negative coefficients. However, the impact of governance is significant at the 1% level, 
while human rights has insignificant impact. The overall score has significant positive 
impact at the 1% level, which shows that the price increases by $0.707 with each unit 
increase in the overall score. Turning to the combined column, all of the indicators have 
significant impacts, except for community. BV, NI and dividends have positive impacts 
at the 1% level. Diversity, employee relations, environment and product have significant 
positive coefficients, while governance and human rights have significant negative 
coefficients. All of the R-squared in this table are around 55%. 
 
Table 4.3.6 shows the regressions from 2000 to 2008. As with previous regressions, both 
BV and NI have a highly significant positive impact on value, while dividends also has a 
significant positive impact. Community and environment both change to a significant 
positive impact from no significant impact over the sub-periods. Diversity and employee 
relations remain the same over the sub-periods, with both retaining a significant positive 
impact on value. Although the governance indicator also retains a significant negative 
impact, the scale of negative valuation decreases sharply for the second sub-period. 
                                                 
29 In order to test for time-varying effects, year-fixed effects regressions are recorded in Appendix 5.3—the 
results of which are consistent with the main context of this thesis.  
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Human rights changes to a significant negative impact from no significant negative 
impact from the second sub-period testing. Again, product has no significant impact over 
the sub-periods. For the overall score, the coefficient remains positive and highly 
significant. Next, in the combined column, community still has no significant explanatory 
power, while governance, diversity, employee relations and environment retain 
significant explanatory power, which is the same as for the first sub-period testing. 
However, both human rights and product change to no significant impact during the 
second sub-period testing. Thus, it can be concluded that the market always values some 
CSR indicators, but not others. This is especially true for environment, which increases in 
importance over the periods. All of the R-squared for these regressions are around 71%. 
 
Industry effects 
Chapter Three runs both the “no-industry” and “10-industry-neutral” stock return 
regressions in order to show important effects for some industries. This provides a 
motivation to run industry level regressions. The Fama-French 10-industry 
classification30 is used in the industry level regressions. Table 4.3.7 shows the 10-industry 
level regressions for each individual CSR indicator, as well as for the overall net score. 
There are two main findings. First, the BV, NI and dividends coefficients are different for 
the ten industries. BV has a highly significant positive impact for all of the industries for 
all of the individual CSR indicators and also the overall score—except for industry 7 
(Shops), which is significant at the 5% level or 10% level for the different individual 
CSR indicators. For NI, all of the industries have highly positive significant impacts for 
all of the individual CSR indicators and the overall score. For dividends, most of the 
industries do not have any significant impact for the individual CSR indicators or the 
overall score—except for industry 1 (Consumer NonDurable), industry 4 (Energy), 
industry 7 (Shops) and industry 10 (Other), which each have a significant dividends 
impact.  
 
                                                 
30 The Fama-French 10-industry definition is: industry 1(Consumer NonDurables), industry 2(Consumer 
Durables), industry 3(Manufacturing), industry 4(Energy), industry 5(HiTec), industry 6(Telecom), 
industry 7(Shops), industry 8(Health), industry 9(Utilities) and industry 10(Other).  
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The second key finding is that CSR does not provide significant valuations for all of the 
ten industries to suggest the industry effects are important. For community, significant 
positive valuations are found for industry 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, while the valuation effects 
for the remaining industries 1, 4 and 10 are not significant. For governance, significant 
negative valuations are found for industry 2, 3, 4, 8, 9 and 10, while the valuation effects 
for the remaining industries 1, 5, 6 and 7 are not significant. For diversity, significant 
positive valuations are found for industry 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10, while the valuation effects 
for the remaining industries are not significant. For employee relations, significant 
valuations are found for industry 1, 5, 6, 8 and 9, while the valuation effects for the 
remaining industries are not significant. For environment, significant valuations are found 
for industry 5, 7 and 10, while the valuation effects for the remaining industries are not 
significant. For human rights, significant negative valuations are found for industry 3, 4 
and 8, while the valuation effects for the remaining industries are not significant. For 
product, significant positive valuations are found for industry 1, 5 and 6, while the 
valuation effects for the remaining industries are not significant. For the overall score, 
significant positive valuations are found for industry 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8, while the 
valuation effects for the remaining industries are not significant. It can therefore be 
concluded that each CSR indicator has a different coefficient for the ten industries, thus 
showing the importance of industry effect.  
 
Since industry 10 has a broad definition, many different types of firms belong to this 
industry. While the 48-industry definition could also be considered, many industries 
comprise only a very small number of firms. The 17-industry definition could also be 
considered, although, as the “other” category, industry 17 contains a high number of 
firms (see Appendix 5 for the Barth model with 17 industry membership).   
 
4.4.2 Normalised KLD score valuation 
The above results are all based on the KLD net score, which simply uses the positive 
score minus the negative score for each CSR indicator. This sub-section shows the results 
using the KLD normalised score (which is discussed in detail in Chapter Three). 
Although there are problems when creating the portfolios with the normalised score, this 
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is not a concern for valuation. Moreover, the advantage of the normalised score is that it 
can be used to compare different metrics and years.  
 
Full sample CSR valuation 
Table 4.4.1 shows the regressions for price on CSR indicators when controlling for the 
Fama-French 48-industry classification and following Petersen (2009) in using two-way 
(year and firm) clustered standard error. As with the net score testing, first, each CSR 
indicator is tested independently. Then, the overall score is created by summing the CSR 
indicator scores, excluding human rights. Finally, the coefficients for all of these CSR 
indicators are tested simultaneously. For all of the regressions in this table, BV has a 
highly positive significant impact on value, with all of the BV coefficients being around 
0.9. NI also has a highly positive significant impact on value, with all of the NI 
coefficients being around 4.4. Meanwhile, the dividends coefficients are around 2.2, 
which is also significantly positive at the level of 5%. Diversity and employee relations 
have highly significant positive coefficients, while both community and environment 
have a significant positive impact on value at the 10% level. However, governance has a 
negative significant coefficient. Both human rights and product have an insignificant 
positive impact on value. Furthermore, the overall measurement has a highly significant 
positive impact on value, which shows that the price increases by $6.975 with each unit 
increase in the overall score. For the combined regression, most of the variables retain the 
same explanatory power as in their independent tests—except for community and 
environment, which both take on an insignificant impact in the combined testing. All of 
the R-squared in this table are around 69%.  
 
S&P sample CSR valuation  
Table 4.4.2 shows the regressions for price on CSR indicators for S&P firms only when 
using the normalised KLD score. As in previous tables, Table 4.4.2 also shows the 
regressions for each individual CSR indicator, the overall score and the combined testing. 
For all of the regressions in this table, both BV and NI have a highly positive significant 
impact on value at the 1% level, while the BV and NI coefficients are around 0.7 and 4.6, 
respectively. The dividends coefficients are all around 1.1 and have a significant positive 
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coefficient at the 10% level. Community, governance and human rights have insignificant 
impact coefficients. Diversity has a significant positive impact at the 10% level. 
Employee relations, environment and product all have significant positive impacts on 
value at the 5% level. The overall score measurement has a highly significant positive 
impact, which shows that the price increases by $6.309 with each unit increase in the 
overall score. In the combined column, diversity loses its explanatory power (unlike in 
the individual regression), while employee relations, environment and product all have 
significant positive impacts. Community has an insignificant positive impact, while both 
governance and human rights have insignificant negative impacts. All of the R-squared in 
this table are around 46%.  
 
The potential importance of intangible assets 
The importance of intangible assets is discussed in Section 4.3. Table 4.4.3 shows the 
regressions for price on CSR indicators with intangible asset proxies when using the 
normalised CSR score. Table 4.4.3 also includes each of the individual indicator 
regressions, the overall score and the combined testing. Both BV and NI have significant 
positive coefficients for all of the regressions, with BV coefficients of 0.55 to 0.61 and NI 
coefficients of around 6.7. Dividends has a positive impact on value but no significant 
impact for most of the indicators—except for environment, where it has significant 
positive impact at the 10% level. As with the net score results, R&D expenditure has a 
significant positive impact for all of the regressions. However, advertising expenditure 
has an insignificant positive impact on value, thus showing that all advertising benefit is 
realised in the current period in the Ohlson/Peasnell framework, or that current earnings 
include adequate advertising expenditure information (Franzen and Radhakrishnan, 2009). 
For the valuation equation run with intangible asset expenditure, community, human 
rights and product all have insignificant positive impacts on value. Diversity, employee 
relations and environment have significant positive impacts, especially for in the case of 
diversity and employee relations, which both have a significant positive impact at the 1% 
level. Governance has an insignificant negative impact on value. The overall score has a 
highly significant positive coefficient. Finally, for the combined regression, environment 
loses its explanatory power; diversity and employee relations retain a significant positive 
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impact; and community, governance, human rights and product retain insignificant 
impacts, same with the individual KLD indicator regression. All of the R-squared in these 
regressions are around 47%, thus representing a decrease from the full sample testing.  
 
The effect of deflation 
As with the net score, the undeflated regressions of market capitalisation are also run for 
the normalised KLD score. Table 4.4.4 shows the undeflated regressions used for 
reinforcing the size effect. For the undeflated regressions, both BV and NI have a highly 
positive significant impact on value, which is the same as for the per share deflation 
regression. The BV and NI coefficients are all around 1.1 and 7.2, respectively, while all 
of these coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Dividends has an insignificant 
positive impact. In terms of the individual CSR indicators, community, diversity and 
employee relations all have a significant positive impact on value—especially in the case 
of diversity and employee relations, which are significant at the 1% level. The 
governance indicator has a significant negative impact on value at the 1% level. 
Environment, human rights and product have insignificant coefficients, while product has 
a negative coefficient. The overall score also has a significant positive impact at the 5% 
level. In the combined column, community loses its explanatory power, while governance, 
diversity and employee relations retain significant explanatory power, and both 
environment and human rights retain insignificant explanatory power. Product has a 
significant negative impact at the 10% level in this regression, unlike in the individual 
KLD indicator regression. Moreover, both governance and product have negative impacts. 
All of the R-squared in this table are around 71%. 
 
Time-varying effects 
Tables 4.4.5 and 4.4.6 show the sub-period regressions31 used to test the valuation effect 
for the different sub-periods, since the CSR rating changes over time. As with the sub-
period testing for the net score, the overall period is split into two sub-periods, namely 
1991-1999 and 2000-2008. Table 4.4.5 shows the regressions from 1991 to 1999. As with 
                                                 
31 In order to test for time-varying effects, year-fixed effects regressions are recorded in Appendix 5.4—the 
results of which are consistent with the main context of this thesis.  
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previous regressions, both BV and NI have a highly significant positive impact on value, 
while the BV and NI coefficients are around 0.7 and 5.4, respectively, and dividends also 
has a significant positive impact for all of these regressions. Diversity, employee and 
environment have highly significant positive impacts on value; while community, 
governance and human rights all have negative coefficients. However, the impact is 
insignificant for community, and significant for governance at the 1% level and for 
human rights at the 5% level. The overall score has a significant positive impact at the 
5% level. Next, in the combined column, most of the indicators have significant 
impacts—except for the case of community and environment. Diversity, employee 
relations and product all have significant positive coefficients, whereas governance and 
human rights have significant negative coefficients. All of the R-squared in these 
regressions are around 55%. 
 
Table 4.4.6 shows the regressions from 2000 to 2008. Again, BV and NI both have a 
highly significant positive impact on value, while dividends also has a significant positive 
impact. Community changes from an insignificant negative impact to a significant 
positive impact between the first and second sub-periods. Diversity, employee relations 
and environment retain significant positive impacts on value, which stays the same during 
the two sub-periods. The governance indicator retains a significant negative impact 
across both sub-periods, while the scale of negative valuation decreases sharply for the 
second sub-period. Human rights changes to an insignificant negative impact from the 
second sub-period. Product has no significant impact over the sub-periods. For the overall 
score, the coefficient retains highly significant positive impact across the sub-periods. 
Next, in the combined column, community, governance and environment lose their 
explanatory power, unlike with the individual KLD indicator regression; while diversity 
and employee relations retain significant explanatory power, which is the same for the 
two testing sub-periods. However, both human rights and product change to no 
significant impact across the two sub-periods. In conclusion, while the market always 
values some of the CSR indicators, it does not value others. All of the R-squared for these 
regressions are around 71%. 
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Industry effects 
Table 4.4.7 shows the Fama-French 10-industry level regressions for each of the 
individual CSR indicators and the overall normalised score. As with the net score, there 
are two main findings. First, the coefficients of the BV, NI and dividends are different for 
the ten industries for the normalised KLD score valuation. BV has a highly significant 
positive impact for all of the industries for all of the individual CSR indicators and the 
overall score—except for in the case of industry 7, for which it has significant positive 
impact at the 10% level for community, governance and human rights, and significant 
positive impact at the 5% level for diversity, employee, environment, product and overall. 
NI has a highly positive significant impact for all of the ten industries, all of the 
individual CSR indicators and the overall score. Dividends has an insignificant impact for 
most of the industries for all of the individual CSR indicators and also for the overall 
score—except for industry 1, 4, 7 and 10, for which it has a significant dividends impact. 
These effects are similar to the net score industry level results.  
 
The second key finding is that CSR does not provide the same positive value for all ten 
industries for the normalised score regressions. For community, significant valuations are 
found for industry 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9, while the valuation effects for the remaining 
industries 1, 4, 5 and 10 are not significant. For governance, significant negative 
valuations are found for industry 2, 3, 7, 8 and 10, while the valuation effects for the 
remaining industries are not significant. For diversity, significant positive valuations are 
found for industry 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10, while the valuation effects for the remaining 
industries are not significant. For employee relations, significant valuations are found for 
industry 1, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, while the valuation effects for the remaining industries are not 
significant. For environment, significant positive valuations are found for industry 5 and 
7, while the valuation effects for the remaining industries are not significant. For human 
rights, significant valuations are found for industry 4, 6 and 9, while the valuation effects 
for the remaining industries are not significant. For product, significant positive 
valuations are found for industry 1, 5 and 6, while the valuation effects for the remaining 
industries are not significant. For the overall score, significant positive valuations are 
found for industry 1, 3, 5 and 6, while the valuation effects for the remaining industries 
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are not significant. On the whole, these effects are similar to the net score results. In 
summary, each CSR indicator has a different coefficient for the ten industries, thus 
showing the importance of industry effect. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The key contribution of this Chapter to existing literature is that most of the CSR 
indicators used (except for corporate governance and human rights) report positive 
market price valuations when using a model based on Ohlson (1995) and Peasnell (1982). 
Both the normalised KLD score and the net KLD score are used to estimate the 
association between CSR indicators and market price by controlling for the book value of 
equity, net income and dividends, with both the book value and net income for all of 
these regressions having positive and highly significant coefficients. Moreover, the 
intangible assets of R&D and advertising expenditure are added to the valuation model. 
Advertising expenditure has insignificant positive coefficients for both KLD rating scores, 
while R&D is found to have significant positive coefficients. Each firm-year cluster is 
assumed to be independent in the regression (Gow et al, 2010), and also controlling for 
Fama-French 48 industry membership. In addition, some of CSR indicators (and 
especially in the case of environment) are not found to be valued in the early period, but 
then increase in importance over time. Also, the ten industries are found to have different 
valuation effects, thus confirming the importance of industry effect. Moreover, both 
governance and human rights have negative valuations, which may be due to the fact that 
the KLD definition for governance is very different to that used in other studies in this 
area. The human rights criteria is not available for several years, and its sub-criteria are 
also less consistent than for the other indicators.  
 
The advantage of the model used in this thesis is that it is based on theoretical valuation 
models (such as Ohlson (1995) and Peasnell (1982)) and also that it assumes each firm-
year cluster to be independent (Gow et al, 2010). In order to explain the corresponding 
results, firms with high-scoring CSR scores are expected to have lower expected costs of 
capital (El Ghoul et al, 2011) or lower expected negative cash flows—or both of these 
 224 
factors. In summary, the high-scoring CSR firms, on average, have higher market 
valuations. It can therefore be concluded that a socially responsible agenda does not 
conflict with maximising shareholder value. The results of this Chapter show that CSR 
engagement is positively priced, that the implications for corporate managers are 
interesting, and that a well-planned CSR strategy may increase firm value. 
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Chapter Five: Disaggregating the CSR Valuation 
Effect 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Several theoretical analyses can be used to explain why exercises in CSR increase firm 
value. For example, McGuire et al (1988) note that investors’ requirements increase as 
CSR decreases. However, if CSR increases—and thereby improves a firm’s reputation—
such costly requirements from investors are reduced. Fombrun and Shanley (1990) report 
that firms with a positive reputation for product and labour earn more profit at a later 
stage by attracting customers and quality workers. In addition, empirical analysis shows 
that conclusions on the relationship between CSR and financial performance are still very 
mixed. For example, Feldman et al (1997) note that firms with good environmental 
performance are less risky, while Brammer et al (2006) identify a negative relationship 
between CSR and financial returns. Likewise, Hamilton et al (1993) do not find any 
statistical difference in the excess returns from mutual and conventional mutual funds, 
while Nelling and Webb (2009) conclude that CSR does not affect financial performance. 
 
By testing the market valuation for different KLD indicators with a model based on that 
of Ohlson (1995) and Peasnell (1982), Chapter Four of this thesis finds that most CSR 
indicators (except for corporate governance and human rights) result in positive market 
valuations. On average, high-scoring CSR firms have higher market valuations, and thus 
firms with higher CSR scores might be expected to have lower expected costs of capital 
(El Ghoul et al, 2011) or lower expected negative cash flows—or both. Based on this 
assumption, this Chapter aims to disaggregate the effect on value into the three separate 
components of the return on equity (ROE) ratio, implied cost of capital (ICC) and growth 
rate. ICC is the discount rate or the internal rate of return, which is equal to the stock 
price to the present value of its expected future cash flow. ICC represents investors’ 
required rate of return, which is considered when making investment decisions. It is a 
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combination of these factors that provides the motivation for this thesis to disaggregate 
the effect of CSR on value in order to analyse the source of the impact of CSR on 
valuation. Three different methodologies are used to compute the ICC and growth rate, 
with the first methodology used being the residual income valuation (RIV) model, which 
is also used to provide individual estimates for the ICC and long-run growth rate 
(meaning that it can solve either the ICC or long-run growth rate beyond year five, but 
not both at the same time). However, the advantage of this method is that it allows for the 
full use of information contained in analyst forecasts. I/B/E/S provides a consensus 
analyst forecast for the three years ahead, and also a long-run growth estimate of earnings 
growth from years three to five. However, these forecasts are not available for all firms, 
and so a fill-in procedure is used (as detailed in Section 5.3.2.1). This duly allows for the 
use of any number of years of specific forecasts. The next two methodologies used 
include one that is based on a new approach from Ashton and Wang (2012), and also a 
modified version of the Easton and Sommers (2007) model that simultaneously estimate 
the ICC and long-run growth rate (and which does not need to assume terminal values or 
future growth rates). Both approaches use one-year-ahead analyst forecasts, solving the 
long-run growth and cost of equity implied by current prices and these one-year ahead 
forecasts.  
 
This Chapter makes significant contributions to existing research by applying the 
aforementioned approach to measure the ICC and long-run growth rate. This is the first 
time that the Ashton and Wang (2012) approach has been used to test the relationship 
between CSR, ICC and growth rate. Although several studies have previously examined 
the relationship between the cost of equity capital and CSR (such as El Ghoul et al (2011) 
and Dhaliwal et al (2010)), these studies do not use the portfolio methodology to test this 
relationship, and neither do they test the relationship between the growth rate and CSR. 
Since Chapter Four concludes that CSR is indeed valued by the market, this Chapter aims 
to test whether CSR market valuation is influenced by the ICC or growth rate—or both. If 
high-scoring CSR firms display higher growth rates than low-scoring CSR firms, this 
implies that high-scoring CSR firms have more persistent abnormal earnings than low-
scoring CSR firms and would thus be expected to have a long-run competitive advantage 
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on low-scoring CSR firms. As such, this Chapter explores the relationship between 
growth rate and CSR. Moreover, in contrast to Sharfman and Fernando (2008), who use 
the CAPM to compute the cost of capital, this Chapter uses several different methods to 
estimate the ICC and growth rate. Moreover, while Chava (2010) and Sharfman and 
Fernando (2008) only look at environment, this Chapter uses a comprehensive set of 
KLD indicators to test the relationship between CSR, the ICC and long-run growth rate.  
 
5.2 Methodology overview 
5.2.1 Residual income valuation 
Frankel and Lee (1998) use the residual income value-to-price ratio to estimate cross-
sectional return. The residual income model used in the 1998 study is similar to that of 
Lee et al (1999), with the difference being that this study uses a constant discount rate 
and a short-period forecasting horizon of three years. The authors conclude that there is 
no significant effect on valuation when using the varying discount rate, and also that 
analyst forecasts provide better results.  
 
Using the residual income model for 20 countries, Frankel and Lee (1999) find this model 
to be a good predictor of performance. However, the authors still identify three problems 
during the application, namely that: (1) some forecast earnings are missed; (2) some 
countries do not hold the clean surplus relation; and (3) time is needed to transfer 
accounting information into value.  
 
Lee, Myers and Swaminathan (1999) use the residual income valuation model for the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) to find that the residual income model has better 
predictability for return than price-to-book ratio or dividend yield. Also, price variations 
can be better explained by intrinsic value (which has a high tracking ability and a 
predictive power for estimating stock return). The authors use a two-stage valuation 
approach. First, they obtain analyst earnings forecast data and long-term growth rates 
from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) for the first three years. They 
use the forecast earnings per share for the first two years, and use the long-term growth 
rate and the second year forecast earnings to estimate the forecast earnings for the third 
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year. Next, they use forecasted earnings divided by the previous year’s book value in 
order to obtain the ROE for the first three years. Second, for years four to year T, the 
authors assume that the ROE fades to the industry median ROE, which can be computed 
by using a past median ROE for all firms in the same industry. For the value after year T, 
year T residual income is used as perpetuity. The authors also apply the clean surplus 
theory to the valuation model, which is: 1t t t tB B FEPS FDPS−= + − , where 
*t tFDPS FEPS k= , and where k is the dividend pay-out ratio. The authors state that this 
ratio is estimated “by dividing actual dividends from the last fiscal year by earnings over 
the same time period”. The authors use the time-varying riskless rate plus a constant risk 
premium as the cost of capital. Then, firms are removed if they are missing a value or if 
they have negative book value.  
 
After comparing the residual income valuation model with several other tests, the Lee et 
al (1999) assert the following points: (1) the time-varying discount rate is the basis factor 
for the residual income model, especially in the US market; (2) the short-term discount 
rate is better than the long-term discount rate; (3) the performance of the model is 
improved by using analyst earnings forecasts (because analysts consider all available 
information when forecasting earnings); and (4) the valuation is not significantly affected 
by different forecasting horizons or risk premiums.  
 
Claus and Thomas (2001) find equity premium to be around 3 percent for the US market 
for every year from 1985 to 1998. An abnormal earnings model is used as an alternative 
valuation model, which also adopts a two-stage approach. First, analyst earnings forecasts 
are selected for the first two years, while a five-year growth rate is obtained from I/B/E/S. 
Next, this growth rate and the previous year’s earnings forecasts are used to compute the 
earnings forecasts from year three to year five. The earnings forecast minus a charge for 
the cost of equity is used to obtain the expected abnormal earnings for the first five years. 
Second, the authors assume a constant growth rate for abnormal earnings after year five. 
The terminal value is the present value of the abnormal earnings after year five, while the 
clean surplus relation is also applied. Frankel and Lee (1998) mention that most 
transactions satisfy the clean surplus theory according to US accounting standards (only a 
249 
 
very small number do not satisfy this theory, and analysts do not use them to forecast 
earnings). The study by Claus and Thomas (2001) uses three different growth rates. The 
first rate is the dividend growth rate for perpetuity (which is assumed by the authors); the 
second is the earnings growth rate for the first five years (obtained from the I/B/E/S); and 
the third is the abnormal earnings growth rate beyond year five (also assumed by the 
authors). The authors also assume the abnormal growth rate as the expected inflation rate.  
 
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) use a discounted residual income model as an 
alternative method to compute the cost of equity capital for US stocks. Again, a two-stage 
approach is used. First, three years’ of I/B/E/S analyst forecasts earnings-per-share are 
used, while assume forecasted return on equity (ROE) fades to the industry median ROE 
at the end of the three years. Second, for the long-term growth in earnings (LTG), a mean 
long-term earnings growth rate from the I/B/E/S is used. A negative relationship is found 
to exist between LTG and the implied risk premium. Moreover, they also test the 
relationship between the implied cost of capital and firm characteristics and industry 
membership. These characteristics could explain almost 60 percent of variations in the 
future implied cost of capital.  
 
Ritter and Warr (2002) report that the model is affected by inflation when used to 
estimate stock return. The authors identify undervaluations during periods of high 
inflation when using the valuation model. Four main assertions are made, namely that: (1) 
the real cost of equity capital should be used as the discount rate (if the discount rate is 
the nominal cost of capital, the valuation model needs to use a higher nominal growth 
rate); (2) wealth is more likely to be transferred from bondholder to stockholder during 
periods of high inflation—especially in the case of high-leveraged firms; (3) there are 
higher nominal interest rates during periods of high inflation (money is transferred from 
the stock market to the money market, and the stock market may have negative returns); 
(4) the valuation model makes several mistakes, including the fact that the nominal 
discount rate is used (rather than the real rate) and also that the model uses the non-
growing nominal perpetuity discount rate to compute terminal value.  
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O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2002) discuss the need to adjust the residual income valuation 
model with an inflation factor. Earlier studies mostly use the standard residual income 
valuation model, which is based on historic accounting data and uses the nominal cost of 
equity as the discount rate. However, Ritter and Warr (2002) argue that the residual 
income valuation model needs to be adjusted with an inflation factor and that it should 
also use the real cost of equity as the discount rate (for example, the adjusted model needs 
to use the current cost, rather than the historical cost, while the residual income needs to 
be deflated to the real value). However, O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2002) argue that 
inflation adjustment doesn’t affect the theoretical firm value. First, they show that the 
clean surplus relation still holds for this valuation and that the firm’s value is equal to the 
book value plus the present value of future expected residual income. The authors find 
that the same residual income valuation is obtained for both current and historical costs. 
Although differences are found between current and historical book value, the difference 
in further residual income counterbalances this difference. Finally, the authors reject the 
argument that the residual income valuation model needs to be adjusted with an inflation 
factor, as this provides the same results as for the standard residual income valuation 
model.  
 
Dong et al (2006) also apply the price-to-residual income value ratio (P/V) to test the 
misvaluation for the takeover market in the US, they uses a two-stage approach for the 
residual income valuation model, which includes a three-year forecasting horizon and a 
terminal value. The forecast EPS is selected from the I/B/E/S and then divided by the 
previous year’s book value per share in order to obtain a ROE forecast for the first three 
years. The clean surplus relation still holds for this valuation. Dividends divided by EPS 
is used to obtain the dividend pay-out ratio. The authors use the CAPM to compute the 
cost of capital, with the range of the cost of capital being 3 to 30 percent.  
 
Following the Lee et al (1999) model, Bi and Gregory (2011) use the price-to-residual 
income valuation ratio to test mergers and acquisitions. First, consensus analyst earnings 
forecasts and dividends are selected from the I/B/E/S for the first three years, and then a 
real growth term plus inflation rate is used to fill the missing earnings forecasts (with the 
251 
 
previous financial year pre-merger dividends used to fill the missing dividend). It is then 
assumed that the residual income linear declines to industry ROE between years four and 
eight. Second, the industry cost of equity capital is used, with CAPM used to compute 
industry beta. The industry average ROE is computed by using rolling industry averages 
for ten years, while the clean surplus is used to compute the book value of equity.  
 
In conclusion, the following points are used to summarise the situation of residual income 
valuation: (1) While Lee et al (1999) note that the residual income model needs to use a 
time-varying discount rate, while Frankel and Lee (1999) conclude that the valuation is 
not significantly affected by the use of a time-varying discount rate; (2) Lee et al (1999) 
report that the performance of the model can be improved by using analyst earnings 
forecasts. Several studies have also used analyst earnings forecasts. For example, Frankel 
and Lee (1998) also use these earnings forecasts to find that the residual income model is 
able to explain approximately 70 percent of cross-sectional returns for the US market; (3) 
Lee et al (1999) argue that valuation is not significantly affected by forecasting horizons 
or risk premium; and (4) O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2002) reject the argument that there is a 
need to adjust the residual income model with an inflation factor.  
 
5.2.2 Approach to simultaneous estimation of implied cost of equity capital and 
long-run growth 
Easton et al (2002) develop an approach to simultaneously estimate the cost of equity 
capital and growth rate by using stock price, book value and forecasting earnings. After 
comparing their estimates of equity premium with other studies, they find that their study 
obtains a higher risk premium than other studies (although this may be due to the fact that 
the study calculates the growth rate, while other studies assume the growth rate for the 
terminal value).  
 
Gode and Mohanram (2003) use both the residual income valuation model and the 
Ohlson-Juettner (OJ) 3132  model to estimate the implied cost of capital, then using the 
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correlation between the implied cost of capital and firm-specific risk factors and future 
realised returns to compare these two models. The authors find a stronger relationship 
between the implied cost of capital of the OJ and the firm’s risk factor than for the 
implied cost of capital for the RIV. The firm’s risk factors include factors such as 
earnings volatility and systematic risk. However, they find only a modest relationship 
between the implied cost of capital of the OJ and future realised returns. 
 
Easton and Monahan (2005) use several different methods to compute the cost of capital, 
and then test the relationship between the cost of capital and realised returns after 
controlling for both the expected bias and noise for realised return. They find that all of 
these different costs of capital are unreliable, also noting that: “None of them had a 
positive association with realised returns, even after controlling for the bias and noise in 
realised returns attributable to contemporaneous information surprises”. However, when 
there is high accuracy for the analyst forecasts, some of the costs of capital are found to 
be reliable.  
 
Easton (2006) compares the cost of capital deriving from several different methods. The 
Easton et al (2002) method is used as the benchmark for comparison with other methods, 
for the reason that this method simultaneously estimates both the expected rate of return 
and the growth rate. The author concludes that his analyses show “…that assumptions 
about growth beyond the (short) forecast horizon may seriously affect the estimates of the 
expected rate of return and may lead to spurious inferences”.  
 
Easton and Sommers (2007) report a bias when using analyst earnings forecasts to 
estimate the implied cost of capital. There is optimism for the analyst earnings forecasts 
and an upward bias for this estimation when using these forecasts to estimate the implied 
cost of capital. The Easton and Sommers (2007) study uses both analyst earnings 
                                                                                                                                                  
32 See Ohlson and Juettner (2005) for further details of this model. As to why the model is not used for this 
thesis, Gregory (2011) states that “Unfortunately, the formula breaks down under circumstances when 
short-run earnings growth is smaller than long-run earnings growth by a sufficient margin to render the 
term under the square root sign in Equation (3) negative. In such circumstances, the choice is either to 
artificially constrain short-run earnings growth or to conclude that a cost of capital cannot be calculated for 
some years. Neither alternative is terribly appealing, particularly as the latter implies ignoring observations 
where economic circumstances are likely to adverse.”  
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forecasts and current earnings realisations to compute the difference in order to estimate 
the bias at 2.84 percent. Thus, if some studies obtain a risk premium of around 3 percent 
by using analyst earnings forecasts, there is barely any premium once this bias is removed. 
The authors state that the differences in the implied cost of capital can lead to different 
conclusions, meaning that the conclusion is affected by the bias. Three different earnings 
are used to estimate the implied cost of capital, which are: (1) the analyst earnings 
forecasts for the next year; (2) realised earnings for the current year; and (3) perfect 
foresight earnings forecasts for the next year. Next, the difference in estimates for 
forecast earnings and realised earnings is taken as the bias. The authors also divide bias 
into “ex ante” and “ex post” measures. Ex ante involves comparing the estimates for 
analyst forecasts with the current year’s realised earnings; while ex post involves 
comparing the estimates for analyst forecasts with the next year’s perfect foresight. The 
authors then use the Easton et al (2002) method to estimate the implied cost of capital by 
using analyst forecasts earnings, and use the O’Hanlon and Steele (2000) method for 
estimation purposes by using the current year’s realised earnings. The authors find the 
range of upward bias to be between 2.75 and 2.84 percent when using the equally-
weighted regression.  
 
Ashton and Wang (2012) develop a new approach to simultaneously estimate the implied 
cost of equity capital and long-run growth rate. The major difference between this new 
approach and that of previous methods is that, for this new approach, no assumptions are 
made for either the terminal values or future growth rates. Most earlier studies use 
forecasting dividends or earnings for several years and apply the terminal value for the 
forecast horizon, and therefore also need to consider the structure of the valuation model, 
dividend pay-out policy, the method used to compute the return on equity, and also the 
long-term growth rate. However, it is not necessary to assume any of these factors with 
this new approach. The authors state that the growth rate and implied cost of capital are 
the endogenous variables, and also that stock price is an indicator of future earnings. 
They also find the risk premium to be between 2.7 and 3.2 percent, and that the long-run 
growth rate is between 4 and 4.35 percent. The new approach from Ashton and Wang 
(2012) assumes a linear relationship between price and current accounting variables, as 
254 
 
well as an unspecified variable that includes information not captured by these 
accounting variables but that do affect price. Moreover, this new approach also assumes 
that the dividend pay-out policy is not used; both no-arbitrage and the clean surplus 
relation hold in this approach.  
 
Although Easton and Sommers (2007) and Ashton and Wang (2012) both use the model 
to simultaneously estimate the cost of equity capital and the long-term growth rate, both 
models use forecasted earnings, current stock price and several accounting variables in 
their estimation. However, Ashton and Wang (2012) model includes more independent 
variables than Easton and Sommers (2007) model, such as current earnings, lagged book 
value and lagged prices.  
 
Ashton, Gregory and Wang (2011) use both Easton and Sommers (ES, 2007) and Ashton 
and Wang (AW, 2012) models to show that risk premium can be affected by analyst 
forecast optimism and the type of model used to estimate the implied cost of capital. The 
realised return is used as the benchmark to estimate the bias. As AW (2012) consider the 
persistence of earnings, the effect of accounting policy and the timing of dependent 
variables, there are insignificant and small biases when computing both the cost of equity 
capital and long-term growth. In comparison, ES (2007) report significant biases. The 
authors also find that using price as a deflator results in smaller biases for the estimation 
of both the implied cost of capital and long-term growth rate than when book value is 
used as a deflator for the equally-weighted regression. As with ES (2007), the value-
weighted regression provides better results than the equally-weighted regression (since it 
takes size effect into consideration). The range of upward bias for the implied cost of 
capital by using analyst earnings forecasts is between 0.40 and 2.82 percent, while there 
is a statistically insignificant bias when book value is used as the deflator for the AW 
model and also when applying the value-weighted regression (this insignificant bias is 0.4 
percent). Meanwhile, the AW model provides a higher adjusted R-squared of 28.8 
percent (compared to 4.2 percent for the ES). The analyst optimistic forecasts estimate 
the upward biases for the implied cost of capital for both of these models. However, the 
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AW model provides a growth rate that is insignificantly smaller than that from the ES 
model.  
 
5.3 Data and performance measurement 
5.3.1 Data 
As described in Chapter Three, the CSR data used in this thesis is obtained from KLD 
Research & Analytics Inc. The normalised score and net score are both computed to rate 
the firms. Then, two types of portfolio are created based on these scores, namely the 
normalised KLD score portfolio and net KLD score portfolio. However, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, problems are met when constructing the normalised KLD score portfolios, 
while the net KLD score portfolios are cleaner and more adequately constructed. Thus, 
the net KLD score portfolios are used in this Chapter. The financial data used comes from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Compustat North America and 
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) databases. Since these different models 
use different data sets, an overview of data-related issues is given in the following section.  
  
5.3.2 Residual Income Valuation model for estimating implied cost of equity capital 
and growth rate 
5.3.2.1 Model equation and data issues 
Although firm value needs to be expressed by an infinite series for theoretical purposes, 
an accurate forecast period is required for real-life situations. Thus, the terminal value 
(“an estimate of the value of the firm based on the residual income earned after the 
explicit forecasting period” (Lee et al, 1999)) is required when using the residual income 
valuation model. The valuation model used in this thesis adopts a two-stage approach, 
namely: (1) forecasting explicit earnings for the coming two years; and (2) forecasting the 
terminal value beyond year two forecast earnings.  
 
This thesis uses the following finite horizon to compute firm value: 
 
1 0 2 1 2 1
0 0 2 2
( * ) ( * ) ( * )(1 )
(1 ) (1 ) ( )(1 )
EPS B r EPS B r EPS B r g
P B
r r r g r
− − − +
= + + +
+ + − +
,                               (5.1) 
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where 0B  is the equity book value per share of the firm in year 0; B1 = B0 + EPS1 – DPS1, 
where DPS1 is the forecasted dividend per share for year 1; EPS1 = I/B/E/S mean 
forecasted EPS for year 1; EPS2 = I/B/E/S mean forecasted EPS for year 2, using the fill-
in procedure as described below when analyst consensus forecasts are missing; r is the 
industry cost of equity (as described below); and g is growth rate. 
 
Data issues 
The data sample used consists of all KLD member firms from 1991 to 2008. In terms of 
obtaining financial data for these firms, the book value per share is obtained from 
Compustat, while the consensus analysts’ earnings per share, dividend per share and 
long-term growth rate are all obtained from I/B/E/S. Moreover, the implied cost of equity 
capital and growth rate are calculated separately, and thus the price per share at the end of 
June is obtained from CRSP. Furthermore, any firms missing data or with a negative 
book value per share are deleted, as are firms with a ROE greater than 100% (because, as 
Frankel and Lee (1998) note, “some firms have extremely low book values, or earnings, 
leading to unreasonable ROE or k estimates. We eliminate such firms by considering 
only firms with ROEs or FROEs of less than 100%”). Even so, there is still a number of 
extreme observations, and therefore the Cohen et al (2003) method is used to deal with 
outliers from the Compustat database (meaning that firms are dropped when their BE/ME 
is less than 0.01 or greater than 100).  
 
Explicit earnings forecasts 
Since I/B/E/S provides monthly consensus forecasts, this Chapter uses the mean forecast 
for the May statistical period33. Because Fama and French (1992) say that “To ensure that 
the accounting variables are known before the returns they are used to explain, we match 
the accounting data for all fiscal year ends in calendar year t-1 (1962-1989) with the 
returns for July of year t to June of t+1. The 6-month (minimum) gap between fiscal year 
end and the return tests is conservative. Earlier work (e.g., Basu (1983)) often assumes 
that accounting data are available within three months of fiscal year ends. Firms are 
                                                 
33 I/B/E/S statistical periods are monthly periods ending on the day prior to the third Friday of each month. 
On this day, I/B/E/S processes all of the available forecasts and computes consensus estimates.  
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indeed required to file their 10-K reports with the SEC within 90 days of their fiscal year 
ends, but on average 19.8% do not comply. In addition, more than 40% of the December 
fiscal year ends firms that do comply with the 90-day rule file on March, 31, and their 
reports are not made public until April. (See Alford, Jones, and Zmijewski (1992).)” 
However, with regard to this data, Frankel and Lee (1998) note that “This mean estimate 
is determined from analyst forecasts on file with I/B/E/S as of the Thursday after the third 
Friday of each month. Since these monthly reports are widely available soon after each 
computer run, the May statistics are in the public domain well before our portfolio 
formation date”. Thus, we use the May statistical period.  
  
As mentioned above, I/B/E/S analysts provide one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead EPS 
and DPS forecasts, as well as long-term growth rates. However, some of these forecasts 
are not available for the samples used in this Chapter. As such, the fill-in procedure is 
used to deal with missing analyst consensus forecasts. For forecast earnings per share, 
firms are eliminated when no one-year-ahead EPS forecast is available; while missing 
two-year-ahead EPS forecast values are filled in by multiplying the previous EPS (EPS1) 
by the EPS long-term growth rate from I/B/E/S. As there is a large number of missing 
values for the forecast dividend per share (DPS), missing one-year-ahead DPS forecast 
values are replaced with zero (because US companies generally have minimal dividend 
payments 34 ); while missing two-year-ahead DPS forecast values are filled in by 
multiplying the previous DPS (DPS1) by the DPS long-term growth rate. Where this 
value is still missing, it is duly replaced with zero.  
 
Cost of equity capital (r) and growth rate (g) 
The above equation shows that the residual income model requires both discount rate and 
growth rate to compute the present value of future residual income to shareholders. Thus, 
we use the industry cost of equity capital (r) as the discount rate, which is calculated 
                                                 
34 Since the dividend per share (DPS) data used in this thesis is obtained from I/B/E/S, a large number of 
DPS values are missing, with those DPS values that are available being quite small (at zero for most firms). 
Moreover, in the US, dividends have historically been taxed at much higher rates than capital gains. Based 
on this tax disadvantage, several studies argue that dividend payments reduce stockholder returns after 
personal taxes. The studies suggest that stockholders respond by reducing the stock prices of the firms 
making these payments (relative to firms that do not pay dividends). Thus, firms would be better off either 
retaining the money they would otherwise pay out as dividends or repurchasing stock.  
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based on the Fama-French 48-industry classifications35. The industry cost of capital used 
is the industry beta estimated from the 60-month rolling regression in a CAPM 
framework. The market risk premium is also assumed to be 3.4 percent, as this is the 
value at which Claus and Thomas (2001) report the risk premium for the US. Industry 
cost of capital calculations show one industry (namely “guns”) as having a cost of equity 
capital less than zero in 2004, and so this is replaced with zero.  
 
Next, for the growth rate (g), Claus and Thomas (2001) assume that there is no real 
growth, with the proxy of inflation being the risk-free rate minus 3 percent. However, as 
this seems rather high, this Chapter instead follows Dimson et al (2011) by using a 
growth rate of the risk-free rate minus 1.8 percent. This Chapter also notes that 
researchers using inflation estimates in terminal growth forecasts often calculate the 
expected inflation rate as the long-run risk-free rate minus 3 percent. However, this seems 
to imply a very high estimate of the long-run risk-free rate on Treasury Bonds, which is 
clearly out of line with both recently observed rates and long-run averages observed for 
the US and globally. Dimson et al (2011) show an annualized long-run real return on US 
government bonds of only 1.8 percent per annum for the period 1900-2010, in 
comparison to a world average of 1.6 percent. 
 
5.3.2.2 Estimating the implied cost of equity capital and growth rate with the RIV 
model  
Since this Chapter aims to test how CSR affects the implied cost of equity capital and 
long-run growth rates, the RIV model is used as the basis model to estimate these two 
factors—with the implied cost of equity capital and long-run growth rates being 
calculated separately. First, the issue of implied cost of equity capital is solved by setting 
the RIV estimated value equal to the share price at the end of June, while the long-term 
growth rate is set as the risk-free rate minus 1.8 percent (as detailed earlier in this section). 
An alternative growth rate is obtained by setting the RIV estimated value equal to the 
share price at the end of June, while the 48-industry cost of equity capital is also used (as 
                                                 
35 These classifications are detailed on the Ken French Data Library, which can be found at the following 
website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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detailed earlier in this section). It is important to know that medium term forecast growth 
in earnings have already been included in the valuation equation, the long-run growth rate 
here is the growth rate to infinity in abnormal earnings. However, these calculations 
return a number of extreme values (with there being either no real growth rate value when 
the RIV estimated value is set equal to the end-of-June price, or no real cost of equity 
capital value), meaning that it is impossible to derive either the implied cost of capital or 
growth rate for some firms when terminal earnings are negative. Therefore, these 
observations must be eliminated.  
 
The rules for eliminating these extreme values are as follows: (1) The solved ICC or 
growth rate values are first used to compute the theoretical price, with this theoretical 
price then being checked against the end-of-June price for each firm. Theoretically, if the 
solved ICC or growth rate values correct, both of these prices should be identical. 
However, there are sometimes very small (yet inevitable) differences in the two prices (a 
difference of 0.01 or 0.001, for example), which may be a result of problems with 
decimal points during calculation. As such, the integer of 10 times the difference between 
the theoretical price and June price is used as the criterion for dropping observations, with 
all firms being eliminated if this integer is not equal to zero. (2) However, this method 
still returns a number of extreme observations (with 67 firms returning negative implied 
cost of equity capital estimations) and therefore the implied cost of capital and growth 
rate are winsorised at 2.5 percent, respectively. Finally, a check is conducted to ensure 
that whether there is a significant difference in the high- and low-scoring CSR portfolios 
for these two factors.  
 
5.3.2.3 Price-to-residual income valuation ratio and ROE ratio 
A price-to-theoretical valuation ratio is then computed using the firm-specific estimation 
value obtained from the RIV model, with the aim of ascertaining whether the high-
scoring CSR firms are overvalued or undervalued. A ratio greater than unity signals that a 
firm is overvalued; while a ratio lower than unity represents undervaluation. To avoid 
implausible values, the price-to-value ratio is winsorised at 1 percent. As well as testing 
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for high- and low-scoring CSR firms, the differences between the ratios for high- and 
low-scoring CSR firms are also tested.  
 
We could analysis with an examination of the one and two year forward profitability 
implied by these analysts’ consensus forecast estimates. The implied return on equity 
(ROE) assesses short-term profitability prospects. The ROE ratio is then computed, with 
the ROEt+1 variable being computed by using EPSt+1/Bt (where EPSt+1 is the I/B/E/S 
mean forecasted EPS for year t+1; Bt is the book value per share for year t; and 
1 1 1t t t tB B EPS DPS+ + += + − , where DPSt+1 is the I/B/E/S mean forecasted DPS for year 
t+1). The ROE ratio is tested to ascertain if it is significantly different from zero for both 
the high- and low-scoring CSR firms, as well as to check for any significant difference in 
the ROEs for the high- and low-scoring CSR firms for the different KLD indicators.  
 
An overview of the residual income valuation model is given in Section 5.2.1.  
 
5.3.3 Models for estimating implied cost of equity capital and growth rate 
5.3.3.1 Modified version of the Easton and Sommers (2007) model  
Based on the residual income valuation model, Easton and Sommers (2007) express the 
relationship between expected earnings and price and book value as:   
 
jt
jt
jt
jt
jt
bps
p
bps
eps
µγγ ++=+ 10
1 ,                                                                                           (5.2) 
where 0γ=g and gr += 1γ , r  is the implied expected rate of return, and g is the 
implied expected growth rate in residual earnings. The regression variables are deflated 
by the book value of equity for the reason that Easton and Sommers (2007) find less bias 
when the variables are deflated by book value. However, although the model used in this 
thesis is based on that of Easton and Sommers (2007), it is also significantly different in 
that it does not use any deflator for the regression variables. The reason for this is that, 
when the Ashton and Wang model36 is run on a deflated basis, both the figures for the 
                                                 
36 See Section 5.3.3.2 for a more detailed explanation. 
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implied cost of equity capital and growth rate are implausible—with the implied cost of 
equity capital being less than the risk-free rate, and the nominal growth in earnings being 
negative. On the other hand, the Ashton and Wang model without deflation provides 
reasonable results for both the implied cost of equity capital and growth rate, thereby 
motivating this thesis to run a modified version of the Easton and Sommers (2007) model 
that is not deflated by the book value of equity.  
 
Thus, the modified version of the Easton and Sommers (2007) model is:  
 
[ ] ( )
ESES
t
ES
tt
tt
gR
bReE
bP
−−
−−
+= +
1
11 , or [ ] ( ) tEStESEStt bgPgReE +−−=+ 11 ,                          (5.3)  
where [ ]1tE e + is one-year-ahead expected earnings, Pt is the price at time t, and bt is the 
book value of equity at time t. RES is the discount factor, RES-1 is the implied cost of 
equity capital and gES is the long-run growth of abnormal earnings. 
 
RES and gES can be estimated by regressing the forecasted earnings on prices and book 
values as equation:  
 
[ ]1 1 2 1t t t tE e P bµ µ ε+ += + + ,                                                                                              (5.4) 
 
Thus, the implied cost of equity capital and growth rate of abnormal earnings can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
211 µµ +=−
ESR                                                                                                               
2
ESg µ=                                                                                                                           (5.5) 
 
Data issues 
The data sample used consists of all KLD member firms from 1991 to 2008. In terms of 
obtaining financial data for these firms, the end-of-fiscal year book value per share is 
obtained from Compustat, the May consensus analysts’ earnings per share from I/B/E/S, 
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and the end-of-June share price37 from CRSP. All variables used are per-share based38 in 
order to reduce heteroskedasticity and to increase comparability across time. 
Observations when the price per share is less than $1 are deleted. In addition, the Cohen 
et al (2003) method is followed to deal with outliers in Compustat, meaning that firms are 
dropped if their BE/ME is found to be less than 0.01 or greater than 100. Even so, some 
extreme observations are still found, and so winsorisation is conducted for the price per 
share, book value per share, and forecasted earnings per share at 1 percent. 
 
5.3.3.2 Ashton and Wang (2012) model  
Ashton and Wang (2012) have developed a new approach to simultaneously estimate the 
implied cost of equity capital and long-run growth rate. Compared with the modified 
version of Easton and Sommers (2007) model, the Ashton and Wang (2012) approach 
uses more variables, such as current earnings, lagged book values and lagged prices. Thus, 
the forecasted earnings are regressed on prices, earnings, book values, lagged book values 
and lagged prices.  
 
The base formula for the Ashton and Wang (2012) model is: 1 2 3t t t t tP b e dα α α ϑ= + + + , 
where tb  is book value, te  is earnings, td  is dividends, and tϑ  is the unspecified variable, 
which represents the value attributed by the market to information not captured by the 
three accounting variables but incorporated into the price. Because accounting numbers 
represent a firm’s historical transactions and prices are normally considered to 
incorporate future growth of companies, the variable39 tϑ  must reflect the nature of the 
growth component.  
 
                                                 
37 For an explanation as to why these data restrictions are used, please see Section 5.3.2.1 on explicit 
earnings forecasts.  
38 The issue of the number of shares employed by different databases is not considered, and thus the end-of-
June share price is directly obtained from CRSP, the end-of-fiscal year book value per share from 
Compustat, and the May consensus analysts’ earnings per share from I/B/E/S. Each database computes the 
variable per share directly (i.e., the variable per share is not computed independently in this thesis).  
39 Ashton and Wang (2012) report that “For the purpose of our analysis, we initially assume the following 
simple model: 11 )1( ++ ++= vttt g εϑϑ , where the growth rate g satisfies 1+g<R and R is one plus the cost 
of equity capital, 1+vtε  is a mean zero error term.” 
263 
 
Ashton and Wang (2012) say that “If for instance, other information were a linear 
function, say, of all future earnings then g would be interpreted as the nominal growth in 
perpetuity of these earnings. This we might well expect on average to equate to the long 
run nominal growth in GDP. However, an element of growth in equation (2)40 is also 
associated with conservatism, since book values and earnings in equation (1) are likely to 
be under-reported distorting values between conservation and less conservative firms. We 
therefore partition our other information variable into a growth element associated with 
growth in positive NPV investment opportunities and growth coming from variations in 
the degree of conservation in reporting. We will measure conservatism by the difference 
between economic earnings, ( )ttt dPP +− −1  and accounting earnings. Hence we rewrite 
equation (2) as: ( ) 1141 )1( +−+ +−+−++= vttttttt edPPg εαϑϑ .” 
 
This is then improved by including all of these assumptions (including no-arbitrage and 
the clean surplus relation) into the base formula. Then, four formulas are evolved from 
the base formula (with adjustments being made for accounting conservatism and price 
used as the deflator, for example). When the model fails to include adjustment for 
accounting conservatism (lagged price per share) or deflation, this is called the “simple 
model without deflation”; when the model accounts for the lagged price per share but not 
deflation, this is called the “extended model without deflation”; when the model accounts 
for deflation but not the lagged price per share, this is called the “simple model with 
deflation”; and when the model accounts for both the lagged price per share and also 
deflation, this is called the “extended model with deflation”41.  
 
Thus, the “simple model without deflation” is:  
[ ]1 1 2 3 4 1t t t t tE e P e b bδ δ δ δ+ −= + + +  ,                                                                                  (5.6) 
where:  
                                                 
40 Equation (1) is: ttttt debP ϑααα +++= 321 ; Equation (2) is : 11 )1( ++ ++= vttt g εϑϑ .  
41 This Chapter also attempts to estimate the Ashton and Wang model on a deflated basis. However, the 
implied cost of equity capital and growth rate figures are implausible, with the implied cost of equity 
capital being less than the risk-free rate, and the nominal growth in earnings being negative.  
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Four valuation variables and four coefficients are found (with the four coefficients being 
obtained after running the formula). Next, the formula is rewritten to obtain the implied 
cost of capital and growth rate: 
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The “extended model without deflation” is:  
[ ] ' ' ' ' '1 1 2 3 4 1 5 1t t t t t tE e P e b b Pδ δ δ δ δ+ − −= + + + + ,                                                                       (5.9) 
where: 
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Finally, the “simple model with deflation” is:  
1 1
1 2 3 4 1
t t t t
t
t t t t
feps e b b
P P P P
δ δ δ δ ε+ − += + + + +
                                                                       (5.11)    
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While the “extended model with deflation” is:  
' ' ' ' '1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 1
t t t t t
t
t t t t t
feps e b b P
P P P P P
δ δ δ δ δ ε+ − − += + + + + +
                                                          (5.12)
 
 
Data issues 
Most of the data used is the same as in the modified version of Easton and Sommers 
(2007) model. Only three additional variables are added (with these being added to the 
data samples used for Ashton and Wang (2012)). In terms of obtaining the firms’ 
financial data, the earnings per share and lagged book value per share are obtained from 
Compustat, while the lagged share price per share is obtained from CRSP. Outliers are 
dealt with in the same way as in the modified version of Easton and Sommers (2007) 
model, and winsorisation is conducted for the price per share, earning per share, book 
value per share, forecasted earning per share, lagged book value per share, and lagged 
price per share at 1 percent.  
 
An overview of the Easton and Sommers (2007) and Ashton and Wang (2012) models is 
given in Section 5.2.2.  
 
5.4 Empirical results 
As is mentioned in Section 5.3, all of the results in this Chapter are based on net KLD 
score portfolios. The price-to-residual income valuation ratio, ROE ratio, implied cost of 
equity capital and long-run growth rate relating to CSR are all tested in order to ascertain 
how these components are affected by CSR. In addition, as the net KLD score for each 
indicator is obtained by calculating the score of strengths minus the score of concerns, 
there is no difference between the no-industry and 10-industry net score portfolios—
meaning that a net score portfolio on an industry basis has the same set of high- and low-
scoring firms as that with a no-industry basis. In order to test how CSR affects these 
components with industry controls, an industry dummy is applied to the regression. 
Further details of these individual tests are provided below.  
 
Price-to-residual income valuation ratio without industry controls 
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Table 5.1 shows the t-test of the price-to-residual income valuation ratios (P/V) for the 
net KLD score portfolios without industry controls. The net KLD score portfolios used in 
this Chapter are the same as those used in Chapter Three of this thesis (please see Section 
3.3.7 for details of how the portfolios are created). First, each CSR indicator is tested 
independently, and then the overall score is computed (this is the sum of each CSR 
indicator score, excluding human rights). The negative portfolios including all six 
controversial criteria are also tested, (as discussed in Chapter Three). The price-to-
residual income valuation ratios are tested to ascertain whether or not they are 
significantly different from unity for the high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring 
portfolios, and also to ascertain whether or not there is significant difference in the ratios 
for the high- and low-scoring portfolios. These tests assume that the cost of equity capital 
and long-run growth rate are the same for each portfolio. For the community indicator, 
the P/V ratios for both the high- and zero-scoring portfolios are significantly greater than 
one. The mean of the P/V ratios for the high- and zero-scoring portfolios is 1.425 and 
1.371, respectively. The P/V ratio for the low-scoring portfolio is significantly less than 
one, while the mean of the P/V ratio is 0.900. The number of observations for the zero-
scoring portfolio is 15,059, which is much higher than that for either the high- or low-
scoring portfolios (because many firms are known to have a zero score for both the 
strengths and concerns for each KLD indicator). The number of observations for the 
high- and low-scoring portfolios is 2,835 and 1,169, respectively. The results showing 
whether the P/V ratio of the high-scoring portfolio is significant different with that of the 
low-scoring portfolio are shown in the row titled “Different (High-Low)”. For the 
community indicator, the P/V ratio for the high-scoring portfolio is a significant greater 
than that for the low-scoring portfolio. For the governance indicator, the P/V ratios for 
the high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios are significantly greater than 
one. In terms of the difference in ratios, the P/V ratio for the high-scoring portfolio is 
significantly lower than that for the low-scoring portfolio, which is consistent with the 
previous results in this thesis (Kempf and Osthoff (2007) do not include corporate 
governance in their research due to the fact that they report different criteria definitions 
for corporate governance being used by KLD and several research papers). For the 
diversity indicator, the P/V ratios for the high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring 
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portfolios are significantly greater than one. In terms of the difference in ratios, the P/V 
ratio for the high-scoring portfolio is not significantly different to that for the low-scoring 
portfolio. For employee relations, the P/V ratios for the high-scoring, zero-scoring and 
low-scoring portfolios are significantly greater than one. In terms of the difference in 
ratios, the P/V ratio for the high-scoring portfolio is significantly greater than that for the 
low-scoring portfolio. For environment, human rights, product, overall and negative, the 
P/V ratios for the high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios are significantly 
greater than one. In terms of the difference in ratios, the P/V ratio for the high-scoring 
portfolio is significantly higher than that for the low-scoring portfolio for all of these 
indicators. It can thus be concluded that, when the markets are efficient, the implications 
are either that the long-run growth rate is higher for high-scoring CSR firms, that the cost 
of equity capital is lower, or a combination of these two factors. For the difference test, 
most of the indicators have higher P/V ratios for the high-scoring portfolios than for the 
low-scoring portfolios—except for the case of governance and diversity.  
 
Price-to-residual income valuation ratio with industry dummies 
Table 5.2 shows the price-to-residual income valuation ratio for the net KLD score 
portfolios with industry dummies. As has already been discussed, the net score portfolio 
on an industry basis has the same set of high- and low-scoring firms as that with no 
industry basis, and an industry dummy is applied to test how CSR affects the ratio with 
industry control. Thus, the regression is run with the P/V ratio as a dependent variable, 
and the high- and low-scoring portfolio dummy and 48-industry dummy as independent 
variables. Due to the characteristics of this regression, it is only possible to test for a 
significant difference in the P/V ratios for the high- and low-scoring portfolios. The 
results show that, after controlling for industry effect, there is insignificant difference in 
the P/V ratios for community and diversity for the high- and low-scoring portfolios. 
Governance, employee relations, environment, human rights, product, overall and 
negative have significantly higher P/V ratios for the high-scoring portfolios than for the 
low-scoring portfolios after controlling for industry effect. Important industry effect is 
found for both the community and governance indicators, since community has a 
significantly higher P/V ratio for its high-scoring portfolio without industry controls, 
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while governance has a significantly lower P/V ratio for its high-scoring portfolio without 
industry controls.  
 
Return-on-equity ratio for year 1 without industry controls 
Table 5.3 shows the t-test for the return-on-equity ratios (ROE) for year 1 for the net 
KLD score portfolio without industry controls. First, each CSR indicator is tested 
independently, after which the overall score and negative portfolios are also tested. Tests 
are made to ascertain whether the ROE1 ratio (one-year-ahead ROE ratio) is significantly 
different from zero for the high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios 
(although the results have little value in themselves, they are still given in the results 
table—with the more important aspect of the results being that which ascertains whether 
there is any significant difference in the ratios for the high- and low-scoring portfolios). 
For all of the indicators, the ROE1 ratios for the high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-
scoring portfolios are significantly greater than zero. Turning to the ratio difference 
testing, the ROE1 ratio for the high-scoring portfolio is not significantly different to that 
for the low-scoring portfolio for either community or human rights. For governance, 
environment, product and negative, the ROE1 ratios for the high-scoring portfolios are 
significantly lower than for the low-scoring portfolios. For diversity, employee and 
overall, the ROE1 ratios for the high-scoring portfolios are significantly greater than for 
the low-scoring portfolios.  
 
Return-on-equity ratio for year 1 with industry dummies 
Table 5.4 shows the ROE1 ratio for net KLD score portfolios with industry dummies. As 
is the case with the P/V ratio, in order to test for industry effect, the regression is run with 
the ROE1 ratio as the dependent variable, and the high- and low-scoring portfolio dummy 
and 48-industry dummy as independent variables. The results show that only human 
rights displays an insignificant difference in the ROE1 ratios for the high- and low-
scoring portfolios; while community, diversity, employee relations and overall have 
significantly higher ROE1 ratios for the high-scoring portfolios. Governance, 
environment, product and negative have significantly lower ROE1 ratios for the high-
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scoring portfolios. An important industry effect is also found for community, which 
shows an insignificant difference in the ROE1 for the portfolios without industry controls.  
 
Return-on-equity ratio for year 2 without industry controls 
Table 5.5 shows the t-test for the return-on-equity ratios (ROE) for year 2 for the net 
KLD score portfolio without industry controls. As with ROE1, all of the CSR indicators, 
overall scores and negative portfolios are tested independently. Again, tests are made to 
ascertain whether the ROE2 ratio is significantly different from zero for the high-scoring, 
zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios (with the more important aspect of the results 
being that which ascertains whether there is any significant difference in the ratios for the 
high- and low-scoring portfolios). For all of the indicators, the ROE2 ratios for the high-
scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios are significantly greater than zero (which 
is the same result as for the ROE1 ratios). Turning to the ratio difference testing, the 
ROE2 ratio for the high-scoring portfolio is not significantly different to that for the low-
scoring portfolio for community, employee, overall and negative. For the governance, 
environment, human rights and product indicators, the ROE2 ratios for the high-scoring 
portfolios are significantly lower than for the low-scoring portfolios. Only for the 
diversity indicator is the ROE2 ratio for the high-scoring portfolio significantly greater 
than that for the low-scoring portfolio. Moreover, some of the indicators have different 
ROE2 ratio difference testing results when compared with the ROE1 ratio.  
 
Return-on-equity ratio for year 2 with industry dummies 
Table 5.6 shows the ROE2 ratio for the net KLD score portfolios with industry dummies. 
As with the P/V ratio and ROE1 ratio, in order to test for industry effect, the regression is 
run with the ROE2 ratio as the dependent variable, and the high- and low-scoring 
portfolio dummy and 48-industry dummy as independent variables. The results show that 
both human rights and negative show an insignificant difference in the ROE2 ratios for 
the high- and low-scoring portfolios; while community, diversity, employee relations and 
overall have significantly higher ROE2 ratios for the high-scoring portfolios. Governance, 
environment and product have significantly lower ROE2 ratios for the high-scoring 
portfolios. Only negative is found to return different results for the ROE1 and ROE2 ratio 
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difference testing after controlling for industry effect, with all other indicators returning 
matching results.  
 
Medium term growth rate without industry controls 
Table 5.7 shows the t-test for the medium term growth rate for the net KLD score 
portfolios without industry controls. As with previous tests, all CSR indicators, overall 
scores and negative portfolios are tested independently. Since the medium term growth 
rate is one of the more important components in the residual income valuation model, it is 
appropriate to try to test how CSR affects the medium term growth rate directly. As such, 
the medium term growth rate is tested to ascertain whether or not it is significantly 
different from zero for the high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios, and also 
to ascertain whether or not there is any significant difference in the medium term growth 
rate for the high- and low-scoring portfolios. For all of the indicators, the medium term 
growth rate for the high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios are significantly 
greater than zero. Turning to the growth rate difference testing, the medium term growth 
rate for the high-scoring portfolio is not significantly different to that of the low-scoring 
portfolio for the human right indicator. For community, governance, environment, 
products and negative, the medium term growth rates for the high-scoring portfolios are 
significantly higher than for the low-scoring portfolios. For diversity, employee relations 
and overall, the medium term growth rates for the high-scoring portfolios are 
significantly lower than for the low-scoring portfolios.  
 
Medium term growth rate with industry dummies 
Table 5.8 shows the medium term growth rate for the net KLD score portfolios with 
industry dummies. As with the P/V ratio and ROE ratio, in order to test for industry effect, 
the regression is run with the medium term growth rate as the dependent variable, and the 
high- and low-scoring portfolio dummy and 48-industry dummy as independent variables. 
The results show that community, human rights and overall show an insignificant 
difference in the medium term growth rate for the high- and low-scoring portfolios; while 
governance, environment, products and negative have significantly higher medium term 
growth rates for the high-scoring portfolios. Both diversity and employee relations have 
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significantly lower medium term growth rates for the high-scoring portfolios. An 
important industry effect is found for community and overall, which show an 
insignificant difference in the medium term growth rate for the portfolios with industry 
dummies. 
 
Implied cost of equity capital from the residual income valuation model without industry 
controls  
Chapter Four of this thesis tests the market valuations for each indicator to show that 
high-scoring CSR firms, on average, have higher market valuations than low-scoring 
CSR firms. In order to explain these results, firms with higher CSR scores are assumed to 
have lower expected costs of capital (El Ghoul et al, 2011) or lower expected negative 
cash flows—or both. Thus, this Chapter aims to disaggregate the value effects into the 
two separate components of implied cost of capital and growth rate (please see Section 
5.3.2.2 for details of how the ICC and growth rate are computed). Table 5.9 shows the 
estimated implied cost of equity capital (ICC) by using the residual income valuation 
model for the net KLD score portfolios without industry controls, by assuming the long-
run growth rate constant between the different CSR portfolios. Tests are made to 
ascertain whether the ICC is significantly different from zero for the high-scoring, zero-
scoring and low-scoring portfolios. Although these results are given in the table, the more 
important aspect of the results is that which ascertains whether there is any significant 
difference in the ICC for the high- and low-scoring portfolios for each of the KLD 
indicators. Turning to the ICC, all of the indicators have significant positive ICC for the 
high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios. In addition, three different tests are 
conducted to check for any significant differences in the ICC for the high- and low-
scoring portfolios (shown as “Difference (High-Low)”); for any significant differences in 
the ICC for the high- and zero-scoring portfolios (shown as “Difference (High-Zero)”); 
and for any significant differences in the ICC for the zero- and low-scoring portfolios 
(shown as “Difference (Zero-Low)”). In terms of “Difference (High-Low)”, the high-
scoring portfolios have significantly lower ICC than the low-scoring portfolios for 
community, governance, employee relations, environment, product and overall. There is 
no significant difference in the ICC for the high- and low-scoring portfolios for either 
272 
 
diversity or human rights. In terms of “Difference (High-Zero)”, for community, diversity 
and overall, the high-scoring portfolios have significantly higher ICC for the zero-scoring 
portfolios. For both environment and products, the high-scoring portfolios have 
significantly lower ICC for the zero-scoring portfolios. There is no significant difference 
in the ICC for governance, employee relations and human rights for the high- and zero-
scoring portfolios. In terms of “Difference (Zero-Low)”, only human rights shows no 
significant difference in ICC for the zero- and low-scoring portfolios, with all others 
having significantly lower ICC for the zero-scoring portfolios. In summary, these results 
support the expectations of this thesis (based on Chapter Four on CSR market valuation) 
and are also consistent with El Ghoul et al (2011). High-scoring CSR firms are found, on 
average, to have lower implied costs of equity capital than low-scoring CSR firms.  
 
Implied cost of equity capital from the residual income valuation model with industry 
dummies  
Table 5.10 shows the estimated implied cost of equity capital (ICC) when using the 
residual income valuation model for the net KLD score portfolios with industry dummies, 
by assuming the long-run growth rate constant between the different CSR portfolios. As 
with previous tests, all CSR indicators, overall scores and negative portfolios are tested 
independently. Again, as with previous tests, in order to test for industry effect, the 
regression is run with the ICC as the dependent variable, and with the high- and low-
scoring portfolio dummy and 48-industry dummy as independent variables. As with 
Table 5.9, the three different tests of “Difference (High-Low)”, “Difference (High-Zero)” 
and “Difference (Zero-Low)” are conducted. In terms of “Difference (High-Low)”, the 
high-scoring portfolios have significantly lower ICC when compared to the low-scoring 
portfolios for community, governance, employee relations, environment, human rights, 
product and overall. There is no significant difference in the ICC for diversity for the 
high- and low-scoring portfolios, with most indicators returning the same results as for 
with the no-industry controls and with industry dummies, except for human rights. In 
terms of “Difference (High-Zero)”, for both the community and diversity indicators, the 
high-scoring portfolios have significantly higher ICC than the zero-scoring portfolios. For 
governance, environment and products, the high-scoring portfolios have significantly 
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lower ICC than the zero-scoring portfolios. No significant difference in ICC is found for 
employee relations, human rights or overall for the high- and zero-scoring portfolios. In 
terms of “Difference (Zero-Low)”, only governance shows no significant difference in 
the ICC for the zero- and low-scoring portfolios, with all others return significantly lower 
ICC for the zero-scoring portfolios. Thus, high-scoring CSR firms are found, on average, 
to have lower implied costs of equity capital than low-scoring CSR firms, regardless of 
whether testing is conducted without industry controls or with industry dummies. 
Moreover, the results for “Difference (High-Low)” are mostly influenced by the results of 
“Difference (Zero-Low)”.  
 
Long-run growth rate from the residual income valuation model without industry 
controls  
Table 5.11 shows the estimated long-run growth rates when using the residual income 
valuation model for the net KLD score portfolios without industry controls, by assuming 
the cost of capital constant between the different CSR portfolios. Tests are made to 
ascertain whether the long-run growth rate is significantly different from zero for the 
high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios (with the more important aspect of 
the results being that which ascertains whether there is any significant difference in the 
long-run growth rate for the high- and low-scoring portfolios for each of the KLD 
indicators). Turning to the long-run growth rate, all of the indicators have significant 
negative growth rates for the high-scoring, zero-scoring and low-scoring portfolios 
(except for the high-scoring human rights and product portfolios, as neither the growth 
rate for human rights nor product are significantly different from zero for the high-
scoring portfolio). These results are consistent with that of the Ohlson model, which 
predicts that the long-run growth rate in RI should be negative42. Table 5.11 also includes 
the results of the “Difference (High-Low)”, “Difference (High-Zero)” and “Difference 
(Zero-Low)” tests. In terms of “Difference (High-Low)”, community, employee relations, 
environment, human rights, product and overall have significantly higher growth rates for 
                                                 
42 The Ohlson model assumes that abnormal earnings are most likely to be temporary in a competitive 
market. There are abnormal earnings if the rate of return is higher than the cost of capital. However, these 
abnormal earnings cannot hold for a long-term period. Please see Section 4.2.1 for a more detailed 
explanation. 
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the high-scoring portfolios than for the low-scoring portfolios; while there is no 
significant difference in the growth rates for the diversity indicator for the high- and low-
scoring portfolios. Governance has a significantly lower growth rate for the high-scoring 
portfolio. In terms of “Difference (High-Zero)”, employee relations, environment, human 
rights, product and overall have significantly higher growth rates for the high-scoring 
portfolios than for the zero-scoring portfolios; while there is no significant difference in 
the growth rates for community, governance and diversity indicators for the high- and 
zero-scoring portfolios. In terms of “Difference (Zero-Low)”, community, employee 
relations, environment, product and overall all have significantly higher growth rates for 
the zero-scoring portfolios than for the low-scoring portfolios; while there is no 
significant difference in the growth rates for diversity, human rights and negative for the 
zero- and low-scoring portfolios. Governance has a significantly lower growth rate for the 
zero-scoring portfolio. In summary, these results are consistent with those for the ICC. 
The results show that, on average, high-scoring CSR firms display higher growth rates 
than low-scoring CSR firms, implying that high-scoring CSR firms have more persistent 
abnormal earnings than low-scoring CSR firms, and they are expected to have a long-run 
competitive advantage compared to low-scoring CSR firms.  
 
Long-run growth rate from the residual income valuation model with industry dummies  
Table 5.12 shows the estimated long-run growth rates when using the residual income 
valuation model for the net KLD score portfolios with industry dummies, by assuming 
the cost of capital constant between the different CSR portfolios. As with previous tests, 
all CSR indicators, overall scores and negative portfolios are tested independently. Again, 
as with previous tests, in order to test for industry effect, the regression is run with the 
long-run growth rate as the dependent variable, and the high- and low-scoring portfolio 
dummy and 48-industry dummy as independent variables. This table also includes the 
three different tests of “Difference (High-Low)”, “Difference (High-Zero)” and 
“Difference (Zero-Low)”. In terms of “Difference (High-Low)”, for the governance 
indicator, the high-scoring portfolio has significantly lower growth rates than the low-
scoring portfolio. There is no significant difference in the growth rates for community, 
diversity and human rights for the high- and low-scoring portfolios. The high-scoring 
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portfolios have significantly higher growth rates than the low-scoring portfolios for 
employee relations, environment, product and overall. Most of the indicators return the 
same results when using the models without industry controls and with industry dummies, 
except for community and human rights. In terms of “Difference (High-Zero)”, for both 
the environment and product indicators, the high-scoring portfolios have significantly 
higher growth rates for the zero-scoring portfolios. No other indicators show any 
significant difference in the growth rates for the high- and zero-scoring portfolios. In 
terms of “Difference (Zero-Low)”, neither human rights nor negative show any 
significant difference in the growth rate for the zero- and low-scoring portfolios, while 
governance has a significantly lower growth rate for the zero-scoring portfolio. All other 
indicators have significantly higher growth rates for the zero-scoring portfolios. Thus, 
high-scoring CSR firms are found, on average, to have higher long-run growth rates than 
low-scoring CSR firms, whether testing without industry controls or with industry 
dummies. This implies that high-scoring CSR firms have more persistent abnormal 
earnings than low-scoring CSR firms.  
 
Disaggregating the value effect with the Ashton and Wang (2012) model  
As discussed in Section 5.3.3.2 on performance measurement, for the Ashton and Wang 
(2012) model, only the results of the “simple model without deflation” and “extended 
model without deflation” are recorded. 
 
Table 5.13 shows the estimated implied costs of capital and long-run growth rates using 
the AW (2012) simple model without deflation for the net KLD score portfolios. As with 
the tables above, all CSR indicators—and also overall and negative—are tested 
independently. There are two reasons that explain the exclusion of human rights from this 
table. First, and as described in Chapter Three, no human rights data is available for 
several years, while its sub-criteria lacks consistency (with most firms having a zero net 
human rights score). Second, only about 50 firms belong to the high-scoring human rights 
portfolio, which may affect results. When the residual income valuation model is used to 
test both the ICC and growth rate for human rights, this provides mostly insignificant 
results. Turning to the growth rate, in terms of the difference testing, community, 
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governance, product and negative have insignificantly different growth rates for the high- 
and low-scoring portfolios; while diversity, employee relations, environment and overall 
have significantly higher growth rates for the high-scoring portfolios than for the low-
scoring portfolios. Turning to the ICC, in terms of the difference testing, community and 
product have significantly lower ICC for the high-scoring portfolios than for the low-
scoring portfolios. Governance and employee relations have significantly higher ICC for 
the high-scoring portfolios than for the low-scoring portfolios; while there is no 
significant difference ICC for the remaining indicators (i.e., for diversity, environment, 
overall and negative) for the high- and low-scoring portfolios. In summary, high-scoring 
CSR firms are found, on average, to have higher growth rates than low-scoring CSR 
firms. However, high-scoring CSR firms, on average, also show insignificant differences 
in the implied cost of equity capital when compared to low-scoring CSR firms.  
 
Table 5.14 shows the estimated implied cost of equity capital and long-run growth rates 
using the AW (2012) extended model without deflation for the net KLD score portfolios. 
Turning to the growth rate, in terms of the difference testing, there is insignificant 
difference in the growth rates for community, governance, diversity and product for the 
high- and low-scoring portfolios; while employee relations, environment, overall and 
negative have significantly higher growth rates for the high-scoring portfolios than for the 
low-scoring portfolios. Turning to the ICC, in terms of the difference testing, community 
and product have significantly lower ICC for the high-scoring portfolios than for the low-
scoring portfolios. Governance, employee relations and negative have significantly higher 
ICC for the high-scoring portfolios; while there is insignificant difference in the ICC for 
the remaining indicators for the high- and low-scoring portfolios (i.e., for diversity, 
environment and overall). On the whole, the results are similar to those for the AW (2012) 
simple model without deflation, which shows that, on average, high-scoring CSR firms 
have higher growth rates than low-scoring CSR firms. However, the implied cost of 
equity capital for high-scoring CSR firms is also found, on average, to be insignificantly 
different to that for low-scoring CSR firms. 
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Disaggregating the value effect with the modified version of Easton and Sommers (2007) 
model  
Table 5.15 shows the estimated implied cost of equity capital and long-run growth rates 
using the ES (2007) model for the net KLD score portfolios (it has already been noted 
that the ES (2007) model has less independent variables than the AW (2012) model). 
Turning to the growth rate, in terms of the difference testing, no significant difference is 
found in the growth rates for community, diversity and product for the high- and low-
scoring portfolios, with only governance displaying a significantly lower growth rate for 
the high-scoring portfolio. Employee relations, environment, overall and negative all 
have significantly higher growth rates for the high-scoring portfolios. Turning to the ICC, 
in terms of the difference testing, only community has a significantly lower ICC for its 
high-scoring portfolio than for its low-scoring portfolio; while governance, employee 
relations, product, overall and negative have significantly higher ICC for the high-scoring 
portfolios. There is insignificant difference in the ICC for diversity and environment for 
the high- and low-scoring portfolios. In conclusion, high-scoring CSR firms are found, on 
average, to have higher growth rates and ICC than low-scoring CSR firms when using the 
modified version of Easton and Sommers (2007) model. In contrast to the Ashton and 
Wang (2012) model, high-scoring CSR firms are, on average, found to have higher 
growth rates than low-scoring CSR firms when using the Ashton and Wang (2012) and 
the modified version of Easton and Sommers (2007) models. However, when using the 
Ashton and Wang (2012) model, the implied cost of equity capital for high-scoring CSR 
firms is, on average, found to be insignificantly different to that of low-scoring CSR 
firms; while high-scoring CSR firms are found, on average, to have higher ICC than low-
scoring CSR firms when using the modified version of Easton and Sommers (2007) 
model. Thus, the two approaches give different results for the relationship between CSR 
and ICC, while the relationship between CSR and growth rate is found to be positive by 
both approaches. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter contributes to existing research by using various methodologies to estimate 
the relationship between CSR, ICC and long-run growth rates, with CSR portfolios being 
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created to test this relationship, since a higher valuation of CSR can arise either the 
higher profitable in short-run, or higher long-run growth rate, or a lower cost of capital, 
we attempt to analyze the source of these valuation differences. The first methodology, 
the residual income valuation model is used to estimate the ICC and long-run growth 
rates. The next two methodologies used are based on a new approach from Ashton and 
Wang (2012) and the modified version of Easton and Sommers (2007) model, which 
simultaneously estimate the ICC and long-run growth rates—and which does not need to 
assume terminal values or future growth rates. Firstly, for the residual income valuation 
model, there is a positive relationship between CSR and growth rates—and a negative 
relationship between CSR and ICC—for most of the KLD indicators. Moreover, high-
scoring CSR firms are found, on average, to have higher growth rates than low-scoring 
CSR firms. Likewise, high-scoring CSR firms, on average, have lower implied cost of 
equity capital than low-scoring CSR firms. This shows that the results support the 
expectations of this thesis (from Chapter Four on CSR market valuation), as well as being 
consistent with El Ghoul et al (2011). Then, for Ashton and Wang (2012) model, four 
different sub-models are used, namely: (1) the simple method without deflation; (2) the 
extended method without deflation; (3) the simple method with deflation; and (4) the 
extended method with deflation43. The relationships between CSR, ICC and long-run 
growth rates are similar for the simple method without deflation and extended method 
without deflation for each of the individual KLD indicators. Moreover, high-scoring CSR 
firms, on average, have higher growth rates than low-scoring CSR firms; the implied cost 
of equity capital for high-scoring CSR firms is, on average, insignificantly different to 
that of low-scoring CSR firms. With the modified version of Easton and Sommers (2007) 
model, high-scoring CSR firms are found, on average, to have higher growth rates and 
ICC than low-scoring CSR firms. The relationship between CSR and long-run growth 
rates is consistent with the Ashton and Wang (2012) model, although the relationship 
between CSR and ICC is not. Thus, the relationship between CSR and ICC is not 
consistent when using these different approaches—most likely because the approaches 
each make different assumptions. The relationship between CSR and growth rate is 
positive with all of the approaches, which suggest that in general it is the higher long-run 
                                                 
43 Please see Footnote 7 for the results from the deflated model.  
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growth rate for high-scoring CSR firms, rather than a lower cost of capital, that is driving 
the valuation. If high-scoring CSR firms display higher growth rates than low-scoring 
CSR firms, implying that high-scoring CSR firms have more persistent abnormal 
earnings than low-scoring CSR firms, and they are expected to have a long-run 
competitive advantage compared to low-scoring CSR firms. 
 
Moreover, the price-to-residual income valuation (P/V) ratio, ROE ratio and medium 
term growth rate are measured for the high- and low-scoring CSR portfolios, with most of 
the KLD indicators having significantly higher P/V and ROE ratios for the high-scoring 
CSR portfolios than for the low-scoring CSR portfolios. Likewise, some of the KLD 
indicators have significantly higher medium term growth rate for the high-scoring CSR 
portfolios.  
28
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Chapter Six: Conclusion and Future Research 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
This thesis provides a comprehensive study of the performance and valuation of the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies of US firms, over the time period 1991-
2008. Many studies examine the relationship between CSR and CFP, with such studies 
considering various financial performance measurements (such as return and Tobin’s q) 
and also different types of CSR measurement (such as environment, governance and 
overall). This thesis uses several different methodologies—as well as a comprehensive 
set of CSR indicators—to investigate the impact of CSR on financial performance and 
market valuation. The core of the thesis rests in Chapters Three, Four and Five, and thus a 
summary of the results from these chapters is given below.  
 
Chapter Three explores the impact of CSR on financial performance by constructing 
portfolios on the basis of firms’ CSR performance. To do this, it is first necessary to 
address how CSR performance is measured by KLD data. There are two broad categories 
of KLD rating data—namely that which is qualitative criteria and that which is 
exclusionary criteria. Seven qualitative criteria are considered—namely community, 
corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights and 
product. The exclusionary criteria apply when a company is involved in controversial 
business areas—namely alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power and tobacco. 
Multiple sub-criteria exist for each KLD criteria and each sub-criterion is presented by a 
binary summary (meaning that each sub-criterion is given a score of either one or zero). 
Where a company has a strength or concern on a particular issue, this is indicated by one. 
Where a company has neither a strength nor a concern, this is indicated by zero.  
 
An attempt is first made to create normalised KLD score portfolios following the Kempf 
and Osthoff (2007) model. First, the top ten percentile of all stocks are used to create 
high-scoring portfolios, while the bottom ten percentile of all stocks are used to create 
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low-scoring portfolios. This is called the positive approach, due to the fact that industry 
bias is not considered. The best-in-class approach is then used to overcome industry bias, 
with portfolios being created for each indicator and each industry (meaning that the 
method of portfolio creation for each industry is the same as with the positive approach). 
However, no clean break point is identified for the normalised scores to create the 
portfolios, and some KLD indicators/industries/year groups do not even have variations 
for the normalised score between firms (for example, there is the same normalised score 
between firms in the industry a, year b and indicator c group (see Figure 3.2)). Such 
portfolios are deemed unlikely to work, and so the cut-off point is changed to the quartile 
in order to avoid such extreme portfolios. The El Ghoul et al (2011) method is then used 
as the net score approach to create a new group of portfolios in order to avoid the 
problem of normalised scores. This thesis considers that this categorisation is rigorous 
and also that it gives clean and unambiguous break points. Net scores that are greater than 
zero are grouped in the high-scoring portfolio; net scores less than zero are grouped in the 
low-scoring portfolio; and net scores that are equal to zero are grouped in the zero-
scoring portfolio.  
 
The financial performance of the portfolios created using the normalised and net KLD 
scores are tested using various factor models. Most KLD indicators are found to have 
insignificant alphas for the high-scoring, low-scoring and rest-scoring portfolios; while 
the long-short portfolios also have insignificant alphas, indicating that investors are 
unable to earn abnormal returns by using the long-short strategy. Although the best-in-
class approach is used to overcome industry bias, the application of industry classification 
does not affect results, and most indicators still have insignificant alphas for the various 
portfolios. Results are not found to be affected by different factor models either. For 
example, the three-factor and four-factor models are used, while the conditional Ferson 
and Schadt (1996) model and conditional three-factor model are also used for robustness 
checking—with all of these providing insignificant alphas. As such, the alphas are found 
to be insignificant for most of the portfolios whether using different factor models to test 
financial performance or using different ways to create the portfolios.   
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Furthermore, the overall period is split into two sub-periods, no time-varying effect is 
found for the alphas. Thus, all of the results imply that the CSR-score formed portfolios 
deliver neither outperformance nor underperformance. However, high-scoring CSR firms 
are found to have lower systematic risk and book-to-market exposures than low-scoring 
CSR firms, which is consistent with the findings of Sharfman and Fernando (2008) and 
El Ghoul et al (2011).  
 
Chapter Four tests to see whether firm value is affected by CSR strategy, and also 
whether this effect is reflected in share prices, using a framework consistent with the 
Peasnell (1982) and Ohlson (1995) model. In the Ohlson (1995) model, the CSR indicator 
is treated as the “other information” variable, while the association between CSR and 
market price is estimated by controlling for the book value of equity, net income and 
dividends. Most CSR indicators are found to have a positive valuation on market price, 
except for in the case of corporate governance and human rights. For all of the 
regressions, book value and net income have positive and highly significant coefficients. 
The formula also controls for intangible assets (namely R&D and advertising 
expenditure)—with advertising expenditure returning insignificant positive coefficients 
for both KLD rating scores, and R&D returning significant positive coefficients.  
 
The Petersen 2-way clustered standard error regressions with industry dummies are run, 
with the industry classifications coming from the Fama-French 48-industry classification. 
Gow et al (2010) note that two-way cluster-robust standard errors are able to solve both 
the cross-sectional and time-series dependences. Although Petersen (2009) and Gow et al 
(2010) both mention that two-way cluster-robust standard errors gives biased standard 
errors if the number of clusters (firms or times) decreases, the data used in this thesis has 
an adequate number of clusters to use the two-way cluster-robust standard errors 
approach. Chapter Four finds most of the CSR indicators to have positive valuations on 
market price, except for in the case of corporate governance and human rights. In 
addition, some of the CSR indicators (and most noticeably environment) are not valued 
during the earlier period, but are found to increase in importance over time. The ten 
industries are found to have different valuation effects, thus reflecting the importance of 
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industry effect 44 . Furthermore, both governance and human rights have negative 
valuations, which may be due to the fact that KLD uses different corporate governance 
definitions to other studies, and also that the sub-criteria for human rights are less 
consistent than the sub-criteria for the other indicators. To summarise, high-scoring CSR 
firms are, on average, found to have higher market valuations than low-scoring CSR 
firms. In order to explain this result, high-scoring CSR firms are expected to have lower 
expected costs of capital (El Ghoul et al, 2011) or lower expected negative cash flows45—
or both of these factors. Thus, it could be concluded that socially responsible agendas do 
not conflict with maximising shareholder value.  
 
Given that Chapter Four finds most CSR indicators to have positive market price 
valuations, Chapter Five explains how valuation effects can be disaggregated into the 
separate components of ROE ratio, implied cost of capital (ICC) and growth rate; and 
several different methodologies are used to estimate the relationship between CSR, ICC 
and long-run growth rates. Firstly, the residual income valuation model is used to 
estimate ICC and long-run growth rates individually, with most of the KLD indicators 
showing a positive relationship between CSR and growth rate, and a negative relationship 
between CSR and ICC. In addition, high-scoring CSR firms are, on average, found to 
have higher growth rates than low-scoring CSR firms; while high-scoring CSR firms are, 
on average, found to have lower ICC than low-scoring CSR firms. These results support 
the expectations of this thesis (from Chapter Four on CSR market valuation), and are also 
consistent with El Ghoul et al (2011). Then, the next two methodologies are based on a 
new approach from Ashton and Wang (2012) and the modified version of Easton and 
Sommers (2007) model, which simultaneously estimate the ICC and long-run growth 
rates. With both methods, high-scoring CSR firms are found, on average, to have higher 
growth rates than low-scoring CSR firms. However, with the Ashton and Wang (2012) 
method, high-scoring CSR firms are found, on average, to have insignificantly different 
implied costs of equity capital to those of low-scoring CSR firms. The modified version 
                                                 
44 The portfolio returns in Chapter Three only capture the effect on the realised cost of capital, while the 
value relevance in Chapter Four captures the effect on the expected cost of capital and cash flow.  
45 A higher firm valuation does not necessarily indicate a lower expected negative cash flow. However, a 
lower expected negative cash flow is one of the factors that lead to higher firm valuation.  
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of Easton and Sommers (2007) model finds high-scoring CSR firms, on average, to have 
higher ICC than low-scoring CSR firms. The relationship between CSR and ICC is not 
consistent when using these different approaches—most likely due to the fact that the 
approaches each make different assumptions. The relationship between CSR and growth 
rate is found to be positive in all of the approaches, which suggest that in general it is the 
higher long-run growth rate for high-scoring CSR firms, rather than a lower cost of 
capital, that is driving the valuation. 
 
The price-to-residual income valuation (P/V) ratio, ROE ratio and medium term growth 
rate of the high- and low-scoring CSR portfolios are also calculated, with most of the 
KLD indicators having significantly higher P/V and ROE ratios for the high-scoring CSR 
portfolios than for the low-scoring CSR portfolios. In addition, some of the KLD 
indicators have significantly higher medium term growth rate for the high-scoring CSR 
portfolios.  
 
To summarise, no outperformance or underperformance is identified when using different 
CSR portfolios or different factor models. However, most of the KLD indicators (except 
governance and human rights) are found to have positive market valuations when using a 
framework consistent with the Peasnell (1982) and Ohlson (1995) model. This provides a 
motivation for disaggregating the value effect into the separate components of ROE ratio, 
ICC and growth rate. All of the approaches identify a positive relationship between CSR 
and growth rate; while the results for the relationship between CSR and ICC are 
inconsistent.  
 
6.2 Limitations of the research 
As with any other database, the KLD database has a number of limitations, which can be 
summarised in three parts: (1) First, it is assumed that the strengths and concerns for each 
KLD indicator indicate perfectly opposing directions; otherwise, the net score would be 
misleading when the variables do not converge (Carver, 1989); (2) Second, it is assumed 
that all criteria and sub-criteria carry equal importance (although some studies consider 
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certain criteria as being more important than others for the different industries, there are 
no standard rules to weight the criteria and sub-criteria for the different industries) and, as 
such, this thesis assumes an equal weighting for all of the criteria and sub-criteria; and (3) 
The number of criteria and sub-criteria change over time, and so this thesis includes the 
new criteria and sub-criteria as soon as they are added by KLD, while deleting criteria 
and sub-criteria as soon as they are removed. Although the basis sub-criteria are not 
consistent over time, this thesis uses the latest available rating information to compute the 
annual rating score for each firm.  
 
There are also additional limitations for two of the KLD indicators—namely corporate 
governance and human rights. Kempf and Osthoff (2007) do not include corporate 
governance in their research, as they report that the criteria definitions for corporate 
governance used by KLD are different to the corporate governance indices used in 
various studies. The human rights indicator is not available for several years and contains 
sub-criteria that are less consistent than for the other indicators. Therefore, when using 
the net KLD score approach to create portfolios, the high-scoring portfolio only includes 
a very small number of firms (see Table 3.2).  
 
For the case of exclusionary criteria, six controversial criteria are used—namely alcohol, 
gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power and tobacco. Portfolios are created by 
combining all six controversial criteria, and thus it is not possible to evaluate the 
individual impact that each of the controversial indicators has on financial performance. 
Moreover, most firms are found to belong to the zero net score group, meaning that only 
a very small number of firms belong to the low-scoring portfolio for each controversial 
indicator (see Table 3.2).  
 
6.3 Suggestions for future research 
The methodology and results in this thesis suggest a number of directions for future 
research. For example, Chapter Three notes that all criteria and sub-criteria are treated as 
being of equal importance, whereas, in truth, certain criteria are deemed to be more 
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important than others by different industries. In light of this, the research in this thesis 
could be extended to test all or some of the KLD indicators according to specific 
industries—with the aim being to ascertain whether specific KLD indicators affect some 
industries more than others. Since most firms have limited capital to invest in CSR, and 
are therefore unlikely to be able to invest in all areas of CSR (i.e., in every KLD 
indicator), results from such a study could help firms decide how to allocate their CSR 
investments. Another extension on the research in Chapter Three would be testing the 
financial performance of six controversial criteria individually for some or all of the 
industries. Testing the controversial indicators in more detail (rather than combining them 
together) would provide information that could be of use to governments when issuing 
regulations or rules relating to these controversial indicators.  
 
Chapter Four considers the effect of CSR on market valuation, and also highlights several 
interesting directions for further research. First, some researchers argue that a “circle 
effect” exists in the relationship between CSR and CFP (Waddock and Graves, 1997; 
Surocca et al, 2010). This means that, while improved CSR can lead to better financial 
performance; better financial performance can also lead to improved CSR (when other 
conditions remain unchanged). Chapter Four tests the effect of CSR on market valuation, 
but does not examine how market valuation affects CSR. Thus, a study could be 
conducted based on the simultaneous equations in Barth et al (1998) to test for this circle 
effect. Such a study could use CSR as a dependent variable, market value and other 
factors as independent variables. Second, Chapter Four does not test the market valuation 
for controversial indicators. As such, another potential area for further research could be 
to test the market valuation of each controversial indicator individually by using a 
framework consistent with Peasnell (1982) and Ohlson (1995). Third, Chapter Four 
concludes that it expects higher-scoring CSR firms to have lower expected costs of 
capital or lower expected negative cash flows—or both of these factors—while the 
relationship between CSR and the implied cost of equity capital is tested in Chapter Five. 
An interesting extension to this research would be to test the relationship between CSR 
and cash flow, as the cash flow of firms will be affected regardless of whether firms 
adopt CSR policies or not (also, variations in cash flow are not systematic risk, and thus it 
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is better to measure the relationship between expected cash flow and CSR directly). For 
example, Healy et al (1992) develop a method of industry-adjusted operating cash flows, 
which—despite being used for merger analysis in that particular study—is still a useful 
general model. Fourth, a valuation effect study could be conducted for other countries. 
And also, could make a distinction between strengths and concerns for each type of KLD 
indicators to investigate how each of these components is valued by markets.  
 
There are also several interesting directions for further research relating to Chapter Five. 
Such as, the residual income valuation model used in Chapter Five assumes the discount 
rate to be the industry cost of equity capital; the long-run growth rate to be the risk-free 
rate minus 1.8 percent; and also there to be a three-year horizon. The sensitivity of these 
assumptions could be tested in order to investigate how these assumptions affect results. 
Alternatively, and moving one step further, these different assumptions could be used to 
compute the average implied cost of equity capital and long-run growth rate. This would 
provide more accuracy with regards to the relationship between CSR, implied cost of 
equity capital and long-run growth rates.  
 
In addition, other CSR databases (such as Innovest) could be used in place of the KLD 
database in order to investigate the effect of CSR databases on results. Studies could also 
be conducted to assess how different levels of executive compensation affect firm 
performance. Despite the fact that executive pay is likely to be affected by a firm’s past 
performance, the KLD corporate governance indicator treats high executive 
compensation as a “concern” and low executive compensation as a “strength”. Hillier, 
Marshall, McColgan and Werema (2007) examine the impact of employee layoff 
announcements on the financial performance of UK-listed firms, and find that stock 
prices drop significantly after layoff announcements due to such announcements 
indicating bad financial conditions. However, the authors also note that significant 
improvements for employee productivity and corporate focus after layoff announcements. 
Thus, a study could be conducted using the methodologies from Hillier, Marshall, 
McColgan and Werema (2007) to test how executive compensation affects firm 
performance, such as by testing for companies’ financial characteristics, operating 
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performance, leverage and productivity at different levels of executive compensation; or 
by using buy and hold abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal stock returns to test 
stock price reactions relating to executive compensation.  
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Appendix 1: Summary of CSR rating institutions 
 
Individual portraits of the CSR rating institutions CSR rating institutions
Allianz Global Investors (RCM, dit, AGF, BAWAG)/Grassroots Centre for Australian Ethical Research (CAER)
Bank Sarasin & Co. Ltd Citizens Advisers
BHF-BANK AG equinet Group
UBS, Union Bank of Switzerland Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch & Cie
Züricher Kantonalbank Pictet & Cie
Business in the Community (BITC) Triodos Bank NV
Calvert Group, Ltd 100 Best Corporate Citizens
Centre Info SA Accountability Rating
Co-op America ASSET4
CoreRatings Covalence SA
Corporate Knights Inc. EthiFinance
E. Capital Partners (ECP) S.p.A. EthicScan Canada Ltd.
EIRIS (Ethical Investment Research Service) Global Ethical Standard
Ethibel INrate
Ethical Consumer Research Association Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)
Innovest Strategic Value Advisors, Inc. Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)
imug (Institut für Markt-Umwelt-Gesellschaft) Japan Research Institute, Ltd. (JRI)
KLD Research & Analytics Inc. Michael Jantzi Research Associates (MJRA)
oekom research AG scoris GmbH
SAM (Sustainable Asset Management) Group Holding AG SERM Rating Agency Ltd.
SiRi (Sustainable Investment Research International) Company Ltd Social Research Service (SIRS)
Kempen Capital Management (KCM), SNS Asset Management (SNS AM) Soziallabel-Initiative Schweiz – Swiss label socially responsible companies
Sustainable Investment Research Institute (SIRIS)
Verité
Vigeo
Ethinvest Environmental Index
Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) SRI Index
FORTUNE 500 Index
FTSE (Financial Times Stock Exchange) Group
SIX/GES Ethical Index
Goldman Sachs Energy Environmental and Social (GSEES) Index
MAALA SRI Index
NAI (Natur-Aktien-Index)
RepuTex SRI Index
Social Index
VÖNIX (VBV-Österreichischer Nachhaltigkeitsindex)
Westpac-Monash Eco-Index
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Appendix 2: KLD definitions 
 
Part A: Qualitative Indicators 
The following shows the seven qualitative indicators for KLD, such as: Community, 
CGOV, Diversity, Employee Relations, Environment, Human Rights and Product. Each 
indicator has a set of strengths and concerns.  
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Concerns Strengths
Community Investment Controversies Charitable Giving
Negative Economic Impact Innovative Giving
Indigenous Peoples Relations Non-US Charitable Giving
Tax Disputes Support for Housing
Other Concern Support for Education
Indigenous Peoples Relations
Volunteer Progrmas
Other Strength
CGOV High Compensation Limited Compensation
Ownership Concern Ownership Strength
Accounting Concern Transparency Strength
Transparency Concern Polictical Accountability Strength
Political Accountability Concern Other Strength
Other Concern
Diversity Controversies CEO
Non-Representation Promotion
Other Concern Board of Directors
Work/Life Benefits
Women&Minority Contracting
Employment of the Disabled
Gay&Lesbian Policies
Other Strength
Employee Relations Union Relations Union Relations
Health and Safety Concern No-Layoff Policy
Workforce Reductions Cash Profit Sharing
Retirement Benefits Concern Employee Involvement
Other Concern Retirement Benefits Strength
Health and Safety Strength
Other Strength
Environment Hazardous Waste Beneficial Products and Services
Regulator Problems Pollution Prevention
Ozone Depleting Chemicals Recycling
Substantial Emissions Clean Energy
Agricultural Chemicals Communications
Climate Change Property, Plant, and Equipment
Other Concern Other Strength
Human Rights South Africa Positive Record in South Africa
Northern Ireland Indigenous Peoples Relations Strength
Burma Concern Labor Rights Strength
Mexico Other Strength
Labor Rights Concern
Indigenous Peoples Relations
Concern
Other Concern
Product Characteristics Product Safety Quality
Marketing/Contracting Concern R&D/Innovation
Antitrust Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged
Other Concern Other Strength  
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Part B: Controversial Indicators 
There are six controversial indicators, such as: Alcohol, Gambling, Tobacco, Firearms, 
Military and Nuclear Power. Each indicator has a set of concerns. 
 
Concerns
Alcohol Licensing
Manufacturers
Manufacturers of products necessary for production of alcoholic beverages
Retailers
Ownership by an alcohol company
Ownership of an alcohol company
Alcohol other concern
Gambling Licensing
Manufacturers
Owners and operators
Supporting products or services
Ownership by a gambling company
Ownership of a gambling company
Gambling other concern
Tobacco Licensing
Manufacturers
Manufacturers of products necessary for production of tobacco products
Retailers
Ownership by a tobacco company
Ownership of a tobacco company
Tobacco other concern
Firearms Manufacturers
Retailers
Ownership by a firearms company
Ownership of a firearms company
Military Manufacturers of weapons or weapons systems
Manufacturers of components for weapons or weapons systems
Ownership by a military company
Ownership of a military company
Minor weapons contracting involvement
Major weapons-related supplier
Military other concern
Nuclear Power Construction&design of nuclear power plants
Nuclear power fuel and key parts
Nuclear power service provider
Ownership of nuclear power plants
Ownership by a nuclear power company
Ownership of a nuclear power company
Design
Fuel cycle/key parts
Nuclear power other concern  
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Appendix 3 
 
Summary of the normalised KLD score for each indicator from 1991 to 2008. Normalised 
score computed on the following CSR indicators: comNOR, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for community relations indicators; cgovNOR, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for governance indicators; divNOR, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
diversity indicators; empNOR, the normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; envNOR, the normalised KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; 
humNOR, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; proNOR, the 
normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators.  
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Year 1991 Year 1992 Year 1993
comNOR Freq. Percent Cum. comNOR Freq. Percent Cum. comNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.375 18 2.82 2.82 0.25 1 0.16 0.16 0.2857143 17 2.65 2.65
0.5 445 69.64 72.46 0.375 17 2.68 2.83 0.4285714 442 68.85 71.5
0.625 135 21.13 93.58 0.5 433 68.19 71.02 0.5714286 127 19.78 91.28
0.75 38 5.95 99.53 0.625 141 22.2 93.23 0.7142857 46 7.17 98.44
0.875 3 0.47 100 0.75 40 6.3 99.53 0.8571429 9 1.4 99.84
cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.875 3 0.47 100 1 1 0.16 100
0.3333333 27 4.23 4.23 cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum. cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.5 600 93.9 98.12 0.1666667 7 1.1 1.1 0.1666667 1 0.16 0.16
0.6666667 12 1.88 100 0.3333333 83 13.07 14.17 0.3333333 128 19.94 20.09
divNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.5 517 81.42 95.59 0.5 477 74.3 94.39
0.1111111 15 2.35 2.35 0.6666667 27 4.25 99.84 0.6666667 33 5.14 99.53
0.2222222 503 78.72 81.06 0.8333333 1 0.16 100 0.8333333 3 0.47 100
0.3333333 88 13.77 94.84 divNOR Freq. Percent Cum. divNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.4444444 30 4.69 99.53 0.1111111 13 2.05 2.05 0.1 4 0.62 0.62
0.5555556 3 0.47 100 0.2222222 483 76.06 78.11 0.2 137 21.34 21.96
empNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.3333333 92 14.49 92.6 0.3 339 52.8 74.77
0.2727273 9 1.41 1.41 0.4444444 39 6.14 98.74 0.4 103 16.04 90.81
0.3636364 50 7.82 9.23 0.5555556 8 1.26 100 0.5 50 7.79 98.6
0.4545455 457 71.52 80.75 empNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.6 7 1.09 99.69
0.5454546 110 17.21 97.97 0.1818182 1 0.16 0.16 0.7 2 0.31 100
0.6363636 12 1.88 99.84 0.2727273 12 1.89 2.05 empNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.7272727 1 0.16 100 0.3636364 90 14.17 16.22 0.1818182 3 0.47 0.47
envNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.4545455 391 61.57 77.8 0.2727273 18 2.8 3.27
0.1666667 2 0.31 0.31 0.5454546 116 18.27 96.06 0.3636364 82 12.77 16.04
0.25 14 2.19 2.5 0.6363636 25 3.94 100 0.4545455 384 59.81 75.86
0.3333333 27 4.23 6.73 envNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.5454546 126 19.63 95.48
0.4166667 70 10.95 17.68 0.0833333 1 0.16 0.16 0.6363636 28 4.36 99.84
0.5 446 69.8 87.48 0.1666667 2 0.31 0.47 0.7272727 1 0.16 100
0.5833333 76 11.89 99.37 0.25 14 2.2 2.68 envNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.6666667 4 0.63 100 0.3333333 43 6.77 9.45 0.0833333 1 0.16 0.16
humNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.4166667 86 13.54 22.99 0.1666667 3 0.47 0.62
0 10 1.56 1.56 0.5 405 63.78 86.77 0.25 21 3.27 3.89
0.5 80 12.52 14.08 0.5833333 81 12.76 99.53 0.3333333 36 5.61 9.5
1 549 85.92 100 0.6666667 3 0.47 100 0.4166667 88 13.71 23.21
proNOR Freq. Percent Cum. humNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.5 403 62.77 85.98
0.25 13 2.03 2.03 0 10 1.57 1.57 0.5833333 86 13.4 99.38
0.375 88 13.77 15.81 0.5 78 12.28 13.86 0.6666667 4 0.62 100
0.5 469 73.4 89.2 1 547 86.14 100 humNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.625 64 10.02 99.22 proNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0 9 1.4 1.4
0.75 5 0.78 100 0.125 1 0.16 0.16 0.5 84 13.08 14.49
0.25 18 2.83 2.99 1 549 85.51 100
0.375 92 14.49 17.48 proNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.5 432 68.03 85.51 0.125 1 0.16 0.16
0.625 88 13.86 99.37 0.25 13 2.02 2.18
0.75 4 0.63 100 0.375 98 15.26 17.45
0.5 434 67.6 85.05
0.625 92 14.33 99.38
0.75 4 0.62 100
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Year 1994 Year 1995 Year 1996
comNOR Freq. Percent Cum. comNOR Freq. Percent Cum. comNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.2 2 0.31 0.31 0.2 1 0.16 0.16 0.3 15 2.33 2.33
0.3 18 2.83 3.15 0.3 15 2.35 2.51 0.4 423 65.79 68.12
0.4 411 64.72 67.87 0.4 414 64.99 67.5 0.5 144 22.4 90.51
0.5 134 21.1 88.98 0.5 137 21.51 89.01 0.6 46 7.15 97.67
0.6 59 9.29 98.27 0.6 53 8.32 97.33 0.7 13 2.02 99.69
0.7 11 1.73 100 0.7 13 2.04 99.37 0.8 2 0.31 100
cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.8 4 0.63 100 cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.1666667 10 1.57 1.57 cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0 1 0.16 0.16
0.3333333 135 21.26 22.83 0 1 0.16 0.16 0.1666667 31 4.82 4.98
0.5 453 71.34 94.17 0.1666667 11 1.73 1.88 0.3333333 554 86.16 91.14
0.6666667 34 5.35 99.53 0.3333333 186 29.2 31.08 0.5 54 8.4 99.53
0.8333333 3 0.47 100 0.5 405 63.58 94.66 0.6666667 2 0.31 99.84
divNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.6666667 32 5.02 99.69 0.8333333 1 0.16 100
0.1 4 0.63 0.63 0.8333333 2 0.31 100 divNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.2 173 27.24 27.87 divNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.0909091 2 0.31 0.31
0.3 270 42.52 70.39 0.0909091 4 0.63 0.63 0.1818182 114 17.73 18.04
0.4 113 17.8 88.19 0.1818182 129 20.25 20.88 0.2727273 302 46.97 65.01
0.5 48 7.56 95.75 0.2727273 289 45.37 66.25 0.3636364 117 18.2 83.2
0.6 25 3.94 99.69 0.3636364 115 18.05 84.3 0.4545455 68 10.58 93.78
0.7 2 0.31 100 0.4545455 67 10.52 94.82 0.5454546 27 4.2 97.98
empNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.5454546 25 3.92 98.74 0.6363636 10 1.56 99.53
0.1818182 1 0.16 0.16 0.6363636 5 0.78 99.53 0.7272727 3 0.47 100
0.2727273 18 2.83 2.99 0.7272727 3 0.47 100 empNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.3636364 102 16.06 19.06 empNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.3 12 1.87 1.87
0.4545455 333 52.44 71.5 0.3 14 2.2 2.2 0.4 103 16.02 17.88
0.5454546 149 23.46 94.96 0.4 107 16.8 19 0.5 354 55.05 72.94
0.6363636 29 4.57 99.53 0.5 325 51.02 70.02 0.6 140 21.77 94.71
0.7272727 3 0.47 100 0.6 156 24.49 94.51 0.7 31 4.82 99.53
envNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.7 30 4.71 99.22 0.8 3 0.47 100
0.0833333 1 0.16 0.16 0.8 5 0.78 100 envNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.1666667 6 0.94 1.1 envNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.1818182 1 0.16 0.16
0.25 13 2.05 3.15 0.1666667 2 0.31 0.31 0.2727273 17 2.64 2.8
0.3333333 38 5.98 9.13 0.25 8 1.26 1.57 0.3636364 32 4.98 7.78
0.4166667 103 16.22 25.35 0.3333333 41 6.44 8.01 0.4545455 60 9.33 17.11
0.5 393 61.89 87.24 0.4166667 94 14.76 22.76 0.5454546 438 68.12 85.23
0.5833333 76 11.97 99.21 0.5 402 63.11 85.87 0.6363636 85 13.22 98.44
0.6666667 5 0.79 100 0.5833333 78 12.24 98.12 0.7272727 10 1.56 100
humNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.6666667 11 1.73 99.84 humNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.4285714 7 1.1 1.1 0.75 1 0.16 100 0.25 5 0.78 0.78
0.5714286 41 6.46 7.56 humNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.5 20 3.11 3.89
0.7142857 587 92.44 100 0.2 3 0.47 0.47 0.75 606 94.25 98.13
proNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.4 23 3.61 4.08 1 12 1.87 100
0 1 0.16 0.16 0.6 605 94.98 99.06 proNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.125 1 0.16 0.31 0.8 6 0.94 100 0.125 7 1.09 1.09
0.25 18 2.83 3.15 proNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.25 17 2.64 3.73
0.375 95 14.96 18.11 0 2 0.31 0.31 0.375 105 16.33 20.06
0.5 424 66.77 84.88 0.125 5 0.78 1.1 0.5 429 66.72 86.78
0.625 90 14.17 99.06 0.25 17 2.67 3.77 0.625 81 12.6 99.38
0.75 6 0.94 100 0.375 99 15.54 19.31 0.75 4 0.62 100
0.5 420 65.93 85.24
0.625 89 13.97 99.22
0.75 5 0.78 100
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Year 1997 Year 1998 Year 1999
comNOR Freq. Percent Cum. comNOR Freq. Percent Cum. comNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.2 1 0.15 0.15 0.2 1 0.15 0.15 0.2 3 0.45 0.45
0.3 18 2.77 2.93 0.3 38 5.8 5.95 0.3 49 7.42 7.88
0.4 446 68.72 71.65 0.4 447 68.24 74.2 0.4 450 68.18 76.06
0.5 114 17.57 89.21 0.5 116 17.71 91.91 0.5 108 16.36 92.42
0.6 56 8.63 97.84 0.6 42 6.41 98.32 0.6 38 5.76 98.18
0.7 11 1.69 99.54 0.7 9 1.37 99.69 0.7 10 1.52 99.7
0.8 3 0.46 100 0.8 2 0.31 100 0.8 2 0.3 100
cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum. cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum. cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0 1 0.15 0.15 0.1428571 15 2.29 2.29 0.1428571 12 1.82 1.82
0.1428571 12 1.85 2 0.2857143 270 41.22 43.51 0.2857143 250 37.88 39.7
0.2857143 231 35.59 37.6 0.4285714 311 47.48 90.99 0.4285714 335 50.76 90.45
0.4285714 345 53.16 90.76 0.5714286 55 8.4 99.39 0.5714286 59 8.94 99.39
0.5714286 57 8.78 99.54 0.7142857 3 0.46 99.85 0.7142857 3 0.45 99.85
0.7142857 2 0.31 99.85 0.8571429 1 0.15 100 0.8571429 1 0.15 100
0.8571429 1 0.15 100 divNOR Freq. Percent Cum. divNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
divNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.1818182 97 14.81 14.81 0.0909091 1 0.15 0.15
0.0909091 3 0.46 0.46 0.2727273 274 41.83 56.64 0.1818182 99 15 15.15
0.1818182 107 16.49 16.95 0.3636364 159 24.27 80.92 0.2727273 257 38.94 54.09
0.2727273 277 42.68 59.63 0.4545455 72 10.99 91.91 0.3636364 173 26.21 80.3
0.3636364 141 21.73 81.36 0.5454546 35 5.34 97.25 0.4545455 71 10.76 91.06
0.4545455 68 10.48 91.83 0.6363636 14 2.14 99.39 0.5454546 38 5.76 96.82
0.5454546 36 5.55 97.38 0.7272727 3 0.46 99.85 0.6363636 12 1.82 98.64
0.6363636 15 2.31 99.69 0.8181818 1 0.15 100 0.7272727 6 0.91 99.55
0.7272727 2 0.31 100 empNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.8181818 2 0.3 99.85
empNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.2 1 0.15 0.15 0.9090909 1 0.15 100
0.2 1 0.15 0.15 0.3 9 1.37 1.53 empNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.3 10 1.54 1.69 0.4 84 12.82 14.35 0.3 10 1.52 1.52
0.4 96 14.79 16.49 0.5 332 50.69 65.04 0.4 93 14.09 15.61
0.5 342 52.7 69.18 0.6 172 26.26 91.3 0.5 317 48.03 63.64
0.6 150 23.11 92.3 0.7 43 6.56 97.86 0.6 176 26.67 90.3
0.7 44 6.78 99.08 0.8 13 1.98 99.85 0.7 48 7.27 97.58
0.8 5 0.77 99.85 0.9 1 0.15 100 0.8 16 2.42 100
0.9 1 0.15 100 envNOR Freq. Percent Cum. envNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
envNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.0909091 1 0.15 0.15 0.1666667 1 0.15 0.15
0.1818182 3 0.46 0.46 0.1818182 3 0.46 0.61 0.25 9 1.36 1.52
0.2727273 21 3.24 3.7 0.2727273 19 2.9 3.51 0.3333333 14 2.12 3.64
0.3636364 28 4.31 8.01 0.3636364 30 4.58 8.09 0.4166667 40 6.06 9.7
0.4545455 58 8.94 16.95 0.4545455 55 8.4 16.49 0.5 69 10.45 20.15
0.5454546 434 66.87 83.82 0.5454546 443 67.63 84.12 0.5833333 441 66.82 86.97
0.6363636 96 14.79 98.61 0.6363636 94 14.35 98.47 0.6666667 81 12.27 99.24
0.7272727 9 1.39 100 0.7272727 10 1.53 100 0.75 5 0.76 100
humNOR Freq. Percent Cum. humNOR Freq. Percent Cum. humNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.25 6 0.92 0.92 0.4 5 0.76 0.76 0.4 6 0.91 0.91
0.5 27 4.16 5.08 0.6 31 4.73 5.5 0.6 36 5.45 6.36
0.75 610 93.99 99.08 0.8 618 94.35 99.85 0.8 617 93.48 99.85
1 6 0.92 100 1 1 0.15 100 1 1 0.15 100
proNOR Freq. Percent Cum. proNOR Freq. Percent Cum. proNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.125 7 1.08 1.08 0.125 8 1.22 1.22 0.125 8 1.21 1.21
0.25 23 3.54 4.62 0.25 35 5.34 6.56 0.25 35 5.3 6.52
0.375 104 16.02 20.65 0.375 97 14.81 21.37 0.375 115 17.42 23.94
0.5 428 65.95 86.59 0.5 431 65.8 87.18 0.5 416 63.03 86.97
0.625 82 12.63 99.23 0.625 78 11.91 99.08 0.625 81 12.27 99.24
0.75 5 0.77 100 0.75 6 0.92 100 0.75 5 0.76 100
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Year 2000 Year 2001 Year 2002
comNOR Freq. Percent Cum. comNOR Freq. Percent Cum. comNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.3 52 7.87 7.87 0.2 7 0.63 0.63 0.2 7 0.64 0.64
0.4 460 69.59 77.46 0.3 79 7.12 7.75 0.3 92 8.36 8.99
0.5 110 16.64 94.1 0.4 864 77.84 85.59 0.4 824 74.84 83.83
0.6 29 4.39 98.49 0.5 121 10.9 96.49 0.5 127 11.53 95.37
0.7 9 1.36 99.85 0.6 29 2.61 99.1 0.6 43 3.91 99.27
0.8 1 0.15 100 0.7 9 0.81 99.91 0.7 4 0.36 99.64
cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.8 1 0.09 100 0.8 4 0.36 100
0.1428571 16 2.42 2.42 cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum. cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.2857143 270 40.85 43.27 0.1428571 21 1.89 1.89 0.1428571 32 2.91 2.91
0.4285714 314 47.5 90.77 0.2857143 279 25.14 27.03 0.2857143 318 28.88 31.79
0.5714286 59 8.93 99.7 0.4285714 753 67.84 94.86 0.4285714 687 62.4 94.19
0.7142857 2 0.3 100 0.5714286 55 4.95 99.82 0.5714286 63 5.72 99.91
divNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.7142857 2 0.18 100 0.7142857 1 0.09 100
0.0909091 3 0.45 0.45 divNOR Freq. Percent Cum. divNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.1818182 100 15.13 15.58 0.0909091 3 0.27 0.27 0.0909091 5 0.45 0.45
0.2727273 241 36.46 52.04 0.1818182 107 9.64 9.91 0.1818182 156 14.17 14.62
0.3636364 168 25.42 77.46 0.2727273 573 51.62 61.53 0.2727273 518 47.05 61.67
0.4545455 86 13.01 90.47 0.3636364 235 21.17 82.7 0.3636364 233 21.16 82.83
0.5454546 38 5.75 96.22 0.4545455 113 10.18 92.88 0.4545455 107 9.72 92.55
0.6363636 17 2.57 98.79 0.5454546 50 4.5 97.39 0.5454546 51 4.63 97.18
0.7272727 3 0.45 99.24 0.6363636 17 1.53 98.92 0.6363636 22 2 99.18
0.8181818 5 0.76 100 0.7272727 10 0.9 99.82 0.7272727 6 0.54 99.73
empNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.8181818 2 0.18 100 0.8181818 3 0.27 100
0.2 1 0.15 0.15 empNOR Freq. Percent Cum. empNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.3 8 1.21 1.36 0.1 1 0.09 0.09 0.2 3 0.27 0.27
0.4 95 14.37 15.73 0.3 12 1.08 1.17 0.3 21 1.91 2.18
0.5 294 44.48 60.21 0.4 160 14.41 15.59 0.4 162 14.71 16.89
0.6 191 28.9 89.11 0.5 673 60.63 76.22 0.5 650 59.04 75.93
0.7 59 8.93 98.03 0.6 198 17.84 94.05 0.6 205 18.62 94.55
0.8 12 1.82 99.85 0.7 55 4.95 99.01 0.7 47 4.27 98.82
0.9 1 0.15 100 0.8 10 0.9 99.91 0.8 11 1 99.82
envNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.9 1 0.09 100 0.9 2 0.18 100
0.1666667 1 0.15 0.15 envNOR Freq. Percent Cum. envNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.25 9 1.36 1.51 0.25 15 1.35 1.35 0.25 7 0.64 0.64
0.3333333 16 2.42 3.93 0.3333333 16 1.44 2.79 0.3333333 22 2 2.63
0.4166667 27 4.08 8.02 0.4166667 57 5.14 7.93 0.4166667 48 4.36 6.99
0.5 70 10.59 18.61 0.5 82 7.39 15.32 0.5 73 6.63 13.62
0.5833333 459 69.44 88.05 0.5833333 856 77.12 92.43 0.5833333 859 78.02 91.64
0.6666667 72 10.89 98.94 0.6666667 74 6.67 99.1 0.6666667 83 7.54 99.18
0.75 7 1.06 100 0.75 10 0.9 100 0.75 9 0.82 100
humNOR Freq. Percent Cum. humNOR Freq. Percent Cum. humNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.4285714 7 1.06 1.06 0.4285714 13 1.17 1.17 0.2857143 10 0.91 0.91
0.5714286 56 8.47 9.53 0.5714286 79 7.12 8.29 0.4285714 73 6.63 7.54
0.7142857 596 90.17 99.7 0.7142857 1,014 91.35 99.64 0.5714286 1,014 92.1 99.64
0.8571429 2 0.3 100 0.8571429 4 0.36 100 0.7142857 4 0.36 100
proNOR Freq. Percent Cum. proNOR Freq. Percent Cum. proNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0 1 0.15 0.15 0 2 0.18 0.18 0 2 0.18 0.18
0.125 13 1.97 2.12 0.125 20 1.8 1.98 0.125 17 1.54 1.73
0.25 36 5.45 7.56 0.25 49 4.41 6.4 0.25 65 5.9 7.63
0.375 109 16.49 24.05 0.375 157 14.14 20.54 0.375 184 16.71 24.34
0.5 420 63.54 87.59 0.5 810 72.97 93.51 0.5 769 69.85 94.19
0.625 77 11.65 99.24 0.625 67 6.04 99.55 0.625 60 5.45 99.64
0.75 5 0.76 100 0.75 5 0.45 100 0.75 3 0.27 99.91
0.875 1 0.09 100
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Year 2003 Year 2004  Year 2005
comNOR Freq. Percent Cum. comNOR Freq. Percent Cum. comNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.2 6 0.2 0.2 0.2 3 0.1 0.1 0.1818182 11 0.37 0.37
0.3 135 4.57 4.78 0.3 143 4.74 4.84 0.2727273 172 5.76 6.13
0.4 2,591 87.8 92.58 0.4 2,637 87.49 92.34 0.3636364 2,580 86.43 92.56
0.5 169 5.73 98.31 0.5 175 5.81 98.14 0.4545455 169 5.66 98.22
0.6 41 1.39 99.7 0.6 41 1.36 99.5 0.5454546 38 1.27 99.5
0.7 6 0.2 99.9 0.7 10 0.33 99.83 0.6363636 10 0.34 99.83
0.8 3 0.1 100 0.8 5 0.17 100 0.7272727 4 0.13 99.97
cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum. cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.8181818 1 0.03 100
0 1 0.03 0.03 0 1 0.03 0.03 cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.1428571 50 1.69 1.73 0.1428571 86 2.85 2.89 0.2727273 13 0.44 0.44
0.2857143 454 15.38 17.11 0.2857143 763 25.32 28.2 0.3636364 50 1.68 2.11
0.4285714 1,921 65.1 82.21 0.4285714 1,595 52.92 81.12 0.4545455 713 23.89 26
0.5714286 524 17.76 99.97 0.5714286 569 18.88 100 0.5454546 1,846 61.84 87.84
0.7142857 1 0.03 100 divNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.6363636 358 11.99 99.83
divNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.0909091 10 0.33 0.33 0.7272727 5 0.17 100
0.0909091 11 0.37 0.37 0.1818182 930 30.86 31.19 divNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.1818182 633 21.45 21.82 0.2727273 1,169 38.79 69.97 0.0909091 15 0.5 0.5
0.2727273 1,509 51.14 72.96 0.3636364 584 19.38 89.35 0.1818182 1,003 33.6 34.1
0.3636364 529 17.93 90.88 0.4545455 197 6.54 95.89 0.2727273 988 33.1 67.2
0.4545455 156 5.29 96.17 0.5454546 78 2.59 98.47 0.3636364 618 20.7 87.91
0.5454546 69 2.34 98.51 0.6363636 25 0.83 99.3 0.4545455 210 7.04 94.94
0.6363636 30 1.02 99.53 0.7272727 16 0.53 99.83 0.5454546 93 3.12 98.06
0.7272727 11 0.37 99.9 0.8181818 4 0.13 99.97 0.6363636 37 1.24 99.3
0.8181818 3 0.1 100 0.9090909 1 0.03 100 0.7272727 16 0.54 99.83
empNOR Freq. Percent Cum. empNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.8181818 5 0.17 100
0.0909091 1 0.03 0.03 0.0909091 1 0.03 0.03 empNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.1818182 5 0.17 0.2 0.1818182 11 0.36 0.4 0.0909091 3 0.1 0.1
0.2727273 77 2.61 2.81 0.2727273 102 3.38 3.78 0.1818182 13 0.44 0.54
0.3636364 646 21.89 24.7 0.3636364 853 28.3 32.08 0.2727273 135 4.52 5.06
0.4545455 1,997 67.67 92.38 0.4545455 1,758 58.33 90.41 0.3636364 862 28.88 33.94
0.5454546 172 5.83 98.2 0.5454546 237 7.86 98.27 0.4545455 1,682 56.35 90.28
0.6363636 45 1.52 99.73 0.6363636 44 1.46 99.73 0.5454546 243 8.14 98.43
0.7272727 7 0.24 99.97 0.7272727 4 0.13 99.87 0.6363636 35 1.17 99.6
0.8181818 1 0.03 100 0.8181818 4 0.13 100 0.7272727 9 0.3 99.9
envNOR Freq. Percent Cum. envNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.8181818 3 0.1 100
0.25 4 0.14 0.14 0.1666667 1 0.03 0.03 envNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.3333333 23 0.78 0.91 0.25 5 0.17 0.2 0.1666667 2 0.07 0.07
0.4166667 60 2.03 2.95 0.3333333 31 1.03 1.23 0.25 4 0.13 0.2
0.5 131 4.44 7.39 0.4166667 74 2.46 3.68 0.3333333 27 0.9 1.11
0.5833333 2,625 88.95 96.34 0.5 151 5.01 8.69 0.4166667 75 2.51 3.62
0.6666667 96 3.25 99.59 0.5833333 2,673 88.69 97.38 0.5 180 6.03 9.65
0.75 12 0.41 100 0.6666667 69 2.29 99.67 0.5833333 2,577 86.33 95.98
humNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.75 10 0.33 100 0.6666667 95 3.18 99.16
0.1428571 1 0.03 0.03 humNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.75 16 0.54 99.7
0.2857143 7 0.24 0.27 0.2857143 8 0.27 0.27 0.8333333 9 0.3 100
0.4285714 171 5.79 6.07 0.4285714 262 8.69 8.96 humNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.5714286 2,769 93.83 99.9 0.5714286 2,740 90.91 99.87 0.1428571 1 0.03 0.03
0.7142857 3 0.1 100 0.7142857 4 0.13 100 0.2857143 5 0.17 0.2
proNOR Freq. Percent Cum. proNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.4285714 114 3.82 4.02
0 2 0.07 0.07 0 4 0.13 0.13 0.5714286 2,861 95.85 99.87
0.125 18 0.61 0.68 0.125 18 0.6 0.73 0.7142857 4 0.13 100
0.25 73 2.47 3.15 0.25 77 2.55 3.28 proNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.375 292 9.89 13.05 0.375 304 10.09 13.37 0 4 0.13 0.13
0.5 2,497 84.62 97.66 0.5 2,518 83.54 96.91 0.125 22 0.74 0.87
0.625 66 2.24 99.9 0.625 91 3.02 99.93 0.25 90 3.02 3.89
0.75 3 0.1 100 0.75 2 0.07 100 0.375 321 10.75 14.64
0.5 2,470 82.75 97.39
0.625 75 2.51 99.9
0.75 3 0.1 100
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Year 2006 Year 2007 Year 2008
comNOR Freq. Percent Cum. comNOR Freq. Percent Cum. comNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.1818182 7 0.24 0.24 0.1818182 11 0.38 0.38 0.1818182 14 0.48 0.48
0.2727273 177 6.01 6.25 0.2727273 241 8.25 8.63 0.2727273 226 7.75 8.23
0.3636364 2,540 86.31 92.56 0.3636364 2,459 84.18 92.81 0.3636364 2,489 85.39 93.62
0.4545455 156 5.3 97.86 0.4545455 154 5.27 98.08 0.4545455 140 4.8 98.42
0.5454546 43 1.46 99.32 0.5454546 40 1.37 99.45 0.5454546 36 1.23 99.66
0.6363636 16 0.54 99.86 0.6363636 12 0.41 99.86 0.6363636 7 0.24 99.9
0.7272727 4 0.14 100 0.7272727 4 0.14 100 0.7272727 3 0.1 100
cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum. cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum. cgovNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.2727273 14 0.48 0.48 0.2307692 1 0.03 0.03 0.1666667 1 0.03 0.03
0.3636364 122 4.15 4.62 0.3076923 9 0.31 0.34 0.25 14 0.48 0.51
0.4545455 978 33.23 37.85 0.3846154 138 4.72 5.07 0.3333333 146 5.01 5.52
0.5454546 1,289 43.8 81.65 0.4615385 878 30.06 35.12 0.4166667 818 28.06 33.58
0.6363636 539 18.31 99.97 0.5384616 1,463 50.09 85.21 0.5 1,538 52.76 86.35
0.7272727 1 0.03 100 0.6153846 426 14.58 99.79 0.5833333 392 13.45 99.79
divNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.6923077 6 0.21 100 0.6666667 6 0.21 100
0.0909091 13 0.44 0.44 divNOR Freq. Percent Cum. divNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.1818182 1,031 35.03 35.47 0.0909091 18 0.62 0.62 0.0909091 19 0.65 0.65
0.2727273 939 31.91 67.38 0.1818182 1,034 35.4 36.02 0.1818182 1,040 35.68 36.33
0.3636364 588 19.98 87.36 0.2727273 948 32.45 68.47 0.2727273 933 32.01 68.34
0.4545455 207 7.03 94.39 0.3636364 528 18.08 86.55 0.3636364 557 19.11 87.44
0.5454546 104 3.53 97.93 0.4545455 215 7.36 93.91 0.4545455 195 6.69 94.13
0.6363636 38 1.29 99.22 0.5454546 110 3.77 97.67 0.5454546 103 3.53 97.67
0.7272727 18 0.61 99.83 0.6363636 46 1.57 99.25 0.6363636 44 1.51 99.18
0.8181818 5 0.17 100 0.7272727 17 0.58 99.83 0.7272727 16 0.55 99.73
empNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.8181818 4 0.14 99.97 0.8181818 6 0.21 99.93
0.0909091 2 0.07 0.07 0.9090909 1 0.03 100 0.9090909 2 0.07 100
0.1818182 20 0.68 0.75 empNOR Freq. Percent Cum. empNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.2727273 144 4.89 5.64 0.0909091 2 0.07 0.07 0.0909091 4 0.14 0.14
0.3636364 854 29.02 34.66 0.1818182 34 1.16 1.23 0.1818182 37 1.27 1.41
0.4545455 1,624 55.18 89.84 0.2727273 148 5.07 6.3 0.2727273 158 5.42 6.83
0.5454546 244 8.29 98.13 0.3636364 803 27.49 33.79 0.3636364 766 26.28 33.1
0.6363636 43 1.46 99.59 0.4545455 1,542 52.79 86.58 0.4545455 1,539 52.8 85.9
0.7272727 9 0.31 99.9 0.5454546 319 10.92 97.5 0.5454546 336 11.53 97.43
0.8181818 3 0.1 100 0.6363636 59 2.02 99.52 0.6363636 59 2.02 99.45
envNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.7272727 11 0.38 99.9 0.7272727 12 0.41 99.86
0.1538462 3 0.1 0.1 0.8181818 2 0.07 99.97 0.8181818 3 0.1 99.97
0.2307692 6 0.2 0.31 0.9090909 1 0.03 100 0.9090909 1 0.03 100
0.3076923 19 0.65 0.95 envNOR Freq. Percent Cum. envNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.3846154 77 2.62 3.57 0.1538462 1 0.03 0.03 0.1538462 1 0.03 0.03
0.4615385 205 6.97 10.53 0.2307692 10 0.34 0.38 0.2307692 10 0.34 0.38
0.5384616 2,486 84.47 95.01 0.3076923 21 0.72 1.1 0.3076923 27 0.93 1.3
0.6153846 113 3.84 98.84 0.3846154 65 2.23 3.32 0.3846154 50 1.72 3.02
0.6923077 23 0.78 99.63 0.4615385 207 7.09 10.41 0.4615385 225 7.72 10.74
0.7692308 8 0.27 99.9 0.5384616 2,459 84.18 94.59 0.5384616 2,397 82.23 92.97
0.8461539 3 0.1 100 0.6153846 124 4.25 98.84 0.6153846 161 5.52 98.49
humNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.6923077 21 0.72 99.55 0.6923077 32 1.1 99.59
0.1428571 1 0.03 0.03 0.7692308 10 0.34 99.9 0.7692308 7 0.24 99.83
0.2857143 6 0.2 0.24 0.8461539 3 0.1 100 0.8461539 5 0.17 100
0.4285714 107 3.64 3.87 humNOR Freq. Percent Cum. humNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.5714286 2,824 95.96 99.83 0.1428571 1 0.03 0.03 0.1428571 1 0.03 0.03
0.7142857 5 0.17 100 0.2857143 7 0.24 0.27 0.2857143 9 0.31 0.34
proNOR Freq. Percent Cum. 0.4285714 109 3.73 4.01 0.4285714 108 3.7 4.05
0 6 0.2 0.2 0.5714286 2,799 95.82 99.83 0.5714286 2,790 95.71 99.76
0.125 28 0.95 1.16 0.7142857 5 0.17 100 0.7142857 7 0.24 100
0.25 83 2.82 3.98 proNOR Freq. Percent Cum. proNOR Freq. Percent Cum.
0.375 332 11.28 15.26 0 4 0.14 0.14 0 3 0.1 0.1
0.5 2,418 82.16 97.42 0.125 28 0.96 1.1 0.125 27 0.93 1.03
0.625 73 2.48 99.9 0.25 94 3.22 4.31 0.25 108 3.7 4.73
0.75 3 0.1 100 0.375 350 11.98 16.3 0.375 342 11.73 16.47
0.5 2,364 80.93 97.23 0.5 2,348 80.55 97.02
0.625 77 2.64 99.86 0.625 83 2.85 99.86
0.75 4 0.14 100 0.75 4 0.14 100
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Table A4.1.9 Sub-period equally-weighted Fama-French model regressions for net 
KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD CSR 
measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations 
indicators; CGOV, the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net 
KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; 
and Overall, the sum of the net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. “High-scoring” are the 
portfolios formed on positive net scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on negative net scores, and 
“Zero-scoring” are the portfolios formed for firms where the net score is zero. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score 0.392 1.080 0.314 0.117 0.620 0.538
low-score 0.951 1.460 0.181 0.395 1.720 0.088
long-short -0.559 -0.830 0.432 -0.278 -1.550 0.125
Community
high-score -0.140 -1.210 0.229 0.021 0.120 0.905
zero-score -0.238 -2.000 0.049 0.173 0.870 0.389
low-score -0.435 -1.450 0.151 0.058 0.280 0.781
long-short 0.295 1.120 0.268 -0.036 -0.190 0.847
CGOV
high-score -0.408 -1.930 0.057 -0.175 -0.870 0.384
zero-score -0.306 -2.170 0.033 0.110 0.540 0.589
low-score -0.076 -0.480 0.634 0.287 1.450 0.149
long-short -0.333 -1.520 0.131 -0.463 -2.280 0.024
Diversity
high-score -0.070 -0.580 0.562 0.090 0.490 0.627
zero-score -0.291 -2.230 0.028 0.127 0.650 0.517
low-score -0.338 -1.660 0.101 0.276 1.210 0.230
long-short 0.268 1.310 0.193 -0.186 -1.220 0.225
Employee Rel
high-score -0.065 -0.480 0.632 0.188 1.220 0.224
zero-score -0.236 -1.990 0.050 0.086 0.450 0.655
low-score -0.394 -2.310 0.023 0.187 0.740 0.460
long-short 0.329 2.250 0.027 0.001 0.000 0.997
Environment
high-score -0.331 -1.900 0.061 0.345 1.650 0.101
zero-score -0.117 -1.000 0.319 0.142 0.690 0.490
low-score -0.472 -2.380 0.019 0.283 1.300 0.198
long-short 0.141 0.840 0.404 0.062 0.310 0.758
Human Rights
high-score -0.145 -0.200 0.840 -0.694 -1.200 0.234
zero-score -0.311 -1.680 0.099 0.134 0.710 0.481
low-score -0.264 -0.610 0.547 0.321 1.470 0.143
long-short 0.119 0.130 0.897 -1.015 -1.770 0.080
Product
high-score 0.017 0.100 0.923 0.272 1.320 0.190
zero-score -0.255 -2.180 0.032 0.123 0.610 0.545
low-score -0.208 -1.510 0.135 0.265 1.500 0.137
long-short 0.225 1.360 0.178 0.006 0.030 0.975
Overall
high-score -0.117 -1.010 0.316 0.038 0.210 0.830
zero-score -0.251 -1.600 0.113 0.074 0.350 0.726
low-score -0.342 -2.510 0.014 0.218 1.040 0.303
long-short 0.225 2.000 0.049 -0.179 -1.320 0.188
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.1.10 Sub-period value-weighted Fama-French model regressions for net 
KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD CSR 
measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations 
indicators; CGOV, the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net 
KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; 
and Overall, the sum of the net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. “High-scoring” are the 
portfolios formed on positive net scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on negative net scores, and 
“Zero-scoring” are the portfolios formed for firms where the net score is zero. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score -0.242 -0.650 0.536 -0.020 -0.250 0.801
low-score 0.757 1.290 0.234 0.088 0.550 0.582
long-short -0.999 -1.290 0.235 -0.108 -0.520 0.603
Community
high-score -0.078 -0.630 0.528 -0.067 -0.500 0.621
zero-score 0.190 2.260 0.026 -0.017 -0.170 0.862
low-score -0.220 -0.650 0.518 0.220 1.060 0.290
long-short 0.141 0.390 0.701 -0.287 -1.030 0.305
CGOV
high-score -0.235 -0.860 0.394 0.041 0.190 0.852
zero-score -0.061 -0.660 0.508 0.083 0.690 0.490
low-score 0.295 2.790 0.006 -0.047 -0.690 0.490
long-short -0.530 -1.700 0.093 0.088 0.370 0.712
Diversity
high-score 0.162 1.920 0.058 -0.046 -0.600 0.549
zero-score -0.057 -0.690 0.494 0.152 1.100 0.273
low-score -0.229 -1.240 0.218 0.119 0.640 0.521
long-short 0.391 1.770 0.080 -0.165 -0.750 0.453
Employee Rel
high-score 0.242 2.170 0.033 0.018 0.190 0.851
zero-score -0.051 -0.750 0.458 -0.021 -0.200 0.840
low-score -0.240 -1.680 0.096 0.005 0.040 0.971
long-short 0.482 2.650 0.009 0.013 0.070 0.947
Environment
high-score 0.111 0.560 0.575 0.141 0.650 0.519
zero-score 0.108 1.470 0.144 -0.103 -1.080 0.283
low-score -0.021 -0.150 0.878 0.160 1.190 0.235
long-short 0.132 0.480 0.630 -0.020 -0.070 0.946
Human Rights
high-score 0.482 0.650 0.519 -0.567 -0.970 0.335
zero-score 0.120 1.250 0.219 -0.039 -0.480 0.633
low-score -0.106 -0.340 0.733 0.146 1.120 0.266
long-short 0.588 0.680 0.497 -0.713 -1.160 0.250
Product
high-score 0.128 0.620 0.536 0.028 0.140 0.887
zero-score 0.099 1.500 0.137 0.004 0.040 0.969
low-score 0.008 0.070 0.947 0.048 0.460 0.647
long-short 0.120 0.480 0.634 -0.020 -0.090 0.931
Overall
high-score 0.168 2.010 0.047 -0.115 -0.950 0.344
zero-score -0.182 -1.260 0.212 0.094 0.780 0.440
low-score 0.009 0.110 0.917 0.143 1.240 0.217
long-short 0.158 1.070 0.288 -0.258 -1.290 0.201
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.1.11 Sub-period equally-weighted industry-neutral basis Fama-French 
model regressions for net KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD CSR 
measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations 
indicators; CGOV, the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net 
KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; 
and Overall, the sum of the net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. “High-scoring” are the 
portfolios formed on positive net scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on negative net scores, and 
“Zero-scoring” are the portfolios formed for firms where the net score is zero. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score 0.603 2.080 0.071 0.099 0.640 0.525
low-score 0.770 0.920 0.386 0.447 1.560 0.122
long-short -0.168 -0.200 0.849 -0.348 -1.610 0.110
Community
high-score -0.118 -0.970 0.335 0.104 0.760 0.447
zero-score -0.081 -0.830 0.411 0.136 0.820 0.414
low-score -0.119 -0.320 0.747 -0.157 -0.420 0.676
long-short 0.000 0.000 0.999 0.261 0.780 0.436
CGOV
high-score -0.267 -1.270 0.207 -0.011 -0.060 0.954
zero-score -0.189 -1.580 0.118 0.102 0.550 0.585
low-score -0.064 -0.380 0.708 0.195 1.200 0.231
long-short -0.203 -0.900 0.371 -0.206 -0.950 0.342
Diversity
high-score 0.024 0.230 0.818 0.050 0.350 0.727
zero-score -0.091 -0.850 0.400 0.166 0.960 0.339
low-score -0.182 -0.930 0.355 0.345 1.550 0.125
long-short 0.205 1.020 0.311 -0.296 -1.860 0.065
Employee Rel
high-score -0.083 -0.740 0.462 0.084 0.590 0.556
zero-score -0.016 -0.180 0.859 0.158 0.930 0.353
low-score -0.359 -1.980 0.051 -0.005 -0.020 0.982
long-short 0.276 1.750 0.083 0.089 0.490 0.624
Environment
high-score -0.298 -1.750 0.084 0.239 0.950 0.344
zero-score -0.028 -0.310 0.760 0.115 0.710 0.479
low-score -0.309 -1.640 0.104 0.332 1.170 0.243
long-short 0.011 0.060 0.951 -0.094 -0.300 0.765
Human Rights
high-score -1.027 -1.200 0.236 -0.758 -1.070 0.288
zero-score -0.107 -0.650 0.517 0.105 0.660 0.510
low-score -0.083 -0.160 0.871 0.359 1.760 0.081
long-short -0.944 -0.930 0.355 -1.118 -1.540 0.127
Product
high-score -0.071 -0.480 0.629 0.188 0.930 0.353
zero-score -0.108 -1.050 0.295 0.094 0.570 0.571
low-score -0.211 -1.450 0.152 0.238 1.230 0.222
long-short 0.140 0.830 0.408 -0.051 -0.200 0.842
Overall
high-score -0.084 -0.850 0.397 0.065 0.450 0.656
zero-score -0.107 -0.740 0.464 0.120 0.600 0.547
low-score -0.139 -1.100 0.272 0.169 0.880 0.378
long-short 0.056 0.460 0.645 -0.104 -0.820 0.416
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.1.12 Sub-period value-weighted industry-neutral basis Fama-French 
model regressions for net KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD CSR 
measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations 
indicators; CGOV, the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net 
KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; 
and Overall, the sum of the net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. “High-scoring” are the 
portfolios formed on positive net scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on negative net scores, and 
“Zero-scoring” are the portfolios formed for firms where the net score is zero. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score -0.067 -0.270 0.793 -0.051 -0.720 0.471
low-score 0.710 1.260 0.243 0.030 0.140 0.887
long-short -0.777 -1.240 0.249 -0.081 -0.360 0.720
Community
high-score -0.058 -0.450 0.656 -0.103 -0.930 0.356
zero-score 0.068 1.130 0.260 -0.001 -0.010 0.991
low-score -0.162 -0.430 0.670 -0.208 -0.560 0.577
long-short 0.105 0.300 0.765 0.105 0.270 0.790
CGOV
high-score -0.050 -0.200 0.838 0.116 0.550 0.584
zero-score -0.172 -1.810 0.073 0.104 0.840 0.402
low-score 0.243 2.160 0.033 -0.086 -1.330 0.186
long-short -0.292 -1.050 0.294 0.203 0.880 0.382
Diversity
high-score 0.137 1.740 0.085 -0.099 -1.340 0.184
zero-score 0.074 0.830 0.409 0.110 0.910 0.365
low-score -0.258 -1.420 0.159 0.254 1.370 0.173
long-short 0.395 1.870 0.065 -0.353 -1.720 0.088
Employee Rel
high-score 0.060 0.790 0.432 0.003 0.030 0.976
zero-score 0.135 1.830 0.071 0.009 0.090 0.927
low-score -0.226 -1.490 0.138 -0.112 -0.700 0.483
long-short 0.286 1.800 0.075 0.114 0.660 0.513
Environment
high-score -0.242 -1.340 0.184 0.005 0.020 0.982
zero-score 0.016 0.250 0.801 -0.043 -0.610 0.543
low-score 0.136 0.930 0.353 0.124 0.620 0.534
long-short -0.378 -1.560 0.122 -0.119 -0.380 0.702
Human Rights
high-score -0.758 -0.930 0.358 -0.656 -1.200 0.233
zero-score 0.072 0.850 0.398 -0.048 -0.670 0.503
low-score -0.049 -0.120 0.906 0.075 0.440 0.660
long-short -0.708 -0.750 0.456 -0.731 -1.300 0.195
Product
high-score -0.074 -0.540 0.594 -0.091 -0.470 0.640
zero-score 0.049 0.870 0.388 -0.037 -0.390 0.700
low-score -0.018 -0.180 0.860 -0.079 -0.750 0.457
long-short -0.056 -0.330 0.739 -0.012 -0.050 0.958
Overall
high-score 0.027 0.390 0.701 -0.066 -0.700 0.486
zero-score -0.083 -0.630 0.531 0.196 1.340 0.183
low-score 0.129 1.300 0.196 0.002 0.020 0.983
long-short -0.102 -0.710 0.480 -0.069 -0.440 0.660
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.1.13 Sub-period equally-weighted Carhart model regressions for net KLD 
score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD CSR 
measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations 
indicators; CGOV, the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net 
KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; 
and Overall, the sum of the net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. “High-scoring” are the 
portfolios formed on positive net scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on negative net scores, and 
“Zero-scoring” are the portfolios formed for firms where the net score is zero. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score 0.297 0.790 0.457 0.113 0.750 0.455
low-score 0.865 1.230 0.260 0.392 1.870 0.064
long-short -0.568 -0.760 0.471 -0.279 -1.550 0.123
Community
high-score 0.116 1.210 0.230 0.018 0.120 0.906
zero-score 0.045 0.490 0.628 0.168 1.070 0.286
low-score 0.010 0.030 0.972 0.055 0.280 0.776
long-short 0.106 0.380 0.704 -0.037 -0.200 0.843
CGOV
high-score 0.005 0.030 0.979 -0.178 -0.960 0.341
zero-score -0.026 -0.210 0.837 0.107 0.600 0.547
low-score 0.236 1.680 0.096 0.282 2.020 0.046
long-short -0.231 -1.000 0.322 -0.460 -2.390 0.019
Diversity
high-score 0.189 1.880 0.063 0.086 0.610 0.544
zero-score -0.021 -0.190 0.851 0.123 0.750 0.454
low-score -0.047 -0.230 0.816 0.271 1.470 0.146
long-short 0.236 1.080 0.285 -0.186 -1.220 0.227
Employee Rel
high-score 0.248 2.310 0.023 0.184 1.590 0.115
zero-score 0.020 0.200 0.841 0.082 0.500 0.615
low-score -0.071 -0.470 0.643 0.181 0.910 0.365
long-short 0.319 2.040 0.044 0.003 0.020 0.987
Environment
high-score 0.003 0.020 0.985 0.343 1.700 0.092
zero-score 0.136 1.390 0.168 0.137 0.870 0.387
low-score -0.118 -0.650 0.520 0.281 1.320 0.190
long-short 0.121 0.670 0.503 0.062 0.310 0.760
Human Rights
high-score -0.092 -0.120 0.904 -0.698 -1.230 0.222
zero-score -0.004 -0.030 0.978 0.130 0.870 0.388
low-score 0.171 0.410 0.681 0.318 1.570 0.119
long-short -0.262 -0.270 0.786 -1.016 -1.770 0.080
Product
high-score 0.302 1.870 0.064 0.269 1.390 0.169
zero-score 0.019 0.210 0.835 0.118 0.740 0.463
low-score 0.074 0.620 0.536 0.262 1.790 0.076
long-short 0.227 1.280 0.203 0.007 0.040 0.970
Overall
high-score 0.124 1.240 0.217 0.034 0.240 0.809
zero-score 0.090 0.690 0.495 0.070 0.390 0.695
low-score -0.043 -0.380 0.707 0.213 1.250 0.215
long-short 0.167 1.400 0.164 -0.179 -1.320 0.189
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.1.14 Sub-period value-weighted Carhart model regressions for net KLD 
score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD CSR 
measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations 
indicators; CGOV, the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net 
KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; 
and Overall, the sum of the net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. “High-scoring” are the 
portfolios formed on positive net scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on negative net scores, and 
“Zero-scoring” are the portfolios formed for firms where the net score is zero. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score -0.274 -0.670 0.526 -0.020 -0.260 0.795
low-score 0.780 1.200 0.269 0.087 0.550 0.582
long-short -1.054 -1.230 0.258 -0.107 -0.520 0.605
Community
high-score 0.069 0.550 0.581 -0.069 -0.560 0.578
zero-score 0.137 1.550 0.124 -0.017 -0.180 0.861
low-score 0.105 0.300 0.764 0.220 1.060 0.291
long-short -0.036 -0.090 0.926 -0.289 -1.060 0.290
CGOV
high-score -0.055 -0.190 0.850 0.042 0.190 0.848
zero-score 0.064 0.710 0.480 0.082 0.700 0.486
low-score 0.276 2.440 0.017 -0.048 -0.720 0.473
long-short -0.330 -1.010 0.318 0.090 0.380 0.704
Diversity
high-score 0.211 2.370 0.020 -0.046 -0.620 0.539
zero-score -0.051 -0.570 0.569 0.151 1.110 0.269
low-score -0.177 -0.900 0.372 0.119 0.640 0.523
long-short 0.388 1.640 0.104 -0.165 -0.750 0.455
Employee Rel
high-score 0.310 2.630 0.010 0.017 0.180 0.854
zero-score -0.047 -0.640 0.523 -0.022 -0.210 0.835
low-score -0.034 -0.250 0.807 0.004 0.030 0.978
long-short 0.344 1.810 0.073 0.013 0.070 0.943
Environment
high-score 0.225 1.080 0.282 0.140 0.640 0.521
zero-score 0.101 1.290 0.199 -0.105 -1.240 0.216
low-score 0.103 0.710 0.477 0.162 1.250 0.213
long-short 0.122 0.420 0.678 -0.022 -0.080 0.938
Human Rights
high-score 0.394 0.500 0.620 -0.571 -0.990 0.326
zero-score 0.123 1.200 0.236 -0.040 -0.500 0.616
low-score 0.035 0.110 0.913 0.146 1.110 0.268
long-short 0.359 0.400 0.694 -0.717 -1.170 0.244
Product
high-score 0.271 1.250 0.213 0.027 0.140 0.891
zero-score 0.068 0.970 0.332 0.003 0.030 0.975
low-score 0.110 0.830 0.409 0.048 0.460 0.648
long-short 0.161 0.600 0.548 -0.021 -0.090 0.930
Overall
high-score 0.172 1.930 0.056 -0.117 -0.990 0.324
zero-score -0.009 -0.060 0.949 0.093 0.770 0.440
low-score 0.061 0.640 0.526 0.143 1.240 0.219
long-short 0.112 0.710 0.481 -0.259 -1.300 0.196
1991-1999 2000-2008
 
 
 
 
 
 
364 
 
Table A4.1.15 Sub-period equally-weighted industry-neutral basis Carhart model 
regressions for net KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD CSR 
measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations 
indicators; CGOV, the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net 
KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; 
and Overall, the sum of the net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. “High-scoring” are the 
portfolios formed on positive net scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on negative net scores, and 
“Zero-scoring” are the portfolios formed for firms where the net score is zero. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score 0.468 1.880 0.102 0.095 0.770 0.440
low-score 0.575 0.650 0.535 0.442 1.700 0.092
long-short -0.106 -0.110 0.913 -0.347 -1.610 0.110
Community
high-score 0.106 0.950 0.344 0.101 0.950 0.346
zero-score 0.126 1.520 0.133 0.133 1.000 0.319
low-score 0.299 0.810 0.421 -0.162 -0.460 0.650
long-short -0.193 -0.590 0.559 0.263 0.790 0.433
CGOV
high-score 0.030 0.150 0.885 -0.013 -0.070 0.945
zero-score 0.041 0.380 0.705 0.098 0.630 0.533
low-score 0.219 1.360 0.178 0.191 1.560 0.120
long-short -0.189 -0.780 0.435 -0.204 -0.970 0.332
Diversity
high-score 0.216 2.360 0.021 0.046 0.430 0.665
zero-score 0.077 0.750 0.456 0.162 1.140 0.257
low-score 0.036 0.180 0.856 0.341 1.780 0.077
long-short 0.180 0.840 0.405 -0.295 -1.870 0.064
Employee Rel
high-score 0.163 1.750 0.083 0.081 0.730 0.470
zero-score 0.150 1.800 0.075 0.155 1.060 0.292
low-score -0.064 -0.370 0.712 -0.009 -0.050 0.959
long-short 0.226 1.350 0.182 0.090 0.500 0.615
Environment
high-score -0.043 -0.260 0.794 0.236 0.980 0.330
zero-score 0.175 2.320 0.022 0.111 0.860 0.393
low-score -0.031 -0.170 0.867 0.329 1.230 0.222
long-short -0.013 -0.070 0.945 -0.093 -0.300 0.768
Human Rights
high-score -0.876 -0.970 0.340 -0.761 -1.070 0.285
zero-score 0.143 1.130 0.264 0.102 0.800 0.426
low-score 0.193 0.370 0.715 0.356 1.900 0.059
long-short -1.069 -0.990 0.325 -1.118 -1.530 0.128
Product
high-score 0.144 1.010 0.317 0.186 0.950 0.346
zero-score 0.108 1.240 0.217 0.090 0.670 0.502
low-score 0.053 0.400 0.692 0.234 1.470 0.144
long-short 0.091 0.510 0.612 -0.048 -0.200 0.845
Overall
high-score 0.103 1.160 0.248 0.061 0.540 0.592
zero-score 0.103 0.730 0.470 0.116 0.650 0.515
low-score 0.098 0.860 0.390 0.165 1.070 0.286
long-short 0.005 0.040 0.970 -0.103 -0.820 0.414
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.1.16 Sub-period value-weighted industry-neutral basis Carhart model 
regressions for net KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD CSR 
measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations 
indicators; CGOV, the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net 
KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; 
and Overall, the sum of the net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. “High-scoring” are the 
portfolios formed on positive net scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on negative net scores, and 
“Zero-scoring” are the portfolios formed for firms where the net score is zero. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score -0.106 -0.400 0.701 -0.051 -0.770 0.444
low-score 0.700 1.130 0.298 0.027 0.140 0.890
long-short -0.807 -1.170 0.280 -0.079 -0.360 0.721
Community
high-score 0.124 0.980 0.327 -0.105 -1.100 0.275
zero-score 0.062 0.970 0.335 -0.002 -0.020 0.987
low-score 0.166 0.420 0.673 -0.211 -0.580 0.563
long-short -0.042 -0.110 0.910 0.106 0.270 0.788
CGOV
high-score 0.121 0.480 0.634 0.117 0.550 0.584
zero-score 0.019 0.230 0.821 0.103 0.860 0.394
low-score 0.271 2.270 0.026 -0.088 -1.490 0.139
long-short -0.150 -0.510 0.611 0.204 0.890 0.374
Diversity
high-score 0.196 2.380 0.019 -0.100 -1.450 0.150
zero-score 0.046 0.490 0.626 0.109 0.920 0.359
low-score -0.175 -0.910 0.367 0.253 1.390 0.167
long-short 0.371 1.640 0.105 -0.352 -1.710 0.089
Employee Rel
high-score 0.154 2.030 0.045 0.001 0.020 0.986
zero-score 0.088 1.130 0.262 0.008 0.090 0.930
low-score 0.017 0.110 0.909 -0.114 -0.750 0.454
long-short 0.138 0.840 0.402 0.115 0.660 0.509
Environment
high-score -0.117 -0.620 0.540 0.005 0.020 0.983
zero-score 0.063 0.950 0.344 -0.044 -0.680 0.501
low-score 0.171 1.100 0.274 0.123 0.620 0.535
long-short -0.288 -1.120 0.268 -0.119 -0.380 0.705
Human Rights
high-score -0.653 -0.750 0.456 -0.661 -1.230 0.220
zero-score 0.099 1.110 0.274 -0.048 -0.690 0.493
low-score 0.089 0.200 0.840 0.073 0.460 0.649
long-short -0.742 -0.740 0.464 -0.733 -1.310 0.193
Product
high-score 0.026 0.180 0.858 -0.092 -0.470 0.637
zero-score 0.073 1.220 0.226 -0.037 -0.400 0.690
low-score 0.064 0.600 0.551 -0.081 -0.860 0.389
long-short -0.038 -0.210 0.831 -0.011 -0.050 0.962
Overall
high-score 0.089 1.200 0.233 -0.067 -0.750 0.456
zero-score 0.052 0.380 0.705 0.195 1.340 0.184
low-score 0.099 0.940 0.351 0.001 0.010 0.990
long-short -0.011 -0.070 0.944 -0.069 -0.440 0.661
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.1.17 Sub-period equally-weighted Ferson and Schadt (1996) model 
regressions for net KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns on the conditional CAPM factors for two 
sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Rm-Rf is from Ken French’s 
website. The conditional variables are the one month lagged de-meaned values of TBR, the 3-month 
Treasury Bill rate; DY is the dividend yield on the S&P 500 index; Moody is the yield on Moody’s BAA 
minus the yield on Moody’s AAA corporate bonds; TERM is the 10-year Treasury Bond yield minus the 3 
month Treasury Bill Rate, and JDUM is a dummy variable equal to unity for the month of January. 
Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD CSR measure for 
exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, 
the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR measure for diversity 
indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the 
net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net KLD CSR measure for human 
rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; and Overall, the sum of the 
net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns 
are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score -0.038 -0.030 0.974 0.416 1.860 0.065
low-score -0.059 -0.030 0.974 0.494 1.810 0.073
long-short 0.021 0.020 0.981 -0.078 -0.410 0.686
Community
high-score 0.053 0.350 0.726 0.313 1.260 0.211
zero-score -0.149 -0.950 0.345 0.355 1.510 0.134
low-score -0.197 -0.570 0.572 0.318 1.000 0.321
long-short 0.250 0.850 0.398 -0.005 -0.020 0.981
CGOV
high-score -0.336 -1.410 0.162 0.326 1.170 0.243
zero-score -0.110 -0.610 0.541 0.342 1.370 0.175
low-score -0.045 -0.250 0.803 0.309 1.440 0.152
long-short -0.291 -1.240 0.216 0.017 0.070 0.943
Diversity
high-score 0.028 0.200 0.841 0.220 1.040 0.300
zero-score -0.130 -0.760 0.447 0.404 1.560 0.123
low-score -0.170 -0.680 0.501 0.434 1.650 0.101
long-short 0.199 0.870 0.388 -0.214 -1.300 0.195
Employee Rel
high-score 0.004 0.020 0.982 0.308 1.600 0.111
zero-score -0.081 -0.540 0.589 0.364 1.500 0.137
low-score -0.226 -1.080 0.285 0.307 1.130 0.260
long-short 0.229 1.440 0.155 0.000 0.000 0.998
Environment
high-score -0.138 -0.660 0.509 0.485 2.020 0.046
zero-score -0.027 -0.180 0.854 0.339 1.390 0.166
low-score -0.264 -1.120 0.265 0.434 1.540 0.127
long-short 0.126 0.710 0.479 0.051 0.210 0.830
Human Rights
high-score -0.009 -0.010 0.991 -0.349 -0.530 0.595
zero-score -0.293 -1.170 0.248 0.326 1.420 0.159
low-score -0.193 -0.420 0.678 0.416 1.590 0.114
long-short 0.184 0.190 0.853 -0.765 -1.280 0.205
Product
high-score -0.005 -0.030 0.979 0.318 1.390 0.168
zero-score -0.112 -0.710 0.481 0.331 1.370 0.172
low-score -0.030 -0.170 0.866 0.395 1.660 0.100
long-short 0.024 0.110 0.911 -0.077 -0.320 0.751
Overall
high-score 0.011 0.080 0.938 0.290 1.300 0.196
zero-score -0.141 -0.730 0.469 0.320 1.230 0.222
low-score -0.200 -1.130 0.260 0.364 1.450 0.150
long-short 0.211 1.730 0.087 -0.074 -0.520 0.607
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.1.18 Sub-period value-weighted Ferson and Schadt (1996) model 
regressions for net KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns on the conditional CAPM factors for two 
sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Rm-Rf is from Ken French’s 
website. The conditional variables are the one month lagged de-meaned values of TBR, the 3-month 
Treasury Bill rate; DY is the dividend yield on the S&P 500 index; Moody is the yield on Moody’s BAA 
minus the yield on Moody’s AAA corporate bonds; TERM is the 10-year Treasury Bond yield minus the 3 
month Treasury Bill Rate, and JDUM is a dummy variable equal to unity for the month of January. 
Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD CSR measure for 
exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, 
the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR measure for diversity 
indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the 
net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net KLD CSR measure for human 
rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; and Overall, the sum of the 
net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns 
are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score -0.441 -0.910 0.405 -0.002 -0.020 0.987
low-score 0.396 0.340 0.746 0.079 0.400 0.688
long-short -0.837 -0.570 0.590 -0.081 -0.360 0.720
Community
high-score 0.007 0.050 0.964 -0.069 -0.400 0.692
zero-score 0.120 1.230 0.222 -0.055 -0.520 0.606
low-score 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.286 0.980 0.328
long-short 0.007 0.020 0.986 -0.355 -1.200 0.232
CGOV
high-score -0.306 -1.060 0.291 0.186 0.750 0.457
zero-score 0.018 0.150 0.878 0.153 1.040 0.301
low-score 0.315 2.410 0.018 -0.130 -1.290 0.200
long-short -0.621 -1.820 0.073 0.316 1.230 0.221
Diversity
high-score 0.125 0.970 0.335 -0.092 -0.860 0.390
zero-score 0.044 0.440 0.661 0.185 1.040 0.302
low-score -0.162 -0.820 0.417 0.099 0.490 0.622
long-short 0.287 1.110 0.270 -0.191 -0.810 0.422
Employee Rel
high-score 0.108 0.760 0.450 -0.073 -0.620 0.536
zero-score 0.062 0.600 0.547 0.037 0.270 0.790
low-score -0.099 -0.520 0.602 -0.027 -0.130 0.895
long-short 0.208 0.900 0.370 -0.046 -0.220 0.830
Environment
high-score 0.031 0.140 0.886 0.002 0.010 0.992
zero-score 0.100 0.920 0.360 -0.098 -0.890 0.378
low-score 0.083 0.480 0.633 0.117 0.560 0.575
long-short -0.051 -0.170 0.865 -0.115 -0.340 0.732
Human Rights
high-score 0.696 0.770 0.446 0.342 0.540 0.590
zero-score 0.130 0.860 0.393 -0.064 -0.640 0.522
low-score 0.076 0.200 0.842 0.060 0.320 0.748
long-short 0.620 0.660 0.510 0.283 0.460 0.644
Product
high-score -0.136 -0.610 0.542 -0.197 -0.940 0.347
zero-score 0.103 1.140 0.256 -0.042 -0.350 0.729
low-score 0.151 0.880 0.380 0.045 0.240 0.814
long-short -0.287 -0.950 0.343 -0.242 -0.800 0.428
Overall
high-score 0.113 0.930 0.357 -0.167 -1.200 0.231
zero-score -0.089 -0.570 0.569 0.210 1.520 0.131
low-score 0.099 0.810 0.418 0.107 0.630 0.531
long-short 0.015 0.090 0.932 -0.274 -1.240 0.218
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.1.19 Sub-period equally-weighted industry-neutral basis Ferson and 
Schadt (1996) model regressions for net KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns on the conditional CAPM factors for two 
sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Rm-Rf is from Ken French’s 
website. The conditional variables are the one month lagged de-meaned values of TBR, the 3-month 
Treasury Bill rate; DY is the dividend yield on the S&P 500 index; Moody is the yield on Moody’s BAA 
minus the yield on Moody’s AAA corporate bonds; TERM is the 10-year Treasury Bond yield minus the 3 
month Treasury Bill Rate, and JDUM is a dummy variable equal to unity for the month of January. 
Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD CSR measure for 
exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, 
the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR measure for diversity 
indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the 
net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net KLD CSR measure for human 
rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; and Overall, the sum of the 
net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns 
are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score 0.513 0.700 0.514 0.251 1.340 0.184
low-score 0.639 0.370 0.723 0.335 1.100 0.275
long-short -0.126 -0.110 0.915 -0.084 -0.380 0.708
Community
high-score -0.001 -0.010 0.995 0.174 1.070 0.285
zero-score -0.050 -0.390 0.698 0.300 1.500 0.137
low-score 0.101 0.240 0.813 -0.152 -0.350 0.724
long-short -0.102 -0.280 0.780 0.326 0.900 0.372
CGOV
high-score -0.204 -0.830 0.410 0.417 1.610 0.111
zero-score -0.056 -0.370 0.711 0.264 1.210 0.227
low-score -0.043 -0.220 0.823 0.209 1.190 0.237
long-short -0.161 -0.660 0.514 0.208 0.890 0.373
Diversity
high-score 0.100 0.810 0.419 0.154 0.930 0.356
zero-score -0.002 -0.020 0.986 0.359 1.670 0.098
low-score -0.077 -0.330 0.743 0.443 1.800 0.075
long-short 0.177 0.800 0.425 -0.289 -1.620 0.108
Employee Rel
high-score -0.019 -0.140 0.886 0.138 0.840 0.404
zero-score 0.062 0.530 0.597 0.373 1.800 0.075
low-score -0.246 -1.170 0.244 0.085 0.360 0.723
long-short 0.227 1.390 0.169 0.053 0.280 0.777
Environment
high-score -0.197 -1.040 0.303 0.298 1.060 0.290
zero-score 0.031 0.260 0.795 0.285 1.440 0.152
low-score -0.170 -0.820 0.416 0.381 1.190 0.235
long-short -0.027 -0.150 0.881 -0.083 -0.250 0.806
Human Rights
high-score -0.955 -1.000 0.323 -0.360 -0.450 0.657
zero-score -0.132 -0.630 0.532 0.253 1.330 0.188
low-score -0.081 -0.150 0.884 0.300 1.370 0.172
long-short -0.874 -0.800 0.431 -0.660 -0.840 0.403
Product
high-score -0.050 -0.300 0.768 0.138 0.640 0.522
zero-score -0.055 -0.400 0.691 0.272 1.350 0.179
low-score -0.055 -0.320 0.752 0.269 1.160 0.249
long-short 0.005 0.030 0.978 -0.130 -0.470 0.636
Overall
high-score 0.002 0.020 0.987 0.256 1.420 0.159
zero-score -0.008 -0.050 0.964 0.295 1.260 0.208
low-score -0.078 -0.500 0.618 0.274 1.260 0.209
long-short 0.080 0.620 0.540 -0.019 -0.140 0.888
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.1.20 Sub-period value-weighted industry-neutral basis Ferson and Schadt 
(1996) model regressions for net KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns on the conditional CAPM factors for two 
sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Rm-Rf is from Ken French’s 
website. The conditional variables are the one month lagged de-meaned values of TBR, the 3-month 
Treasury Bill rate; DY is the dividend yield on the S&P 500 index; Moody is the yield on Moody’s BAA 
minus the yield on Moody’s AAA corporate bonds; TERM is the 10-year Treasury Bond yield minus the 3 
month Treasury Bill Rate, and JDUM is a dummy variable equal to unity for the month of January. 
Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD CSR measure for 
exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, 
the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR measure for diversity 
indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the 
net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net KLD CSR measure for human 
rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; and Overall, the sum of the 
net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns 
are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score -0.588 -1.130 0.309 -0.060 -0.580 0.562
low-score 0.621 0.500 0.641 -0.168 -0.750 0.454
long-short -1.209 -0.790 0.466 0.108 0.480 0.634
Community
high-score 0.005 0.030 0.975 -0.107 -0.820 0.417
zero-score 0.070 0.850 0.398 -0.026 -0.240 0.809
low-score 0.067 0.150 0.879 -0.357 -0.850 0.399
long-short -0.063 -0.140 0.886 0.249 0.600 0.548
CGOV
high-score 0.027 0.100 0.918 0.245 1.070 0.288
zero-score -0.065 -0.540 0.589 0.136 0.930 0.356
low-score 0.249 1.970 0.052 -0.152 -1.500 0.137
long-short -0.222 -0.720 0.474 0.397 1.640 0.105
Diversity
high-score 0.155 1.230 0.221 -0.118 -1.070 0.288
zero-score 0.114 1.170 0.244 0.144 0.960 0.337
low-score -0.168 -0.830 0.408 0.146 0.760 0.446
long-short 0.323 1.260 0.211 -0.264 -1.220 0.225
Employee Rel
high-score 0.073 0.660 0.511 -0.061 -0.510 0.613
zero-score 0.161 1.730 0.087 0.053 0.460 0.646
low-score -0.124 -0.690 0.489 -0.128 -0.670 0.506
long-short 0.197 1.080 0.282 0.068 0.370 0.715
Environment
high-score -0.152 -0.730 0.469 0.172 0.670 0.505
zero-score 0.040 0.460 0.645 -0.029 -0.300 0.761
low-score 0.130 0.810 0.417 0.010 0.040 0.970
long-short -0.282 -1.120 0.264 0.162 0.480 0.630
Human Rights
high-score -0.685 -0.750 0.459 0.024 0.040 0.968
zero-score 0.085 0.650 0.518 -0.049 -0.500 0.619
low-score 0.062 0.120 0.904 -0.031 -0.150 0.881
long-short -0.747 -0.740 0.466 0.055 0.100 0.923
Product
high-score -0.121 -0.830 0.410 -0.259 -1.290 0.199
zero-score 0.085 1.030 0.304 -0.031 -0.290 0.775
low-score 0.141 1.050 0.297 -0.103 -0.600 0.547
long-short -0.261 -1.400 0.165 -0.157 -0.600 0.552
Overall
high-score 0.060 0.500 0.620 -0.052 -0.400 0.691
zero-score 0.051 0.360 0.716 0.266 1.660 0.101
low-score 0.124 1.110 0.269 -0.077 -0.520 0.608
long-short -0.064 -0.400 0.693 0.025 0.160 0.875
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.1.21 Sub-period equally-weighted conditional 3-factor model regressions 
for net KLD score  
The table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess return on the conditional Fama-French factors 
model for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Ln(ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of market equity for all firms in each portfolio. Ln(BE/ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of BE/ME for each portfolio. BE/ME is measured once each 
calendar year, and it is used to explain 12 monthly returns starting in July of the following year. Ln(ME) 
and Ln (BE/ME) are measured net of their average values (across portfolios) each month in order to control 
the market-wide variation. Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD 
CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations 
indicators; CGOV, the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net 
KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; 
and Overall, the sum of the net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score 0.658 2.260 0.065 0.167 1.010 0.315
low-score 1.235 1.920 0.103 0.245 1.200 0.234
long-short -0.577 -0.980 0.363 -0.079 -0.460 0.644
Community
high-score 0.018 0.160 0.871 0.226 1.460 0.147
zero-score -0.070 -0.550 0.580 0.139 1.010 0.316
low-score -0.427 -1.220 0.226 0.157 0.820 0.415
long-short 0.337 0.990 0.326 0.036 0.170 0.862
CGOV
high-score -0.187 -0.800 0.424 -0.093 -0.550 0.585
zero-score -0.050 -0.460 0.646 0.044 0.310 0.761
low-score 0.044 0.270 0.789 0.372 2.030 0.044
long-short -0.237 -0.950 0.344 -0.455 -2.460 0.015
Diversity
high-score -0.002 -0.010 0.988 0.209 1.390 0.167
zero-score -0.201 -1.530 0.130 0.182 1.080 0.281
low-score -0.288 -1.340 0.182 0.296 1.420 0.160
long-short 0.205 0.950 0.347 -0.117 -0.710 0.477
Employee Rel
high-score 0.013 0.100 0.922 0.229 1.570 0.119
zero-score -0.193 -1.550 0.124 0.185 1.170 0.244
low-score -0.307 -1.850 0.068 0.150 0.770 0.445
long-short 0.256 1.680 0.097 0.067 0.450 0.657
Environment
high-score -0.032 -0.200 0.842 0.381 1.830 0.071
zero-score 0.003 0.030 0.977 0.228 1.520 0.131
low-score -0.358 -1.830 0.071 0.264 1.290 0.200
long-short 0.175 0.960 0.339 0.055 0.270 0.785
Human Rights
high-score 0.264 0.360 0.717 -1.330 -2.080 0.040
zero-score -0.128 -0.750 0.458 0.222 1.470 0.144
low-score 0.075 0.150 0.882 0.412 1.910 0.059
long-short 0.145 0.140 0.892 -1.651 -2.600 0.010
Product
high-score 0.038 0.210 0.835 0.323 1.450 0.150
zero-score -0.127 -1.060 0.290 0.230 1.450 0.151
low-score -0.138 -0.850 0.395 0.338 2.190 0.031
long-short 0.066 0.340 0.738 -0.068 -0.310 0.759
Overall
high-score -0.068 -0.550 0.585 0.254 1.470 0.143
zero-score -0.126 -0.760 0.451 0.183 0.970 0.334
low-score -0.300 -2.020 0.046 0.287 1.460 0.146
long-short 0.157 1.360 0.176 -0.070 -0.580 0.563
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.1.22 Sub-period value-weighted conditional 3-factor model regressions for 
net KLD score  
The table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess return on the conditional Fama-French factors 
model for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Ln(ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of market equity for all firms in each portfolio. Ln(BE/ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of BE/ME for each portfolio. BE/ME is measured once each 
calendar year, and it is used to explain 12 monthly returns starting in July of the following year. Ln(ME) 
and Ln (BE/ME) are measured net of their average values (across portfolios) each month in order to control 
the market-wide variation. Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD 
CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations 
indicators; CGOV, the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net 
KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; 
and Overall, the sum of the net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score -0.085 -0.160 0.881 0.036 0.380 0.707
low-score 0.872 1.370 0.219 0.125 0.720 0.472
long-short -0.957 -0.930 0.390 -0.089 -0.400 0.687
Community
high-score 0.170 1.340 0.183 -0.016 -0.100 0.917
zero-score 0.202 2.790 0.006 0.064 0.690 0.490
low-score -0.491 -1.320 0.191 0.042 0.190 0.849
long-short 0.548 1.300 0.198 -0.104 -0.380 0.703
CGOV
high-score 0.392 1.300 0.197 -0.052 -0.260 0.796
zero-score 0.137 1.280 0.205 0.059 0.470 0.637
low-score 0.298 2.540 0.013 0.059 0.700 0.482
long-short 0.068 0.200 0.844 -0.111 -0.510 0.613
Diversity
high-score 0.169 1.550 0.125 0.044 0.470 0.636
zero-score 0.030 0.300 0.767 0.161 1.190 0.237
low-score -0.204 -0.950 0.343 0.260 1.270 0.205
long-short 0.285 1.150 0.252 -0.217 -0.930 0.357
Employee Rel
high-score 0.231 1.740 0.086 0.053 0.480 0.635
zero-score 0.011 0.120 0.905 0.090 0.890 0.374
low-score -0.041 -0.260 0.793 -0.006 -0.040 0.969
long-short 0.243 1.220 0.225 0.072 0.360 0.717
Environment
high-score 0.200 0.830 0.410 0.208 0.760 0.447
zero-score 0.137 1.400 0.165 0.026 0.300 0.766
low-score 0.094 0.630 0.533 0.122 0.780 0.437
long-short 0.129 0.410 0.683 0.034 0.100 0.923
Human Rights
high-score 0.570 0.730 0.469 -1.456 -2.000 0.048
zero-score 0.167 1.360 0.182 0.056 0.680 0.497
low-score 0.202 0.530 0.596 0.210 1.350 0.181
long-short 0.496 0.520 0.608 -1.599 -2.110 0.037
Product
high-score 0.152 0.720 0.473 0.149 0.680 0.500
zero-score 0.053 0.640 0.521 0.130 1.040 0.301
low-score 0.154 1.030 0.307 0.124 0.940 0.349
long-short -0.076 -0.300 0.768 -0.003 -0.010 0.992
Overall
high-score 0.174 1.750 0.083 0.002 0.020 0.987
zero-score -0.077 -0.460 0.648 0.190 1.480 0.142
low-score 0.070 0.620 0.538 0.203 1.460 0.146
long-short 0.029 0.170 0.864 -0.214 -0.960 0.340
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.1.23 Sub-period equally-weighted industry-neutral basis conditional 3-
factor model regressions for net KLD score  
The table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess return on the conditional Fama-French factors 
model for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Ln(ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of market equity for all firms in each portfolio. Ln(BE/ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of BE/ME for each portfolio. BE/ME is measured once each 
calendar year, and it is used to explain 12 monthly returns starting in July of the following year. Ln(ME) 
and Ln (BE/ME) are measured net of their average values (across portfolios) each month in order to control 
the market-wide variation. Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD 
CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations 
indicators; CGOV, the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net 
KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; 
and Overall, the sum of the net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score 0.883 4.000 0.007 0.174 1.270 0.207
low-score 1.456 1.490 0.187 0.329 1.270 0.208
long-short -0.573 -0.560 0.597 -0.155 -0.730 0.465
Community
high-score -0.060 -0.470 0.642 0.135 0.950 0.346
zero-score 0.058 0.530 0.595 0.188 1.450 0.150
low-score -0.397 -0.880 0.383 -0.138 -0.570 0.571
long-short 0.192 0.420 0.678 0.286 1.130 0.260
CGOV
high-score -0.172 -0.700 0.488 -0.027 -0.130 0.893
zero-score 0.019 0.170 0.862 0.083 0.590 0.557
low-score 0.016 0.090 0.928 0.326 2.130 0.036
long-short -0.183 -0.690 0.490 -0.343 -1.520 0.132
Diversity
high-score 0.054 0.500 0.620 0.195 1.670 0.099
zero-score -0.099 -0.920 0.361 0.232 1.590 0.114
low-score -0.099 -0.460 0.647 0.407 1.850 0.068
long-short 0.099 0.450 0.655 -0.243 -1.370 0.174
Employee Rel
high-score -0.006 -0.050 0.961 0.149 1.030 0.304
zero-score 0.030 0.280 0.778 0.284 1.900 0.060
low-score -0.315 -1.800 0.076 0.047 0.270 0.789
long-short 0.275 1.540 0.128 0.109 0.630 0.528
Environment
high-score -0.054 -0.320 0.752 0.323 1.350 0.180
zero-score 0.053 0.510 0.611 0.249 1.770 0.079
low-score -0.276 -1.540 0.128 0.253 1.180 0.242
long-short 0.071 0.360 0.722 0.021 0.080 0.934
Human Rights
high-score -0.130 -0.150 0.883 -1.531 -1.940 0.055
zero-score 0.018 0.100 0.921 0.213 1.560 0.121
low-score 0.143 0.220 0.830 0.443 2.200 0.030
long-short -0.120 -0.100 0.919 -1.896 -2.380 0.019
Product
high-score -0.037 -0.210 0.836 0.274 1.240 0.217
zero-score -0.028 -0.260 0.795 0.243 1.690 0.094
low-score -0.239 -1.330 0.187 0.221 1.350 0.180
long-short 0.102 0.500 0.619 -0.009 -0.030 0.973
Overall
high-score -0.071 -0.640 0.526 0.212 1.510 0.134
zero-score -0.013 -0.080 0.936 0.230 1.130 0.260
low-score -0.111 -0.810 0.422 0.276 1.570 0.119
long-short -0.061 -0.460 0.649 -0.098 -0.860 0.390
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.1.24 Sub-period value-weighted industry-neutral basis conditional 3-factor 
model regressions for net KLD score  
The table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess return on the conditional Fama-French factors 
model for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Ln(ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of market equity for all firms in each portfolio. Ln(BE/ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of BE/ME for each portfolio. BE/ME is measured once each 
calendar year, and it is used to explain 12 monthly returns starting in July of the following year. Ln(ME) 
and Ln (BE/ME) are measured net of their average values (across portfolios) each month in order to control 
the market-wide variation. Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the net KLD 
CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the net KLD CSR measure for community relations 
indicators; CGOV, the net KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the net KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the net 
KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the net KLD CSR measure for product indicators; 
and Overall, the sum of the net KLD CSR score measures, excluding human rights. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
 
383 
 
Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
zero-score 0.208 0.530 0.612 0.000 0.000 0.996
low-score 1.317 1.960 0.097 0.030 0.140 0.890
long-short -1.109 -1.140 0.296 -0.030 -0.120 0.901
Community
high-score 0.165 1.170 0.244 -0.127 -0.950 0.346
zero-score 0.151 2.310 0.023 0.032 0.400 0.689
low-score -0.752 -1.570 0.121 -0.212 -0.890 0.376
long-short 0.769 1.560 0.123 0.099 0.360 0.717
CGOV
high-score -0.010 -0.030 0.973 0.144 0.550 0.581
zero-score 0.048 0.480 0.630 0.012 0.110 0.912
low-score 0.287 2.160 0.034 -0.011 -0.130 0.894
long-short -0.297 -0.910 0.367 0.155 0.560 0.576
Diversity
high-score 0.210 2.110 0.038 -0.060 -0.680 0.499
zero-score 0.089 0.880 0.381 0.134 1.110 0.268
low-score -0.164 -0.790 0.432 0.335 1.710 0.091
long-short 0.310 1.260 0.212 -0.411 -1.880 0.062
Employee Rel
high-score 0.075 0.680 0.497 0.050 0.490 0.628
zero-score 0.244 2.270 0.026 0.120 1.170 0.244
low-score -0.127 -0.760 0.448 -0.080 -0.510 0.608
long-short 0.178 0.940 0.349 0.162 0.880 0.382
Environment
high-score -0.039 -0.190 0.848 0.182 0.710 0.476
zero-score 0.081 0.960 0.339 0.069 0.970 0.332
low-score 0.198 1.260 0.209 0.042 0.220 0.829
long-short -0.272 -0.990 0.323 0.123 0.350 0.724
Human Rights
high-score -0.163 -0.190 0.847 -1.795 -2.180 0.031
zero-score 0.136 1.080 0.287 0.036 0.490 0.628
low-score 0.503 0.820 0.419 0.032 0.180 0.861
long-short -0.419 -0.360 0.721 -1.753 -2.060 0.041
Product
high-score 0.068 0.420 0.676 -0.039 -0.190 0.853
zero-score 0.083 1.110 0.270 0.051 0.590 0.554
low-score 0.092 0.660 0.514 -0.271 -1.950 0.054
long-short -0.092 -0.470 0.641 0.152 0.600 0.549
Overall
high-score 0.095 1.120 0.265 -0.012 -0.120 0.909
zero-score -0.018 -0.120 0.904 0.242 1.440 0.152
low-score 0.212 1.850 0.068 0.068 0.570 0.568
long-short -0.215 -1.320 0.191 -0.097 -0.610 0.545
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.2.9 Sensitivity analysis equally-weighted Fama-French model regressions 
for normalised KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: 
Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity 
indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; 
Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the 
normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative 
criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures 
for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 
percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of 
normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-
scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.054 0.410 0.683 -0.002 -0.020 0.987
low-rated -0.105 -0.860 0.393 -0.105 -0.860 0.393
long-short 0.159 1.300 0.195 0.104 0.960 0.336
CGOV
high-rated 0.955 2.410 0.017 -0.296 -2.010 0.046
low-rated 0.081 0.640 0.525 0.027 0.230 0.820
long-short 0.875 2.240 0.026 -0.323 -2.370 0.019
Diversity
high-rated -0.058 -0.470 0.640 -0.010 -0.080 0.933
low-rated -0.105 -0.710 0.476 -0.102 -0.760 0.450
long-short 0.047 0.320 0.747 0.092 0.930 0.354
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.052 0.380 0.702 0.053 0.460 0.645
low-rated -0.138 -0.880 0.382 -0.070 -0.540 0.592
long-short 0.190 1.390 0.165 0.123 1.290 0.199
Environment
high-rated -0.047 -0.240 0.814 -0.035 -0.250 0.803
low-rated -0.200 -1.300 0.194 -0.064 -0.540 0.589
long-short 0.153 0.680 0.500 0.029 0.250 0.805
Human Rights
high-rated -0.634 -1.420 0.158 -0.634 -1.420 0.158
low-rated -0.026 -0.190 0.850 -0.026 -0.190 0.850
long-short -0.607 -1.390 0.165 -0.607 -1.390 0.165
Product
high-rated 0.187 0.640 0.525 0.080 0.590 0.559
low-rated 0.056 0.490 0.628 -0.093 -0.780 0.434
long-short 0.132 0.430 0.665 0.173 1.570 0.117
Combination1
high-rated -0.079 -0.670 0.504 -0.054 -0.500 0.614
low-rated -0.052 -0.350 0.728 -0.036 -0.270 0.785
long-short -0.027 -0.190 0.853 -0.018 -0.190 0.850
Combination2
high-rated 0.118 0.970 0.335 -0.012 -0.110 0.910
low-rated -0.166 -1.130 0.261 -0.078 -0.580 0.559
long-short 0.284 2.100 0.037 0.066 0.760 0.449
10 percentile 33.33 percentile
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Table A4.2.10 Sensitivity analysis value-weighted Fama-French model regressions 
for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: 
Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity 
indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; 
Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the 
normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative 
criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures 
for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 
percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of 
normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-
scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.038 0.320 0.751 -0.030 -0.330 0.744
low-rated 0.067 1.140 0.256 0.067 1.140 0.256
long-short -0.029 -0.190 0.849 -0.097 -0.750 0.454
CGOV
high-rated 0.835 2.030 0.043 -0.037 -0.210 0.836
low-rated 0.075 1.510 0.133 0.046 1.080 0.283
long-short 0.760 1.820 0.070 -0.083 -0.440 0.657
Diversity
high-rated -0.035 -0.340 0.736 0.028 0.410 0.685
low-rated -0.170 -1.390 0.165 -0.038 -0.390 0.698
long-short 0.135 0.740 0.461 0.066 0.480 0.629
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.301 1.710 0.089 0.155 1.230 0.219
low-rated -0.088 -0.860 0.391 0.026 0.420 0.678
long-short 0.389 1.860 0.064 0.129 0.810 0.421
Environment
high-rated -0.105 -0.330 0.741 0.114 0.790 0.430
low-rated 0.087 0.910 0.362 0.022 0.580 0.560
long-short -0.192 -0.530 0.599 0.093 0.620 0.538
Human Rights
high-rated -0.179 -0.390 0.694 -0.179 -0.390 0.694
low-rated 0.042 0.930 0.354 0.042 0.930 0.354
long-short -0.221 -0.480 0.629 -0.221 -0.480 0.629
Product
high-rated -0.049 -0.150 0.879 0.031 0.220 0.825
low-rated 0.076 0.950 0.341 0.046 1.140 0.257
long-short -0.126 -0.360 0.720 -0.015 -0.110 0.916
Combination1
high-rated 0.064 0.440 0.662 0.059 0.680 0.496
low-rated 0.119 1.070 0.284 0.118 1.650 0.101
long-short -0.055 -0.260 0.795 -0.058 -0.440 0.662
Combination2
high-rated 0.075 0.560 0.573 0.000 0.000 0.999
low-rated 0.076 0.700 0.487 0.082 1.090 0.276
long-short -0.001 -0.010 0.996 -0.082 -0.650 0.515
10 percentile 33.33 percentile
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Table A4.2.11 Sensitivity analysis equally-weighted industry-neutral basis Fama-
French model regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: 
Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity 
indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; 
Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the 
normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative 
criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures 
for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 
percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of 
normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-
scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.244 2.030 0.043 0.011 0.120 0.904
low-rated -0.041 -0.400 0.689 -0.059 -0.570 0.572
long-short 0.285 2.440 0.016 0.070 0.720 0.472
CGOV
high-rated 0.753 2.470 0.014 -0.182 -1.290 0.197
low-rated 0.042 0.400 0.693 0.006 0.060 0.950
long-short 0.711 2.320 0.022 -0.188 -1.450 0.147
Diversity
high-rated -0.025 -0.190 0.847 0.034 0.360 0.721
low-rated -0.019 -0.150 0.883 -0.028 -0.240 0.807
long-short -0.006 -0.040 0.966 0.063 0.700 0.487
Employee Rel
high-rated -0.010 -0.060 0.948 -0.027 -0.250 0.800
low-rated -0.211 -1.510 0.133 -0.026 -0.240 0.809
long-short 0.201 1.110 0.267 -0.001 -0.010 0.993
Environment
high-rated 0.097 0.530 0.595 -0.093 -0.580 0.563
low-rated -0.091 -0.850 0.395 -0.023 -0.230 0.816
long-short 0.188 1.010 0.315 -0.070 -0.510 0.613
Human Rights
high-rated -0.934 -1.680 0.095 -0.866 -1.590 0.114
low-rated -0.117 -0.640 0.524 -0.214 -1.310 0.194
long-short -0.816 -1.420 0.158 -0.652 -1.260 0.211
Product
high-rated 0.018 0.090 0.928 0.008 0.070 0.948
low-rated 0.040 0.330 0.745 -0.022 -0.210 0.834
long-short -0.021 -0.100 0.922 0.030 0.240 0.809
Combination1
high-rated -0.100 -0.870 0.387 -0.047 -0.530 0.598
low-rated -0.076 -0.570 0.570 0.026 0.230 0.821
long-short -0.024 -0.170 0.867 -0.073 -0.850 0.397
Combination2
high-rated -0.001 -0.010 0.995 -0.021 -0.230 0.816
low-rated -0.066 -0.460 0.645 0.010 0.090 0.930
long-short 0.066 0.470 0.642 -0.031 -0.370 0.709
10 percentile 33.33 percentile
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Table A4.2.12 Sensitivity analysis value-weighted industry-neutral basis Fama-
French model regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: 
Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity 
indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; 
Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the 
normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative 
criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures 
for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 
percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of 
normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-
scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.114 0.990 0.326 -0.092 -1.100 0.272
low-rated 0.016 0.260 0.798 0.004 0.070 0.942
long-short 0.098 0.700 0.483 -0.096 -0.840 0.404
CGOV
high-rated 0.759 2.430 0.016 -0.068 -0.470 0.640
low-rated 0.037 0.780 0.436 0.023 0.550 0.586
long-short 0.723 2.260 0.025 -0.091 -0.600 0.548
Diversity
high-rated 0.040 0.350 0.729 0.024 0.380 0.703
low-rated -0.179 -1.630 0.104 -0.030 -0.360 0.719
long-short 0.218 1.310 0.193 0.054 0.460 0.644
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.004 0.030 0.978 0.074 0.960 0.338
low-rated -0.198 -1.840 0.067 0.017 0.320 0.747
long-short 0.202 1.200 0.231 0.057 0.640 0.523
Environment
high-rated -0.065 -0.360 0.719 -0.075 -0.520 0.601
low-rated 0.022 0.340 0.738 0.026 0.650 0.518
long-short -0.087 -0.430 0.665 -0.101 -0.660 0.509
Human Rights
high-rated -0.718 -1.590 0.113 -0.650 -1.480 0.140
low-rated -0.223 -1.760 0.080 -0.331 -2.040 0.043
long-short -0.495 -1.070 0.288 -0.319 -0.790 0.433
Product
high-rated 0.016 0.080 0.933 -0.076 -0.620 0.533
low-rated 0.014 0.220 0.826 0.026 0.520 0.605
long-short 0.002 0.010 0.991 -0.102 -0.780 0.436
Combination1
high-rated 0.025 0.280 0.778 -0.030 -0.470 0.637
low-rated -0.051 -0.530 0.600 0.053 0.790 0.432
long-short 0.076 0.540 0.589 -0.082 -0.830 0.406
Combination2
high-rated 0.007 0.060 0.949 -0.037 -0.610 0.540
low-rated -0.162 -1.450 0.148 0.026 0.370 0.713
long-short 0.169 1.020 0.311 -0.063 -0.650 0.517
10 percentile 33.33 percentile
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Table A4.2.13 Sub-period equally-weighted Fama-French model regressions for 
normalised KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated -0.250 -2.150 0.034 0.117 0.620 0.538
low-rated -0.061 -0.360 0.719 0.395 1.720 0.088
long-short -0.189 -1.310 0.194 -0.278 -1.550 0.125
Community
high-rated 0.134 0.860 0.390 0.021 0.120 0.905
low-rated -0.251 -2.020 0.046 0.159 0.820 0.416
long-short 0.385 2.450 0.016 -0.138 -0.800 0.425
CGOV
high-rated -0.408 -1.930 0.057 -0.175 -0.870 0.384
low-rated -0.096 -0.870 0.388 0.277 1.400 0.165
long-short -0.313 -1.600 0.112 -0.452 -2.230 0.028
Diversity
high-rated 0.010 0.080 0.938 0.137 0.740 0.461
low-rated -0.350 -2.450 0.016 0.191 0.870 0.385
long-short 0.360 2.610 0.011 -0.053 -0.310 0.759
Employee Rel
high-rated -0.021 -0.120 0.905 0.243 1.410 0.160
low-rated -0.270 -2.240 0.027 0.187 0.880 0.383
long-short 0.250 1.850 0.067 0.055 0.370 0.715
Environment
high-rated -0.331 -1.900 0.061 0.345 1.650 0.101
low-rated -0.194 -1.680 0.096 0.132 0.690 0.492
long-short -0.137 -0.950 0.345 0.213 1.150 0.252
Human Rights
high-rated -0.145 -0.200 0.840 -0.694 -1.200 0.234
low-rated -0.309 -1.670 0.101 0.137 0.730 0.464
long-short 0.164 0.230 0.822 -0.831 -1.480 0.141
Product
high-rated 0.017 0.100 0.923 0.272 1.320 0.190
low-rated -0.250 -2.190 0.031 0.130 0.680 0.499
long-short 0.267 1.920 0.058 0.141 0.820 0.413
Combination1
high-rated -0.074 -0.650 0.517 0.039 0.230 0.819
low-rated -0.296 -2.070 0.041 0.244 1.140 0.255
long-short 0.222 1.730 0.087 -0.205 -1.270 0.208
Combination2
high-rated -0.101 -0.850 0.398 0.180 1.070 0.288
low-rated -0.281 -1.980 0.051 0.239 1.100 0.273
long-short 0.180 1.420 0.158 -0.059 -0.410 0.686
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.2.14 Sub-period value-weighted Fama-French model regressions for 
normalised KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated 0.043 0.590 0.554 -0.020 -0.250 0.801
low-rated 0.141 0.970 0.336 0.088 0.550 0.582
long-short -0.098 -0.500 0.617 -0.108 -0.520 0.603
Community
high-rated 0.143 0.940 0.350 -0.067 -0.500 0.621
low-rated 0.158 2.100 0.039 0.029 0.320 0.749
long-short -0.015 -0.080 0.938 -0.096 -0.500 0.616
CGOV
high-rated -0.235 -0.860 0.394 0.041 0.190 0.852
low-rated 0.148 2.370 0.020 -0.044 -0.650 0.519
long-short -0.382 -1.290 0.201 0.085 0.360 0.721
Diversity
high-rated 0.076 0.800 0.425 -0.041 -0.330 0.739
low-rated -0.127 -1.440 0.152 0.106 0.630 0.527
long-short 0.202 1.370 0.174 -0.147 -0.600 0.549
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.573 3.290 0.001 -0.029 -0.140 0.886
low-rated -0.088 -1.450 0.152 0.087 0.840 0.401
long-short 0.661 3.210 0.002 -0.116 -0.450 0.653
Environment
high-rated 0.111 0.560 0.575 0.141 0.650 0.519
low-rated 0.058 1.040 0.303 -0.030 -0.530 0.597
long-short 0.053 0.250 0.801 0.171 0.760 0.450
Human Rights
high-rated 0.482 0.650 0.519 -0.567 -0.970 0.335
low-rated 0.074 0.930 0.357 0.011 0.190 0.848
long-short 0.408 0.560 0.581 -0.578 -0.980 0.331
Product
high-rated 0.128 0.620 0.536 0.028 0.140 0.887
low-rated 0.057 1.240 0.219 0.013 0.210 0.837
long-short 0.071 0.320 0.751 0.015 0.070 0.943
Combination1
high-rated 0.039 0.310 0.757 -0.060 -0.400 0.688
low-rated -0.029 -0.280 0.781 0.225 1.800 0.075
long-short 0.068 0.370 0.713 -0.285 -1.240 0.219
Combination2
high-rated 0.054 0.470 0.641 0.067 0.480 0.632
low-rated 0.052 0.450 0.657 0.192 1.460 0.148
long-short 0.001 0.010 0.995 -0.125 -0.560 0.575
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.2.15 Sub-period equally-weighted industry-neutral basis Fama-French 
model regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated -0.097 -1.030 0.306 0.099 0.640 0.525
low-rated 0.109 0.680 0.498 0.455 1.580 0.117
long-short -0.205 -1.370 0.174 -0.356 -1.630 0.106
Community
high-rated -0.001 -0.010 0.992 0.109 0.770 0.446
low-rated -0.092 -0.920 0.360 0.109 0.650 0.514
long-short 0.091 0.610 0.544 0.000 0.000 0.999
CGOV
high-rated -0.277 -1.290 0.199 -0.029 -0.140 0.887
low-rated -0.048 -0.500 0.617 0.203 1.280 0.204
long-short -0.229 -1.140 0.255 -0.232 -1.080 0.282
Diversity
high-rated 0.092 0.790 0.432 0.144 0.850 0.396
low-rated -0.106 -0.910 0.365 0.190 1.000 0.322
long-short 0.198 1.410 0.161 -0.046 -0.290 0.776
Employee Rel
high-rated -0.095 -0.650 0.518 0.161 1.020 0.312
low-rated -0.124 -1.160 0.247 0.198 1.090 0.280
long-short 0.029 0.220 0.828 -0.036 -0.260 0.797
Environment
high-rated -0.314 -1.770 0.081 0.235 0.940 0.350
low-rated -0.065 -0.670 0.503 0.088 0.570 0.571
long-short -0.249 -1.620 0.108 0.146 0.660 0.512
Human Rights
high-rated -1.027 -1.200 0.236 -0.758 -1.070 0.288
low-rated -0.184 -0.570 0.571 -0.054 -0.260 0.795
long-short -0.843 -0.890 0.376 -0.704 -1.000 0.317
Product
high-rated -0.064 -0.390 0.694 0.188 0.930 0.353
low-rated -0.070 -0.770 0.444 0.069 0.410 0.680
long-short 0.006 0.040 0.966 0.118 0.570 0.570
Combination1
high-rated -0.028 -0.270 0.791 0.037 0.260 0.797
low-rated -0.127 -0.970 0.334 0.236 1.230 0.220
long-short 0.099 0.800 0.424 -0.199 -1.370 0.175
Combination2
high-rated -0.115 -0.980 0.330 0.098 0.650 0.519
low-rated -0.108 -0.780 0.440 0.232 1.220 0.226
long-short -0.007 -0.050 0.960 -0.133 -1.010 0.316
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.2.16 Sub-period value-weighted industry-neutral basis Fama-French 
model regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated 0.024 0.410 0.686 -0.051 -0.730 0.469
low-rated 0.228 1.610 0.112 0.038 0.180 0.859
long-short -0.204 -1.160 0.248 -0.089 -0.390 0.697
Community
high-rated -0.044 -0.290 0.770 -0.085 -0.680 0.496
low-rated 0.060 1.020 0.312 -0.026 -0.290 0.776
long-short -0.104 -0.570 0.573 -0.059 -0.330 0.740
CGOV
high-rated -0.049 -0.200 0.840 0.100 0.470 0.641
low-rated 0.104 1.810 0.073 -0.076 -1.210 0.228
long-short -0.154 -0.600 0.553 0.176 0.770 0.441
Diversity
high-rated 0.063 0.660 0.510 -0.065 -0.570 0.567
low-rated -0.012 -0.160 0.870 0.053 0.380 0.702
long-short 0.076 0.540 0.587 -0.118 -0.600 0.552
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.144 0.990 0.327 0.066 0.530 0.594
low-rated 0.047 0.750 0.453 0.003 0.030 0.974
long-short 0.097 0.610 0.545 0.063 0.420 0.675
Environment
high-rated -0.254 -1.380 0.171 -0.005 -0.020 0.980
low-rated 0.113 2.290 0.024 -0.065 -1.020 0.308
long-short -0.368 -1.880 0.063 0.060 0.250 0.801
Human Rights
high-rated -0.758 -0.930 0.358 -0.656 -1.200 0.233
low-rated -0.254 -0.860 0.394 -0.193 -1.200 0.232
long-short -0.504 -0.570 0.571 -0.463 -0.900 0.372
Product
high-rated -0.127 -0.800 0.424 -0.091 -0.470 0.640
low-rated 0.087 1.740 0.085 -0.038 -0.470 0.639
long-short -0.214 -1.320 0.189 -0.053 -0.250 0.800
Combination1
high-rated -0.005 -0.050 0.959 -0.082 -0.890 0.374
low-rated 0.108 1.040 0.301 0.035 0.350 0.728
long-short -0.113 -0.690 0.493 -0.117 -0.820 0.412
Combination2
high-rated 0.033 0.350 0.729 -0.077 -0.830 0.407
low-rated 0.060 0.570 0.570 0.021 0.190 0.852
long-short -0.027 -0.170 0.867 -0.098 -0.620 0.537
1991-1999 2000-2008
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
420 
 
Table A4.2.17 Sensitivity analysis equally-weighted Carhart model regressions for 
normalised KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: 
Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity 
indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; 
Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the 
normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative 
criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures 
for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 
percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of 
normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-
scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.202 1.690 0.093 0.131 1.280 0.200
low-rated 0.088 0.910 0.366 0.088 0.910 0.366
long-short 0.114 0.920 0.357 0.043 0.400 0.687
CGOV
high-rated 1.046 2.620 0.010 -0.160 -1.150 0.252
low-rated 0.284 3.120 0.002 0.224 2.490 0.014
long-short 0.762 1.930 0.055 -0.383 -2.810 0.005
Diversity
high-rated 0.111 1.060 0.291 0.167 1.720 0.086
low-rated 0.121 1.030 0.306 0.084 0.740 0.462
long-short -0.009 -0.060 0.950 0.083 0.820 0.414
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.205 1.640 0.102 0.250 2.900 0.004
low-rated 0.102 0.820 0.416 0.120 1.120 0.263
long-short 0.102 0.760 0.446 0.130 1.330 0.184
Environment
high-rated -0.017 -0.080 0.935 0.094 0.710 0.478
low-rated -0.074 -0.500 0.617 0.117 1.230 0.219
long-short 0.057 0.250 0.802 -0.023 -0.200 0.845
Human Rights
high-rated -0.485 -1.090 0.275 -0.485 -1.090 0.275
low-rated 0.124 1.120 0.263 0.124 1.120 0.263
long-short -0.609 -1.380 0.169 -0.609 -1.380 0.169
Product
high-rated 0.338 1.150 0.251 0.212 1.650 0.100
low-rated 0.209 2.140 0.034 0.090 0.950 0.345
long-short 0.128 0.410 0.679 0.122 1.110 0.267
Combination1
high-rated 0.077 0.770 0.445 0.093 1.020 0.308
low-rated 0.121 0.910 0.363 0.160 1.500 0.136
long-short -0.044 -0.300 0.764 -0.067 -0.700 0.484
Combination2
high-rated 0.271 2.520 0.012 0.126 1.420 0.157
low-rated 0.025 0.200 0.844 0.127 1.200 0.233
long-short 0.246 1.800 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.997
33.33 percentile10 percentile
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Table A4.2.18 Sensitivity analysis value-weighted Carhart model regressions for 
normalised KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: 
Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity 
indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; 
Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the 
normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative 
criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures 
for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 
percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of 
normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-
scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.086 0.720 0.475 0.041 0.470 0.640
low-rated 0.062 1.040 0.302 0.062 1.040 0.302
long-short 0.024 0.160 0.873 -0.021 -0.160 0.871
CGOV
high-rated 0.796 1.910 0.058 -0.058 -0.320 0.747
low-rated 0.084 1.650 0.100 0.057 1.310 0.190
long-short 0.712 1.680 0.094 -0.115 -0.610 0.543
Diversity
high-rated -0.017 -0.160 0.874 0.073 1.070 0.287
low-rated -0.095 -0.790 0.431 0.007 0.070 0.942
long-short 0.078 0.420 0.673 0.066 0.470 0.636
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.370 2.090 0.038 0.176 1.380 0.169
low-rated -0.020 -0.200 0.840 0.037 0.590 0.556
long-short 0.390 1.840 0.068 0.139 0.850 0.394
Environment
high-rated -0.096 -0.300 0.766 0.159 1.090 0.276
low-rated 0.058 0.600 0.549 0.040 1.070 0.284
long-short -0.154 -0.420 0.678 0.120 0.780 0.434
Human Rights
high-rated -0.096 -0.210 0.835 -0.096 -0.210 0.835
low-rated 0.056 1.260 0.210 0.056 1.260 0.210
long-short -0.152 -0.330 0.742 -0.152 -0.330 0.742
Product
high-rated 0.052 0.160 0.874 0.083 0.600 0.550
low-rated 0.099 1.230 0.220 0.064 1.590 0.113
long-short -0.048 -0.140 0.893 0.019 0.130 0.900
Combination1
high-rated 0.179 1.280 0.201 0.084 0.950 0.342
low-rated 0.088 0.790 0.431 0.145 2.020 0.045
long-short 0.091 0.440 0.662 -0.061 -0.450 0.653
Combination2
high-rated 0.163 1.250 0.213 0.043 0.550 0.583
low-rated 0.076 0.680 0.495 0.109 1.440 0.151
long-short 0.087 0.440 0.662 -0.066 -0.520 0.606
33.33 percentile10 percentile
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Table A4.2.19 Sensitivity analysis equally-weighted industry-neutral basis Carhart 
model regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: 
Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity 
indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; 
Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the 
normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative 
criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures 
for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 
percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of 
normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-
scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.392 3.690 0.000 0.126 1.580 0.115
low-rated 0.100 1.170 0.244 0.101 1.220 0.225
long-short 0.291 2.450 0.015 0.024 0.250 0.801
CGOV
high-rated 0.832 2.710 0.007 -0.062 -0.460 0.643
low-rated 0.197 2.430 0.016 0.154 1.970 0.050
long-short 0.635 2.050 0.042 -0.216 -1.650 0.101
Diversity
high-rated 0.110 0.910 0.366 0.175 2.210 0.028
low-rated 0.166 1.560 0.121 0.133 1.350 0.179
long-short -0.057 -0.380 0.707 0.042 0.460 0.646
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.095 0.650 0.519 0.135 1.620 0.106
low-rated -0.022 -0.190 0.851 0.124 1.390 0.165
long-short 0.117 0.650 0.516 0.011 0.130 0.899
Environment
high-rated 0.145 0.790 0.430 0.046 0.310 0.760
low-rated 0.048 0.520 0.605 0.123 1.560 0.120
long-short 0.097 0.520 0.602 -0.077 -0.550 0.585
Human Rights
high-rated -0.832 -1.490 0.139 -0.766 -1.400 0.165
low-rated 0.038 0.240 0.813 -0.098 -0.650 0.518
long-short -0.870 -1.500 0.137 -0.668 -1.270 0.205
Product
high-rated 0.111 0.550 0.582 0.102 0.820 0.416
low-rated 0.223 2.260 0.025 0.142 1.730 0.085
long-short -0.112 -0.510 0.609 -0.040 -0.320 0.748
Combination1
high-rated 0.034 0.330 0.742 0.071 0.930 0.355
low-rated 0.089 0.760 0.447 0.200 2.130 0.035
long-short -0.055 -0.380 0.701 -0.129 -1.510 0.132
Combination2
high-rated 0.154 1.420 0.157 0.098 1.290 0.199
low-rated 0.110 0.860 0.388 0.187 2.050 0.042
long-short 0.043 0.300 0.761 -0.089 -1.110 0.269
10 percentile 33.33 percentile
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Table A4.2.20 Sensitivity analysis value-weighted industry-neutral basis Carhart 
model regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: 
Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity 
indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; 
Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the 
normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative 
criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures 
for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 
percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of 
normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-
scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.224 2.060 0.041 -0.016 -0.200 0.841
low-rated 0.024 0.370 0.712 0.019 0.330 0.743
long-short 0.201 1.480 0.141 -0.035 -0.300 0.762
CGOV
high-rated 0.791 2.490 0.013 -0.067 -0.450 0.650
low-rated 0.060 1.300 0.195 0.046 1.110 0.267
long-short 0.730 2.250 0.025 -0.113 -0.740 0.461
Diversity
high-rated 0.083 0.730 0.468 0.064 1.030 0.306
low-rated -0.094 -0.890 0.375 0.013 0.160 0.870
long-short 0.177 1.050 0.295 0.051 0.430 0.669
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.077 0.560 0.577 0.130 1.750 0.082
low-rated -0.096 -0.950 0.341 0.036 0.690 0.493
long-short 0.173 1.020 0.310 0.094 1.060 0.292
Environment
high-rated -0.098 -0.540 0.590 -0.049 -0.340 0.736
low-rated 0.047 0.700 0.486 0.047 1.180 0.238
long-short -0.145 -0.710 0.476 -0.096 -0.620 0.536
Human Rights
high-rated -0.587 -1.310 0.193 -0.520 -1.190 0.236
low-rated -0.150 -1.240 0.216 -0.263 -1.660 0.099
long-short -0.438 -0.930 0.352 -0.257 -0.630 0.531
Product
high-rated 0.048 0.240 0.810 -0.042 -0.340 0.731
low-rated 0.066 1.070 0.286 0.060 1.220 0.223
long-short -0.018 -0.090 0.931 -0.102 -0.770 0.441
Combination1
high-rated 0.054 0.600 0.549 0.001 0.010 0.993
low-rated -0.004 -0.040 0.971 0.097 1.490 0.139
long-short 0.058 0.410 0.686 -0.097 -0.960 0.337
Combination2
high-rated 0.074 0.720 0.475 -0.001 -0.010 0.990
low-rated -0.081 -0.750 0.456 0.080 1.160 0.246
long-short 0.154 0.920 0.361 -0.081 -0.820 0.413
10 percentile 33.33 percentile
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Table A4.2.21 Sub-period equally-weighted Carhart model regressions for 
normalised KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated 0.036 0.410 0.684 0.113 0.750 0.455
low-rated 0.211 1.310 0.194 0.392 1.870 0.064
long-short -0.175 -1.130 0.260 -0.279 -1.550 0.123
Community
high-rated 0.400 2.770 0.007 0.018 0.120 0.906
low-rated 0.044 0.450 0.652 0.155 1.010 0.317
long-short 0.356 2.120 0.037 -0.137 -0.800 0.426
CGOV
high-rated 0.005 0.030 0.979 -0.178 -0.960 0.341
low-rated 0.176 2.100 0.038 0.272 1.890 0.061
long-short -0.171 -0.840 0.404 -0.450 -2.320 0.022
Diversity
high-rated 0.231 2.000 0.049 0.133 0.950 0.346
low-rated -0.042 -0.350 0.729 0.186 1.000 0.322
long-short 0.273 1.880 0.064 -0.054 -0.310 0.758
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.296 1.910 0.059 0.238 1.920 0.057
low-rated 0.002 0.020 0.982 0.183 1.040 0.300
long-short 0.294 2.050 0.043 0.055 0.370 0.715
Environment
high-rated 0.003 0.020 0.985 0.343 1.700 0.092
low-rated 0.078 0.860 0.391 0.128 0.850 0.399
long-short -0.075 -0.490 0.625 0.215 1.230 0.223
Human Rights
high-rated -0.092 -0.120 0.904 -0.698 -1.230 0.222
low-rated 0.006 0.050 0.963 0.133 0.900 0.371
long-short -0.097 -0.130 0.899 -0.831 -1.480 0.143
Product
high-rated 0.302 1.870 0.064 0.269 1.390 0.169
low-rated 0.029 0.330 0.742 0.126 0.830 0.410
long-short 0.273 1.840 0.069 0.143 0.860 0.391
Combination1
high-rated 0.156 1.560 0.122 0.035 0.250 0.802
low-rated 0.030 0.260 0.798 0.240 1.320 0.190
long-short 0.126 0.940 0.349 -0.205 -1.270 0.208
Combination2
high-rated 0.160 1.610 0.110 0.176 1.280 0.204
low-rated 0.056 0.500 0.615 0.234 1.320 0.189
long-short 0.104 0.780 0.439 -0.058 -0.400 0.687
1991-1999 2000-2008
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
430 
 
Table A4.2.22 Sub-period value-weighted Carhart model regressions for normalised 
KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated 0.081 1.060 0.290 -0.020 -0.260 0.795
low-rated 0.199 1.280 0.203 0.087 0.550 0.582
long-short -0.118 -0.560 0.575 -0.107 -0.520 0.605
Community
high-rated 0.268 1.700 0.092 -0.069 -0.560 0.578
low-rated 0.134 1.670 0.097 0.029 0.320 0.749
long-short 0.134 0.650 0.518 -0.098 -0.540 0.591
CGOV
high-rated -0.055 -0.190 0.850 0.042 0.190 0.848
low-rated 0.147 2.210 0.030 -0.044 -0.670 0.505
long-short -0.202 -0.650 0.520 0.086 0.370 0.713
Diversity
high-rated 0.164 1.680 0.096 -0.043 -0.360 0.720
low-rated -0.087 -0.940 0.350 0.105 0.630 0.528
long-short 0.251 1.600 0.114 -0.147 -0.600 0.549
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.581 3.120 0.002 -0.030 -0.150 0.883
low-rated -0.042 -0.660 0.512 0.087 0.840 0.404
long-short 0.624 2.830 0.006 -0.116 -0.450 0.652
Environment
high-rated 0.225 1.080 0.282 0.140 0.640 0.521
low-rated 0.083 1.410 0.161 -0.031 -0.560 0.576
long-short 0.142 0.630 0.529 0.170 0.750 0.452
Human Rights
high-rated 0.394 0.500 0.620 -0.571 -0.990 0.326
low-rated 0.099 1.190 0.241 0.010 0.190 0.851
long-short 0.295 0.380 0.707 -0.581 -0.990 0.324
Product
high-rated 0.271 1.250 0.213 0.027 0.140 0.891
low-rated 0.079 1.610 0.111 0.013 0.200 0.840
long-short 0.193 0.820 0.416 0.015 0.070 0.944
Combination1
high-rated 0.136 1.040 0.300 -0.061 -0.440 0.662
low-rated 0.059 0.540 0.589 0.225 1.790 0.076
long-short 0.077 0.390 0.696 -0.286 -1.260 0.210
Combination2
high-rated 0.162 1.360 0.176 0.065 0.500 0.619
low-rated 0.130 1.060 0.294 0.192 1.450 0.150
long-short 0.031 0.150 0.879 -0.126 -0.580 0.564
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.2.23 Sub-period equally-weighted industry-neutral basis Carhart model 
regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated 0.121 1.610 0.111 0.095 0.780 0.440
low-rated 0.287 1.780 0.079 0.451 1.720 0.088
long-short -0.167 -1.040 0.300 -0.355 -1.630 0.106
Community
high-rated 0.180 1.290 0.201 0.106 0.930 0.352
low-rated 0.125 1.480 0.141 0.105 0.800 0.426
long-short 0.055 0.350 0.728 0.001 0.000 0.996
CGOV
high-rated 0.043 0.210 0.834 -0.030 -0.150 0.879
low-rated 0.164 2.080 0.041 0.200 1.610 0.110
long-short -0.120 -0.570 0.571 -0.230 -1.110 0.270
Diversity
high-rated 0.251 2.190 0.031 0.140 1.050 0.298
low-rated 0.124 1.210 0.231 0.186 1.150 0.252
long-short 0.128 0.860 0.393 -0.046 -0.280 0.777
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.118 0.830 0.408 0.158 1.260 0.212
low-rated 0.099 1.090 0.279 0.194 1.260 0.212
long-short 0.019 0.130 0.894 -0.036 -0.260 0.798
Environment
high-rated -0.053 -0.310 0.761 0.232 0.970 0.334
low-rated 0.123 1.450 0.150 0.085 0.680 0.496
long-short -0.176 -1.080 0.282 0.147 0.660 0.511
Human Rights
high-rated -0.876 -0.970 0.340 -0.761 -1.070 0.285
low-rated 0.170 0.570 0.569 -0.058 -0.310 0.759
long-short -1.046 -1.050 0.301 -0.703 -1.000 0.319
Product
high-rated 0.147 0.910 0.363 0.186 0.950 0.346
low-rated 0.115 1.450 0.150 0.065 0.510 0.614
long-short 0.031 0.200 0.843 0.121 0.600 0.547
Combination1
high-rated 0.174 1.860 0.066 0.034 0.290 0.769
low-rated 0.137 1.200 0.233 0.232 1.480 0.143
long-short 0.036 0.280 0.781 -0.198 -1.370 0.173
Combination2
high-rated 0.136 1.380 0.172 0.095 0.760 0.447
low-rated 0.184 1.550 0.126 0.227 1.480 0.141
long-short -0.048 -0.330 0.746 -0.132 -1.010 0.313
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.2.24 Sub-period value-weighted industry-neutral basis Carhart model 
regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns per month on the factor model for each 
portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Portfolios formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated 0.054 0.850 0.397 -0.052 -0.770 0.442
low-rated 0.295 1.950 0.054 0.035 0.180 0.861
long-short -0.241 -1.290 0.202 -0.087 -0.390 0.697
Community
high-rated 0.104 0.680 0.498 -0.087 -0.790 0.430
low-rated 0.066 1.040 0.303 -0.027 -0.290 0.771
long-short 0.039 0.200 0.841 -0.061 -0.350 0.724
CGOV
high-rated 0.138 0.540 0.591 0.101 0.470 0.639
low-rated 0.103 1.670 0.098 -0.077 -1.320 0.190
long-short 0.034 0.130 0.899 0.178 0.790 0.431
Diversity
high-rated 0.144 1.440 0.153 -0.067 -0.640 0.522
low-rated 0.005 0.070 0.947 0.052 0.380 0.703
long-short 0.138 0.940 0.350 -0.119 -0.600 0.549
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.225 1.460 0.149 0.065 0.550 0.583
low-rated 0.055 0.820 0.414 0.003 0.030 0.976
long-short 0.170 1.010 0.318 0.062 0.420 0.675
Environment
high-rated -0.123 -0.640 0.525 -0.006 -0.030 0.978
low-rated 0.109 2.050 0.043 -0.066 -1.080 0.280
long-short -0.232 -1.130 0.261 0.060 0.250 0.802
Human Rights
high-rated -0.653 -0.750 0.456 -0.661 -1.230 0.220
low-rated 0.050 0.180 0.856 -0.194 -1.240 0.219
long-short -0.703 -0.750 0.456 -0.467 -0.910 0.364
Product
high-rated -0.026 -0.160 0.876 -0.092 -0.470 0.637
low-rated 0.087 1.640 0.105 -0.039 -0.530 0.598
long-short -0.113 -0.670 0.507 -0.053 -0.250 0.802
Combination1
high-rated 0.088 0.820 0.412 -0.083 -0.960 0.341
low-rated 0.104 0.940 0.349 0.034 0.350 0.726
long-short -0.016 -0.100 0.924 -0.117 -0.820 0.414
Combination2
high-rated 0.141 1.470 0.146 -0.078 -0.880 0.383
low-rated 0.061 0.540 0.589 0.020 0.180 0.855
long-short 0.080 0.480 0.630 -0.098 -0.620 0.539
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.2.25 Sensitivity analysis equally-weighted Ferson and Schadt (1996) model 
regressions for normalised KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns on the conditional CAPM factors, Rm-Rf 
is from Ken French’s website. The conditional variables are the one month lagged de-meaned values of 
TBR, the 3-month Treasury Bill rate; DY is the dividend yield on the S&P 500 index; Moody is the yield 
on Moody’s BAA minus the yield on Moody’s AAA corporate bonds; TERM is the 10-year Treasury Bond 
yield minus the 3 month Treasury Bill Rate, and JDUM is a dummy variable equal to unity for the month of 
January. Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Community, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance 
indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the 
normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights 
indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of 
the normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and 
Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary 
criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-
scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are 
the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.327 1.870 0.063 0.284 1.830 0.069
low-rated 0.177 1.200 0.232 0.177 1.200 0.232
long-short 0.150 1.040 0.299 0.107 0.900 0.371
CGOV
high-rated 0.943 2.270 0.025 0.065 0.350 0.725
low-rated 0.281 2.000 0.047 0.243 1.780 0.076
long-short 0.663 1.610 0.109 -0.178 -1.210 0.226
Diversity
high-rated 0.066 0.480 0.630 0.192 1.450 0.149
low-rated 0.177 1.000 0.319 0.212 1.290 0.199
long-short -0.110 -0.640 0.524 -0.020 -0.180 0.858
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.180 1.180 0.240 0.281 2.070 0.039
low-rated 0.147 0.830 0.407 0.215 1.390 0.165
long-short 0.032 0.230 0.817 0.066 0.680 0.500
Environment
high-rated 0.213 1.000 0.320 0.258 1.590 0.113
low-rated 0.150 0.790 0.429 0.210 1.450 0.149
long-short 0.062 0.260 0.799 0.048 0.390 0.694
Human Rights
high-rated -0.015 -0.030 0.977 -0.015 -0.030 0.977
low-rated 0.213 1.190 0.237 0.213 1.190 0.237
long-short -0.228 -0.480 0.635 -0.228 -0.480 0.635
Product
high-rated 0.020 0.060 0.949 0.274 1.780 0.076
low-rated 0.280 1.790 0.075 0.195 1.330 0.184
long-short -0.260 -0.750 0.454 0.079 0.640 0.524
Combination1
high-rated 0.132 0.940 0.347 0.226 1.710 0.089
low-rated 0.211 1.130 0.262 0.229 1.440 0.151
long-short -0.079 -0.500 0.615 -0.003 -0.030 0.979
Combination2
high-rated 0.267 1.950 0.052 0.238 1.810 0.072
low-rated 0.087 0.490 0.628 0.191 1.220 0.223
long-short 0.180 1.220 0.225 0.047 0.530 0.598
10 percentile 33.33 percentile
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Table A4.2.26 Sensitivity analysis value-weighted Ferson and Schadt (1996) model 
regressions for normalised KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns on the conditional CAPM factors, Rm-Rf 
is from Ken French’s website. The conditional variables are the one month lagged de-meaned values of 
TBR, the 3-month Treasury Bill rate; DY is the dividend yield on the S&P 500 index; Moody is the yield 
on Moody’s BAA minus the yield on Moody’s AAA corporate bonds; TERM is the 10-year Treasury Bond 
yield minus the 3 month Treasury Bill Rate, and JDUM is a dummy variable equal to unity for the month of 
January. Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Community, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance 
indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the 
normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights 
indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of 
the normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and 
Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary 
criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-
scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are 
the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.053 0.360 0.720 -0.035 -0.300 0.766
low-rated 0.053 0.780 0.435 0.053 0.780 0.435
long-short 0.000 0.000 1.000 -0.088 -0.640 0.524
CGOV
high-rated 0.708 1.640 0.103 0.022 0.120 0.904
low-rated 0.014 0.190 0.852 0.004 0.060 0.955
long-short 0.693 1.570 0.117 0.019 0.100 0.924
Diversity
high-rated -0.088 -0.670 0.502 -0.065 -0.680 0.499
low-rated -0.048 -0.370 0.710 0.057 0.510 0.607
long-short -0.040 -0.200 0.844 -0.122 -0.800 0.427
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.086 0.450 0.654 0.028 0.200 0.841
low-rated -0.068 -0.510 0.612 0.040 0.460 0.645
long-short 0.154 0.630 0.530 -0.012 -0.070 0.948
Environment
high-rated -0.376 -1.090 0.276 -0.006 -0.040 0.968
low-rated 0.096 0.720 0.470 0.025 0.380 0.705
long-short -0.472 -1.160 0.245 -0.031 -0.190 0.851
Human Rights
high-rated 0.588 1.160 0.249 0.588 1.160 0.249
low-rated -0.002 -0.020 0.981 -0.002 -0.020 0.981
long-short 0.590 1.230 0.222 0.590 1.230 0.222
Product
high-rated -0.529 -1.500 0.135 -0.122 -0.820 0.411
low-rated 0.083 0.650 0.518 0.051 0.710 0.479
long-short -0.612 -1.520 0.131 -0.173 -1.000 0.319
Combination1
high-rated -0.091 -0.580 0.566 -0.034 -0.340 0.732
low-rated 0.136 0.900 0.368 0.126 1.180 0.241
long-short -0.226 -0.950 0.344 -0.160 -1.050 0.297
Combination2
high-rated -0.039 -0.270 0.786 -0.053 -0.610 0.541
low-rated 0.031 0.210 0.835 0.057 0.540 0.593
long-short -0.069 -0.310 0.759 -0.109 -0.780 0.437
10 percentile 33.33 percentile
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Table A4.2.27 Sensitivity analysis equally-weighted industry-neutral basis Ferson 
and Schadt (1996) model regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns on the conditional CAPM factors, Rm-Rf 
is from Ken French’s website. The conditional variables are the one month lagged de-meaned values of 
TBR, the 3-month Treasury Bill rate; DY is the dividend yield on the S&P 500 index; Moody is the yield 
on Moody’s BAA minus the yield on Moody’s AAA corporate bonds; TERM is the 10-year Treasury Bond 
yield minus the 3 month Treasury Bill Rate, and JDUM is a dummy variable equal to unity for the month of 
January. Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Community, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance 
indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the 
normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights 
indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of 
the normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and 
Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary 
criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-
scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are 
the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.339 2.430 0.016 0.132 1.190 0.234
low-rated 0.145 1.180 0.241 0.166 1.340 0.182
long-short 0.195 1.410 0.159 -0.034 -0.310 0.753
CGOV
high-rated 0.870 2.640 0.009 0.134 0.770 0.443
low-rated 0.210 1.800 0.073 0.198 1.720 0.086
long-short 0.660 2.020 0.045 -0.064 -0.460 0.646
Diversity
high-rated 0.030 0.200 0.844 0.189 1.740 0.084
low-rated 0.204 1.320 0.187 0.228 1.650 0.100
long-short -0.175 -0.990 0.325 -0.039 -0.380 0.703
Employee Rel
high-rated -0.016 -0.100 0.923 0.157 1.320 0.189
low-rated -0.011 -0.070 0.943 0.213 1.660 0.098
long-short -0.004 -0.020 0.982 -0.056 -0.610 0.540
Environment
high-rated 0.253 1.310 0.192 0.108 0.610 0.540
low-rated 0.090 0.740 0.462 0.191 1.640 0.103
long-short 0.163 0.830 0.410 -0.083 -0.570 0.568
Human Rights
high-rated -0.464 -0.730 0.468 -0.371 -0.590 0.556
low-rated 0.145 0.630 0.530 0.121 0.550 0.582
long-short -0.609 -0.970 0.334 -0.491 -0.860 0.390
Product
high-rated 0.075 0.360 0.721 0.185 1.280 0.202
low-rated 0.215 1.500 0.135 0.173 1.410 0.159
long-short -0.140 -0.590 0.554 0.012 0.090 0.928
Combination1
high-rated 0.060 0.460 0.648 0.174 1.610 0.110
low-rated 0.107 0.710 0.476 0.225 1.670 0.096
long-short -0.047 -0.330 0.743 -0.051 -0.570 0.571
Combination2
high-rated 0.129 0.930 0.356 0.161 1.500 0.135
low-rated 0.086 0.550 0.586 0.196 1.470 0.142
long-short 0.043 0.300 0.763 -0.035 -0.410 0.679
10 percentile 33.33 percentile
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Table A4.2.28 Sensitivity analysis value-weighted industry-neutral basis Ferson and 
Schadt (1996) model regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns on the conditional CAPM factors, Rm-Rf 
is from Ken French’s website. The conditional variables are the one month lagged de-meaned values of 
TBR, the 3-month Treasury Bill rate; DY is the dividend yield on the S&P 500 index; Moody is the yield 
on Moody’s BAA minus the yield on Moody’s AAA corporate bonds; TERM is the 10-year Treasury Bond 
yield minus the 3 month Treasury Bill Rate, and JDUM is a dummy variable equal to unity for the month of 
January. Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Community, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance 
indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the 
normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights 
indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of 
the normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and 
Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary 
criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-
scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are 
the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at 
KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.148 1.080 0.283 -0.058 -0.580 0.562
low-rated -0.006 -0.080 0.935 -0.001 -0.010 0.990
long-short 0.154 1.070 0.285 -0.057 -0.490 0.624
CGOV
high-rated 0.656 2.000 0.047 0.008 0.050 0.959
low-rated 0.011 0.150 0.877 0.013 0.190 0.846
long-short 0.645 1.880 0.061 -0.005 -0.030 0.978
Diversity
high-rated 0.051 0.350 0.723 -0.015 -0.170 0.865
low-rated -0.085 -0.730 0.465 0.047 0.530 0.600
long-short 0.136 0.730 0.466 -0.063 -0.490 0.626
Employee Rel
high-rated -0.035 -0.240 0.814 0.078 0.800 0.427
low-rated -0.175 -1.380 0.170 0.050 0.700 0.485
long-short 0.140 0.780 0.434 0.028 0.290 0.770
Environment
high-rated 0.000 0.000 0.998 0.003 0.020 0.986
low-rated 0.010 0.110 0.912 0.019 0.290 0.768
long-short -0.009 -0.040 0.966 -0.016 -0.100 0.921
Human Rights
high-rated -0.114 -0.230 0.820 -0.017 -0.030 0.972
low-rated -0.138 -0.830 0.410 -0.184 -0.960 0.338
long-short 0.024 0.050 0.960 0.167 0.410 0.682
Product
high-rated -0.087 -0.430 0.670 -0.104 -0.820 0.414
low-rated 0.058 0.600 0.546 0.023 0.310 0.755
long-short -0.145 -0.640 0.523 -0.128 -0.910 0.364
Combination1
high-rated 0.055 0.540 0.591 -0.023 -0.300 0.768
low-rated -0.055 -0.440 0.657 0.055 0.660 0.511
long-short 0.110 0.750 0.456 -0.079 -0.780 0.437
Combination2
high-rated 0.020 0.170 0.863 -0.031 -0.390 0.695
low-rated -0.208 -1.600 0.112 0.017 0.190 0.853
long-short 0.229 1.360 0.174 -0.047 -0.490 0.626
10 percentile 33.33 percentile
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Table A4.2.29 Sub-period equally-weighted Ferson and Schadt (1996) model 
regressions for normalised KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns on the conditional CAPM factors for two 
sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Rm-Rf is from Ken French’s 
website. The conditional variables are the one month lagged de-meaned values of TBR, the 3-month 
Treasury Bill rate; DY is the dividend yield on the S&P 500 index; Moody is the yield on Moody’s BAA 
minus the yield on Moody’s AAA corporate bonds; TERM is the 10-year Treasury Bond yield minus the 3 
month Treasury Bill Rate, and JDUM is a dummy variable equal to unity for the month of January. 
Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; 
CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, 
the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for 
qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score 
measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 
25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of 
normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-
scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated -0.097 -0.660 0.511 0.391 1.680 0.095
low-rated 0.070 0.350 0.727 0.528 1.960 0.053
long-short -0.168 -1.110 0.269 -0.137 -0.730 0.468
Community
high-score 0.314 1.650 0.103 0.366 1.480 0.143
low-score -0.130 -0.810 0.422 0.411 1.740 0.084
long-short 0.444 2.270 0.026 -0.046 -0.240 0.809
CGOV
high-score -0.282 -1.180 0.241 0.325 1.170 0.244
low-score -0.016 -0.130 0.901 0.416 1.910 0.059
long-short -0.266 -1.290 0.200 -0.092 -0.400 0.687
Diversity
high-score 0.104 0.730 0.468 0.235 1.130 0.260
low-score -0.175 -0.960 0.341 0.477 1.800 0.075
long-short 0.279 1.780 0.079 -0.243 -1.250 0.214
Employee Rel
high-score 0.096 0.490 0.627 0.382 1.890 0.061
low-score -0.092 -0.600 0.553 0.430 1.710 0.091
long-short 0.188 1.290 0.200 -0.047 -0.320 0.751
Environment
high-score -0.101 -0.490 0.626 0.593 2.440 0.016
low-score -0.054 -0.370 0.713 0.394 1.670 0.097
long-short -0.047 -0.320 0.753 0.198 1.060 0.290
Human Rights
high-score -0.089 -0.110 0.909 0.089 0.130 0.896
low-score -0.292 -1.210 0.233 0.396 1.720 0.088
long-short 0.204 0.260 0.796 -0.308 -0.500 0.616
Product
high-score 0.029 0.150 0.883 0.445 1.890 0.061
low-score -0.076 -0.510 0.611 0.392 1.660 0.100
long-short 0.105 0.660 0.513 0.053 0.280 0.776
Combination1
high-rated 0.076 0.540 0.589 0.309 1.430 0.154
low-rated -0.162 -0.940 0.349 0.462 1.730 0.086
long-short 0.238 1.780 0.079 -0.153 -0.880 0.381
Combination2
high-rated 0.011 0.070 0.942 0.427 2.010 0.047
low-rated -0.168 -0.980 0.331 0.435 1.700 0.092
long-short 0.179 1.330 0.186 -0.008 -0.050 0.958
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.2.30 Sub-period value-weighted Ferson and Schadt (1996) model 
regressions for normalised KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns on the conditional CAPM factors for two 
sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Rm-Rf is from Ken French’s 
website. The conditional variables are the one month lagged de-meaned values of TBR, the 3-month 
Treasury Bill rate; DY is the dividend yield on the S&P 500 index; Moody is the yield on Moody’s BAA 
minus the yield on Moody’s AAA corporate bonds; TERM is the 10-year Treasury Bond yield minus the 3 
month Treasury Bill Rate, and JDUM is a dummy variable equal to unity for the month of January. 
Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; 
CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, 
the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for 
qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score 
measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 
25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of 
normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-
scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated 0.035 0.300 0.768 -0.061 -0.560 0.579
low-rated 0.214 1.330 0.187 0.049 0.280 0.776
long-short -0.179 -0.810 0.422 -0.110 -0.520 0.604
Community
high-score 0.202 1.040 0.301 -0.148 -0.880 0.381
low-score 0.108 1.220 0.226 0.005 0.050 0.962
long-short 0.094 0.440 0.659 -0.153 -0.790 0.434
CGOV
high-score -0.305 -1.090 0.280 0.150 0.610 0.541
low-score 0.128 1.270 0.207 -0.110 -1.120 0.264
long-short -0.433 -1.380 0.170 0.261 1.030 0.303
Diversity
high-score 0.095 0.690 0.493 -0.233 -1.500 0.137
low-score -0.031 -0.320 0.752 0.128 0.670 0.502
long-short 0.125 0.760 0.447 -0.360 -1.330 0.187
Employee Rel
high-score 0.379 1.870 0.065 -0.174 -0.810 0.421
low-score 0.037 0.350 0.724 0.005 0.030 0.973
long-short 0.342 1.460 0.149 -0.178 -0.620 0.536
Environment
high-score 0.051 0.230 0.816 -0.041 -0.180 0.861
low-score 0.094 0.970 0.337 -0.063 -0.670 0.502
long-short -0.043 -0.190 0.851 0.023 0.090 0.926
Human Rights
high-score 0.587 0.690 0.492 0.389 0.620 0.538
low-score 0.101 0.730 0.469 -0.046 -0.520 0.604
long-short 0.486 0.600 0.555 0.434 0.730 0.468
Product
high-score -0.119 -0.530 0.595 -0.143 -0.680 0.496
low-score 0.126 1.250 0.213 -0.029 -0.280 0.780
long-short -0.245 -0.940 0.352 -0.113 -0.470 0.639
Combination1
high-rated 0.007 0.050 0.962 -0.248 -1.590 0.115
low-rated 0.047 0.330 0.742 0.126 0.670 0.503
long-short -0.040 -0.200 0.842 -0.374 -1.410 0.160
Combination2
high-rated 0.033 0.250 0.803 -0.095 -0.650 0.514
low-rated 0.095 0.570 0.570 0.051 0.280 0.778
long-short -0.063 -0.300 0.766 -0.145 -0.580 0.565
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.2.31 Sub-period equally-weighted industry-neutral basis Ferson and 
Schadt (1996) model regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns on the conditional CAPM factors for two 
sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Rm-Rf is from Ken French’s 
website. The conditional variables are the one month lagged de-meaned values of TBR, the 3-month 
Treasury Bill rate; DY is the dividend yield on the S&P 500 index; Moody is the yield on Moody’s BAA 
minus the yield on Moody’s AAA corporate bonds; TERM is the 10-year Treasury Bond yield minus the 3 
month Treasury Bill Rate, and JDUM is a dummy variable equal to unity for the month of January. 
Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; 
CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, 
the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for 
qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score 
measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 
25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of 
normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-
scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated -0.027 -0.230 0.821 0.349 1.840 0.069
low-rated 0.167 0.890 0.377 0.446 1.420 0.159
long-short -0.194 -1.230 0.221 -0.097 -0.430 0.670
Community
high-score 0.099 0.620 0.538 0.193 1.150 0.252
low-score -0.049 -0.380 0.708 0.351 1.750 0.083
long-short 0.148 0.810 0.421 -0.158 -0.970 0.335
CGOV
high-score -0.179 -0.720 0.476 0.410 1.500 0.136
low-score -0.013 -0.110 0.912 0.368 2.010 0.046
long-short -0.166 -0.780 0.440 0.042 0.180 0.859
Diversity
high-score 0.143 1.070 0.287 0.188 1.050 0.298
low-score -0.016 -0.110 0.915 0.455 2.010 0.047
long-short 0.159 1.010 0.316 -0.267 -1.470 0.144
Employee Rel
high-score 0.020 0.120 0.903 0.272 1.530 0.129
low-score -0.033 -0.240 0.807 0.393 1.840 0.068
long-short 0.053 0.370 0.715 -0.121 -0.810 0.420
Environment
high-score -0.195 -1.010 0.316 0.315 1.120 0.266
low-score -0.003 -0.030 0.980 0.321 1.690 0.094
long-short -0.192 -1.200 0.232 -0.006 -0.020 0.981
Human Rights
high-score -1.041 -1.170 0.250 -0.027 -0.030 0.974
low-score -0.037 -0.100 0.920 0.357 1.250 0.213
long-short -1.004 -1.040 0.303 -0.383 -0.500 0.617
Product
high-score -0.056 -0.320 0.753 0.322 1.420 0.160
low-score -0.003 -0.030 0.978 0.255 1.300 0.196
long-short -0.053 -0.330 0.739 0.067 0.310 0.759
Combination1
high-rated 0.047 0.400 0.688 0.219 1.250 0.213
low-rated -0.050 -0.330 0.741 0.370 1.690 0.095
long-short 0.097 0.740 0.460 -0.151 -1.020 0.312
Combination2
high-rated -0.053 -0.400 0.690 0.255 1.380 0.170
low-rated -0.056 -0.350 0.727 0.359 1.690 0.095
long-short 0.003 0.020 0.983 -0.104 -0.780 0.435
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.2.32 Sub-period value-weighted industry-neutral basis Ferson and Schadt  
(1996) model regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess returns on the conditional CAPM factors for two 
sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Rm-Rf is from Ken French’s 
website. The conditional variables are the one month lagged de-meaned values of TBR, the 3-month 
Treasury Bill rate; DY is the dividend yield on the S&P 500 index; Moody is the yield on Moody’s BAA 
minus the yield on Moody’s AAA corporate bonds; TERM is the 10-year Treasury Bond yield minus the 3 
month Treasury Bill Rate, and JDUM is a dummy variable equal to unity for the month of January. 
Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for community relations indicators; 
CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD CSR measure for employee relations 
indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for environmental indicators; Human Rights, 
the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; Product, the normalised KLD CSR 
measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for 
qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score 
measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 
25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of 
normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-
scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated 0.052 0.550 0.583 -0.075 -0.740 0.463
low-rated 0.309 1.980 0.051 -0.051 -0.220 0.827
long-short -0.256 -1.290 0.199 -0.024 -0.100 0.918
Community
high-score 0.050 0.280 0.783 -0.133 -0.950 0.343
low-score 0.062 0.770 0.440 -0.052 -0.470 0.638
long-short -0.011 -0.060 0.953 -0.080 -0.470 0.636
CGOV
high-score 0.026 0.100 0.920 0.108 0.480 0.633
low-score 0.104 1.160 0.251 -0.136 -1.380 0.171
long-short -0.077 -0.260 0.795 0.244 1.030 0.305
Diversity
high-score 0.138 0.960 0.341 -0.161 -1.170 0.243
low-score 0.035 0.420 0.673 0.092 0.600 0.550
long-short 0.103 0.630 0.533 -0.253 -1.200 0.232
Employee Rel
high-score 0.141 0.860 0.391 -0.019 -0.120 0.901
low-score 0.082 0.950 0.343 -0.060 -0.490 0.628
long-short 0.060 0.360 0.723 0.041 0.260 0.793
Environment
high-score -0.149 -0.700 0.483 0.094 0.370 0.712
low-score 0.122 1.430 0.156 -0.109 -1.080 0.282
long-short -0.271 -1.340 0.185 0.203 0.800 0.426
Human Rights
high-score -0.773 -0.890 0.380 0.233 0.390 0.698
low-score 0.007 0.020 0.986 -0.066 -0.330 0.739
long-short -0.779 -0.870 0.392 0.299 0.590 0.559
Product
high-score -0.185 -1.120 0.267 -0.163 -0.800 0.427
low-score 0.134 1.480 0.141 -0.099 -0.870 0.386
long-short -0.319 -1.860 0.067 -0.064 -0.280 0.778
Combination1
high-rated 0.006 0.040 0.965 -0.112 -0.970 0.336
low-rated 0.105 0.850 0.398 -0.046 -0.350 0.728
long-short -0.099 -0.560 0.574 -0.066 -0.460 0.643
Combination2
high-rated 0.078 0.590 0.556 -0.121 -1.020 0.310
low-rated 0.043 0.320 0.746 -0.087 -0.630 0.527
long-short 0.034 0.210 0.837 -0.035 -0.230 0.821
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.2.33 Sensitivity analysis equally-weighted conditional 3-factor model 
regressions for normalised KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess return on the conditional Fama-French factors 
model for each portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values. Ln(ME) is the value-weight average of the 
natural log of market equity for all firms in each portfolio. Ln(BE/ME) is the value-weight average of the 
natural log of BE/ME for each portfolio. BE/ME is measured once each calendar year, and it is used to 
explain 12 monthly returns starting in July of the following year. Ln(ME) and Ln(BE/ME) are measured 
net of their average values (across portfolios) each month in order to control the market-wide variation. 
Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.085 0.650 0.519 0.112 1.060 0.292
low-rated -0.002 -0.020 0.983 0.019 0.190 0.851
long-short 0.088 0.790 0.432 0.092 1.020 0.311
CGOV
high-rated 0.974 2.520 0.012 -0.213 -1.530 0.128
low-rated 0.130 1.090 0.275 0.102 0.950 0.343
long-short 0.844 2.220 0.027 -0.315 -2.460 0.015
Diversity
high-rated 0.052 0.410 0.679 0.040 0.350 0.724
low-rated 0.069 0.530 0.594 -0.030 -0.260 0.797
long-short -0.017 -0.110 0.909 0.070 0.680 0.496
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.059 0.400 0.691 0.123 1.020 0.309
low-rated -0.130 -0.890 0.377 -0.031 -0.250 0.803
long-short 0.189 1.300 0.195 0.154 1.620 0.108
Environment
high-rated 0.079 0.340 0.733 0.061 0.460 0.646
low-rated -0.133 -0.900 0.368 0.020 0.180 0.861
long-short 0.212 0.840 0.401 0.041 0.340 0.735
Human Rights
high-rated -1.506 -2.850 0.005 -1.506 -2.850 0.005
low-rated 0.089 0.650 0.519 0.089 0.650 0.519
long-short -1.595 -3.230 0.001 -1.595 -3.230 0.001
Product
high-rated 0.277 0.930 0.353 0.101 0.700 0.486
low-rated 0.155 1.380 0.169 -0.042 -0.340 0.731
long-short 0.121 0.390 0.698 0.143 1.150 0.250
Combination1
high-rated -0.030 -0.240 0.814 -0.021 -0.180 0.857
low-rated -0.012 -0.080 0.936 0.012 0.090 0.927
long-short -0.018 -0.120 0.905 -0.033 -0.370 0.715
Combination2
high-rated 0.078 0.580 0.565 0.078 0.580 0.565
low-rated -0.080 -0.510 0.611 -0.080 -0.510 0.611
long-short 0.159 1.050 0.297 0.159 1.050 0.297
10 percentile 33.33 percentile
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Table A4.2.34 Sensitivity analysis value-weighted conditional 3-factor model 
regressions for normalised KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess return on the conditional Fama-French factors 
model for each portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values. Ln(ME) is the value-weight average of the 
natural log of market equity for all firms in each portfolio. Ln(BE/ME) is the value-weight average of the 
natural log of BE/ME for each portfolio. BE/ME is measured once each calendar year, and it is used to 
explain 12 monthly returns starting in July of the following year. Ln(ME) and Ln(BE/ME) are measured 
net of their average values (across portfolios) each month in order to control the market-wide variation. 
Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.015 0.110 0.914 0.050 0.480 0.633
low-rated 0.104 1.770 0.079 0.107 1.800 0.073
long-short -0.089 -0.540 0.590 -0.057 -0.430 0.671
CGOV
high-rated 0.948 2.350 0.020 0.153 0.870 0.385
low-rated 0.120 2.000 0.047 0.089 1.700 0.090
long-short 0.828 2.050 0.041 0.064 0.350 0.729
Diversity
high-rated 0.034 0.280 0.778 0.065 0.750 0.455
low-rated 0.040 0.290 0.772 0.042 0.450 0.655
long-short -0.006 -0.030 0.976 0.024 0.160 0.869
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.318 1.590 0.114 0.181 1.270 0.206
low-rated -0.040 -0.380 0.708 0.073 1.040 0.299
long-short 0.358 1.560 0.121 0.107 0.620 0.536
Environment
high-rated -0.022 -0.060 0.950 0.152 0.870 0.388
low-rated 0.091 0.870 0.386 0.085 1.680 0.095
long-short -0.112 -0.280 0.778 0.068 0.370 0.715
Human Rights
high-rated -1.469 -2.530 0.012 -1.469 -2.530 0.012
low-rated 0.106 1.790 0.075 0.106 1.790 0.075
long-short -1.575 -2.730 0.007 -1.575 -2.730 0.007
Product
high-rated 0.007 0.020 0.983 0.130 0.880 0.382
low-rated 0.160 1.700 0.091 0.072 1.330 0.186
long-short -0.153 -0.430 0.668 0.058 0.370 0.715
Combination1
high-rated 0.093 0.530 0.597 0.068 0.670 0.504
low-rated 0.167 1.300 0.194 0.161 1.870 0.063
long-short -0.074 -0.300 0.762 -0.093 -0.630 0.527
Combination2
high-rated 0.067 0.440 0.660 0.067 0.440 0.660
low-rated 0.186 1.350 0.178 0.186 1.350 0.178
long-short -0.119 -0.520 0.602 -0.119 -0.520 0.602
10 percentile 33.33 percentile
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Table A4.2.35 Sensitivity analysis equally-weighted industry-neutral basis 
conditional 3-factor model regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess return on the conditional Fama-French factors 
model for each portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values. Ln(ME) is the value-weight average of the 
natural log of market equity for all firms in each portfolio. Ln(BE/ME) is the value-weight average of the 
natural log of BE/ME for each portfolio. BE/ME is measured once each calendar year, and it is used to 
explain 12 monthly returns starting in July of the following year. Ln(ME) and Ln(BE/ME) are measured 
net of their average values (across portfolios) each month in order to control the market-wide variation. 
Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.099 0.710 0.481 -0.045 -0.430 0.669
low-rated 0.062 0.700 0.484 0.061 0.660 0.507
long-short 0.037 0.260 0.795 -0.106 -1.050 0.293
CGOV
high-rated 0.668 2.070 0.040 -0.236 -1.610 0.108
low-rated 0.113 1.130 0.262 0.050 0.530 0.599
long-short 0.554 1.710 0.089 -0.286 -2.040 0.043
Diversity
high-rated 0.065 0.460 0.647 0.134 1.470 0.143
low-rated 0.128 1.050 0.296 0.058 0.550 0.582
long-short -0.063 -0.380 0.701 0.076 0.790 0.430
Employee Rel
high-rated -0.121 -0.610 0.539 0.046 0.380 0.705
low-rated -0.157 -1.280 0.201 0.045 0.410 0.684
long-short 0.036 0.180 0.858 0.001 0.010 0.991
Environment
high-rated 0.250 1.410 0.159 0.032 0.220 0.830
low-rated -0.022 -0.220 0.829 0.062 0.620 0.535
long-short 0.272 1.410 0.161 -0.030 -0.220 0.829
Human Rights
high-rated -1.921 -3.020 0.003 -1.868 -2.990 0.003
low-rated 0.004 0.020 0.983 -0.090 -0.540 0.592
long-short -1.925 -3.000 0.003 -1.778 -3.030 0.003
Product
high-rated 0.177 0.790 0.432 0.059 0.410 0.679
low-rated 0.025 0.190 0.852 0.064 0.580 0.565
long-short 0.151 0.630 0.529 -0.005 -0.040 0.971
Combination1
high-rated -0.011 -0.080 0.933 -0.003 -0.030 0.980
low-rated 0.055 0.420 0.677 0.115 0.960 0.336
long-short -0.066 -0.440 0.661 -0.117 -1.300 0.194
Combination2
high-rated -0.026 -0.200 0.844 -0.033 -0.340 0.735
low-rated -0.047 -0.310 0.760 0.046 0.390 0.699
long-short 0.021 0.130 0.898 -0.079 -0.880 0.380
10 percentile 33.33 percentile
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Table A4.2.36 Sensitivity analysis value-weighted industry-neutral basis conditional 
3-factor model regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess return on the conditional Fama-French factors 
model for each portfolio, with associated t-values and p-values. Ln(ME) is the value-weight average of the 
natural log of market equity for all firms in each portfolio. Ln(BE/ME) is the value-weight average of the 
natural log of BE/ME for each portfolio. BE/ME is measured once each calendar year, and it is used to 
explain 12 monthly returns starting in July of the following year. Ln(ME) and Ln(BE/ME) are measured 
net of their average values (across portfolios) each month in order to control the market-wide variation. 
Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 10/33 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Community
high-rated 0.016 0.120 0.907 -0.108 -1.060 0.292
low-rated 0.110 1.890 0.061 0.061 1.130 0.259
long-short -0.094 -0.590 0.558 -0.169 -1.380 0.169
CGOV
high-rated 0.689 2.020 0.045 -0.162 -1.000 0.318
low-rated 0.087 1.520 0.131 0.052 1.060 0.291
long-short 0.602 1.740 0.083 -0.215 -1.270 0.205
Diversity
high-rated 0.111 0.930 0.355 0.079 1.000 0.318
low-rated -0.016 -0.140 0.891 0.077 0.990 0.323
long-short 0.128 0.680 0.498 0.002 0.020 0.985
Employee Rel
high-rated -0.144 -0.730 0.463 0.120 1.220 0.225
low-rated -0.114 -1.050 0.295 0.095 1.430 0.154
long-short -0.030 -0.150 0.884 0.025 0.210 0.831
Environment
high-rated 0.104 0.530 0.597 0.035 0.220 0.827
low-rated 0.078 1.130 0.259 0.092 1.860 0.065
long-short 0.026 0.120 0.907 -0.057 -0.330 0.743
Human Rights
high-rated -2.107 -3.210 0.002 -2.049 -3.180 0.002
low-rated -0.211 -1.380 0.169 -0.308 -1.750 0.081
long-short -1.896 -2.870 0.005 -1.741 -2.830 0.005
Product
high-rated 0.186 0.880 0.381 0.013 0.100 0.919
low-rated -0.016 -0.160 0.876 0.085 1.450 0.149
long-short 0.202 0.890 0.377 -0.072 -0.530 0.600
Combination1
high-rated 0.119 1.150 0.251 0.020 0.280 0.781
low-rated 0.058 0.490 0.622 0.133 1.740 0.084
long-short 0.061 0.390 0.697 -0.113 -1.090 0.278
Combination2
high-rated 0.038 0.330 0.741 -0.023 -0.320 0.752
low-rated -0.104 -0.760 0.449 0.082 1.010 0.312
long-short 0.142 0.760 0.451 -0.105 -0.990 0.324
10 percentile 33.33 percentile
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Table A4.2.37 Sub-period equally-weighted conditional 3-factor model regressions 
for normalised KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess return on the conditional Fama-French factors 
model for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Ln(ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of market equity for all firms in each portfolio. Ln(BE/ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of BE/ME for each portfolio. BE/ME is measured once each 
calendar year, and it is used to explain 12 monthly returns starting in July of the following year. Ln(ME) 
and Ln (BE/ME) are measured net of their average values (across portfolios) each month in order to control 
the market-wide variation. Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated -0.103 -0.840 0.402 0.167 1.010 0.315
low-rated 0.016 0.090 0.925 0.245 1.200 0.234
long-short -0.119 -0.780 0.436 -0.079 -0.460 0.644
Community
high-rated 0.082 0.470 0.641 0.251 1.610 0.110
low-rated -0.083 -0.670 0.504 0.190 1.280 0.203
long-short 0.165 1.070 0.290 0.061 0.430 0.665
CGOV
high-rated -0.167 -0.720 0.473 -0.083 -0.480 0.634
low-rated 0.063 0.590 0.560 0.353 2.070 0.041
long-short -0.229 -1.050 0.297 -0.436 -2.350 0.020
Diversity
high-rated 0.157 1.470 0.144 0.276 1.640 0.104
low-rated -0.159 -1.230 0.224 0.331 1.890 0.061
long-short 0.316 2.310 0.023 -0.055 -0.310 0.755
Employee Rel
high-rated -0.103 -0.520 0.604 0.299 1.700 0.091
low-rated -0.235 -1.810 0.074 0.192 0.960 0.339
long-short 0.132 0.790 0.434 0.107 0.750 0.452
Environment
high-rated -0.046 -0.290 0.771 0.407 1.990 0.049
low-rated 0.005 0.050 0.962 0.207 1.130 0.262
long-short -0.051 -0.350 0.725 0.201 1.030 0.304
Human Rights
high-rated 0.252 0.350 0.726 -1.357 -2.120 0.036
low-rated -0.037 -0.220 0.826 0.245 1.510 0.133
long-short 0.290 0.380 0.709 -1.601 -2.660 0.009
Product
high-rated 0.031 0.170 0.865 0.282 1.260 0.209
low-rated -0.114 -0.990 0.323 0.257 1.270 0.205
long-short 0.146 0.920 0.360 0.025 0.130 0.899
Combination1
high-rated 0.066 0.550 0.586 0.185 1.020 0.309
low-rated -0.091 -0.610 0.541 0.279 1.310 0.193
long-short 0.157 1.080 0.281 -0.094 -0.620 0.536
Combination2
high-rated -0.133 -0.990 0.326 0.249 1.390 0.168
low-rated -0.256 -1.630 0.107 0.240 1.150 0.251
long-short 0.124 0.850 0.395 0.009 0.070 0.946
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.2.38 Sub-period value-weighted conditional 3-factor model regressions for 
normalised KLD score 
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess return on the conditional Fama-French factors 
model for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Ln(ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of market equity for all firms in each portfolio. Ln(BE/ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of BE/ME for each portfolio. BE/ME is measured once each 
calendar year, and it is used to explain 12 monthly returns starting in July of the following year. Ln(ME) 
and Ln (BE/ME) are measured net of their average values (across portfolios) each month in order to control 
the market-wide variation. Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated 0.100 1.120 0.265 0.036 0.380 0.707
low-rated 0.183 1.150 0.253 0.125 0.720 0.472
long-short -0.083 -0.400 0.693 -0.089 -0.400 0.687
Community
high-rated 0.140 0.750 0.452 -0.011 -0.070 0.943
low-rated 0.143 2.060 0.043 0.107 1.170 0.244
long-short -0.003 -0.010 0.989 -0.117 -0.600 0.553
CGOV
high-rated 0.434 1.470 0.146 -0.051 -0.250 0.800
low-rated 0.174 2.310 0.023 0.056 0.680 0.497
long-short 0.260 0.820 0.412 -0.107 -0.490 0.623
Diversity
high-rated 0.116 0.990 0.326 0.072 0.520 0.602
low-rated 0.016 0.150 0.881 0.204 1.330 0.185
long-short 0.100 0.560 0.576 -0.133 -0.540 0.589
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.531 2.330 0.022 0.036 0.160 0.873
low-rated -0.004 -0.040 0.964 0.146 1.260 0.212
long-short 0.535 2.010 0.047 -0.110 -0.400 0.692
Environment
high-rated 0.211 0.890 0.377 0.235 0.870 0.389
low-rated 0.143 1.850 0.067 0.055 0.720 0.471
long-short 0.067 0.260 0.793 0.181 0.630 0.528
Human Rights
high-rated 0.592 0.770 0.444 -1.479 -2.030 0.045
low-rated 0.142 1.240 0.222 0.100 1.480 0.143
long-short 0.450 0.580 0.562 -1.579 -2.170 0.032
Product
high-rated 0.162 0.750 0.453 0.140 0.630 0.527
low-rated 0.117 1.750 0.084 0.119 1.390 0.168
long-short 0.045 0.190 0.847 0.021 0.090 0.927
Combination1
high-rated 0.184 1.250 0.214 -0.003 -0.020 0.985
low-rated 0.095 0.770 0.442 0.280 1.840 0.069
long-short 0.089 0.420 0.673 -0.283 -1.050 0.295
Combination2
high-rated 0.058 0.450 0.655 0.091 0.560 0.577
low-rated 0.114 0.850 0.399 0.264 1.600 0.112
long-short -0.056 -0.260 0.794 -0.173 -0.680 0.499
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.2.39 Sub-period equally-weighted industry-neutral basis conditional 3-
factor model regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess return on the conditional Fama-French factors 
model for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Ln(ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of market equity for all firms in each portfolio. Ln(BE/ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of BE/ME for each portfolio. BE/ME is measured once each 
calendar year, and it is used to explain 12 monthly returns starting in July of the following year. Ln(ME) 
and Ln (BE/ME) are measured net of their average values (across portfolios) each month in order to control 
the market-wide variation. Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated -0.004 -0.040 0.969 0.175 1.270 0.206
low-rated 0.229 1.280 0.203 0.327 1.260 0.210
long-short -0.233 -1.300 0.196 -0.153 -0.720 0.471
Community
high-rated -0.051 -0.290 0.771 0.114 0.760 0.450
low-rated 0.033 0.310 0.757 0.192 1.420 0.158
long-short -0.084 -0.490 0.624 -0.078 -0.500 0.620
CGOV
high-rated -0.170 -0.670 0.502 -0.055 -0.260 0.793
low-rated 0.097 1.000 0.322 0.325 2.320 0.022
long-short -0.267 -1.130 0.261 -0.380 -1.700 0.092
Diversity
high-rated 0.203 1.720 0.088 0.285 1.840 0.068
low-rated 0.018 0.140 0.886 0.328 2.090 0.039
long-short 0.185 1.360 0.178 -0.043 -0.270 0.789
Employee Rel
high-rated -0.065 -0.410 0.684 0.269 1.500 0.137
low-rated -0.085 -0.720 0.475 0.264 1.490 0.138
long-short 0.020 0.120 0.902 0.005 0.030 0.975
Environment
high-rated 0.009 0.050 0.957 0.335 1.430 0.156
low-rated 0.071 0.670 0.504 0.208 1.340 0.182
long-short -0.062 -0.390 0.700 0.127 0.570 0.571
Human Rights
high-rated -0.374 -0.400 0.689 -1.442 -1.820 0.072
low-rated 0.378 1.110 0.275 0.111 0.530 0.596
long-short -0.751 -0.690 0.497 -1.553 -2.020 0.046
Product
high-rated -0.029 -0.150 0.879 0.238 1.070 0.285
low-rated 0.006 0.070 0.948 0.250 1.350 0.178
long-short -0.035 -0.200 0.841 -0.012 -0.050 0.959
Combination1
high-rated 0.017 0.140 0.889 0.178 1.090 0.279
low-rated -0.045 -0.310 0.758 0.321 1.690 0.095
long-short 0.062 0.420 0.675 -0.143 -0.980 0.327
Combination2
high-rated -0.172 -1.350 0.181 0.188 1.100 0.275
low-rated -0.055 -0.350 0.725 0.310 1.660 0.100
long-short -0.117 -0.770 0.445 -0.122 -0.840 0.400
1991-1999 2000-2008
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Table A4.2.40 Sub-period value-weighted industry-neutral basis conditional 3-factor 
model regressions for normalised KLD score  
The Table shows the result of regressing portfolio excess return on the conditional Fama-French factors 
model for two sub-periods. The portfolios span the period of 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. Ln(ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of market equity for all firms in each portfolio. Ln(BE/ME) is the 
value-weight average of the natural log of BE/ME for each portfolio. BE/ME is measured once each 
calendar year, and it is used to explain 12 monthly returns starting in July of the following year. Ln(ME) 
and Ln (BE/ME) are measured net of their average values (across portfolios) each month in order to control 
the market-wide variation. Portfolios are formed on the following CSR indicators: Negative, the normalised 
KLD CSR measure for exclusionary criteria; Community, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
community relations indicators; CGOV, the normalised KLD CSR measure for governance indicators; 
Diversity, the normalised KLD CSR measure for diversity indicators; Employee Rel, the normalised KLD 
CSR measure for employee relations indicators; Environment, the normalised KLD CSR measure for 
environmental indicators; Human Rights, the normalised KLD CSR measure for human rights indicators; 
Product, the normalised KLD CSR measure for product indicators; Combination1, the sum of the 
normalised KLD CSR score measures for qualitative criteria, excluding human rights, and Combination2, 
the sum of the normalised KLD CSR score measures for both qualitative and exclusionary criteria. “High-
scoring” are the portfolios formed on the top 25 percentile of normalised scores, “Low-scoring” are the 
portfolios based on the bottom 25 percentile of normalised scores, and “Long-Short” are the portfolios 
going long in the high-scoring and short in the low-scoring portfolio. Portfolios are formed at KLD year 
ends and returns are over the period 1992-2009. 
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Alpha t-value p-value Alpha t-value p-value
Negative
high-rated 0.062 0.890 0.376 0.001 0.010 0.993
low-rated 0.380 2.210 0.030 0.030 0.140 0.890
long-short -0.318 -1.570 0.120 -0.030 -0.120 0.902
Community
high-rated -0.064 -0.360 0.717 -0.140 -0.960 0.338
low-rated 0.126 1.890 0.062 0.030 0.360 0.718
long-short -0.190 -0.920 0.360 -0.169 -0.930 0.355
CGOV
high-rated 0.001 0.000 0.996 0.116 0.440 0.658
low-rated 0.197 2.720 0.008 -0.001 -0.010 0.991
long-short -0.195 -0.630 0.527 0.117 0.430 0.667
Diversity
high-rated 0.209 1.770 0.080 -0.031 -0.250 0.804
low-rated 0.075 0.920 0.359 0.163 1.400 0.163
long-short 0.133 0.880 0.382 -0.194 -1.010 0.315
Employee Rel
high-rated 0.164 0.940 0.350 0.125 0.860 0.393
low-rated 0.173 1.900 0.060 0.130 1.170 0.244
long-short -0.009 -0.040 0.967 -0.005 -0.030 0.976
Environment
high-rated 0.032 0.160 0.875 0.198 0.790 0.434
low-rated 0.204 2.770 0.007 -0.006 -0.080 0.939
long-short -0.171 -0.730 0.468 0.204 0.770 0.444
Human Rights
high-rated -0.451 -0.510 0.612 -1.711 -2.070 0.041
low-rated 0.067 0.210 0.838 -0.132 -0.770 0.442
long-short -0.519 -0.510 0.614 -1.579 -1.950 0.053
Product
high-rated -0.010 -0.060 0.954 -0.054 -0.250 0.800
low-rated 0.136 2.060 0.042 0.059 0.610 0.544
long-short -0.146 -0.800 0.426 -0.113 -0.520 0.605
Combination1
high-rated 0.104 0.820 0.413 -0.044 -0.430 0.672
low-rated 0.235 1.910 0.060 0.139 1.160 0.247
long-short -0.131 -0.720 0.473 -0.182 -1.190 0.235
Combination2
high-rated 0.080 0.720 0.471 -0.031 -0.290 0.774
low-rated 0.195 1.750 0.083 0.116 0.880 0.381
long-short -0.115 -0.690 0.492 -0.147 -0.870 0.388
1991-1999 2000-2008
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